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First they came for thejews 
and / did not speak out - 
because / was not ajew. 
Then they came for the communists 
and / did not speak out - 
because / was not a communist. 
Then they came for the trade unionists 
and / did not speak out - 
because / was not a trade unionist. 
Then they came, for me - 
and ther'e was-. no one left 
to speak out for me. 
Pastor Njemoeller (victim of the Nazis), 
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ABSTRACT 
Lesbian and gay issues are increasingly being recognised politically and legally as 
human rights issues. Within psychology, however, they ha,,,, e rarely been explored 
within a human rights framework. The purpose of this study is to inN-estigate support for 
and reasoning about lesbian and gay issues employing an explicitly human rights 
perspective, using a multi-method approach. In order to provide a broad over'6eýv of 
support for and reasoning about human rights among British students, a Human Rights 
Questionnaire was developed based on existing "homophobia" and "human rights" 
scales. This questionnaire was completed by 627 students, and subjected to statistical 
and thematic analyses. This was followed up by six tape-recorded focus groups with 
students, whose discussions of these issues enabled a more in-depth understanding 
derived from thematic analyses of their transcribed data. Finally, in order to explore 
arguments against lesbian and gay human rights, a textual analysis of Hansard and 
newspaper reports of the Age of Consent debate was perforined as a case study. 
Findings of the thesis are as follows. First, whilst respondents to the questionnaire 
support the general principle that a person's sexual orientation should not block that 
person's access to basic rights and freedoms, they are less willing to extend specific 
human rights to lesbians and gay men, especially social rights (e. g. right to marry, right 
to adopt children). Second, although in the focus groups students sometimes employed 
human rights arguments in relation to lesbian and gay issues, they tended to show initial 
support followed by an evaluation of potential considerations in extending human rights 
to lesbians and gay men using arguments which are not rights-based. As the case study 
also illustrates, when lesbian and gay issues are specifically addressed in human rights 
terms, they are countered with arguments which are derived from other frameworks 
(e. g. religious conviction, protection of the vulnerable), rather than with arguments 
w1iich are themselves rights-based. The findings are discussed with a view to 
establishing how best to promote lesbian and gay human rights in order to achic\-e 
positix, e social change for lesbians and gay men. 
CHAPTERI 
Lesbians and Gay Men and Human Rights 
"As long as it is unsafe for two men to dance together at a rugby function 
(despite what might have occurred in the showers); 
as long as it is unsafe for two women to stroll arm in arm along a sunny, daylight beach: 
as long as there is loathing and fear and disgust and embarassment, 
there will never be freedom for any of us. 
But we will not go away, and we will certainly not lie down and die or be trampled over, 
not any more". 
- Ngahuia Te Awekotuku (1992, p. 288). 
Internationally, lesbians and gay men are the victims of systematic human rights 
violations, and in no country do they currently have equal human rights with 
heterosexual persons. Violations of lesbian and gay human rights are not restricted to 
physical violence (a violation of the right to life, liberty, and security of person), but 
include the denial of human rights to privacy, dignity, and respect; equal access to 
employment and favourable work conditions; appropriate health care; social and legal 
recognition of partnerships; the right to freedom of expression and assembly; the right 
to marry, and the right to parent children: all of which are purportedly guaranteed by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
The UDHR opens with the statement that "all members of the human family" 
have equal and inalienable rights (United Nations [UN], 1948). However, the socio- 
political reality for lesbians and gay men internationally suggests that the human rights 
of lesbians and gay men are not respected, often not protected, and are frequently 
violated. Lesbians and gay men are, therefore, denied full membership of the "human 
family", and are not afforded the freedom and dignity promised by human rights 
declarations and treaties, such as the UDHR (Amnesty International UK, 1999). 
Although a human rights framework has commonly been employed in 
relation to lesbian and gay issues in political and legal discourse (e. g. see Wilets, 
1994,1995; Wintemute, 1995) and increasingly in grass-roots activism, to date, this 
has seldom been the case in psychology. The purpose of this study then was 
explicitly to employ a human rights framework to the psychological study of lesbian 
and gay issues. This thesis, therefore. takes a human rights approach to the 
psychological study of lesbian and gay issues, an approach which has increaslilgly 
been used in effective campaigns to secure justice and equality for lesbians and -, a\ 
men. 
Although a handful of recent studies (e. g. Payaslyo6lu & lqdu,, -gu, 1999; 
Sotelo, 1997,2000a, 2000b) have explored support for human rights. only one 
(Sotelo, 2000b) focuses on support for the extension of human rights to lesbians and 
gay men, and no study to date has explored the way in which people think, reason, 
talk, and argue about lesbian and gay issues, focusing explicitly and 
comprehensively on human rights. Consequently, this thesis focuses on four key 
questions: 
1. Do people support lesbian and gay rights as human rights'? 
2. What kinds of reasoning do people use about lesbian and gay issues" (i. e. 
to what extent do they use rights-based reasoning? ) 
3. How do people talk about lesbian and gay issues? (i. e. Do they talk about 
them as human rights? ) 
4. What kinds of arguments do people use against lesbian and gay human 
rights? 
Each of these questions will be explored in turn in the three analysis chapters of this 
thesis (Chapters 3,4, and 5). By focusing on the way(s) in which people think, 
reason, talk, and argue about lesbian and gay human rights issues, we might gain 
some insight into how best to promote lesbian and gay human rights and achieve 
positive social change for lesbians and gay men. 
To begin, this chapter will first illustrate why a human rights approach is 
important for thinking about lesbian and gay issues, by outlining the manifold ways 
in which the human rights of lesbians and gay men are violated internationally. 
Next, human rights theory will be outlined, followed by a section illustrating how 
human rights have been applied to lesbian and gay issues in practice. The final 
section of this chapter will briefly explore and counter some of the key criticisms of 
a human rights framework. In sum, this chapter gives a global overview of how 
human rights apply to lesbian and gay issues in the wider world, contributing to a 
rationale for applying a human rights framework to lesbian and ga"., issues within 
psychology. 
Setting the Scene: The Socio-political Climate for Lesbians and Gay Men 
Somewhere in the world, every day, lesbians and gay men' are the victims of 
violence and injustice merely for being who they are, for loving persons of their 
own sex, expressing that love in public, violating gender norins, and/ol- fighting for 
lesbian and gay rights (see Amnesty International, 1997-, Heinze, 1995. International 
Lesbian and Gay Human Rights Commission [IGLHRC], 1995, Rosenbloom, 
1996a). 
The International Legal Status of Lesbians and Gay Men 
Currently, consenting sexual acts between two women or two men are illegal in 41 
of the world's countries and a number of US states, and sex between men is illegal 
in a further 40 countries (see International Lesbian and Gay Association [ILGA], 
1999; Amnesty International, 1997; National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 
[NGLTF], 1999). In only a handful of countries (e. g. South Africa, Ecuador, and 
Fij i2 ) does the constitution - the overarching statement which governs specific 
legislation - explicitly offer protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation (see ILGA, 1999). 
Lesbians fare worst in many Muslim countries (e. g. Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi 
Arabia) where the Islamic "shari'a law" renders sexual behaviour between two persons 
of the same sex "against the divine will" and therefore subject to the death penalty. For 
example, in Iran, if a woman is convicted four times of lesbianism (mosahegah), she 
faces the death penalty, but for merely engaging in a lesbian relationship the lesser 
punishment of 100 lashes may be administered (Amnesty International, 1997; ILGA, 
1999; Wilets, 1994). Similarly, sodomy is a crime punishable by death if between two 
consenting adult males, or by 74 lashes for a minor, and "Tathiz" (the rubbing of thighs 
or buttocks) by two men is punishable by 100 lashes, or on the fourth occasion, death. 
Iranian law also renders it illegal for two persons of the same sex to "stand naked under 
one cover", an offence for which women may receive 100 lashes, and men 99 lashes 
Throughout this thesis. the terms 'lesbian' and 'gay' will be used because they are the English terms 
most commonly used in international human rights discourse (Amnesty International, 1999). However, it 
is recognised that man\- of these issues also apply to bisexual, transgendered, or intersex persons. 
1ýý, outh Affica since May 1996, Ecuadorsince December 1998, and Fiji since July 1999. but currentlý 
under challenge for repeal. 
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(ILGA, 1999). Much less extreme, Article 204 of the Nicaraguan constitution states that 
"'anyone who induces, promotes. propagandizes... sexual intercourse between persons of 
the same sex commits the crime of sodomy and shall incur one to three ) cai-s' 
imprisonment". (Gonzalez, 1996, p. 127; see also Amnesty International. 1994). 
On the other hand, some countries - particularly in Europe - havc some 
legislation prohibiting discrimination on a basis of sexual orientation. For example, 
under section 135a (198 1) of the Norwegian penal code, it is illegal to "threaten to 
deride, or to incite to hatred, persecution or contempt" against anyone on account of his 
or her "homosexual inclination, lifestyle, or orientation" and section 349a makes it 
illegal to refuse to give goods or services to anyone on these grounds (Lindstad, 1996, 
p. 134; also ILGA, 1999). However, of the 50 countries in Europe, consenting male 
homosexuality is still illegal in Armenia and the Chechan Republic (ILGA, 1999), and 
article 200 of the Romanian penal code, which criminalises consensual adult 
homosexuality (for both women and men) is still in use (Amnesty International, 1997). 
In a further three European countries (Cyprus, Liechtenstein, and the UK), clauses in the 
law prohibit or restrict the so-called "promotion" or "encouragement" of homosexuality. 
including the dissemination of information about homosexuality (ILGA, 1999) 3. 
Despite the official legal status of lesbians and gay men, in no country of the 
world, including the UK are lesbians and gay men free from institutional 1 sed 
discrimination. In a major western democracy such as the United States, same-sex 
relationships continue to be illegal in many States (Wilets, 1995). Even in countries 
with so-called 'progressive' legislation (e. g. South Africa, Norway), lesbians and gay 
men do not have access to the full range of rights afforded heterosexual persons. 
Attempts to secure basic human rights and legal protection on a basis of sexual 
orientation have commonly considered lesbians and gay men to be a unified group. 
However, there are some key differences in the ways in which the human rights of 
lesbians are violated, as opposed to the violation of gay men's rights. In particular, 
lesbians are seldom explicitly mentioned in the legislation of most countries. For 
example, sodomy laws typically refer only to sexual practices between 111ales, but in 
practice the laws are often applied to both men and women, or like the age of consent 
In the UK, Section 28 of the Local GovernmentAct 1988 (the law referred to here) is currentlv under 
reN ic\\ in I ii-gland, and was repealed in June 2000 In Scotland. Section 28 of the (UK) Local Government 
Act states that a local authority sliall not "Intentional Iy promote homosexuallt,, or publish material \% Ith 
the intention ot'pronioting homosexuality- or "promote the teaching in any maintained school of the 
acceptability of honio sexual ity as a pretended family relationship" (Trade Unionist, Against Section 28, 
1989, p. 27). 
i 
laws in the UK, lesbians are onlý' afforded equality by interpretation, rather than explicit 
mention. 
Likewise, because of the heteropatriarchal structure of society. discrimination 
against lesbians is often conflated with sex discrimination, and for some lesbians. witil 
race and/or disability discrimination also (cf. Kitzinger, 1994). For example. in all 
societies (to a greater or lesser degree) women are ovenN, helmingly the objects of sexual 
harassment, and of domestic violence. Consequently, human rights violations against 
lesbians (as women) more frequently occur in the 'private' sphere, or im, ol-v e threats of 
or actual sexual violation, more often than is reportedly the case for gay men. On the 
other hand, the violations of the human rights of gay men more frequently in\Avc 
imprisonment or conviction, due to the explicit mention of sodomy in legislation. 
Furthen-nore, in most countries, there are few public places for lesbians to 
socialise, and even fewer spaces that are not shared with gay men. For example, it has 
only been since the 1990s that groups for lesbians and bisexual women have emerged in 
East Asian countries (Khush, 1993; Mak, Hui, Poone, & King, 1996; RISC, 1992). 
Consequently, in many countries gay men (as men) have more social freedom than 
lesbians, and as a result (as gay men) have a greater visibility. For these type of reason,,, 
human rights violations against lesbians sometimes differ from violations against gay 
men. Therefore, in outlining human rights violations against lesbians and gay men, in 
the next section, specific reference will be made to differences between lesbians and ga" 
men, where these apply. 
Human Rights Violations against Lesbians and Gay Men 
As has just been illustrated, throughout the world, lesbians and gay men are 
systematically discriminated against in legal policy and practice. However, human 
rights violations against lesbians and gay men are not restricted to the law. 
Regardless of their legal status, lesbians and gay men are discriminated against in a 
whole range of ways, which under international law constitute violations of their 
human rights. Using the UDHR (UN, 1948) as a framework, an oN-er-N-Iew will now 
be given of the range of current human rights violations perpetrated against lesbians 
and gay men, internationally. This section NN-111 look at seven main areas: (1) the 
right to life, hbcrtý' and security of person; (2) the right to privacy, dignity and 
i-csI)cct, (3) the right to employment, (4) the right to health care, education, NN-clfare 
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and housing; (5) the right to marry and found a family: (6) freedom of expression 
and assembly, and the right to information; and (7) the right to immigration and 
asylum. Whilst this section will draw on examples from around the world. in 
summing up positive change in each of these areas, the focus ", III primarily be on 
UK examples where applicable. 
The Right to Life, Liberty, & Secunty of Person 
The right to life is undisputedly the most basic and sacrosanct of human rights (Wilets, 
1994; see discussion of this point later in this chapter). The UDHR states that "ever",, olie 
has the right to life, liberty, and security of person (Article 3-, my emphasis) and that 
"No one shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" 
(Article 5; my emphasis). However, despite the agreement of almost all the world's 
countries to these articles, lesbians and gay men are subjected to cruel and inhumane 
treatment, and are at the risk of being raped, physically violated, or even killed, simply 
for being lesbian or gay. 
In parts of Asia and Latin America, lesbians (and gay men) have been and 
continue to be beaten, sexually assaulted, tortured, and murdered. Last year, 90+ 
lesbians and gay men were executed in Iran (Khush, 1993) and in Brazil, 82 gay men, 
42 transvestites, and 6 lesbians were murdered because of their sexuality (ILGA, 
1998b). Similarly, a recent report from Colombia (Ordobez & Elliott, 1998) highlights 
the way in which lesbians and gay men, along with other "disposables" 4, such as gay 
men, street children, vagrants, prostitutes, petty criminals, and transvestites, are the 
targets of what has become known as "social cleansing" (see also Wilets, 1994). An 
ineffective Judicial system means that often those perpetrating the violence (usually 
security forces, paramilitary groups, death squads, and neo-Nazis) are unlikely to be 
punished if they are caught (see also Reading International Support Centre [RISC]. 
1992). 
4- Disposable" (desechable) is the ten-n originally given by the Colombian National Police in the 197()s . --I -1111 to refer to people who for economic. social, aesthetic, or "moral" reason-, are considered human garbage. 
"S, ocial cleansing" is the term given to both official and illicit organised attempts to rid society ot', uch 
'undesirable' people (Ordo0ez & Elliott, 1998). 
However, violence of this kind is not restricted to non-western countries. Hate- 
motivated crimes typically include rape, being spat at. being attacked and, or robbed. 
sexual assault, and being threatened with weapons (Stonewall. 1996). sometimes 
resulting in death. For example, in October 1998, Matthew Shepard -a 22-year-old 
student in Wyoming, USA - was beffiended by two young men posing as gay. driven 
out of town, tied spread-eagled to a fence, tortured, beaten around the skull with a 
pistol, and left to die (Gumbel, 1998; Northmore, 1998). 
Similarly, in April 1999, the UK lesbian and gay community was the target of 
violence in a nail bomb attack on the Admiral Duncan gay pub in Soho, London. Recent 
reports suggest that hate-motivated crimes against lesbians and gay men are on the 
increase, but the process of eliminating such crimes is often impeded by the police. who 
sometimes refuse to investigate or act on reports of 'less serious' incidences. 
Furthermore, in the US, the police themselves are reported to be the third most corni-non 
perpetrators of rape and sexual assault against lesbians and gay men (Comstock, 199 1 ). 
In most countries. ) statistical infori-nation regarding 
hate crimes against lesbians 
and gay men are not collected. However, reports from the US show that in 1997 (the 
latest figures available), 236 incidents of hate crimes against lesbians and 927 against 
gay men were reported to the US federal police (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 
1999). Similarly, the 1994 UK National Survey of Homophobic Violence and 
Harassment (Stonewall, 1996) states that around I in 3 men and I in 4 women have 
experienced violent attacks, and 73% have been verbally abused because of their lesbian 
or gay sexuality. These figures are likely to be an underestimation of the actual 
situation, recent reports (see Minter, 1996; National Organisation of Women [NOW], 
1998; Mason & Palmer, 1996) estimate that around 80% of such crimes against lesbians 
and gay men go unreported. Only 22 states of the US have hate crime laws which 
include crimes based on sexual orientation (NGLTF, 1999b), and even where such laws 
exist, because it is often difficult to determine when a women is targeted as a lesbian 
rather than as a woman, many reported crimes may not necessarily be registered as anti- 
lesbian (Minter, 1996). 
Reports from around the world suggest that physical violence is more often 
perpetrated against gay men than lesbians, and that gay men tend more often to be the 
victims of brutal crimes. However. lesbians are no less the victims of violence. but 
rather, the crimes committed against lesbians tend to be much less \'isible (cf. Kitzin&Ycr. 
1994), and more often socially condoned as 'acceptable' ways of treating women who 
S 
'deviate' from socially prescribed gender roles and behaviours. Furthen-nore, because in 
many countries lesbians (as women) are not able to establish communities or engage in 
public life, human rights violations against lesbians are more likely to occur withill the 
home (Rosenbloom, 1996b). Additionally. because heterosexism has ensured that the 
lives of women (both lesbian and heterosexual) are already restricted through tear, it is 
(potentially) easier to control and dominate lesbian women through threat and'or actual 
violence, particularly rape, than it is to have control over men in these ways. 
As the following case illustrates, in the public sphere, lesbians are raped inerely 
for admitting to being lesbian, and such incidences are not always treated by officials 
with the seriousness that rape against a heterosexual woman might be: 
Los Angeles, CA: A lesbian security guard, 22, was assigned to work a holiday night shift 
with a guard from a temporary employment service. He propositioned her repeatedly. 
Finally, she told him she was a lesbian. Issuing anti-lesbian slurs, he raped her. Her partner 
and mother convinced her to go to the hospital, then report the crime. Police took two 
weeks to investigate -- even though her employer had the man's name and [his] 
employer's name. (Human Rights Campaign, 1998). 
However, violence of this kind against lesbians is not restricted to the public sphere. 
Around 60% of young lesbians in the US report being the victims of violent physical 
assault at the hands of members of their own families (Hunter, 1990; Minter, 1996), and 
in the UK 5% of lesbians and gay men report violent attacks and 14% harassment from 
family members with regard to their sexuality. 
Internationally, domestic violence appears to account for a large proportion of 
physical violence against lesbians and gay men, especially lesbians. The following two 
cases show that in non-western societies (in these cases, Zimbabwe and India) rape 
and/or brutal physical violence is perpetrated against lesbians in their own homes, and 
condoned by parents: 
When they found out that I was a lesbian.... My parents decided to look for a husband on 
my behalf so they brought several boys home to meet me but I was not interested so in the 
end they forced an old man on me. They locked me in a room, and brought him everyday 
to rape me so I would fall pregnant and be forced to many him. They did this until I was 
go pregnant after which they told me I was free to do whatever I wanted but that I must CY 
and stay with this man or else they \Nould throw me out of the house. (Fxcerpt fi-om GAL/ 
news-letter, reproduced in Rosenbloom, 1996b. p. xN-1). 
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... I slid the little bolt on the door and we took our clothes off. For a few minutes we -stood 
fondling each other.... %Ve lay down and did what I now know was the number 69.... %Ve 
were still on the floor in that position when a terrible noise erupted as the door came 
crashing down ... We 
both jumped and looked with horror. and I suppose total fear, at ni\ 
elder brother. The servant woman appeared next to him and after a few minutes ot'his 
screaming my mother came rushing in .... My mother and the ser\ ant woman stood in total 
silence as my brother cursed and cursed. My friend handed me my clothing and I put on 
what I could. My brother then stepped forward and grabbed her by the arm and dragged 
her out of the bathroom and opening the back door shoved her outside.... My brother then 
returned and grabbed me and like a wild animal beat me until I fell on the floor.... He 
picked me up by the hair and beat me in the stomach, by the crotch and in the breasts. I 
fainted... (Khush report, reproduced in Thadani, 1996b. p. 8 1) 
Much of this kind of violence goes unreported, as regardless of the official legal status 
of lesbians, in many countries (e. g. India, Thailand, Algeria; see RISC, 1992 and 
Thadanil 1996b) lesbianism is not considered culturally acceptable (cf, Thadani, 1996b). 
Consequently, reporting violence often means having to admit to being lesbian, or 
engaging in lesbian acts, rendering one subject to further brutality and hostility, either at 
the hands of the law, and/or at the hands of family. 
Domestic violence of this magnitude against lesbians (as lesbians) is not 
exclusively a non-western problem, however. Many published coming out narratives 
highlight equally brutal cases of domestic violence inflicted on lesbians in the western 
world as they came out to their parents (see, for example, Sharon Paloma in Abbott & 
Fan-ner, 1995, p. 140 and Susan in Wishik & Pierce, 199 1, p. 28), and UK research also 
highlights similar incidences (e. g. see Stonewall, 1996). Furthen-nore, in many places in 
the western world, it is potentially not safe for lesbians and gay men to be 'out' or 
openly gay, nor for them to exhibit public displays of affection for their partners in the 
ways that heterosexuals are freely able to. In the UK, reports of verbal abuse with 
violent overtones (e. g. epithets such as "fucking queer/poof', "shoot the batty boy", or 
to a woman "all you need is a good, hard fuck") often accompanied by threats of 
physical violence or assault are commonplace (Stonewall, 1996). 
Hence, lesbians and gay men are routinely denied their basic human right to life. 
liberty and security of person, with little or no legal protection. For this right to be 
respected, would require social, legal, and structural change, for example, the collection 
of hate crinics statistics. the training of police in lesbian and gay aNý areness. taking hate- 
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motivated sexual assault of lesbians and gay men seriously (in the same way that racial 
attacks are); and overall. the use of international law recognising hate c imes api IIn, i ns t 
lesbians and gay men as violations of basic human rights. To date, no legal or political 
change has been made to ensure that internationally this right is respected for les-biwis 
and gay men. 
The right to privacy, dignity, and res ect PýJl 
Underlying the construct of human rights, is the notion that human beings have intrinsic 
value (Jones, 1994) and therefore are worthy of being treated with dignity and respect. 
Article 9 of the UDHR states that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile" (my emphasis), and Article 12 that "no one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary interference with his [sic] privacy" and that "everyon has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks" (my emphasis). Hoývever, 
daily, lesbians and gay men around the world are arrested, detained, incarcerated in 
prisons and mental institutions, have their homes raided, are extortioned or blackmailed, 
and are discriminated against in law courts, often by the very people who are supposed 
to protect them. 
Even where homosexuality is legal between consenting adults (as it is in about 
70% of the world's countries), lesbians and gay men can be, and have been, arrested and 
charged under laws which prohibit acts against "public decency" or "public morality", 
or for "unnatural carnal sex" or "acts against the order of nature" (Amnesty 
International, 1997; Rosenbloom, 1996a; Hayfield, 1995). Often the women or men will 
be detained for a short period, while they are harassed by voyeuristic police officials, 
sometimes physically violated, and then extortioned before being released. The 
following incident occurred in Mexico: 
The regulations for police and Good Government mention "moral lapses" and "accepted 
customs" and these provisions have been used to impose fines or arrest lesbians who ha% e 
been caught publicly kissing or embracing. A recent example involved t-, ý'o women who 
were kissing in a car. A police patrol approached, demanded an explanation, and ga\e 
them a citation on the grounds that what they \, ý'ere doing was deviant: they . k-ere 
threatened with being taken to the police station for "moral culpability". Even after the 
women accepted the citation, the officers continued the interrogation with prurient 
questions about the nature of the women's relationship. They were made to get into the I 
police wagon separately and they , vere asked to pay a certain sum for their i-elease. (Nrez 
& Jim6nez, 1996, p. I 11). 
Similarly, even though homosexuality is not officially illegal in Turkey. police officials 
are reported regularly to raid the homes of lesbians and gay men, arrest and detain thein. 
often subjecting them to harassment, intimidation and abuse (Amnesty International, 
1997). In some countries, officials reportedly may torture their victims in order to obtain 
the names of others they can then arrest (e. g., see section on Iran in RISC. 1992). 
Regular police raids on gay or lesbian bars or clubs are also widely docurnentcd. 
and invariably illustrate the (illegal) victimisation of lesbians and gay men by police, for 
engaging in (legal) homosexual behaviour: 
In a 1987 raid on a lesbian bar in Lima, Peru, police arrested approximately 70 women. 
The raid was staged in cooperation with a local television station, which caught the 
women on camera as they left the bar one by one and aired the footage on the national 
news. As a result, many women lost their jobs, and some were reported to have been 
beaten by their families. The women were forced to leave the police station after curfew 
and at least two were raped on their way home. (Dorf & P6rez, 1994, cited in Rosenbloom, 
1996b, p. xviii) 
Furthermore, the actions of the police in such raids clearly endanger lesbian and gay 
detainees' security of person, in that their lives are put at risk both by their being 
publicly exposed, and by their being released after curfew when they are at highest risk 
of being raped or killed. Although, today, these incidents Primarily occur in non- 
western countries , it 
is only 30 years ago that very similar raids were routinely 
occurring in the western world, particularly the US (Healey & Mason, 1994). 
Another way in which lesbians and gay men have their right to privacy, digity. 
and respect violated is through incarceration in mental institutions and prisons. A recent 
report from Amnesty International highlighted a case of HIV/AIDS Prisoners in New 
Orleans being made to wear a stun belt, when other prisoners were not made to 
(Amnesty International, UK [AIUK], 1999b), and it is not uncommon to hear of gay 
i-nen being raped by fellow prisoners. 
In contrast xvith male homosexuality, lesbianism is typically considered 
pathological, rather than criminal, and thus lesbians are more likely to be subjected to 
psyciliatric "trcatment" than to be imprisoned (Amnesty International, 1997). Although 
such cascs arc becorning fe, -N, er, the violation of lesbians' pnN-Licy, dignity, and respect in 
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such institutions are widel-y documented (e. g. see Amnesty International, 1997; Gessen. 
1996; IGLHRC. 1995). Until relatively recently. lesbians in man,,, ' countries (e. g. the 
US, Russia, and Romania) have been subjected to forced "medical" treatment, including 
electric shocks, psychotropic drugs, and "aversion therapy". in attempts to -cure' thern 
of their lesbianism (Amnesty International, 1997), even though homosexualitv was 
removed from the DSM in 1973. Often lesbians in psychiatric care are were subjected to 
rape and physical violence by officials whilst in care (see, for example, the case of 
Daphne Scholinski in IGLHRC, 1995). 
Hence, many lesbians and gay men are routinely denied their human ri, dits to Z7 
privacy, dignity and respect. Although these practices are still occurring in many 
countries, this is fortunately no longer the case in most western countries. 
Homosexuality was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual [DSM] in 
1973 and the International Classification of Diseases [ICD] in 1990 (Herek, 1997), and 
few practitioners in the west consider homosexuality an illness, and ha,,.,, e therefore 
abandoned the use of conversion therapies. 
Right to Employment 
Article 23 of the UDHR states that "everyone has the ri ht to work, to free choice of 19 
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment (my emphasis). In many countries, including the USA and the UK, 
lesbians and gay men are not legally protected from discrimination in the workplace 
(Minter, 1996; National Association of Citizen's Advice Bureaus [NACAB], 1994), and 
in the UK dismissal or refusal to employ someone on the grounds of sexual orientation 
is not illegal, nor is paying someone less because of their sexuality, and an employer 
may do so without any forrn of official redress (Lesbian and Gay Employment Rights 
[LAGER], 1998; Lewis, 1998; Liberty, 1994). Recent surveys in the UK (e. g. SCPR. 
1995 and Stonewall, 1993; see Stonewall, 1998a for both) report that up to 481 o of 
lesbians and gay men had been harassed at work (i. e. had been ostracised, 'outed', 
and/or blackmailed; had faced false accusations of child abuse, or had been the 
recipients of malicious jokes, threats, and/or violence) because of their sexuality, and 
around 65-7W o chose to be out to very tew , if any. of their co-workers through 
fear of 
discrimination and harassment. In the 1997,98 year, the UK organisation LAGER 
(L-esbian and Gay Ernplo\iiient Rights) received over 2000 calls requestnig, ad\ ice and 
13 
information, and took on 153 long-term cases concerning wrongful dismissal and 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 
Moreover, employers openly report in surveys that they would discri'minate 
against lesbians and gay men. For example, a survey of 191 employers in the medical 
profession, most of whom were members of the American Association of Ph"'sicians for 
Human Rights (AAPHR) revealed that 18% would fire, 27% would refuse to hire, and 
26% would refuse to promote a person they perceived to be lesbian, gay, or bisexual 
(Schatz & O'Hanlan, 1994, cited in NOW, 1998; see also the international reports in 
Rosenbloom, 1996a). Similarly, in the UK, a social survey (SCPR, 1995, in Stonewall, 
1998a) showed that I in 3 heterosexuals said they would be less likely to hire a gay or 
lesbian job applicant. Even in so-called liberal workplaces, such as universities, lesbians 
and gay men report having been fired, refused promotion, or not re-hired because of 
their sexuality (e. g. see Kitzinger, 1990c-, McDaniel, 1982, cited in Kitzinger 1990a; 
Mintz & Rothblum, 1997). Furthermore, in the USA, some lesbian academics report 
being advised to omit from their CVs any publications or community work on lesbian 
and gay issues, or risk not gaining tenure (see Mintz & Rothblum, 1997). 
Another way in which lesbians and gay men are often discriminated against in 
employment, is through exclusion from benefits (LAGER, 1998), although an 
increasing number of major international companies (e. g. Microsoft Corporation; 
Disney; British Airways) are extending benefits to same-sex partners (Thorson & 
Hillhouse, 1998). Typically though, provisions (i. e. travel or relocation expenses, 
parental leave, medical insurance, and sick leave for care of children) are extended to 
the employee's legally defined spouse, often including opposite-sex de facto partners, 
but not same-sex partners (see ILGA, 1999). For example, a female employee of South 
West Trains in the UK was recently denied a travel pass for her (female) partner, even 
though unmarried heterosexual employees were entitled to the travel passes for theil, 
partners (see BBC, 1998; European Court, 1998). Although some employers do not 
extend such benefits to de facto heterosexual partners, lesbians and gay men still haN'c 
grounds to expect recognition, as they do not have the option of marrying whereas 
heterosexual couples do (Thorson & Hillhausen, 1998). Furthennore, even in countries 
where same-sex partnerships are legal (e. g. Den-mark, Norway, Netherlands), such 
benefits are not always extended to same sex partners (e. g. see Mattijssen, Turksma, & 
de Vries, 1996). 
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Lesbians and gay men are also discriminated against with regard to choice of 
employment. Whilst it is arguable whether in reality anyone has free choice of 
employment (as promised in the UDHR), the freedom of lesbians (and gay men) to seek- 
the vocation or career of their choice is restricted by legally and sociall" Y condoned 
discrimination. For example, whilst a lesbian or gay man may choose to seek 
employment as a factory worker, bank clerk or business executive, she lie may be 
prohibited from entering the police force or armed services, be denied admission to the 
priesthood, and even be prevented or discouraged from training as a teacher. just for 
being lesbian or gay. For example, in 1996, the Rajabhat Institute Council (the 
governing body of Thailand's teachers colleges) announced that it would prohibit 
homosexuals from enrolling at teacher's colleges in Thailand, using a diagnostic test to 
select out "sexually abnormal" people (IGLHRC, 1998a). 
Similarly, gay men and lesbians have traditionally been seen as a security risk 
(through perceived potential for blackmail) and therefore haý'e, and still are, prohibited 
from serving in the armed forces in many western countries (e. g. see Minter, 1996, 
Palmer, 1996), For similar reasons, until very recently lesbians and gay men were 
banned from working for the UK spy agency M15, as well as being prevented from 
serving in the anned forces. 
Lesbians and gay men have also been discriminated against in the priesthood. In 
the UK, they may be ordained in the Church of England, on the condition that they 
remain celibate and do not "promote" homosexuality (General Synod of the Church of 
England, 199 1), but not necessarily in other Christian denominations. Furthen-nore, 
because gay men have typically been associated with the spread of HIV/AIDS, those 
who are, or who are believed to be HIV positive have been unnecessarily discriminated 
against through fear and ignorance on the part of potential employers (Liberty, 1994). 
Thus, lesbians and gay men are denied human rights with respect to 
employment. Although some significant changes have taken place in the UK - the %M 15 
ban was lifted in June 1997, and the ban in the an-ned forces lifted in January 2000 - 
there is still a need for further changes. In particular, legal protection from 
discrimination is needed, including the recognition of lesbian and gay partners for 
benefits afforded the partners of heterosexual employees. In October 1999. as a result of 
the Grant case. South West Trains changed its policý, to allow the extension of benefits 
to saine-sex partners, and the UK Associatioii of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) 
subsequciitly urged all its train companies to follow suit (BBC, October 5 1999). 
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Although some employers have made positive changes in respect of same-sex partners. 
legal protection against discrimination is needed to ensure employers universally 
respect lesbian and gay human rights. 
Right to Health Care, Education, Welfare and Housing 
Article 25 of the UDHR states that "Everyone has the right to a standard of hvillg 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself [sic] and of his [sic] family, includIllo 
food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services" (my emphasis). 
Although it would be difficult to argue that in the western world lesbians and gay men 
are not afforded this right, Article 2 states that "eveEyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind" (my emphasis), 
which suggests not only the provision of these resources, but the equal (or non- 
discriminatory) provision of them. Likewise, Article 26 states "everyon has the right to 
education" (my emphasis), and although lesbians and gay men (usually) do ha',, 'c access 
to education, the article goes on to state "education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality", which in practice has been interpreted to 
include the teaching of content in an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner (1paye- 
Sowunmi & Szwarc, 2000) - this too is subject to the non-discrimination clause of 
Article 2, and by implication includes lesbian and gay perspectives in education. 
For much of the 20th century, the medical profession defined homosexuality as a 
disease or disorder, and consequently lesbians and gay men still face discrimination 
from medical personnel (Liberty, 1994). Health care professionals have often been 
reported to be particularly ill-informed as to the needs of lesbians and gay men, who as 
a result have been provided with inappropriate or inaccurate infonnation (see Kitzingcr. 
1993; Martinho, 1996; Minter, 1996, Todosijevic, 1996). Furthermore, because same- 
sex relationships are not legally recognised in most countries, the partners of lesbians 
and gay men are often denied visitation rights in hospitals and prisons (see IGLHR(', 
1998b), as they are frequently not recognised as next of kin by medical professionals. 
and thus are often not informed of illness, injury, or death of their partners. 
Consequently, a lesbian or gay man will usually not be consulted for consent with 
regard to medical treatment of hcr(his partner, or in legal matters if her his partner dies 
intestate. 
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In some countries lesbians and gay men report having been denied access to 
education, or expelled from school because of their sexuality. For example, a 19 year 
old girl in Brazil was banned from school "for her own safety" after having kis, ssed tier 
girlfriend and being threatened with physical assault by fellow students (Martinho. 
1996; see also Todosijevic, 1996). In addition, schools often fail to provide accurate and 
appropriate infori-nation about homosexuality in their sexuality education programme". 
and adequate protection against anti-gay bullying (Hayfield, 1995). In England. \Vales. 
and Northern Ireland, Section 28 of the Local Government Act still acts to discourage 
discussion of lesbian and gay issues in the classroom (ILGA, 1999: Lewis, 1998), and 
often prevents students (gay and straight) from having free access to published 
information about lesbianism and gay male homosexuality (Liberty, 1994: Trade 
Unionists Against Section 28,1989). A repeal of Section 28 is currently being 
considered by the UK government, but the proposal has met with strong opposition 
from the "keep the clause campaigners" (see www. stonewall. org. uk). 
With reference to housing, lesbians (and gay men) have frequently reported 
being refused accommodation, or evicted from it on grounds of their sexuality. Whilst 
in the UK, private landlords are legally able to discriminate on grounds of sexuality 
(Liberty, 1994), social services do not have this power of discrimination. Nevertheless, 
lesbians and gay men - particularly those living on council estates - have reported a 
constant threat of violence, including "excrement through [their] letterbox; burglary, 
graffiti; vandalism; as well as verbal abuse and physical assault" (Hayfield, 1995, p. 197; 
see also Stonewall, 1996). 
Lesbian or gay couples who share a rented or jointly owned property also 
frequently experience difficulty if they separate or if one partner dies. Since same-sex 
partnerships are not legally recognised, under the intestacy laws a lesbian or gay partner 
does not automatically receive the right to succession, even though the famil", of the 
deceased person often does (ILGA, 1999). Even where a legal agreement has been 
drawn up, the family (parents or children) of the deceased partner have the legal right to 
contest the agreement (ILGA, 1999; Liberty, 1994). This frequently results in a 
bereaved partner being evicted from what has been the couple's home. 
Thus, even in the UK, lesbians and gay men are discriminated against in health 
care, education, welfare and housing in ways which do not afford them equal status with 
heterosexuals. HowcN-er. some positive changes haN, e been made recently in the UK. For 
example, the UK sex education syllabus has been revised to allow homophobic bullying 
to be addressed in the classroom (see www. stonewall. org. uk), and in June 2000. Section 
28 was repealed in Scotland. In addition, a precedent was set by a UK court ruling in 
October 1999 granting Martin Fitzpatrick the same tenancy rights as a family member. 
allowing him to stay in his late (male) partner's London flat (ILGA. 1999). For these 
rights to be fully respected though would require consistent and universal application of 
equality in both policy and in practice. 
Right to Marry and found a Family 
Article 16 of the UDHR states that "men and women of full age ... have the right to 
marry and found a family". This article does not say that the marriage must be betweeii 
a man and a woman, and therefore it is not self-evident that only heterosexual couples 
have the right to marry and found a family. However, internationally, lesbians and gaý 
men are not usually legally entitled to marry, and are invariably denied access to the full 
range of parenting rights afforded heterosexual couples. 
With only a small number of exceptions - 22 states of the US (see NGLTF, 
1999a) and a handful of countries in Europe (e. g. France, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
and others) - same-sex partnerships are not legally recognised. Where same-sex 
partnerships are legally recognised, they are typically referred to as "registered 
partnerships" or "domestic partnerships", which usually do not carry the same rights 
and benefits as 'marriage' 5. The main difference between the two, is that marriage is 
internationally recognised and understood, whilst domestic partnerships are not. Whilst 
a same-sex couple whose partnership is 'registered' may be entitled to certain benefits 
in their own country (e. g. immigration status, accession rights, partner benefits), their 
partnership will not be recognised in other countries. 
In the UK, same-sex marriage is not permitted, and there is currently no 
provision for registered partnership (Lewis, 1998). Furthennore, recent proposals for 
same-sex couples to be legally entitled to marry have been declined by courts in NeýN 
Zealand (Action for Gay Marriage, 1997), the Czech Republic (Bluhm, 1998). and 
Hawaii (Minter, 1996); and in California, a vote has recently been undertaken to 
institute proposition 22, a measure designed to prevent legal recognition of same-,, cx 
marriages (Badalian, 2000). Moreover, in India and many Muslim countries. lesbians 
The only exception is the Netherlands. where in December 2000. same-sex mamage was legaliscd with 
the full nghts of heterosexual niamage ("Dutch Senate Approves Lesbian and Gav Marriage*'. 200 1 
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are forced into arranged heterosexual marriages In order to 'cure' them of their 
lesbianism. and avoid bringing social disgrace on the familý. 
Since lesbian and gay couples do not have the legal right to inarry. thcy are not II 
afforded many of the benefits and privileges afforded by marital status. As already 
outlined, lesbians and gay men are typically denied entitlement to partner bcnefits in the 
workplace, and in relation to housing, health, and welfare. For example, in the U, K, 
Gary Partridge whose partner John Light was killed in the bomb attack on the Admiral 
Duncan (gay) pub in Soho, London in April 1999, was denied compensation for his loss 
- had his partner have been female, he would have been compensated (Stonewall, 
1999b). 
However, even where such relationships are legally recognised, with the 
exception of the Netherlands (ILGA, 1998b; "Dutch Senate... ", 200 1), same-sex 
partnerships do not carry the same benefits as those of married or de facto heterosexual 
couples. For example, in Scandinavia, lesbian and gay couples do not have the same 
rights with regard to adoption or access to reproductive technologies that their 
heterosexual counterparts do (e. g. see Lindstad, 1996). Furthermore, in Vietnam, 
attempts by a lesbian couple and a gay couple to marry, resulted in the subsequent 
banning of same-sex marriage and the couples were requested to sign a promise never to 
live together again (ILGA, 1999). 
Lesbian and gay couples are also denied the full range of parenting rights 
afforded to heterosexual couples. With few exceptions, lesbians are invariably denied 
access to assisted reproductive technologies, adoption services, and custody rights of 
their own or their partner's children. For example, in a widely cited US custody and 
visitation battle, Sharon Bottoms' has been fighting for legal custody of her own 
biological son: custody was awarded to the child's maternal grandmother because 
Sharon is a lesbian ("Key dates in lesbian ...... 1997). In the UK, 
lesbians have usually 
been successful in gaining custody of their children, whilst gay men have usually had 
more difficulty (Lewis, 1998, Liberty, 1994). However, paragraph 16 of the Children 
Act (1989) ridicules the notion that lesbians can make good parents, making it difficult 
for lesbians to foster or adopt children (Hayfield, 1995). 
Lesbians and gay men have typically encountered discrimination Xvith regard to 
children born from donor insemination or surrogacy. For example, section 13 of Ole UK 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 states that clinics cannot provide 
ccs without taking into account "the wclfare of any child who inay be born as a 
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result including the need of that child for a father". resulting in some clinics not 
providing services to lesbians (ILGA, 1999). Similarly. a British gay couple who 
produced twins through a surrogate mother in the US. ývere denied residency for their 
children, even though one of the men was the biological father of the children. and the 
twins' birth certificates named both men as parents of the children (BBC. 2000). 
It is also much more difficult for a same-sex partner to gain legal recopition as 
a guardian of her/his partner's child (especially if seeking custody after a partner's 
death) than it is for a de facto father in a heterosexual relationship to do so. Reports 
from a number of countries indicate that the partner of a lesbian mother is not entitled to 
parental rights, nor are such partnerships recognised for purposes of inhenitance, to 
obtain loans for purchasing real estate, nor to obtain medical or life insurance as a 
couple or a family (e. g. see Lindstad. 1996; Per6z & Jim&nez, 1996; Peterson. 1996). 
Lesbians in European countries report being discriminated against in the same way (e. g. 
see Anonymous, 1995; Hayfield, 1995; Hayinan, 1995; Trade Unionists Against Section 
285 1989), whilst in New Zealand and Australia same-sex relationships are considered 
de facto for immigration purposes (Hayman, 1995). but not (yet) for other legal 
purposes (see "Action for gay marriage", 1996; Ministry of Justice, 1999). 
Thus, lesbian and gay couples are denied their human rights to marry and found 
a family: rights freely extended to heterosexual couples. Whilst there has been no 
significant change in the UK legislation governing the marriage and parenting rights of 
lesbian and gay couples, custody cases involving the children of lesbian or gay parents 
in this country are significantly fewer than in the past. Conversely, in the US. lesbian 
and gay parenting is still relatively controversial, and custody battles commonplace. 
However, with regard to same-sex marriage, a precedent was recently set in Vermont, 
USA, when a Civil Union was issued to a lesbian couple (Kathleen Peterson & Carolyn 
Conrad) - the first in US history to be issued to a same-sex couple. The license affords 
them "virtually all the benefits and responsibilities of marriage" (Gewirtz, 2000). 
Similarly, a precedent was set in the Netherlands on 19 December 2000, ýN. hen the 
Dutch Senate passed legislation entitling lesbians and gay men to legallý, marry - The 
first country in the world to do so (see "Dutch Senate... ", 200 1 ). 
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Freedom of Expression and Assembly & the Right to Information 
Article 19 states that "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres'sion. this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek-. receive and 
impart information and ideas" (my emphasis)- and Art icle 20 states "everyone has the 
right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association" (my emphasis). In practice. the 
latter has been applied when attacks have been made on rallies and marches on animal 
rights and anti-abortion (1paye-Sowunmi & Szwarc, 2000), and therefore could 
conceivably be applied to anti -lesbi an/gay action at lesbian and gay events also. 
Lesbians and gay men do not have the same degree of freedom of expression 
that heterosexuals have. For example, even in the western world, it is not necessariby, 
safe for lesbians and gay men to express basic forms of affection (i. e. to hold hands; to 
exchange a kiss) towards their partners in public without the fear of being threatened 
with verbal abuse or physical assault. Furthermore, in some countries, attempts by 
lesbians to organise politically and socially are often undermined by authorities. For 
example, in Colombia, if problems arise in the gay bars, it is the women who are forced 
to leave, and are denied access to the few public places where they can gather (Rond6n. 
1996). 
In some countries there are restrictions placed on access to and the retail of gay 
and lesbian literature, and sometimes embargoes placed on the importation of such 
literature. For example, in both 1995 and 1996, the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe 
(GALZ) group was banned from the Zimbabwe International Book Fair, where it was to 
have had a stall displaying material on homosexuality and gay and lesbian human rights 
(Amnesty International, 1997; Dunton & Palmberg, 1996). In addition to banning the 
GALZ stall from the international book fair, the Zimbabwean government has also 
banned The Penguin Book ofLesbian Short Stories and the British magazine Diva. and 
in 1993, police raided the homes of GALZ members seizing any literature which 
contained the words "lesbian" or "gay" (Clark, 1996). Similarly, in Argentina, the local 
gay magazine., VA'Magazzine was recently taken out of circulation by officials (IGLHRC. 
1999). 
Whilst there is no official ban on the importation or sale of lesbian and gav 
literature in the UK, in the early 1990s. there Nvere a number of cases reported where 
police officers and customs officials seized safe-sex posters, postcards. video's. and 
books such as Thc Joi, of Gai, Sex and The Joi, ofLesbian Sex on grounds of obscenitv 
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(Liberty., 1994). In addition, lesbian and gay literature is subject to more stringent 
censorship than is heterosexual material of an equivalent nature, and whilst explicit 
heterosexual literature is freely available in mainstream bookstores, lesbian and gay 
literature is seldom found in places other than specialist feminist or lesbian and gay 
bookstores. 
Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 has also had a profound effect on 
censorship of lesbian and gay literature and access to information. Section 28 states that 
"a local authority shall not intentionally promote homosexuality ... [nor] promote the 
teaching ... of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship" 
(Colvin & Hawksley, 1989, p. 1). Although Section 28 can be interpreted in a vancty of 
ways (e. g. see Colvin & Hawksley, 1989; Lewis, 1998; Liberty, 1994), and may not 
actually prohibit any local authority practices, it has resulted in the widespread 
censorship of literature distributed by local authorities; caution in giving funding to 
lesbian and gay organisations or providing them with facilities; restricted provision of 
lesbian and gay books in public libraries; and has created the perception that the 
discussion of lesbian and gay issues in schools is prohibited (Hayfield, 1995; ILGA, 
1999; Lewis, 1998). Similar legislation exists in both Leichtenstein and Cyprus, in the 
latter of which gay men are also prohibited from advertising for partners in public 
newspapers. 
As this section has highlighted, lesbians and gay men have neither the same 
level of freedom of expression, nor the same degree of access to infori-nation afforded 
heterosexuals and other groups. Whilst some progress has been made in the UK towards 
legislative change - Section 28 of the Local Government Act having being repealed in 
Scotland in June 2000, and currently under review in England and Wales -for these 
rights to be fully respected for lesbians and gay men would also require significant 
social change. 
Immigration and Asylum 
In most western countries , immigrants are given 'leave to enter' on grounds that the),, 
are coming to join a relative, typically a spouse, who is a citizen of that country 
(Liberty, 1994). For example, if a man or xvoinan is a British Citizen, but his'her legallý 
defined spouse is not British, the latter would automatically be granted permanent 
residency (and in this case, citizenship) ot-i a basis that he she is married to a British 
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Citizen. Similarly. if either one of these persons was offered employment in a counti-N, 
of which neither was a citizen, both would be granted residence. because of their marital 
status. However, since lesbian and gay couples are not legally pen-nitted to marry. these 
are not usually extended to lesbian and gay couples, even though in some cases 
unmarried heterosexual couples may be eligible (on provision of evidence that they are 
in a 'permanent', committed relationship). 
Asylum, on the other hand, is granted to members of a particular social group 
who can provide evidence that they are at risk due to persecution in their own countrv. 
Article 14 of the UDHR states that "eveKyon has the right to seek and to enjovin other 
countries asylum from persecution" (my emphasis). According to the United Nations 
Convention on the status of refugees, persecution must encompass state and legal 
persecution as well as social ostracism and bodily harin (Berger & Lewis, 1998). Until 
relatively recently, persecution based on sexual orientation was not recognised as 
grounds for asylum. 
Currently, sexual orientation is explicitly mentioned in the asylum laws of 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and around 13 countries in Europe (see 
Berger & Lewis, 1998; ILGA, 1999), and a number of these countries have granted 
asylum to lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered persons (see ILGA, 1999). Until N'cry 
recently, lesbians and gay men seeking entry to the UK on the grounds that they feared 
persecution because of their sexuality, have been refused asylum on the grounds that 
homosexuals do not forrn a particular 'social group'. However, in March 1999, the 
House of Lords allowed the appeal of two women claiming asylum in the UK, and ruled 
that anyone persecuted for their sexual identity who was not protected by their owil 
government could seek asylum in the UK (Stonewall Press release, ILGA 1999). 
The immigration laws of a small number of (western) countries (see ILGA, 
1999) currently extend immigration rights to the partners of lesbians and gay men. 
Although immigration requirements are usually strict (Liberty, 1994), until relatively 
recently, most countries applied more stringent conditions to lesbian and gay couples 
than was the case for heterosexual couples. For example, until June last Year (1999), 
lesbian and gay couples wishing to enter the UK, were only entitled to immigrate as a 
couple if they had been living together for 4 years, whereas de facto heterosexual 
couples Nvere only required to have been living together for 2 years (Lewis, 1998). 
Similarly, in South Africa, in FebruarN, 1999, a high court ruling found that theAliens 
Control Act was Lin constitutional in that it unfairly discriminated against lesbian and 
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gay couples by denying them the same rights as married couples have under the act' 
(National Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Equality [NCLGE] press release. TLGA 1999). 
Human Rights in Theory and Practice 
Human rights are rights which all people possess by virtue of being human (Donnelleý', 
1993; Gewirth, 1984; Jones, 1994; Pennock, 1981), or "the rights of all people at all 
times and in all situations" (Cranston, 1962, quoted in Bouandel, 1997. p. 20). This 
section will begin by first theorising human rights, then outlining how these are 
fon-nulated into treaties and declarations, and finally, how human rights are protected 
and promoted in practice. 
What are Human Rights? 
Natural Rights 
In the 18th century, European philosophers (e. g. John Locke, Thomas Paine; vis-a-vis 
Thomas Hobbes) introduced the idea of 'natural rights', a law deemed higher than state 
laws and derived from the natural order of things (Weissbrodt, 1998). John Locke, the 
major proponent of natural rights, suggested that "all individuals were endowed by 
nature with inherent rights to life, liberty and property which were their own and could 
not be removed or abrogated by the state" (Davidson, 1993, p. 28). Locke further 
defined people as sociable and rational beings capable of action (Bouandel, 1997), thus 
natural rights were grounded in rational action, or the natural order. From a natural 
rights perspective, then, individuals were assumed to be autonomous beings capable of 
exercising choice (Davidson, 1993). 
Natural rights (in the Lockean sense) were rights which represented the basic 
entitlements of all human beings, governed by 'natural law' (Jones. 1994): natural law 
being deten-nined by God, and individuals, as unique, rational, and autonomous beings, 
therefore being subject to the authority of God (Davidson, 1993; Jones. 1994). 
Consequently. each person's status was believed to be deten-nined by God, and 
differences in social status and corporeality believed to be 'natural'. 
A constitutional court rulin-, -, in 
December 1999 followed. the chan-ge of law taki Cr ing eft' ct fom 2000. 
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Because natural rights , vere seen as bestowed on individuals by God. these 
rights were conceptuallsed as inalienable (unable to be taken aýN-av). and absolute (must 
not be compromised) (Pennock, 198 1). However, as the concept of natural rights 
developed, it gradually became severed from its theistic origin in natural law. and 
became grounded in "enlightened secular rational thought" (e. g. reasoning) (Davidson. 
1993, p. 27). Consequently, the state (rather than God) was entrusted with the role of 
ensuring the protection of rights (Davidson, 1993). 
With the establishment of political authority (separate from, but guided by, the 
church), the concept of natural fights was carried forward into political society (Jones, 
1994). However, the concept of natural rights gradually fell into disfavour in the 19th 
century, as it was not seen as scientifically verifiable (Davidson, 1993). Thus, the 
philosophy of natural rights was superseded by the concept of human rights (which, 
ironically, were taken to be self-evident). 
Human Rights 
Although the concept of 'human rights' is derived from the concept of natural rights, it 
is fundamentally different, in that it starts from a position of all people being born equal 
(i. e. universal and egalitarian). A human rights perspective, therefore, holds that all 
people, everywhere, equally possess human rights (whether they want them or not), 
simply because they are human beings (Donnelley, 1993; Jones, 1994; Pennock, 198 1). 
Thus, human rights, in contrast with natural rights, are independent of differences in 
social position (e. g. sexuality, class, race, sex, disability) or ideology (e. g. political or 
religious affiliation, culture). 
Since human rights are universal and egalitarian, they transcend society and its 
rules or laws (Davidson, 1993; Donnelley, 1993; Jones, 1994), and are seen to exist 
regardless of whether or not they are embodied in legislation (Jones. 1994). Thus, laýý. s. 
declarations, and conventions do not 'give' human rights to people (Jones, 1994, United 
Nations Dept. of Public Information, 1997), by virtue of special relationships, prornises 
or contracts (e. g. marriage), or social statuses (Donnelley. 1993: Jones, 1994). Human 
rights begin with the individual as a human being, and differ from special rights. which 
are rights acquired by status or attribute (Pennock, 198 1 ). 
In addition to being universal and egalitarian. as xvith natural rights, hurnan 
n(,, hts are also inalienable (David son, 1993: Donnelleý, 1993: Pennock, 1981). That is. 
because no person can renounce. lose, or forfeit her his state of beino human IIII 
(Donnelley, 1993), human rights cannot be taken away from anyone: E% en the most 
heinous murderer has human rights. Similarly, in the case of sexuality, a lesbian has 
human rights because she is human, just as a gay man has human rights because he 11ý 
human: A woman's lesbianism, or a gay man's gayness, is irrelevant to her/ his 
possession of human rights. 
Finally, human rights are indivisible (Annan, 1997). That is, because human 
rights are inherent to human beings (qua human beings), they cannot be separated from 
each other, and must be accepted (and respected) in their totality (United Nations 
Department of Public Information, 1997). 
So, which rights are human rights? 
Although writers on human rights across a variety of disciplines have been reasonably 
homogenous in their definitions of human rights, they have tended to disagree with one 
another as to exactly which rights count as human rights (as opposed to other kinds of 
rights). In particular, the inclusion of social and economic rights (as opposed to civil 
and political rights) as human rights has often been disputed (Bouandel, 1997). 
Essentially, human rights are moral or ethical principles of justice/faimess. 
Beginning from the premise of equality of all peoples (the basis of human rights), 
Rawls' (1972/1991) theory of justice suggests that it is from the 'original position', that 
we can best deten-nine the basic principles of justice. That is, without knowing whether 
one will be rich or poor, lesbian/gay or heterosexual, black or white, disabled or able- 
bodied, female or male, etc., one is unlikely to risk being the least advantaged in 
society, and so from behind this 'veil of ignorance'(see Rawls, 1972/199 1, pp. 136-142). 
one will derive principles which are truly fair. According to Rawls, this scenario 
inevitably produces certain principles of justice (see Rawls, 1972/199 1, pp. 60-65 for a 
detailed outline of these principles), which in terms of human rights. translate into 
freedom of speech and assembly, conscience, and thought, The right to hold property. 
and freedom ftom arbitrary arrest and seizure. However, in the political and legal 
literature, human rights are conceptualised more broadly than Raývls' theory appears to 
suggest. 
A human rights position holds that human beings (as human beings) have 
intrinsic valucNvorth in and of themselves (Jones, 1994). and that the essence or nature 
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of being human makes us entitled to certain things. Therefore, it is generallý- agreed that 
the right to life is the most basic and sacrosanct of human rights (Wilets. 1994). Without 
being alive, one cannot enjoy their human rights. Life is fundamental to the wholc 
notion of human rights, so the right to life must undisputedlý- be a human right. 
Consequently, the arbitrary deprivation of a human life is unequivocally a human rights 
violation, as it deprives another individual of her/his human rights 7. What matters, is 
that as far as human rights are concerned, the right to life is paramount, and therefore. 
absolute8: It is inviolable. Thus, the killing of lesbians and gay men unquestionablý. 
constitutes a human rights violation. 
If life is central to human rights, and the right to life is paramount, rights which 
orient towards the preservation of life, and maintaining the well-being (health or 
dignity) of the human must also be considered human rights (cf, Okin's, 1981 
discussion on needs pp 235-237). Consequently, deliberate actions which could 
potentially result in the loss or degradation of life constitute human rights violations. 
For example, torture, cruel and degrading treatment, exploitation (e. g. slavery, child 
labour, work conditions), privacy and security of person (freedom from fear). In 
addition, so that human life is maintained intergenerationally, the right to reproduce 
(typically conceptualised as the right to marry and found a family) is usually considered 
a basic human right. 
Thirdly, underlying the concept of human rights, is the notion of human beings 
as free and autonomous beings, and as beings with potential to develop, and thus worthy 
of the dignity and (self) respect necessary to develop to their full potential (cf. Okin's, 
1981 discussion on capacities pp 235-237). Consequently, human rights which attend to 
the nurturance of freedom, dignity, and respect; and uphold the quality of life, must also 
9 be considered human rights. On this level, then, we have the right to education , which 
7 As straight forward as this may seem, it raises issues of under what conditions is a human being hving'. ' 
and therefore what constitutes the arbitrary deprivation of human life'? For example, at what point is an 
unborn foetus considered a human being'? And, does the right to life prohibit the termination of life- 
support to a dying person'? Debates over abortion and euthanasia, in relation to the right to life. ha% c been 
central to much discussion of human rights, however, they are beyond the scope of this thesis (scc. for 
example, Baier, 1981 for a detailed discussion of these issues). 
8 Absolute rights are rights which should never be overridden, and thus should be upheld whatever the 
consequence,,. A prima facie right, on the other hand, is a right that may be justi fiably over-ridden in 
certain situtions. For example, ordinarily one might have a right to x. and it , N-ould normally be Wrong to 
be denied that right. However, in some situations. that might may have to Yield to a competing or more 
important consideration (Joiies. 1994). 
9 By education. I am referring to the broader concept of learning, as opposed to "Chooling or 
indoctrination. I oo often the right to education has been construed as the necessit\ for imperialistic 
Brit ish ,, tyle schooling to be universally implemented. It is this tNpe of colonialistic. and neo-coloniali, tic. 
western interpretation,, of human rights which I am attempting to avoid here. 
includes the right of access to infori-nation. freedom of expression. &, semblv, and 
0 association: and the right to immigration and asylum' . 
On this basis, the right to life is absolute, and all other human rights pertaining 
to the preservation of the right to life, or to the quality of that life must be seen as pl*i . III(I 
fýcie rights. Consequently, in a situation where human rights conflict with one another. 
the right which is more essential to human life must be preserved, at the expense of the 
less essential one. This would appear to be reasonable (at least in theory). in that it 
would be difficult to imagine a situation where it would be preferable for exarnple, to 
kill people so as to provide a hospital or school from those who remain. However. 
human rights are indivisible, thus, all of these rights should be preserved for all people 
in all situations, and all things being equal, none of them should be compromised. 
Formulations of Human Rights 
Although human rights exist as a concept, to be implemented in practice, attempts ha\'c 
been made to formulate them into legally and constitutionally recognised documents. 
Consequently, numerous treaties, conventions, and declarations have been developed to 
enunciate what human rights are, and to ensure their legal protection (Wilets, 1994). 
These documents are guidelines which attempt to highlight the values that all nations 
and states should use as a yardstick against which to measure their actions (Cassese, 
1990). 
It is generally agreed that the earliest agreement (at least in the western world) 
enumerating what later became thought of as human rights was the Magna Carta signed 
in 1215 (Cassese, 1990, but cf. Davidson, 1993). The Magna Carta (or great charter) 
was an agreement between King John of England and his subjects, after the king 
violated the ancient laws and customs by which England had been goN-cmed. 
In the late 18th century, human rights began to be codified into national 
constitutions. The first of these formulations was the United States Declaration of 
Independence, adopted on 4th July 1776, claiming the right of the American people to 
be free from rule by the British crown, and the right of all men [sic] to life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness (Declaration of Independence, 1776). Soon after, in 1789. a.,, -, a 
result of the French Revolution. the first French republic was established. and the 
10 Althou,, h it should be noted that in a pure model where there no such thing, a-,; states oT- nations. there 
would be no need t'Or asvIurn. 
-Declaration of the Rights of Man" was proposed (Trade Unionists Agyainst Section 28. 
1989). Together, these two documents became the foundation of human rights 
legislation, and the model on which the UDHR was developed some 150 yeal-s later 
(Cassese, 1990; Marks, 1998). 
However, human rights issues gained international attention on an 
unprecedented level immediately following the Second World War. The Nazi i-egirne in 
Germany, both before and during the war, was responsible for the massacre of six- 
million Jews (commonly known as 'the Holocaust'), five-hundred-thous and gyj)sles, 
and tens of thousands of others , including lesbians and gay men (see Donnelly, 1993: 
Grau, 1995; Schoppmann, 1995). In addition, medical research by Nazi officials, 
including (among other things) inflicting wounds and diseases on, and the execution and 
defleshing of humans, was carried out on otherwise healthy individuals (Kimmel, 
1988). The arbitrary deprivation of, and blatant disregard for, life evident in these 
atrocities are, as already outlined, clear violations of the most fundamental of human 
rights. 
The exposure of the atrocities of the holocaust, and the Nuremberg War Crimcs 
Trials II which followed, drew attention to the need for human rights of individuals to be 
protected internationally (Donnelly, 1993; Weissbrodt, 1988). This heightened 
awareness resulted in the development of codes of ethics for medical and psychological 
practice, and also the formation of the United Nations (UN), the first ten years of which 
were devoted primarily to defining human rights, and clarifying the international 
obligation to promote them. A clear human rights agenda was, therefore, incorporated 
into the official charter of the UN (UN, 1968). 
In 1946, the UN Commission on Human Rights was established under the 
chairpersonship of Eleanor Roosevelt. Its initial task was to prepare the world's first 
international declaration of human rights (Davidson, 1993; UN, 1968). The 
commission's draft was eventually submitted to its third committee, who spent 81 
meetings considering 168 suggested amendments (Humphrey, 1988). Finally. on I Oth 
December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly with no dissenting votes (Donnelly, 1991: Jones, 
1994; UN, 1968, Weissbrodt, 1998). Only eight members of the L". \' (all the corninunist 
As a result of the atrocities committed duning the holocaust. leading Nazis xý ere charged with crime, 
against humanity. during the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials (194-5-1946). Although such acts ha-% e clel-irly L- - been considered inunoral. the,, - were not legally prohibited at the time they occurred. Thus, the 
Nuremberg trial.,, (although ex post facto prosecution) were an ZI I catalyst 
for the mobilisation of 
the human rights inoN ement (Donnelley. 199 3). 
states, Plus Saudi Arabia, and South Africa) abstalned from votIng, because for vanou" 
reasons they objected to some of the content of the document (see Humphrey. 1988). 
However, the UDHR was not a treaty. and therefore was not binding in law 
(Donnelly, 1993). On completion of the UDHR. then, the Commission on Human 
Rights devoted its attention to drafting two covenants: one on civil and political rights. 
and the other on economic, social, and cultural rights, 'vý'hich together became known a, 
the International Human Rights Covenants (UN, 1968). Thus in 1966, when the 
International Human Rights Covenants (collectively called the International Bill of 
Human Rights) was adopted, the protection of human rights became a legal obli-ation 
in all member nations (Davidson, 1993; Donnelley, 1993-, UN, 1986; Weissbrodt, 
1988). 
Over the ensuing years, a succession of human rights conventions wei-c adopted 
in a number of geographical regions (Weissbrodt, 1988). The first of these was the 
"Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms", adopted 
by the Council of Europe in Rome on the 4th November 1950. This was followed by the 
"American Convention on Human Rights" in November 1969, and "The African 
Charter on Human and People's Rights" in 198 1. These conventions parallel the model 
set by the UN (with certain variations), and all are currently utilised in international law. 
Although a commission of human rights was established in the Arab States in 1968, this 
commission is not active, and attempts to establish a human rights treaty in the Islamic 
world have not come to fruition (Davidson, 1993; Weissbrodt, 1988). Similarly, there 
remains no regional human rights system in Asia (Weissbrodt, 1988). 
In addition to these multilateral agreements, many countries have fon-nally 
recognised human rights as part of their national law. For example, human rights feature 
as central to a number of national agreements, including the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
(1993), the Canadian Charter (1982), and the UK Human Rights Act which came into 
effect on October 2,2000. Internationally, however, countries differ substantially in the 
extent to which human rights are incorporated into national law. 
The Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
The various covenants. charters, and declarations of human rights described abo\ c are 
enforced by the legal system. both nationally (where international human rights are 
recognised within domestic law) and intemationally (in the case of intcmational 
agreements). With the exception of the Affican Charter, for which no Affican human 
rights court exists (Wilets, 1994). the remaining three multilateral agreements ha\ c 
parallel bodies/courts for the legal enforcement of human rights: The Inter-. -\rnenican 
Court of Human Rights, in the case of the American Convention; The European 
Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. in the case of 
the European Convention; and the Human Rights Committee, in the case of the UDHR 
(see Davidson, 1993; Wilets, 1994). 
Human rights violations are usually brought before the international courts 
either by individuals, or by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). such as Arnnesty 
International, or Human Rights Watch (Cassese, 1990). In the case of the LN any 
person or group may complain about human rights violations, even if the country 
concerned is not currently a member of the UN (see Donnelley, 1993). Complaints are 
then processed by a sub-commission, before being passed on to the Human Rights 
Commission for investigation (UN, 1986; Wilets, 1994). 
However, there is no international police force to check that governments are 
complying with their human rights obligations, nor to compel them to comply if they 
aren't (Weissbrodt, 1988). Most of the work of promoting and protecting human rights 
is carried out by human rights organisations. The first of these was the Geneva-based 
International Committee of the Red Cross, fonned in 1865. The committee was 
established to give relief to the wounded and victims of armed conflict (Davidson, 
1993; Weissbrodt, 1988). It was the establishment of this committee which lead to the 
first multilateral treaty, commonly known as the Geneva Convention. The convention 
assured soldiers prisoner of war status if they became sick, wounded, shipwrecked, or 
chose to lay down their arms, and offered security of life and property of civilians in 
occupied territories (Weissbrodt, 1988). 
Over the early 20th century, a number of organisations were established to 
address particular social issues, such as slavery, brutal working conditions, and child 
labour. Among these were the International Labour Organisation (11-0), established in 
1919 (Cassese, 1990), and the League of Nations, established in 1926 (Weissbrodt, 
1988). Although not human rights organisations per se, they have contributed 
sigificantly to the advancement of human rights (Davidson, 199 3). Howe% er, the 
establishment of the UN and the subsequent development of the UDHR. acted as a 
catalyst for tile ernergence of human rights organisations in contemporary (1A, estem) 
societ\'. 
Although the United Nations (UN) was (and continues to be) important in 
initiating international action to protect the human rights of individuals in le(-Yislation, 
being formed of the governmental bodies it was unable to provide a non-partkail voice 
in world affairs, which impeded progress on establishing and preserving human n(ghts 
internationally. Consequently, NGOs began to emerge around the ýN'orld, in an effort to 
monitor human rights violation, and actively to work for positive social and political 
change. 
In 1961, Peter Benenson (a British lawyer) launched an Appeal for Amiicsty 
after reading in The Observer that some Portuguese students had been imprisoned for 
making a toast to freedom (Amnesty International. 1998; Bouandel, 1997). The appeal 
was so far reaching that it continued to exist beyond the year long appeal, developing 
into an organisation with branches throughout the world. Amnesty became the 
foundation of the modem human rights movement as the first NGO devoted specificallý' 
to human rights issues. Non-partisan and independent of ideology, this organisation 
became known as "Amnesty International", and focused on working for the release of 
prisoners detained for peaceably holding religious and political beliefs which differed 
from those of their governments. In the 1970s Amnesty International gained pen-nanent 
observer status at the UN, acting as the watchdog for international human rights. 
Through the work of Amnesty International, and more recently other human 
rights activist groups, human rights are monitored internationally, and reported on by 
these organisations. Human rights violations are dealt with through the imposition of 
political and public pressure, such as through persuasion (e. g. letter writing campaigns), 
embarrassment, aid to victims, technical assistance to governments which are 
complying, and if necessary ceasing trade with offending countries (Brems, 199 7 
Weissbrodt, 1998; Wilets, 1994). Since its inception in 1961, Amnesty International has 
been involved in 47,000 cases, many of which have resulted in the release of political 
prisoners (AIUK Information Office, personal communication, 3 August 2000). 
Following the establishment of Amnesty International, a number of local 
organisations sprung up around the western world. The most well-knwvn of these 
groups, Helsinki Watch, was established in 1978 by Russian activists, and is known 
today as "Human Rights Watch". However, until relatively recently the work of N. 'GO,,, 
focused primarily on human rights violations on a basis of religion, sex. and 
race/ethnicity, and there has been a noticable reticence on the part of NGOs fc)T- the 
inclusion of lesbian and gay human right,, into their agendas (Sanders. 1996). 
Almost 30 years after the establishment of Amnesty International. the rights of 
lesbians and gay men finally came to the attention of international human right" 
organisations (cf. Helfer & Miller, 1996). In 1990. the US based "International Ga% and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission" (IGLHRC) was established to bridge the gap 
between the human rights movement and the lesbian and gay rights moN, ement. It 
wasn't until a year later, after 17 years of protest from lesbian and gay activists 
(Rosenbloom, 1996), that Amnesty International officially included violations against 
lesbians and gay men into its agenda, although its charter has neN-er been amended, 2 
Similarly, in 1994, Human Rights Watch modified its mandate to includesexual 
orientation issues (see Sanders, 1996 for a brief outline of both the Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch decisions). However, although the UN has a 
number of rapporteurs and working groups employed to investigate alleged human 
rights violations, to date, none of them have investigated human rights violations based 
on sexual orientation (Helfer & Miller, 1996). 
In addition to the work of Amnesty International and the IGLHRC, sevei-al local 
and international gay and lesbian rights organisations are involved in working for the 
human rights of lesbians and gay men. The most well known organisations are the 
Washington DC based organisation the Human Rights Campaign, established in 1980; 
the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), established in 1978; the 
International Lesbian Information Service (ILIS); and in the UK, Stonewall and 
Outrage!. Although NGOs have no official legal status, they serve a particular role as 
mediators between the public and governments on behalf of the victims of abuses 
(Cassese, 1990; Davidson, 1993). 
Lesbians and Gay Men & Human Rights in Practice 
To date., no international treaty or declaration explicitly mentions sexual orientation as a 
protected category. For example, the UDHR states that "everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion. political or other opinion, national or social origin. 
property, birth or other status" (UN, 1998). However, in judicial and political practice. 
12 One ofthe main rcasons for not explicitly mentioning sc-\ual onientation in the charter. i, that it N%ould 
prohibit Amnesty International from working in a number of the "vorld's - cs where honwcNuaht\ 
is still illegal. 
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the human rights of lesbians and gay men are increasinizjlý, being recognised as protected 
under the category "other status" (Helfer & Miller. 1996). Human nghts declarations 
have, therefore, been successfully used to contest human rights violations aginst 
lesbians and gay men, and to create positive social change: especially with regard to the 
repealing of state sodomy laws under the European Convention. 
Progress in Advancing Lesbian and Gay Human Rights 
The first victory for gay rights in international human rights law was Dudgeon v. U111tcd 
Kingdom. In 1981 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the prohibition of 
gay male sexual activity in Northern Ireland (Gay male sexual activity had been 
decriminalised in England and Wales in 1967) violated the right for respect to pnvýite 
life (Sanders, Krickler, & Croome, 1997; Wintemute, 1997). As a result of the Dud0con 
case, Northern Ireland's sodomy laws were repealed in 1982 (Wintemute, 1997). After 
this judgement, a number of the UK's dependent territories (e. g. Guernsey, Jersey, Isle 
of Man, Gibraltar, and Bennuda) also amended their legislation, avoiding sirnilar cascs 
(Wintemute, 1997). 
The Dudgeon case set a precedent for similar cases in Ireland in 1988, and in 
Cyprus in 1993, both of which resulted in the repeal of the state sodomy laws. Since the 
Dudgeon case, the prohibition of homosexuality in states belonging to the Council of 
Europe, is in conflict with the European Convention, thus states applying for 
membership to the Council are required to repeal their sodomy laws (Sanders et al., 
1997): three have done so since joining the Council (Krickler, 1998a; Sanders et al., 
1997). 
Whilst considerable progress has been made under the European convcntion, 
unfortunately, progress under the United States Convention has been much less 
successful. In the 1986 Hardwick case, a case directly paralleling Dudgeon, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the oral and anal intercourse law does not violate the 
fundamental rights of homosexuals, in that homosexual sodomy is immoral under the 
US Constitution, and therefore homosexuals do not have a fundamental right to en(, a(Ye 
in sodomy (Wilets, 1995-, Winternute, 1997). In this particular case, it \ý as construed 
that the right to privacy is limited to marriLige. family, and procreation. and thus not 
applicable to homosexual activity (Heirize. 199-5). The case also failed on the grounds 
that in Georgia, as in many states of the US. sodomy is illegal for both heterosexuals 
and homosexuals (see argument in Wintemute. 1997, p-38). 
Another precedent for lesbian and gay rights was set in 1994, this- time under the 
UDHR. Toonen v. Australia (another case similar to Dudgeon N's United Kingdom) was 
considered before the Human Rights Committee of the UN. In this case, Toonen argucd 
non-discrimination, privacy rights and equality rights under Articles 2,17 &_, 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Helfer & Miller. 1996; Wilcts, 
1995). The law, it was argued, discriminated on two grounds: sexual orientation 
(covered under "other status"), and sex (by applying only to males). On April 4.1994, 
the commission ruled that the Tasmanian law violated Toonen's right to pri,,,, acy 
(Article 17), and the rights to non-discrimination (Article 2) and was therefore a 
violation of fundamental human rights (Sanders et al.. 1998). This case set a precedent, 
in that it was the first producing the verdict that under article 2 'sex' is to be taken to 
include 'sexual orientation' (IGLHRC, 1998a; Sanders et al., 1998; Wintemute, 199-5). 
This decision also marked the first time that any UN body had unequivocally stated that 
fundamental human rights protections extend to lesbians and gay men (Helfer & Miller, 
1996). 
In 1993, Claudia Roth (a member of the European Parliament) submitted a 
landmark report on equality issues for lesbians and gay men (Sanders et al., 1997). In 
response to the Roth Report , in February 1994, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution calling for all member states to abolish all laws criminalising homosexuality; 
equalise all age of consent laws; end discrimination of homosexuals in housing, social 
security, adoption, inheritance, and criminal laws; take measures to reduce violence 
against homosexuals and prosecute offenders; combat social discrimination against 
homosexuals; and provide funding to social and cultural organisations (IGLHRC. 
1998a; Sanders et al., 1997; Wilets, 1994). In addition, the resolution requests that the 
UK repeal Section 28, and seeks the recommendation that gay men and lesbians be 
guaranteed full and equal rights of marriage and parenting (IGLHRC, 1998a). In 1997, 
the European Union revised the Treaty of Amsterdam to allow the European 
Commission to act against member states which allow discrimination based on sexual 
orientation (IGLHRC. 1998a). 
As a direct consequence of the Roth report. a number of UK laws concerning 
homosexuality have come under reN, icN\-. Since 1994, the age of consent forsex between 
men has corne under scrutiny on several occasions. After considerable debate in the 
House of Commons. in 1994 the age of consent for sex between men NvLis- lowered from 
21 to 18, maintaining an unequal age of consent for gay men as compared with their 
heterosexual and - implicitly - lesbian peers. Subsequently. a case brought before the 
European Court (Euan Sutherland v. UK) in respect of the unequal age of consent, 
resulted in the European Human Rights Commission ruling, in 1997, that 
no objective and reasonable justification exists for the maintenance of a higher minimum 
age of consent to male homosexual, than to heterosexual, acts and that the application 
discloses discriminatory treatment in the exercise of the applicant's rights to respect fO F 
private life under Article 8 of the convention (ILGA, quoted in Krickler. 1998b, p. 
unknown). 
The UK was therefore obliged to bring its age of consent laws in line with its 
obligations under international laws in relation to privacy (McKek'ey, 1998). Although 
the House of Commons passed the redrafted legislation of the bill in July 1998,111 1999. 
and in 2000, it was overwhelmingly rejected in the House of Lords on both occasions. 
An equal age of consent was finally realised in November 2000, but only by the rare 
invocation of the Parliament Act (see AIUK, 2000). 
In addition to changes to the age of consent laws, as already highlighted 
considerable progress has been made towards the recognition of the (human) rights of 
lesbians and gay men in the UK. For example, in January 2000 the ban on lesbians and 
gay men serving in the military was officially lifted, then in March, new sex education 
guidelines were released, highlighting the need to deal with homophobic bullying, and 
recognise the needs of young lesbians and gay men for advice and information. The 
most recent victory has been the repeal of Section 28 in Scotland (June 2000), ývhich 
although currently under review in the British parliament, was defeated at its first 
reading in the House of Lords (July 2000). 
In recent years, issues surrounding sexual orientation have increasingly featured 
prominently on the international human rights agenda as fundamentallý, important issues 
(Marks, 1998). In 1995, lesbian human rights achieved global prominence, when they 
were madc a major issue on the agenda of the 4 th World Conference on Wornen in 
Beijing (Helfer & Miller, 1996). In the same year, the L, 'nited '. Nations Hui-nan Rights- 
Committee (LINFIRC) censured the United States for the sodomy laws carried on the 
books of several US states, which effectively inffinge the human rights of lesbian and I-- 
oay persons by criminalising same sex sexual relations (IGLHRC, 1998a). HoNý c% er. to . tl - 
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date, 20 states in the US still legally criminalize homosexualitv, sodomv being illegal 
for both heterosexuals and homosexuals in 14 states (NGLTF. 1999c). 
In addition, the late 1990s saw a considerable increase in individual cýiscs of 
employment discrimination being won in many countries on grounds of hurnan n,, hts. 
For example, in Israel, on 30 November 1994, the Israeli Supreme Court ended a fix c 
year case against El Al Airlines (Israel's state owned airline). by ruling that equl\ alent 
benefits must be given to same sex partners of employees as are gi\, eii to opposite , cx 
partners (Safier, 1994). Similarly, in South Africa, the Pretoria High Court ruled on 4 
February 1998 that the failure of the South African Police Services Medical Aid to 
extend health coverage to lesbian police officer Jolande Langmaat's lo\-cr of II ycars 
violated the South Affican Constitution (ILGA, 1998b). Although the first majol- case ot 
this kind to be taken to the International Courts (Grant v South West Trains) %N-as 
rejected by the European Court (BBC, 1998, for full judgement of the court see 
European Court 1998), in October 1999, South West Trains reversed its position on 
partner benefits with regard to Lisa Grant's case, followed by a mandate by ATOC (the 
UK Association of Train Operating Companies) that all train companies in Britain 
revise their policies to include the extension of partner benefits to lesbian and gay 
couples (BBC, 1999). 
Mixed Success and Slow Progress 
Although there are relatively few international court cases where lesbians or gay men 
have successfully won on claims of human rights violations, this is not necessarily a 
cause for concern (although the lack of successful cases involving lesbians as opposed 
to those involving gay men clearly is). Proportionately, the number of cases brought to 
the international courts is very low, when compared against the incidence of'ý-iolations 
against lesbians and gay men internationally. However, there are sex-ci-al plausible 
reasons for this, and it is not, therefore, necessarily indicative of a lack of success in the 
advancement of lesbian and gay human rights. 
One of the main reasons that lesbian and gay issues are seldom brou(,, Iit before 
the courts or international treaty organisations, is that they are infrequently promoted as 
human rights issues. and are therefore seldom viewed as such. Whilst in part this maV 
be attributed to complacency on the part of individuals (including, manv lesbians and 
i, ay men). these issues are often seen as things which happen to individuals. rather than 
systematic violations against lesbians and gay men as a group. For example. it is not 
uncommon for lesbians and gay men to expect to be discriminated against. ,, -o flicy may 
actively conceal their identities, avoid certain places, and/or take precautions to ensure 
their safety (see Kitzinger. 1996, p. II), and often J ust accept (sometimes begrud gi n0y. 
sometimes willingly) the status quo. The vast majority of cases of lesbian and 
men"s human rights violations (e. g. Dudgeon; Toonen), have been brought to the 
international courts by individuals who were themselves lesbian and gay acti". 1sts. NN-ho 
have made an occupation of fighting for lesbian and/or gay rights. 
Another reason is that the threat to governments (and sometimes organisations) 
of embarrassment; exposure; or exclusion from international politics, trade, and aid; is 
often enough to achieve the desired goals. Since the 1960s over half of the \ý'orld's 
countries have repealed their sodomy laws (Sanders, 1996). The pressure exerted by 
human rights organisations has a major impact on the advancement of human rights, 
including lesbian and gay human rights. Human rights organisations usually work 
outside of the legal system, so advancements made by these organisations are often 
'hidden' achievements. In the UK, organisations such as Stonewall, Liberty, and 
Outrage! have played a significant part in lobbying for change in the political arena, 
thus minimising the number of cases which are brought before the international courts. 
However, these organisations have also contributed significantly to the recognition of 
lesbian and gay human rights by bringing individual cases to the attention of 
governments, international courts and the general public: Often it has been human rights 
organisations who have funded and supported cases brought before the international 
courts. 
Problems with a Human Rights Framework 
The human rights construct has faced intense criticism from a number of groups, 
including feminists and cultural relativists. In this section, I Nvill brietly explore - and 
counter -a number of key arguments against a human rights framework. My contention 
is that a human rights framework is useful for studying lesbian and pay issucs in 
psychology. 
I" ýS 
Universality vs Cultural Diversi", 
The main criticism levelled at proponents of human rights are accusations- of cultural 
imperialism, in that the underlying theory of human rights is liberal and indi" idualistic, 
and therefore seen as both 'western' and 'eurocentric' (Brems. 1997. %larks. 199, S': sec 
also discussion in Evans, 1998). In this respect, human rights have typically been 
viewed by many as an arrogant assertion by western culture that its N alLics- should be 
prioritised over those of non-westem cultures (Jones, 1994). Relativist, " have often 
claimed that human rights are a product of the dominant cultures of western countries. 
framed in their language, and reflecting their needs and aspirations (Brerns. 1997). 
Although most non-western cultures did not initially contribute to the \\'riting 
and fon-nulation of human rights documents such as the UDHR, most have been 
involved in their subsequent development (Perry, 1997). Almost all countries of the 
world are signatories to the UDHR (see the UN ýNrcbsite http: /, /ýý,,. N"ýý,,. un. org/), and many 
are signatories to similar human rights treaties and declarations, such as the African 
Charter, or the European Convention. Governments and nations seldom reject hurnan 
rights outright, but rather reject the classification of certain practices as human rights, or 
object to certain aspects of the content and interpretation of human rights documents 
(Brems, 1997). It would seem then, that although cultural differences may exist ýý'Ith 
respect to the content of human rights (i. e. what should or should not be included as 
human rights), there is significant transcultural agreement with the principle of human 
rights itself (Perry, 1997). Governments attempting to justify alleged violations of 
human rights have seldom justified their actions from a cultural perspective, thus, 
working within and affinning a human rights framework, rather than working against it 
(Heinze, 1995). 
Second, cultural and ethnic groups have frequently claimed that they do not 
view themselves as atomistic individuals, but rather as having an ascribed status as 
members of a larger group or community (Brems, 1997). The argument that human 
rights are individualistic and therefore incompatible with collectivist. or conimunitarian 
interests (Joncs, 1994) is often made, but is not necessarily justifiable. Although i-nany 
(particularly non-western) cultures do not view people as atomistic individuals, a liuman 
rights framework is not necessarily incompatible with the notion of collectivism. nor 
with cultural relativism. Humail rights are to some extent culturally relati\ c. in that (I 
all cultures embracc individualism and collectivism to some extent, and (2)) human 
rights are construed differently within different political contexts and cultures (see 
Cassese, 1990; Donnelley, 1993). This diversity is not necessarily a problem. in that the 
liberalism which underpins the notion of human rights seeks to accommodate and 
celebrate diversity (Jones, 1994). Thus, human rights are not inherently coerciN c. and 
although some human rights are absolute (i. e. the right to life, liberty. and secunt% of 
person), others are less central, and therefore there is room to justify sorne variation 
without obscuring the fundamental universality of human rights (Brems. 1997: 
Donnelley, 1993). Human rights provide a baseline of what is 'acceptable' practice, but 
they are not prescriptive, thus there is room for considerable diversity in cultural 
practices within those boundaries. 
Third, although there may be some cross-cultural divergence as to the exact 
nature and limits of specific concepts (e. g. 'dignity' or 'liberty'), there is widespread 
agreement that some rights are absolute (Heinze, 1995). For example, few cultures, 
faiths, or creeds agree that torture, rape, arbitrary detention, ethnic cleansing, and 
politically motivated disappearances are acceptable, or even tolerable (Perry, 1997). 
However, this is too simplistic, in that it assumes that the issue of human rights being 
(potentially) coercive can be reasonably easily reconciled with cultural relativism. 
However, this is potentially problematic when particular human rights are seen as 
fundamentally at odds with beliefs, values, and practices central to a given culture. For 
example, some cultures place a high premium on the first-born child being a boy, and 
thus condone (and even actively assist) the abortion of female foetuses. Likewise, in 
many non-western cultures it has been a long-standing cultural tradition to remove a 
woman's external genitals, and then force her to marry a man of someone else's 
choosing. Both, in one way or another contravene women's right (as human beings) to 
life, liberty, and security of person. 
Cultural practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM), the deliberate 
abortion of female foetuses, and widow burning (Sati), have been at the forefront of 
debates over human rights versus cultural practice. Typically, it has been argued by 
some (including women within those cultures) that these are time-honoured cultural 
practices whieh need to be preserved, whilst others (e. g. activists. those from Xýcstern 
cultures, as well as those from within the cultures in question) ha. c argued that such 
practices are human rights violations. 
However, 'ust because a given practice is culturally (or sociafly) condoiied. or 
even 'traditional'. does not rnean that it is acceptable, and that "c should respect or 
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tolerate it (Donnelley, 1994; Jones, 1994). Consider. for example. the deeply rooted 
cultural practices of racism. sexism. and anti-semitism in the west (Donnelley. 199'ý). 
The slaughtering of millions of Jews, homosexuals, religious activists. gypsie". and 
others in Nazi Gen-nany was culturally condoned, yet the outcry at those atrocities, led to 
the establishment of the contemporary human rights movements. with the support of 
western cultures to which such practices had been endemic. Similarly, prior to the civil 
rights movement, slavery, and more recently the banning of black people frorn certain 
occupations, activities and locations was culturally condoned in the west. Counter to 
claims of moral imperialism from outsiders, human rights for all have prii-nanily been 
advanced by those from within a culture, but who are not necessarily victims (Perry, 
1997), and as a result, it has been possible to change traditional cultural practices 
without rejecting culture or religion (Marks, 1998). 
We can further validate the argument for human rights by examining the extent 
to which human rights violations actually occurring at the moment, are manifestations 
of cultural practices which just happen to conflict with human rights. The answer is 
probably not all that many. As Jones (1994) suggests, the vast majority of hurnan rights 
violations are unlikely to be the result of people innocently carrying out cultural 
practices, but rather, "mere abuses of power [by authorities, acquaintances, or family 
members] or consequences of ideologies [e. g. Christianity] which are every bit as 
western in origin as the doctrine of human rights" (Jones, 1994, p. 219). Moreover, to 
claim that on the basis of ascriptive characteristics (e. g. sex, race), one group (especially 
the group with the power and responsibility for defining and enforcing those 
distinctions) is entitled to radically different basic rights from another group, is not 
about cultural diversity, but rather is an outright rejection of the idea of human rights 
(Donnelley, 1993), and is itself an abuse of power by one group over another. 
Furthen-nore, whilst many non-western cultures are apparently unwilling to embrace the 
construct of human rights because of its eurocentrism and individualism, they are often 
only too willing uncritically to embrace other neo-colonialistic influences on their 
cultures (i. e. McDonalds; Cable TV; The Internet) (see Mason-John & OkorroýN-a. 
1995). 
In the case of homosexuality, attempts have often been made in non-\N, estem 
societies to justify the violation of lesbians' and gay men Is human rights on the basis 
that homosexuality is a "white man's [sic] disease" (see Doughty, 1998, Gledhill. 1998: 
Nlason-John & Khambatta, 1993): a product of colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
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However, numerous accounts from anthropologists. sociologists, and lesbians and py 
men in non-western societies suggest that homosexuality in some form or other existed 
in many traditional societies. and was acceptable in countries and regions as Culturally 
and temporally diverse as India and South Asia (see AIDS Bhedba,,, - Virodhi Andolan 
(ABVA), 1993; Thadani, 1996a; 1996b); Indonesia (see Ga-yatri, 1996), Nigeria, Kenya. 
East Africa, and Tanzania (see Mason-John & Khambatta, 1993; Mason-John & 
Okorrowa, 1995); New Guinea, Melanesia, and Polynesia (see Besnier, 1993: Herdt, 
1997; Te Awekotuku, 1995); Turkey (see RISC, 1992): Thailand (see Herdt. 1997, 
Weinrich & Williams, 1991); among Indigenous Canadian peoples (Weinrich & 
Williams, 1991; Williams, 1996); and in ancient Greece (see Herdt, 1997). Recent 
accounts by black lesbians (e. g. Mason-John & Okorrowa, 1995; Thadani, 1996) claim 
that it is colonialism, in particular, the importation of Christianity to Affica and Asia, 
and the slave trade which were largely responsible for the erasure and suppression of 
indigenous 'homosexual iti es' (see also Sanders, 1996). 
Awareness of Human Rights is poor and Support for Human Rights Weak 
Despite ever-increasing access to inforination and the media, awareness of human rights 
is generally poor. In the 1970s, Holt (1972) reported that when given a copy of major 
human rights documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, most Americans 
were not able to recognise the documents, and found them both 'radical' and 
'subversive'. Much more recently though, Peters and Montgomerie (1998) reported 
"considerable ignorance" (p. 45) on the part of teachers as to human rights in relation to 
education, and PayaslyoOlu and Iýduygu (1999) that on average only 53% of students 
showed awareness of which human rights issues existed in legislation. Congruently, 
studies of school children report a lack of understanding of the concept of human rights 
and appear generally uninformed about human rights issues (see Wade, 1994 for 
reviews). However, whilst support for human rights is typically reported to be greater 
among university educated individuals (e. g. see PayaslyoOlu & lqdu,,, I-, u, 1999: Sotclo, 
2000a), teachers are often reported to resist human rights education (see Wade. 1994 for 
re\-lews). Furthen-nore, Spini & Doise (1998) report that many of their respondents 
showed a 'disinterested' attitude towards human rights. 
However. over recent years. the human rights movement has gaincd momentum. 
The UDHR is currently ratified by almost all of the world's countnc,, -, and has inspired 
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more than 60 human rights treaties, declarations. and covenants around the world (L-',, 
Department of Public Information. 1997). Amnesty International, the world's largest 
human rights organisation currently has just over one million members worldwide 
(AIUK Information Office, personal communication. 3 August 2000). Furthermore. in 
the UK, current opinion polls show that around 89% of people sun, eved "'ay that the\, 
believe in human rights (Puddphatt, 1998). 
It has also been suggested that human rights are poorly understood (Bouandel, 
1997), and as a result have not been widely promoted. It took the 50th anniversary of 
the signing of the UDHR in 1998 to bring human rights back to the forefront of 
international politics. The United Nations declared 1995-2004 the decade of human 
rights education, and have been undertaking a massive public a%vai-cness campaigrn to 
educate people about and promote human rights (see UN Department of Public 
Infori-nation, 1997). 
Support for human rights may still be relatively weak, and the extent of human 
rights violations occurring internationally would suggest that it is, but this is not a 
reason to ignore human rights. Just because something is not well supported, does not 
mean that it is not important. The vast majority of issues which acti",, ists have succeeded 
in winning on grounds of human rights have not been popular. The fact that the hui-nan 
rights of many individuals, including lesbians and gay men, are being violated, daily, is 
reason enough to pursue (and promote) human rights. 
Human Rights Formulations as Poor Representations of 'True' Human Rights 
Another major problem with a human rights framework, is that discussion around 
human rights issues has typically started from, and centred around human rights 
declarations, treaties, and covenants. Human rights declarations, charters. and treaties. 
purport to represent 'true'. 'self-e,, v, ident', and 'inherent' human rights. For example. 
Article I of the UDHR states that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and shall act toward's one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood [sic]". (UN, 1948, p. 2). Similarly. the , \mencan 
Declaration of independence states "we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men 
[sic] are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable 
rights" (American Declaration of Independence, 1776, p. 1). Ho\vever, these 
formulations are poor representations of 'true' human rights, in that (I ) they arc 
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exclusive of certain groups in society; (2) they are vaguely worded. leaving their 
interpretation open to abuse; and (3) they include some rights which may not 
necessarily be human rights, whilst excluding others which might be humall rights. 
To date, lesbians and gay men (and also disabled people) have not been 
explicitly mentioned in any human rights document. Article 2 of the UDHR and its 
regional counterparts (i. e. Article I of the American Convention, Article 119 of the 
European Convention, and Article 2 of the Affican Charter) states that "Evel-, one is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion. 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status" (UN, 1998, my emphasis). 13ý' 
not being specifically mentioned in these formulations both activists and lesbians and 
gay men have encountered unnecessary discussion about whether sexual orientation is a 
protected category in international law, under the terms "other status", or even "sex". 
In attempts to resolve this issue, legal discussion has focused on whether sexual 
orientation is innate or chosen, with varying consequences in legal practice (see 
Wintemute, 1995). However, discussion around the origin and inclusion of sexual 
orientation ought not to be an issue, as it fails to recognise that human rights are 
afforded to people as human beings, and not on a basis of categories, such as sexual 
orientation. However, one of the main problems, is that distinctions are made in human 
rights legislation (i. e. race, sex, and religion are explicitly stated), which gives rise to 
discussion of other categories or statuses. From a 'true' human rights position, it would 
be better not to mention any examples, but to merely state 'all human beings'. 
On the other hand, as Celia Kitzinger highlights "there is always the danger that 
oppressed groups will be excluded from rights and protections unless they are 
specifically included by name" (Kitzinger, 1994, p. 138). The non-inclusion of lesbians 
and gay men in human rights formulations has, in practice, discriminated against 
lesbians and gay men. For example, in the Toonen v Australia (1994) case, a precedent 
1, N, as set in that the judge ruled that the category "sex" in the UDHR was to be taken as 
inclusive of sexual orientation (see IGLHRC, 1998a; Wilets, 1994). Howex-er, in the 
Grant v South West Trains case in the UK (1996), a verdict was reached on a basl,, that 
'sex' did not include sexual orientation (see BBC, 1998, European Court, 1998). The 
former case was successful, whereas the latter was not: Had homoscxualitý- been 
explicitly included in the formulations, this could not have happened. The exclusion of 
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any group through non-mention has contributed to the reinforcement of cultural 
definitions of the excluded groups as less than fully human (Bunch, 1995)- 
Additionally, the wording of these documents. in particular the use of sexist 
language, has also been problematic for establishing inclusion. Although more recent 
versions of the UDHR and its regional counterparts have been reýN, orded using inclusiVe 
language (e. g. "no one... " and "everyone... "), there are still a number of anomalies. For 
example, articles 22,27 (2), and 29 (1 & 2) of the UDHR. and articles 5 (2 & 4), 0 (1). 
and 8 (1) of the European Convention include explicitly sexist language. Article 8 (1) of 
the European Convention is a prime example, stating that "Everyone has the nght to 
respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence" (Council of 
Europe, 1950, my emphasis). Similarly, even the American Convention talks about "the 
essential rights of man" (see Organisation of American States, 1969, my emphasis). 
Feminist writers have also been critical of human rights. Apart from the issue of 
sexist language, human rights have typically been viewed by feminists as men"s (read: 
male) rights, in that they fail to reflect the need for protection from the human rights 
violations typically faced by women, instead priontising the rights of concern to men: 
namely, civil and political rights in the public sphere (Bunch, 1995). Many feminists 
have claimed that human rights are "a product of the dominant male half of the world, 
framed in their language, reflecting their needs and aspirations" (Brems, 1997, p. 137), 
and that they are therefore underpinned by a western liberal discourse based in the 
public sphere from which women have traditionally been excluded (Peterson & Parisi, 
1998). 
Although not the only issue of concern (Friedman, 1995), feminists have 
particularly been concerned with the omission of violence against women (especially in 
the private sphere) from the human rights agenda, despite its obvious connection with 
human rights. For example, Charlotte Bunch states that violence against women is 
the issue which most parallels a human rights paradigm and yet is excluded. You can see in 
violence all the things the human rights community already says it's against: it invok es , Ia-% ery. it 
involves situations of torture, it involves terrorism, it invokes a whole serics of things that the 
human rights community is already committed to [fightMg. but which] have never been defined in 
terms of Nvomen's lives. (quoted in Friedman, 1995, p. 20). 
Essentially this is still the case. however, the recognition of women's rights as human 
rights have recendly begun to be acknowledged. For example, the World Contercnce on 
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Human Rights in Vienna 0 993) gained recognition for violence against womeii. 
whether in public or private as a human rights violation (Bunch, 1996), and rape has 
been formally recognised by the UN as a form of torture, especially when perpetrated 
by police officials or during war (Bunch, 1995). 
Feminists have also claimod that human fights not only marginalisc wonieii ." 
concerns, but favour the interests of white, western, heterosexual males at the expciisc 
of non-white, non-western, and non-heterosexual cultures and individuals (Evans. 
1998). In particular, human rights have been criticised for their state sanctioned 
heterosexism because of their failure to provide legal protection for those whose 
gender/sexuality is 'outside' of the heterosexual norm, and who are therefore N-ulnerablc 
to discrimination and violence (Peterson & Parisi, 1998). 
Furthermore, the wording of human rights treaties and declarations is 
sufficiently vague that their interpretation is left to discretion, and therefore open to 
abuse. For example, in the UDHR, words such as 'arbitrary' (article 9,12, & 15) are not 
defined, and concepts such as 'family' (article 16) and 'education' (article 26) are not 
qualified. This is problematic, firstly, because concepts of 'family' and 'education' 
differ considerably cross-culturally, and secondly, because the translation of words into 
other languages 13 can substantially alter their meaning. However. suggesting that more 
specific definitions and qualifications need to be employed in formulations of human 
rights, runs the risk of producing legislation that is prescriptive and (potentially) 
imperialistic. However, in not at least engaging with these issues, the vagueness of 
human rights documents has contributed to human rights abuses both transculturally 
(e. g. the imposition of western style schooling in non-western settings) and 
intraculturally (e. g. FGM, Sati, and the abortion of female foetuses). 
Finally, the content of human rights documents is problematic. For example. 
even at the time the UDHR was being devised, there was some cross-cultural 
disagreement over what should or should not count as a human right (see Humphrey, 
1988). Whilst the right to vote in elections (which is included in some form in human 
rights documents) may well be a right which people are entitled to, it is debatable 
whether it is a human right, in that it is tied to the concept of democracy, which is not 
inherent to being human. Similarly. some (e. g. Okin, 198 1) have argued that the ri ght 
13 To date, the Universal Declaration has been translated into more than 200 Ian, -, ua, -, c,, including a 
number of local language vct-sions released for the 50th Anniversary of the signing of the Um\ erNal Cý II 
Declaration (UN' Department of Public Information. 1998a). 
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to (give and receive) love is essential to the well-being of the person, and is therefore a 
basic human right, yet this is omitted ftom all the major human rights docurnents. 
Summary: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation 
Increasingly, lesbian and gay rights are being recognised as human rights iSSLICS. 
However, while the literature has much to offer by way of utopian visions, it is clear 
from the first section of this chapter that there is a large mismatch bem-een theorý' and 
the socio-political reality for lesbians and gay men (Dvans, 1998). By locating sexual 
orientation within a human rights framework (in the same way as has been previouslý' 
done for women and black people) lesbians and gay men can link their struggle to a 
tradition that has transformed an array of basic human needs into rights respected under 
domestic and international law (Helfer & Miller, 1996). Since human rights have 
proved an important tool in other spheres, they may also be strategically useful in the 
contemporary struggle to create positive social change for lesbians and gay men, despite 
claims of their inherent heterosexism (Kaplan, 1997; Peterson & Parisi, 1998). 
Furthermore, the struggle to achieve lesbian and gay human rights is integral to 
the struggle for the human rights of all people, not just lesbians and gay men. Just as a 
chain is only as strong as its weakest link, human rights as an effective political tool are 
only as strong as their weakest links. Therefore, if human rights are to be effective in the 
struggle to ensure human rights for all people then we must work to achieve recognition 
of all people in human rights policy and practice: "If the human rights of any group are 
left behind. ) the 
human rights of all are incomplete" (Bunch, 1996, p. viii). 
This chapter has looked at human rights in theory and practice, with particular reference 
to human rights violations against lesbians and gay men, and the extent to which a 
human rights framework has been successful in securing human rights for lesbians and 
gay men. In the next chapter, the extent to which human rights have featured within 
psychology will be outlined, and the interface between lesbian and gay psychology and 
hurnan rights explored. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Psychology and Lesbian and Gay Human Rights 
In the previous chapter the socio-political situation for lesbians and gay men was 
discussed, the concept of human rights introduced, and the intersection betwcen lesbian 
and gay issues and human rights highlighted. Given the extent to'ýý'hich the human 
rights of lesbians and gay men are violated, it would be expected that human rights 
violations against lesbians and gay men would be of concern to psychologists. The 
purpose of this chapter, then, is to discuss the relationship between psychology and 
human rights, with particular reference to lesbian and gay issues. 
In order to explore the interface between psychology and lesbian and gay human 
rights, this chapter comprises three main sections. In the first section, the interface 
between psychology and human rights will be discussed. Next, the relationship between 
psychology as a discipline and lesbian and gay issues will be discussed, with reference 
to human rights. Finally, the relationship between lesbian and gay issues within (and 
beyond) psychology and human rights will be explored. The main argument of this 
chapter, discussed in the concluding section, is that psychology has seldom explicitly 
engaged with human rights, much less in relation to lesbian and gay issues. 
Psychology and Human Rights 
Although popular within political and legal studies, a human rights framework has 
seldom been explicitly employed in mainstream psychological research. However, 
where it has been employed, a human rights perspective has been applied to issues such 
as domestic violence (e. g. Perilla, 1999; Russo, Koss, & Goodman, 1995), incest (e. g. 
Russell, 1995), transracial adoption (e. g. Penn & Coverdale, 1996) and educational 
psychology practice (e. g. Burden, 1993). 
Despite the dearth of psychological studies employing a human rights 
framcwork, human rights themselves ha\ýe been of some interest to psychologists in 
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three main ways: (1) the implications of human rights for psychological practice. (2) 
moral reasoning, and (3) attitudes, perceptions, and understandings of human rights. I 
shall now review each of these in turn. 
Human Rights and Psychological Practice 
Contemporary psychology has acknowledged the importance of psycholop, in the 
advancement of basic human rights (e. g. see Melton, 1989,1992: Rosenzweh, '. 1988). 
Much psychological research has therefore been devoted to investigating the extent and 
psychological consequences of human rights violations, typically with a vieNN- to deN-eloping 
appropriate therapeutic practices. For example, many studies have explored hurnan nghts 
violations as a consequence of specific political regimes (e. g. Khamis, 1998; Rasekh et al., 
1998); against specific groups of individuals such as children (e. g. Cohn, 1998; Dawes & 
Cairns, 1998; Wessells, 1997) or cultural, religious and/or social groups (e. g. Ghadirian, 
1998; Kornfeld, 1995); whilst others have investigated the effect of war on civilian 
populations (Lykes, Brabexk, and Radan, 1993; Summerfield, Loughrey, Nikapota, & 
Parry-Jones, 1997), trauma following human rights violations (e. g. Becker, 1995; Silox"e, 
1999), and empowerment of (e. g. Snodgrass-Godoy, 1999) and empathy for (e. g. Harff, 
1987) victims of human rights violations. 
A small body of psychological literature has also been devoted to the discussion 
of human rights in relation to policy and practice outside of psychology concerning 
children (e. g. Drexel, 1994; John, 1994; Lansdown, 1994; Levesque, 1996; Verhellen, 
1994), and the disabled (e. g. Ashman, 1990; Baker, 1993; Olkin, 1997; Stratford, 
199 1). The main purpose of studies concerning children has been to assess human 
rights violations against children (e. g. physical violence, poverty, and homelessness) in 
relation to international human rights treaties such as the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (e. g. see John, 1994; Lansdown, 1994; Levesque, 1996). Studies of human 
rights and disability, on the other hand, have focused on the human rights of disabled 
persons in relation to issues such as sterilisation of the intellectually disabled (e. (-,. 
Ashman, 1990): the right to live and work in the community (e. g. Stratford, 199 1 ); and 
the development of appropriate therapeutic practice when working with disabled 
children (e. g. Olkin, 1997). 
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Mainstream psychology has also reflected on human rights in relation to therapeutic 
and research practices more generally. A number of studies have evaluated therapeutic 
practice for dealing specifically with victims of human rights abuses. In particular, se,. ei-al 
studies (e. g. Gavagan & Martinez, 1997) have focused on the development of stratcgics fol- 
intervention with survivors of human rights violations, whilst others (e. (-,. see Becker, 1995. 
Lykes, 1996; Silove, 1999; Simpson, 1995) have engaged in debates about the usefulne"s 
of psychological constructs, notably post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), when dealing 
with victims of human rights violations. These studies have tended to conclude that the 
construct of PTSD is inadequate for describing the psychological status of victims of 
human rights abuses. 
However, the main area where psychological practice has come under scrutiny, has 
been in terrns of ethics, or the extent to which research and therapeutic practices respect the 
rights of human subjects. The social climate of concern for human rights during the 1960s 
and 1970s, the revision of ethical guidelines within institutional ised psychology, and the 
publication of Baumrind's (1964) critique of Stanley Milgram's (1963) study of obedience, 
strongly contributed to an increased interest by psychologists in the ethics of psychological 
research (McGaha & Kom, 1995). As a result, psychology spawned numerous publications 
and researches devoted to discussing and evaluating the ethics of procedures and practices 
in psychological research (e. g. Elms, 1975; Gardner, 1978; Kelman, 1967) and therapy (e. g. 
Kastrup, 1997; Vasquez, 1996). 
Moral Reasoning 
Psychological theory and research on moral reasoning has engaged more implicitly with 
human rights. Human rights occupy a small, but key position in moral developmental 
theory. Lawrence Kohlberg devised a stage theory of moral development, comprising 
six stages, or modes of reasoning about moral issues (see table 2.1). Based on Jean 
Plaget's cogitive-moral developmental theory, each of the six stages were grouped into 
three lcx, cls of moral development: precon,,, -entional. conventional, and postcon%, cntional 
(or principled) (Langford, 1995). 
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Table 2.1: The Six Moral Stages (adapted from Kohlberg, 1984, pp. 174-176) 
Content of Stage 
Level and stage What is right Reasons for doing right 
Level 1: Preconventional 
Stage 1- Heteronomous 
morality 
To avoid breaking rules backed by 
punishment, obedience for its own sake, 
avoiding physical damage to persons and 
property. 
Avoidance of punishment, and the 
supedor power of authorities. 
Stage 2- Individualism, 
instrumental purpose, and 
exchange. 
Following rules when it is in someone's 
immediate interest; acting to meet one's 
own interests and letting others do the 
same. Right is what's fair, an equal 
exchange, a deal, an agreement. 
To serve one's own needs or interests in 
a world where you have to recognise 
that other people have their interests, 
too. 
Level 11: Conventional 
Stage 3- Mutual 
interpersonal expectations, 
relationships, and 
interpersonal conformity. 
Living up to what is expected by people 
close to you. "being good" is important and 
means having good motives, showing 
concern about others. 
The need to be a good person in your 
own eyes and those of others. Desire to 
maintain rules and authority which 
support stereotypical good behavior. 
Stage 4- Social system and Fulfilling the duties to which you have 
conscience agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in 
extreme cases where they conflict with 
other fixed social duties. Right is 
contributing to society, the group, or 
institution. 
To keep the institution going as a whole, 
to avoid breakdown in the system "if 
everyone did it", or the imperative of 
conscience to meet one's defined 
obligations. 
Level III: Postconventional 
or Principled 
Stage 5- Social contract 
or utility and individual 
rights 
Being aware that people hold a variety of 
values and opinions, that most values and 
rules are relative to your group. These 
relative rules should be upheld in the 
interest of imparbality and because they 
are the social contract. Some nonrelative 
values and rights like life and liberty, 
however, must be upheld in any society 
and regardless of majority opinion. 
A sense of obligation to the law because 
of one's social contract to make and 
abide by laws for the welfare of all and 
for the protection of all people's rights. A 
feeling of contractual agreement freely 
entered upon, to family, friendship, and 
work obligations. Concern that laws and 
duties be based on rational calculation of 
overall utility, "the greatest good for the 
greatest number". 
Stage 6- Universal 
ethical principles. 
Following self-chosen ethical principles. 
Particular laws or social agreements are 
usually valid because they rest on such 
principles. When laws violate these 
principles, one acts in accordance with the 
principle. Principles are universal 
principles of justice: the equality of human 
rights and respect for the dignity of human 
beings as individual persons. 
The belief as a rational person in the 
validity of universal moral principles, and 
a sense of personal commitment to 
them. 
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Although by adulthood, indi, ý'iduals are (theoretically) able to reason at a 
postconventional level, they still have access to the range of arguments available at all 
six 'stages'. Within this framework, reasoning from a human rights perspectiN c 
occupies a privileged position, featuring at stage six, the 'highest' stage of moral 
reasoning. This is evident, in that Kohlberg (1984) explicitly states that reasonin (-Y at 
stage six is characterised by "universal principles of justice: the equality of human 
rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons" (p. 176). 
Human rights reasoning is therefore central to Kohlbergian moral deN-elopmental theory 
and indicative (in Kohlberg's theory) of maturity in moral reasoning. 
Arising from Kohlberg's theory is a well established body of empirical research, 
but for the most part, these studies have seldom explored human rights reasoning, much 
less engaged with a human rights framework. In part, this is probably due to the fact 
that in most studies, few (if any) participants have been found to reason at stage six (see 
Kohlberg, 1984; Kohlberg et al., 1983). However, although stage six (human rights) 
reasoning seldom appears to emerge in studies of moral reasoning, in moral 
developmental theory it serves as the benchmark by which earlier stages of reasoning 
are considered less adequate (Carter, 1987). 
More importantly, studies of moral reasoning have tended not to focus on the 
types of arguments used to reason about moral issues, but typically have focused on 
exploring correlates of moral reasoning (e. g. Chovan & Freeman, 1993; Hubbs-Tait & 
Gan-non, 1995; Lapsley et al., 1984; Lonkey et al., 1984); investigated the moral 
reasoning of specific groups, such as young offenders (e. g. Aleixo & Norris, 2000; 
Mullis & Hanson, 1983), ethnic groups and non-western cultures (de Mey et al., 1999-, 
Hau & Lew, 1989; Zeidner & Nevo, 1987); or have explored gender differences in 
moral reasoning (e. g. Galotti et al., 1991; Wark & Krebs, 1996). Others have used a 
Kolbergian framework to undertake longitudinal studies of moral development (e. g. 
Kitchener et al., 1984). In order to facilitate large-scale research of this kind, many 
studies have employed Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT), a psychometric test 
designed to operationallse Kohlberg's theory (see Schlaefli et al., 1985 and Rest et al., 
1978 for reviews of psychological studies employing this measure). 
Some studies within a moral developmental framework have, hoxvcver, explored 
people's (mostly children's) attitudes towards or reasoning about specific rights issues. 
i -) 
including human rights issues. For example, psychologists have studied attitude,, -, 
towards and reasoning about euthanasia (e. g. see Lee et al., 1996: Rogers. 1996): the 
death penalty (e. g. Ellsworth and Gross. 1994); environmental issues (e., -,. Kahn. 1997). 
and AIDS (e. g. Schwalbe & Staples, 1992). 
Moral developmental theory has come under considerable criticism though (cf. 
Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983), for being andro- and ethno-centric (e. g. scc Gilligan. 
1982; Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1987; Sampson, 1988). and for a failure in empirical research to 
demonstrate sequential progression through the stages (e. g. see Carter, 1987). In particular, 
Kohlberg's theory has been criticised by feminists, notably Carol Gilligan (1982). who 
have claimed that the model is androcentric because it favours a justice-based reasoning 
favoured by men, over the ethics of care and connection favoured by women (see Gilligan, 
1982; or for a summary see Greene & Maccoby, 1986). 
However, Gilligan's study has also come under criticism (e. g. see the '\-Iewpoint' 
section of Signs, 11 (2), 1986; Special feature in Feminism & PsVchologi,, 4 (3). 1994: also 
Segal, 1987; Woods, 1996). Whilst Gilligan's study seems to suggest that when reasoning 
about 'real life' issues such as abortion, women invoke an ethic of 'care and connection', it 
is not self-evident that women consistently use this type of reasoning when thinking about 
moral issues (Kerber, 1986). Furthermore, studies of moral reasoning which specifically 
look at sex/gender differences have, with few exceptions, found little difference in 
reasoning between women and men, even when using Gilligan's own method (Wood, 
1996). Moreover, some have suggested that the tendency for women to reason from a 
standpoint of care and connection, rather than of justice, may equally be interpreted as a 
consequence of women's socialisation and oppression, as of the hierarchical structure of 
Kohlberg's theory. 
However, as others (e. g. Schwalbe & Staples, 1992) have suggested, people may be 
stage inconsistent in their reasoning, employing different types of arguments depending oil 
the type of dilemma they are faced with. In revising his theory in the 1980s, Kohlberg 
himself suggested that each stage of his moral framework was self-contained. comprising 
distinct vicws of the socio-moral world (see Carter, 1987). So, although Kohlberg's 
cognitive-moral framework has traditionally been seen as a sequential, hierarchical. stage 
theory, it may equally be conceptualised as six distinct ways of thinking about moral issues. 
Essentially though, Kohlberg's theory is a theory of justice, and therefore of social 
transfon-nation (Lourenqo, 1996). thus a failure to employ stage six (human nights) 
reasoning may be viewed as a rejection of the notion of justice and positive s(--)c'al change. IIIII- 
Attitudes, Perceptions, and Understandings of Human Rights 
Human rights have also featured in the psychological study of attitudes. Since the mid- 
1980s there has been a burgeoning interest in attitudes towards and/or social 
understandings of human rights among mainstream psychologists. This field of enquirý' 
has primarily explored understandings of human rights among specific populations. 
such as children (e. g. Wade, 1994; Ruck et al., 1998); investigated understandings ill 
cross-national (e. g. Clemence et al., 1995; Dolse et al., 1999) and non-westem contexts 
(e. g. Atolagbe and Otubanjo, 1984; Macek et al., 1997); and looked at people's 
constructions of human rights (for example, Diaz-Veizades et al., 1995, Stainton- 
Rogers & Kitzinger, 1995) and whether situational and ideological contexts make a 
difference to people's attitudes (Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990). 
Central to this body of research has been the work of Willem Doise, who with 
international colleagues has carried out a number of cross-national studies exploring 
how people in different countries organise their beliefs about violations of human 
rights, and whether these concur with the principles defined by experts and international 
organisations (e. g. see Clemence et al., 1995; Doise et al., 1994-, Doise et al., 1999). 
These studies employed a composite questionnaire primarily comprising (1) 30 articles 
of the UDHR, to which respondents were asked to evaluate understanding and 
importance of each article (see Doise et al., 1994), and (2) the Rokeach Values Survey 
(Rokeach, 1973). On a basis of a cluster analysis of responses, findings of these studies 
suggest that for the most part, individuals adhere to an institutional definition of human 
rights. Conversely, a study of the construction of human rights in public discourse, 
using a Q-sort methodology showed a lack of homogeneity in people's construction of 
human rights (see Stainton Rogers & Kitzinger, 1995). 
From a developmental perspective, some psychologists have explored children's 
and adolescents' conceptual understandings of human rights (Helwhy. 1995, Ruck et al.. 
1998; Wade, 1994). In one study (Ruck et al., 1998) children and adolescents frorn ýi-e 
eight to 16 were interviewed on their knowledge about human rights. The semi- 
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structured interviews comprised questions such as "What is a right"*' and "Who has 
rights? " followed by vignettes structured around moral dilemmas where a child wishcs 
to exercise a right that is in conflictkvith authority. Similarly. in Wade's (1994) studN. 
after a class unit on human rights, children between the ages of nine and eleven %vere 
interviewed about their understandings of human rights. and how they \ iewed the 
connection between human rights and their own lives. The findings of both studies 
suggest that children's understandings about human rights are influenced by lioýv the, 
perceive rights in their own lives, and are based on their personal interests and agendas. 
Although currently only a small body of research, others (Diaz-k'eizades et al., 
1995) have directly explored attitudes towards human rights issues, either by 
investigating perceptions of the existence of human rights in a given setting (e. g. 
Atolagbe & Otubanjo, 1984; Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990; Payaslyo6lu & 
19duygu, 1999), or by exploring support for human rights for all (e. g. Payaslyo6lu & 
lgduygu, 1999; Sotelo, 1997,2000a, 2000b). In one study (Atolagbe & Otubanjo, 
1984), university students in Nigeria were administered an attitude survey, comprising 
statements about human rights and the enforcement of justice in Nigeria (e. g. "Freedom 
of speech exists in Nigeria"; "To wipe out crime in Nigeria, the courts should impose 
stiffer fines or longer jail sentences"), to which respondents were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement. The findings of this study 
showed a "fairly positive assessment of ... opportunities 
for the enjoyment and defence 
of human rights in Nigeria" (p. 96). Conversely, in Moghaddam & Vuksanovic's (1990) 
study, students were randomly distributed one of three different versions of an 
otherwise identical human rights scale. Following an experimental design, respondents 
were asked to indicate the extent to which they perceived specific violations in human 
rights to be occurring in Canada (condition 1), The Soviet Union (condition 2), and 
Third World societies (condition 3). Analyses of the data showed that support for 
human rights was stronger in the Soviet and third world conditions than in the Canada 
condition. Moghaddam & Vuksanovic also found that religiousity and right-wing 
political ideology were negatively associated with support for human rights. 
Other studies on support for human rights have typically comprised the 
administration of attitude surveys. For example, Diaz-Veizades (1995) administered an 
attitude survcy comprising questions about the extension of human rights generally 
"Everyone should have the right to favorable conditions of work-, "Everyone should 
have the right to leave any country, even his or her own"). A factor analysis sho%ved 
that the items converged on four factors (social security, civilian constraint, Equality. 
Privacy), which like other studies (e. g. Clemence et al., 1995: Dolse et al.. 1994, Doise 
et al., 1999) were reflective of the classifications currently used in human rights 
documents. Significant differences in responses on some of these factors ýý'ere found oil 
a basis of sex and political party affiliation. In Sotelo's studies (Sotelo. 1997,2000a, 
2000b) respondents also completed an attitude survey, but the focus of the studics NN'as 
to explore the willingness of participants to extend human rights to specific societal 
groups, such as feminists or homosexuals. 
Altematively, some studies (e. g. Diaz-Veizades et al., 1995, Doise et al., 1994: 
Macek et al., 1997) have extended the concept of support for human rights by 
investigating perceived responsibility for enforcing human rights. Overwhelmingly, 
these studies have concluded that most respondents view the enforcement of individual 
human fights as the responsibility of governmental institutions, rather than themselves. 
For example, in Macek et al. 's (1997) study, the majority of respondents did not bel icvc 
that they could contribute to the implementation of any of the articles of the UDHR, 
whilst in Doise et al. 's (1994) study, almost two thirds of respondents considered that 
none of the human fights issues concerned them personally. 
In summary, across these three areas, psychologists have engaged with human rights: 
explicitly, in relation to both psychological practice, and the study of attitudes, 
perceptions, and understandings of human rights; and implicitly in moral developmental 
theory. However, across these areas, it would seem that only one study (Sotelo, 2000b) 
has engaged with human rights in relation to lesbian and gay issues. In the next section. 
the relationship between psychology and lesbian and gay issues will be discussed. 
highlighting the extent to which psychology as a discipline has been responsible for 
both the advancement and inhibition of progress in achieving human rights for lesbians 
and gay men. 
Psychology and Lesbian and Gay Issues 
Since its inception, psychology has been responsible both for \-iolating and for 
promoting the human rights of lesbians and gay men, and at other times, hynoring 
lesbian and gay human rights issues completely. This section, will review the extent to 
which psychology as a discipline has (institutionally) engaged with lesbian and 
human rights, and has contributed to, or inhibited, the advancement of lesbian and gaý' 
rights. 
The advancement of lesbian and gay human rights within psychology as a discipline 
Since the 1970s, psychology has undergone a series of institutional changes which have 
contributed to the advancement of lesbian and gay rights, particularly in the United 
States, but more recently in the United Kingdom. 
Major institutional changes within psychology were largely triggered by the 
landmark decision of the Board of Directors of the American Psychiatric Association, 
in December 1973, to remove homosexuality (per se) from the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM), after the Association's meetings had repeatedly been 
interrupted by the social protest of gay activists (Bayer & Spitzer, 1982; Kitzinger, 
1990b; Silverstein, 1991). This decision was supported by the vote of the membership 
in 1974 (Bayer & Spitzer, 1982; Herek, 1997), by a 58% majority (Kirk & Kutchins, 
1992). 
The removal of homosexuality as a diagnostic category triggered activism 
within the American Psychological Association (APA), with the inauguration in the 
same year of the (then) Association of Gay Psychologists (AGP). The AGP delivered a 
list of demands to Albert Bandura, the then president of the APA, among which werc 
the demand for the APA Board of Directors to create a task force to represent lesbian 
and gay psychologists, and to follow the lead of the American Psychiatric Association 
in rejecting the notion of homosexuality as a mental illness (Kimmel & Browning. 
2000). In 1975, the APA Council of Representatives responded by establishing the Task 
Force on the Status of Lesbian and Gay Psychologists (later superseded by the 
Committee on Lesbian and Gay Concerns) to address issues facing lesbian and gav I ltý 
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members of the APA (Kimmel & Browning, 2000: Morin & Rothblum, 199 1). The 
es purpose of these groups was to be active in developing policy on civil rights ssu , for 
lesbians and gay men. In the same year, the Council amended its Equal Employment 
Opportunity policy to include sexual orientation, and declared its commitment to the 
depathologisation of lesbians and gay men stating that "homosexuality, per se. implicN 
no impairment in judgement, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational 
capabilities" and that "the American Psychological Association urges all mental health 
professionals to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness that has Iong 
been associated with homosexual orientations" (Conger. 1975, p. 633). 
Over this period, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues 
(Division 9 of the APA), a division committed to rights issues, acted as the liaison bodý' 
between the AGP and the APA (Kimmel & Browning, 2000). In January 1980, the 
Council created a Committee on Gay Concerns (COGC), to keep records of teaching 
and research on lesbian and gay issues, and to provide information to help change the 
stereotypical notions about homosexuality (Kimmel & Browning, 2000). In 1976, the 
President of the Association for the advancement of Behavior Therapy suggested that 
efforts to modify sexual orientation be terminated, setting the path towards the 
tennination of conversion therapy (Haldeman, 199 1, cited in Garnets & D'Augelli, 
1994). 
On 15 June 1981, a group met for the first time as an organised effort to achieve 
divisional status for the psychological study of lesbian and gay issues. The embargo on 
new divisions was lifted by the Council of the APA in January 1984 (Kimmel & 
Browning, 2000), and in August 1984, the Council (under the presidency of Janet 
Spence) by a majority of 70% voted that the Society for the Psychological Study of 
Lesbian and Gay Issues be established as Division 44 (Abeles, 1985; Kimmel & 
Browning, 2000). Four years later, the Council of the APA issued the following 
statement urging its members not to use the remaining classifications of homosexuality 
on the 1CD and DSM in psychological practice: 
BE IT RESOLVED that the American Psychological Association: Urge its- members not to 
use the -302.0 Homosexuality- diagnosis in the current ICD-9-CM or the "302-00 I-_, -, o- 
dystonic Homosexuality- diagnosis in the current DSM-111 or future editions of either 
document. (Fox, 1988, p. 529). 
Since January 1985. when Division 44 was officially established, the division 
sues and the APA together have been politically actiý'e in addressing ci ', I nghts, is 
affecting social policy (e. g. see Bersoff & Ogden, 199 1 ), and have taken an actl\ e role 
in addressing concerns and assessing psychologists through its Task Force on 
Heterosexual Bias in Psychotherapy. The APA's agenda of advancing civil rights fol- 
lesbians and gay men continues to be monitored by the Committee on Lesbian and Gay 
Concerns (Morin & Rothblum, 1991), much of this political action being due to the 
work of the ALGP (previously the AGP), which although sharing much of its 
membership with Division 44, as an organisation independent of the APA could 
respond in a more radical way than would have otherwise been possible (Kii-nmel & 
Browning, 2000). 
In the United Kingdom, progress towards the institutional recognition of lesbian 
and gay psychology has been somewhat slower. However, a Lesbian and Gay 
Psychology Section (the equivalent to a Division of the APA) was finally established 
within the British Psychological Society (BPS) on 18 December 1998 (Kitzinger, 
1999a; Wilkinson, 1999b). Although the remit of the BPS prohibits its sections from 
being 'political' (per se), it is clear that the Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section is (at 
least in part) devoted to ensuring the advancement of lesbian and gay rights. For 
example, the official aim of the section is reportedly 
I Fo contribute ... to removing the stigma of mental illness that 
has long been associated with -ga, y 
male and lesbian sexual identities and to contribute psychological perspectives to social policy 
initiatives which provide for better quality of life for lesbian and gay people, their families and 
ffiends. (Kitzinger et al., 1997, quoted in Kitzinger, 1999, p. 4). 
Currently, the Committee (on behalf of the Section) is in the process of finalising an 
official statement regarding the unequal age of consent for sex between men as opposed 
to their heterosexual counterparts. Its view as a professional body, is that "recent 
psychological research does not support the maintenance of the current disparity in the 
age of consent" and therefore "the Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section... finds no 
sound psychological evidence to support a different age of consent for same sex versus 
opposite-sex sexual activities" (British Psychological Society Lesbian and Gav 
ý ýj 
Psychology Section Committee. 2000). Subject to approval from the British 
Psychological Society, this statement will be made available in support of the 
advancement of lesbian and gay human rights. 
The impeding of lesbian and gay human rights within psychology as a discipline 
Despite considerable progress, the struggle to achieve positive social change for 
lesbians and gay men has been and continues to be developed against a backdrop of 
entrenched heterosexism within psychology as a discipline. A number of psychologists 
interested in lesbian and gay issues have commented on heterosexual bias, or cultural 
heterosexism in psychology generally (e. g. Kitzinger, 1990a: 1990b; 1996b: Lapsley & 
Paulin, 1994), in practical training (e. g. Buhrke, 1989; Pilkington & Cantor, 1996), and 
in psychological practices (e. g. Chemin et al., 1997; Morin, 1977). 
One of the main sources of heterosexism in psychology is the under- 
representation (and in some cases, the mis-representation) of lesbian and gay issues in 
psychology publications. As some psychologists (e. g. Kitzinger, 1996b: Lapsley & 
Paulin, 1994; Simoni, 1996) have pointed out, lesbians and gay men have been 
seriously marginalised in psychology textbooks. Typically, lesbian and gay issues are 
compartmental i sed in small sections on "homosexual behaviour" or "homosexual 
relationships" (Kitzinger, 1996), often in the adolescence chapter. Otherwise, lesbian 
and gay issues are relegated to specialist sub-di scipI ines, such as 'abnon-nal 
psychology' (Lapsley & Paulin, 1994). 
For example, in a recent investigation of psychology textbooks published 
between 1991 and 1995, in introductory, social, developmental, and abnon-nal 
psychology (Simoni, 1996), findings confirmed the general consensus of poor coverage 
of lesbian and gay perspectives and issues. Several of the textbooks reviewed did not 
mention the terrns 'lesbian', 'gay', 'homosexual', 'heterosexual', or 'sexual orientation' 
anywhere in the book, and most others segregated such content in sections on sexuality, 
or gave a token coverage of homosexuality (see also Kielwasser & Wolf 1994, for an 
examination of high school textbooks). Furthen-nore, whilst a substantial body of 
research suggests that young lesbians and gay men are at high risk of attempted suicide 
and self-harm, substance abuse, homelessness. truancy, and underachievement (e. g. scc 
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Remafedi et al.. 1993: Rotheram-Borus. et al.. 1992, Hershberger et al.. 1996). social 
and developmental psychologists have generally omitted to mention sexual Orientation 
in relation to these issues (see Nelson. 1994). 
Similarly, coverage of lesbian and gay issues in psychology journals is also 
poor. Apart from a special issue of Developmental PsYchologý- on "Sexual Orientation 
and Human Development" (vol. 3 1, issue 1,1995), lesbian and gay issues have seldom 
featured in mainstream psychology journals, although a special issue is planned for 
Journal of'Community and Applied Social Psychology (Ed. Coyle & Wilkinson). 
Although there is an ever-increasing number of interdisciplinary journals devoted to 
lesbian and gay issues (e. g. GLQ, Journal ofHomosexuality, Journal C! f Lesbian 
Studies, Journal of'Gay and Lesbian Social Services), to date there is only one 
specifically psychology journal devoted exclusively to lesbian and gay issues: The 
recently inaugurated BPS Lesbian and Ga. v Psy, chology Review. 
Furthermore, coverage of lesbian (and gay) issues in feminist psychology 
journals -a sub-discipline which one would expect to be more empathic about lesbian 
(and gay) issues - is patchy. For example, in Psychology of Women Quarterly from 
1991- 1998, only seven of the 191 articles (about 4%) appearing in that period were 
explicitly on lesbian issues. Feminism & Psychology has done somewhat better: of all 
the articles (all formats, excluding book reviews, and excluding the special issue on 
heterosexuality) published in Feminism & Psychologi, since its inauguration in 199 1, 
about 10% have been explicitl devoted to lesbian issues, and some articles on gay 
issues have also been published in the journal. However, a number of the articles 
appearing in the journal are multi- or inter-disciplinary, rather than strictly 
psychological, thus the actual percentage of lesbian (and gay) psychology articles per se 
is likely to be slightly lower than 10%. Despite this, as Kitzinger (I 996b) notes, there 
havc been recurrent complaints that Feminism & Psychology has 'too much' lesbian 
content. 
Moreover, lesbian (and gay) perspectives are largely absent from Psycholoov of týl 
Women textbooks, and where included, this amounts to a tokenistic gesture at being 
inclusive, and is often no better (and sometimes much worse) than the efforts of 
mainstream psychologists (Kitzinger, 1996). For example, a relatively recent 
psychology of women textbook titled "The Psychology of Women: Ongoing Debates" 
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(Walsh, 1987) includes only one section on lesbianism. which Is titled "Is Le, hianisill a 
Sickness? " (a question seldom raised in contemporary mainstream psvcholouyv). The 
sequel to this text (Walsh, 1997) engages, ývith a similarly outmoded debate. the sectioll 
on sexual orientation titled "Sexual Orientation: Is it Deten-nined by Biology')". 
Another source of hetero-centri city in psychology is found in the instruments 
used to measure psychological phenomena. In a recent investigation, Chernin Ct al. 
(1997) systematically assessed heterosexual bias in seven widely used psychological 
assessment instruments, finding that with only one exception, The Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI), all instruments contained some form of heterosexist bias. Chemin and 
colleagues identified three types of bias: omission bias -, výýhere wording and iterns refer 
to concepts and circumstances which apply exclusively to heterosexuality (e. g. inamed, 
copulation); connotation bias - when words with negative connotations are associated 
with sexual minorities (e. g. the juxtaposition of such tenns as "chi Id-mol ester" 
alongside the words "homosexual" or "gay"), and contiguity bias - when scales for 
assessing psychopathology appear alongside those assessing homosexuality. 
The professional training programs of clinical and other professional 
psychologists apparently also fail adequately to represent the issues and concerns of 
lesbians and gay men. In a relatively recent study, Pilkington & Cantor (1996) surveyed 
student members of Division 44 of the APA about their graduate training in 
professional psychology. Typically, comments in textbooks, and by instructors wcrc 
found to pathologise, stereotype, or ridicule lesbians and gay men, or referred to 
'diagnosing' and 'curing' homosexuality. 53% of the sample reported a total of 42 
heterosexually biased passages in clinical psychology textbooks, such as " homosexuals 
cannot truly love because they do not have the polarity of the opposite sexes in their 
relationships", and some describing male homosexuals as "passl\'e-weak characters... 
impulsive, and hypersexual" (quoted in Pilkington and Cantor, 1996, p. 606). 
Additionally, 58% of respondents reported offensive comments made by instructors, 
and 50% of the sample had been actively discouraged from undertaking practica. 
internships, or research on lesbian and/or gay issues or topics. 
Lack of exposure to lesbian and gay issues and perspectives in psychology 
courses more generally is also commonplace (see Kitzinger. 1990). In a large sur\, ey of 
doctoral students in counselling psychology (Buhrke, 1989), it was found that the 
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students received little exposure to lesbian and gay issues or clients in the course of 
their training. Furthermore, attempts to include lesbian and gay issues In the curriculum 
have frequently been discouraged (e. g. see Kitzinger. 1990; Mintz & Rothblum, 1997). 
Likewise, lesbian and gay academics (including psychologists) frequently report beino 
discouraged from including publications on lesbian and gay issues in their CVs, if they 
wish to secure tenure-track (US) or permanent (UK) positions (e. g. see Mintz & 
Rothblum, 1997). 
Attempts to establish a Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section within the BPS 
also met with considerable resistance. The initial proposal for a Psychology of 
Lesbianism Section was declined in 1991 by the BPS Council, and only receIN, ed tile 
support of one of the BPS's subsystems: the 'Special Group in Counselling 
Psychology' (Comely et al., 1992). A second proposal in 1993 was also declined by tile 
BPS Council & Scholastic Affairs Board (SAB) (Beloff, 1993, Wilkinson, 1999b), and 
although a somewhat revised proposal for a Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section was 
submitted in 1994, with the support of the Scientific Affairs Board this too was defeated 
at Council (Coyle et al., 1995; Wilkinson, 1999b). These early proposals were rejected 
by the BPS as being outside the remit of the society. Others within the BPS opposed the 
establishment of the section, as they felt that it was not something the Society should be 
seen to support (see Holder, 1993). For example, when the idea was first put forward, 
the Executive Secretary of the BPS wrote that "by accepting a section devoted to the 
study of lesbianism, the society will be giving a public signal that it endorses behaviour 
which, by the biblical standards they personally seek to follow, is incompatible with 
their own standards of morality" (Quoted in Holder, 1993), whilst the proposals 
themselves were turned down on the grounds of being "too narrow" and "too political" 
(Kitzinger, 1999a). 
The most recent attempt to establish the section was ratified in 1998, and the 
section was finally established, but only by a narrow majority vote (1988 to 1623) of 
the BPS membership (Kitzinger, 1999a; 1999b; Wilkinson, 1999b). This membership 
vote yielded the largest 'anti'-vote on any issue in the history of the BPS. and during 
the campaign to establish support, members of the steering group received abusive hate 
mail from sorne BPS members (see Kitzinger, 1999a; Wilkinson, 1999b). Since the 
Section has been established, attempts by the committee actively to contribute to the 
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advancement of lesbian and gay rights by providing official statements on public 
policy issues (e. g. the Age of Consent debate) have also been blocked by the BPS 
(Celia Kitzinger, address at the 'Extraordinary General Meeting' of Section ineillbers at 
the Inaugural BPS Lesbian and Gay Section Conference, The University of Surreý. 18 
July 2000). 
Summary 
Significant progress in advancing lesbian and gay rights has been made (at least in some 
quarters) within psychology institutionally. In the UK, the recent establishment of the 
Lesbian and Gay Section of the BPS, although strongly opposed, was endorsed by 
many members of the BPS with little or no professional interest in lesbian and gay 
psychology. This milestone, together with the forthcoming publication of a book on 
lesbian and gay psychology in the UK (published by the BPS), and the inaugural 
conference of the section in July 2000, represent important moves towards the 
recognition of lesbian and gay issues within institutional i sed psychology. 
On the other hand, psychology's maintenance of lesbian and gay invisibility 
through heterosexism and hetero-centri city in its publications, assessment instruments, 
professional training, and institutional representation has impeded the advancement of 
the human rights of lesbians and gay men. Thus psychology as a discipline has been 
responsible for both facilitating, and for impeding, the passage of positive social change 
for lesbians and gay men. Not only has psychology actively denied the rights of 
lesbians and gay men to access to information, and the right to organise institutionally 
(freedom of association), but it has inhibited the promotion of lesbian and gay human 
rights within and without psychology, by failing to legitimate and support the efforts of 
those actively working towards positive social change. 
In the next section, psychological theory and research on lesbian and gyaý' issues 
will be reviewed, with a view to exploring the interface between these issues and 
human rights. In particular, I will focus on the way(s) in which psychological theory 
and research on lesbian and gay issues has contributed to, or inhibited. the advanccrnent 
of lesbian and gay human rights. 
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Lesbian and Gay Issues as Human Rights - In and Beyond Psý cholo*- 
Since the late 1800s, lesbians and gay men have been the subjects Of interest and 
investigation, first by sexologists. and subsequently by psychologists. Howe\ er. the 
extent to which both sexologists and psychologists have attempted to address the 
human rights of lesbians and gay men has varied considerably as a function of socio- 
political climate and disciplinary ethos. 
In this section, the sexological and psychological literature on lesblans and oav -tý . 
men will be traced chronologically, and within its socio-political context e%-aluated in 
relation to a human rights perspective. Since a large body of literature is I-eviewed in 
this section, it will be divided into three subsections. The first of these ("'Early attempts 
to address lesbian and gay human rights") will trace the sexological literature on 
lesbians and gay men from the late nineteenth through to the early twentieth century. 
Next, the early psychological and mid-twentieth century sexological literature will be 
reviewed in the section titled "Opposing lesbian and gay human rights". Finally, the 
contemporary (post 1970s) psychological study of lesbians and gay men will be 
reviewed ("Leaving behind lesbian and gay human rights"). 
Early Attempts to Address Lesbian and Gay Human Rights: 
The Homosexual as Victim 
The predominantly anti -1 esbi an/gay stance within psychology owes much to the legacy 
of the early sexologists. Prior to the late 19th century, as with most aspects of social lite 
the status of sexuality in society was governed by the church and state. Lesbianism and 
gay male homosexuality (at least in Europe) were deemed "unnatural" and enshrined in 
religion as 'sin' and in law as 'crime' (Boswell, 1980; Herek, 1997), and therefore 
subject to punishment. As early as the 1600s, lesbian women were tried for witchcraft 
in Europe (see Barstow, 1994), and in the late 1800s much of Europe instituted la, -vs 
crii-ninalising sexual behaviour between males. Although early sexology has been 
frequently condemned for introducing the pathological model of homosexuality into 
psychology (e. g. see Kitzinger, 1987, p. 42-1), it is against the societal backdrop of its 
time, we must assess the work of early sexologists (NVeeks. 1977). 
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Prior to the development of sexology as a sub-discipline. Karl Heinrich Ulrich., 
pioneered the gay movement through his concern for the right of 'urnings' 
(homosexuals) to equality and equal treatment. Although Ulrichs claimed that umings 
were strong enough to fight for their own rights, he actively spoke out on their behalf 
for the abolishment of the Prussian anti-homosexual law (Kennedy, 1988). The law in 
question was the penal code § 152, which in 1871 became § 175, stating that "an 
unnatural sex act committed between persons of male sex or by humans with animals 
[was] punishable by imprisonment; [and that] the loss of civil rights may also be 
imposed" (Reich Penal Code, 1871, quoted in Grau, 1993, p. 65). In his campaign for 
institutional change, Ulrichs published much literature claiming that homosexuality 
should not be condemned in law, as despite a history of persecution, it had existed 
internationally for centuries, and therefore was both natural and inborn (Kennedy, 
1988). 
Similarly motivated by societal and legal injustice towards (male) homosexuals, 
the early sexologists engaged in attempts to challenge the criminalisation of 
homosexuality in their respective countries: Richard von Krafft-Ebing in Austria (Hyde, 
1970); Havelock Ellis in England (Brome, 1979); and Magnus Hirschfeld in Gen-nany 
(Wolff, 1986). From the late 19th century, homosexuality was illegal in Gennany under 
the Reich Penal Code (§ 175; quoted above); In Austria under a harsh law criminalising 
sexual conduct between two males or two females; and in England, the English 
Criminal Law Amendment Act (1885) had Just been passed, making " 'gross 
indecency' between males, 'however privately committed, a penal offence... (Brome, 
1979, p. 100) punishable by two years' imprisonment with hard labour (Hyde, 1970). 
Havelock Ellis and his colleague, Symonds, were agreed that the attitude of the 
English law in relation to inverts (homosexuals) should be "that the same definition of 
public decency should be applied to intercourse between adult males as to that between 
adult male and female" (Calder-Marshall, 1959, p. 146). Together they engaged in Ný ork 
with the explicit intent of securing the rights of (male) homosexuals, by challengint" the 
discourses of sin, crime, and illness which were responsible for condemning, 
criminalising, and pathologising homosexuality. Both ýN-ere concerned with educating 
professionals, practitioners, and the public, as a precursor to legal reform (Weeks. 
1977). 
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Despite the social and political constraints of their time. both Ellis and Symonds 
(following the works of Ulrichs and Krafft-Ebing) testified to the normalcý of 
homosexual relations, suggesting that homosexuality was neither a sin. crime, nor 
illness, but a harrnless sexual variation caused by a congenital abnormality (\Veek-s. 
1977). In his book A Problem ofModern Ethics, Symonds claimed that he %ý. as- 
interested in the social justice aspects of the criminalisation of homosexuality, in that it 
condemned "a class of people who were guilty of nothing"(Weeks, 1977, p. 55). In a 
letter to Carpenter in 1892, Symonds stated that in order to initiate social change. "the 
first thing is to force people to see that the passions in question have their justification 
in nature" (quoted in Weeks, 1977, p. 54). Although they had initially collaborated on 
the work, after Symonds' death Ellis published his well-known book, Studies in the 
Psychology of Sex: Sexual Inversion (1897/190 1). Piecing together anthropological, 
historical, religious, and literary evidence, Ellis attempted to demonstrate that 
homosexuality was a common part of human sexuality across time and place (rather 
than a vice, or product of social decay), emphasising that homosexuals were essentially 
'ordinary' people (Weeks, 1977). 
Similarly, Ellis' Gen-nan contemporary Magnus Hirschfeld also engaged in a 
political struggle to secure the rights of gay men. Hirschfeld was at the forefront of the 
homosexual emancipation movement in Gennany, where in 1897, he established the 
Scientific Humanitarian Committee, whose key concern was to see the abolition of 
Paragraph 175, which punished homosexuality with heavy prison sentences and loss of 
status or position, even when a court had allowed the defendant to go free (Wolff, 
1986). In its first year, the Scientific Humanitarian Committee (led by Hirschfeld) sent 
a petition to the Reichstag with 2000 signatories (including Krafft-Ebing and others) 
requesting the repeal of Paragraph 175. Although the initial petition was unsuccessful, 
at the assembly of each new Reich, a further petition was furnished. Hirschfeld ývas also 
involved in the protest against the imprisonment of Oscar Wilde in England. was 
actively involved in rescuing from prison sentences and suicide, men accused of 
'sodomy', and wrote and distributed a pro-homosexual pamphlet entitled ""hat the 
people should know of the third sex" (Wolff, 1986). In 1918, Hirschfeld established the 
Sexual Science Institute, which became the home of the Scientific Humanitarian 
Committee, a centre for research in sexology, and a repository for a large collection of I- 
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paintings., books, periodicals. and documents (including those by Freud, Ellis. \-on 
Krafft-Ebing and others) relating to sexo1ogical study. 
In attempting to secure the rights of homosexuals, the early sexologists drew on 
arguments that were not rights-based. Primarily, their arguments were based around 
homosexuality being natural, and inborn, but rooted in the manifestation of a congenital 
disorder. For example, von Krafft-Ebing (1882/1965), finding no physiological 
differences between homosexual and heterosexual men, concluded that "just as in all 
pathological perversions of the sexual life, the cause must be sought in the braill" (N-on 
Krafft-Ebing, 1882/1965, p. 222). Similarly, Havelock Ellis (like Ulnchs and 
Hirschfeld) testified that homosexuals were the victims of a congenital disorder, which 
he likened to colour-blindness, and claimed that in every other respect homosexuals 
were normally- functioning human beings indistinguishable from heterosexuals (Calder- 
Marshall, 1959; Doan & Walters, 1998; Weeks, 1977). Both von Krafft-Ebing and Ellis 
supported their claim of the inborn nature of homosexuality, on a basis of inedico- 
forensic (von Krafft-Ebing, 1882/1965) and anecdotal (Ellis, 1897/190 1) e-v, idence of a 
family history of inversion, neuroses (e. g. hysteria, neurasthenia), and precocity of 
(physical and psychic) sexual emotions (see also Grosskurth, 1980). 
The success of this approach in securing the human rights of lesbians and gay 
men was very limited. Whilst there was evidence that for individual homosexuals, the 
work of the sexologists was helpful on a personal level (see Calder- Marshall, 1959, 
Wolff, 1986), and in some cases saved men from imprisonment or suicide, little was 
achieved by way of social and legal change. 
Victorian England was not ready to accept homosexuals as a non-nal part of its 
society (cf. Brome, 1979), and among the general population of the time, Ellis' work 
was not well received (Calder-Marshall, 1959). Since anti-homosexual sentiments were 
so widespread, Ellis had difficulty finding a publisher for his book' (Brome, 1979; 
Calder-Marshall, 1959), and when eventually published, the first edition was banned 
from sale. Soon after the book's publication, George Bedborough (a bookstore owner) 
ýN,, as arrested and prosecuted on a charge of having "sold and uttered a certain lewd 
Sexual Inivi-sion was first published in Germany as Das Kontrdre Geschlechsgeflild in 1896. The 
rnanuscnpt Nvas subsequently sent to several medical publishers in England (who were not prepared to 
touch the topic) before it was finally accepted for publication by a new, and small, publishing house. 
Watford Universitv Press (see Brome, 1979, Calder-Marshall. 1959). 
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wicked bawdy scandalous and obscene libel in the f orm of a book entitled Studies in the 
Psychology of'Sex: Sexual Inversion" (quoted in Grosskurth, 1980. p. 194). As a result, 
Ellis was forced to send his subsequent works to America for publication (Freedman. 
1942). Furthermore, it was not until 70 years later that Ellis' vision was (partially) 
realised by British law (Brome, 1979), when the recommendation of the Woltenden 
report of 1957 - that consenting sex between two males be decriminalised - was 
incorporated into the Sexual Offences Act (1967). 
The situation in Germany was not much better. Ulrichs was warned by the 
Hanoverian Ministry against publishing his works, and in 1864, was expelled from 
membership of the Hochstift. He was tried in Wiirttemberg, but after proving his work 
was scientific, he was absolved. Eventually, he fled to Italy. Magnus Hirschfeld, who 
directly took up Ulrich's cause, was taken to court and fined for "propagating obscene 
inquiries and pamphlets" (Wolff, 1986). Then on the 6 th May 1933, the Sexual Science 
Institute was stormed by Nazis, and works held in the institute (including books, 
paintings, and periodicals) were seized or destroyed, including several unpublished 
manuscripts by Ulrichs, Krafft-Ebing and others. Those responsible for the raid made it 
clear that their intentions were to destroy the institute, and death threats were made 
against Hirschfeld. Three days later, some 10,000 volumes, plus an effigy of Hirschfeld 
were publicly burned at Berlin's Opernplaz (Grau, 1993). 
Legally, the situation did not change in Germany either. Section 175 was rcv1sed 
in June 1935 to include the criminalisation of any physical contact between two naked 
male bodies (with sexual intent), an offence punishable according to "healthy public 
feeling", and for which both parties involved in the act could be punished. Paragraph 
175 (formerly § 175) remained in effect in Germany until 1994 (Grau, 1993). 
Whilst firmly rooting the origins of homosexuality in genetic and biological 
causes may have contributed to the demise of the homosexual being viewed as a deviant 
(sinner or criminal), it replaced the deviant discourse with a discourse of the 
homosexual as 'victim'. On the one hand, this approach emancipated the homosexual 
from blame, and therefore in need of societal compassion and psychological help, rather 
than punishment (Comstock, 1991). However, it fed directly into the dominant 
discourse of the medical model, positioning the homosexual as a N-Ictim of a hereditary 
illness, and in so doing. failed to displace the heteronon-native framework of Victorian 
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society. Consequently. whilst aimed at advancing the human rights of lesbians and gay 
men, the work of early sexologists was largely unsuccessful in creating positi%-e -social 
change, in that by defining the lesbian or gay man as 'victim'. it personallsed and 
individualised the oppression of lesbians and gay men. 
Opposing Lesbian and Gay Human Rights: The Homosexual as Pathologicallý- III 
From the mid-twentieth century, psychology began to develop into a discipline in its 
own right, characterised by the 'scientific' study of people and behaviour, through 
'objective' assessment and measurement. Emerging out of the work of the early 
sexologists, mid-century psychologists who were working within the medical i-nodel 
(the dominant framework at that time) adopted the notion of the homosexual as victim. 
However, rather than viewing homosexuality within a social context, the individualistic 
approach of the medical model gave rise to the notion of homosexuality as a 
pathological illness. 
Consequently, from the 1950s until the 1970s, the psychological study of 
lesbians and gay men was dominated by research which portrayed lesbians and gay men 
as sick, abnormal, or deviant (Kitzinger, 1987). The majority of this research was 
focused on 'establishing' the cause of homosexuality in order to detennine whether or 
not homosexuals were sick (Morin, 1977). Two key theories dominated this research. 
Whilst one school of thought (the biological school) suggested that being lesbian or gay 
was determined by one's genes, the other school of thought (the environmental school) 
suggested that being lesbian or gay was shaped by a person's upbringing. Both set 
about proliferating psychological research to support their own theory. 
A large body of (primarily) clinical research was therefore created by the 
biologists, devoted to finding genetic (or chromosomal) factors which they believed 
predisposed an individual to homosexuality (Masters, Johnson, & Kolodny, 1995, see 
Kenyon, 1970 for a detailed account). Some of these studies comprised investigations 
of identical twins (e. g. Pardes, Steinberg, & Simons, 1967; Perkins, 1973), whilst others 
focused on brain structure and function, hormone levels, and genital measurement and 
comparison (e. g. Jacoby, 1928; Perloff, 1949; Moore, 1945). Many of these studies 
concluded that the cause of male homosexuality lay in the hypothalamus. whilst 
lesbians were believed to have higher blood testosterone IeN-els and larger than aN-erage 
clitori. 
The envirom-nentalists, on the other hand. claimed that the root of 
homosexuality lay in early socialisation. This research attributed homosexual 
tendencies to a dysfunctional relationship between the lesbian or galy person and her his 
parents, such as a failure to resolve the oedipal complex: or more typically an o%'er- 
protective mother and a weak, passive father (Bieber, 1969). For example, Charlotte 
Wolff (197 1) suggested that lesbianism is caused by an inadequate lo\. e relationship 
with the mother (thus the need to seek love in other women) and a poor relationship 
with the father (preventing her from learning to relate to men) (Wolff, 197 1). Some of 
this work also suggested that homosexuality was learned through early sexual 
experiences: either through pleasurable, gratifying same-sex encounters, or through 
unpleasant, dissatisfying, or frightening heterosexual encounters (see Masters et A, 
1995). 
Whilst neither theory supplanted the other, both contributed to the 
pathologisation of lesbians and gay men by either seeing them as the products of 
genetic defects, or disturbed backgrounds (Kitzinger, 1987). Consequently, this body of 
research contributed to the proliferation of therapeutic psychology and psychiatry aimed 
at the 'cure' of homosexuality, commonly known as conversion therapy (Feldman & 
McCulloch, 1971). Although in most western countries this procedure ceased in the 
early 1970s because of its low success rate (Silverstein, 1991), many othenvise healthy 
lesbians and gay men were needlessly subjected to forced incarceration, 
hypothalamadectomy, shock treatment, and sometimes genital mutilation. 
This body of research directly opposed the advancement of lesbian and gay 
human rights. Rather than achieving societal compassion for lesbians and gay men, as 
the early sexologists had attempted, categorising homosexuality as an illness in this %vay 
gave "authoritative weight to those who would discriminate against homosexuals in 
employment, discharge them from military service , Nithout honor, deprive them of 
various legal rights, and indeed sometimes confine them involuntarily in mental 
institutions" (Man-nor, 1980). Thus it contributed to maintaining and increasing the 
denial of human rights to lesbians and gay men. In addition, because psý'chologý' had 
become a 'scientific' discipline, it became more concerned xvith establishing the 'truth' 
about homosexuality, than it was about attempting to create positiN e social and political 
change, and in so doing began to move away from a rights-based approach. 
However 
, in direct response to this body of pathological research. other research 
emerged testifying that lesbians and gay men are as well adjusted as (if not better 
adjusted than) their heterosexual counterparts. The first studies of this type were 
undertaken by Alfred Kinsey and his colleagues who, although sexologists rather ftin 
psychologists (see Herek, 1997), published two well-known studies on human sexuality 
- Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948) and Scxual 
Behavior in the Human Female (Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, & Gebhard, 1953) - with 
the specific aim of " 'detoxify[ing]' the homosexual identity" (de Cecco. 1990. p. 377). 
Carried out on non-clinical populations, the main findings of these studies \\'erc that 
many women and men had experienced both homosexual and heterosexual responses 
and/or behaviour. 
The findings of the Kinsey studies (of both men and women) strengthened the 
efforts of the lesbian and gay movement by suggesting that any man or woman could 
engage in homosexual acts, supporting the notion that homosexuality was not restricted 
to just a small number of pathological men and women with particular personal 
characteristics and family backgrounds (Comstock, 199 1, Herek, 1997). However, 
Kinsey's work was not well-received. In England, the major national newspapers 
suggested that the books were 'pornographic' and 'morally subversive', whilst the 
magistrates in Doncaster ordered the confiscation of The Sexual Behavior of the Humall 
Female which they believed to be intended to deprave and corrupt (Hyde, 1970). 
Only a few years later, Evelyn Hooker published a (at the time) controversial 
psychological study on the adjustment of male homosexuals, refuting the idea that there 
was a connection between pathology and homosexuality (Hooker, 1957/1992). Using a 
matched pairs sample of homosexuals and heterosexuals, Hooker administered the 
Rorschach, Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), and Make-A-Picture- Story (MAPS) 
tests to each of the participants. The results of the tests were then gl"'en to clinicians 
experienced in the Rorschach to give an unbiased judgement of personalit". ' and 
adjustment of each participant, and to differentiate the homosexual from the 
heterosexual records. This study showed that there was no difference betwcen 
heterosexuals and homosexuals in the adjustment ratings assigned by the 'udues. j -tý 
Furthennore, neither judge was able to correctly identltýý the sexuality of part, cipant,, at 
a level better than chance. 
Similarly, the work of Gagnon and Simon (1973) suggested that there was no 
difference between lesbian and heterosexual females. In their book Sexiial Condlict 
(Simon & Gagnon, 1973), they state that "the female homosexual follows conx-entional 
feminine patterns in developing her commitment to sexuality and in conducting not 
only her sexual career but her non-sexual career as well" (p. 178) and that "their pattern 
of overt sexual behavior... tend[s] to resemble closely those of heterosexual female,, " 
(p. 18 0). 
Although this model of homosexuality did not succeed in completely 
overthrowing that of homosexuality as pathology2, it was instrumental in 
revolutionising the psychology of lesbians and gay men (Kimmel & Browning, 2000). 
It was the work of Kinsey, Gagnon and Simon, Hooker and others which was invoked 
to argue for the removal of homosexuality from the DSM, and ultimately the 
dethronement of the model of homosexuality as pathology within psychology, paNýing 
the way for a 'gay-affin-native' (cf. Kitzinger, 1987) psychology of lesbians and gay 
men. 
On the other hand, whilst providing counter-evidence has sometimes been effectl\, c 
in advancing rights, at other times it has not. The main problem is that this approach to 
lesbian and gay issues is diversionary, in that it generally evokes lengthy debates about 
whether lesbians and gay men really are as well-adjusted as heterosexuals, or whether 
sexual orientation is caused by nature or nurture. Such arguments then become susceptible 
to further debates about whether a given piece of research which 'proves' that lesbians and 
gay men make just as good parents as heterosexual people, or that lesbians and gay men are 
as well if not better adjusted than heterosexuals, is good 'scientific' research. Furthen-nore, 
as feminists (e. g. Kitzinger, 1987) have often argued, this approach is a two-edged sword, 
in that providing 'positive images' as counter-discourses to prejudice reinforces the 
opposition's arguments (Smith, 1994), by using heterosexuals as the yardstick by which 
lesbians and gay men are measured. 
-1 ie,, A igN.. 1-11.1998). but Psvchological Nvork v m, homosexuality as pathology still exists even today (i. e. see \R' 
fortunately is relatively scarce. 
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Leaving Behind Lesbian and Gaý, Human Rights: 
Researching Attitudes and Beha, * iours. 
The removal of homosexuality from the DSM and changes in societal attitudes due to 
the Lesbian and Gay Liberation Movement, saw a major shIft in the dominant focus of 
psychological research on lesbians and gay men from the 1970s onwards, to what has 
become known as 'gay-affinnative' psychology (Kitzinger, 1987), also known Lis 
'lesbian and gay psychology'. The favoured view of this era was that homosexualit". is 
an alternative form of sexual attraction and behaviour, and an equally valid variant of it 
(Garnets & D'Augelli, 1994). Therefore, psychology's focus moved away from lesbians 
and gay men as the objects of pathology, onto individual and societal prejudice against 
lesbians and gay men (Kitzinger, 1987). 
Adopting a liberal humanist (or equal ity-centred) approach, the aim of this work 
appeared to be both the reinforcing and affin-ning of lesbian and gay culture, and 
awareness- rai sing about lesbian and gay issues. Consequently, the vast majority of 
work since the 1970s focused on theorising and researching (1) anti-lesbian/gay 
attitudes and behaviours, through the study of homophobia, heterosexism, hate crimes, 
and social climate; and (2) investigating the psycho-social consequences of lesbian and 
gay oppression. This sub-section will give an overview of the psychological research in 
each of these areas. 
The Invention of Homophobia 
In the early 1970s, psychologists began researching homophobia, a term coined by 
Smith (197 1) and popularised by Weinberg (1.972). Homophobia was defined as "the 
dread of being in close quarters with homosexuals - and in the case of homosexuals 
themselves, self-loathing"' (Weinberg, 1972, p. 4). However, in more recent work it has 
come to be conceptualised as feelings of anxiety, disgust, aversion, anger, discomfort 
and fear towards lesbians and gay men (see Davies. 1996; Hudson and Ricketts, 1980). 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s a number of alternative ten-ns were also ernployed, 
such as 'homonegativism' (Hudson & Ricketts, 1980), 'homosexophobia' (Lc% itt and 
Kassen, 1974), and 'homosexism'. In this body of work, people holding negative 
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attitudes came to be known as 'homophobes'. or as -homophobic'. 
This shift from viewing homosexuality as pathological to \, iewing extreme 
negative reactions to homosexuality as patholo ical. represented a major psychological 91 
reversal in thinking about lesbian and gay issues (Kitzinger. 1987). Consequently. from 
the 1970s, psychology spawned a plethora of scales to measure and assess hornophobia 
(e. g. see Hudson & Ricketts, 1980; Lumby, 1976: Millham, San Miguel. & Kcllo, -, (.,,. 
1976; Smith, 197 1), and to establish its correlates in order to ensure that 'homophobcs' 
could be readily identified (and treated). As with any psychometric measurement, 
respondents in these studies would be asked to respond to a series of statements, such as 
I would not want to join an organisation that has homosexuals in its membership" 
(Lumby, 1976), "The growing number of male homosexuals indicates a decline in 
American morals" (Millham et al., 1976), or "Homosexuals should be locked up to 
protect society" (Smith, 197 1). Each item would then be coded and scored, and the 
scores added to give an overall homophobia score. 
A number of studies employing homophobia scales have investigated and 
documented the attitudes of particular groups of individuals, such as psychologists and 
mental health professionals (e. g. Fort, Steiner, & Conrad, 197 1; Garfinkle and Morin, 
1978; DeCrescenzo, 1983-84), social workers (e. g. Wisniewski & Toomey, 1987), 
medical professionals and students (e. g. Douglas, Kalman, & Kalman, 1985; Klamen, 
Grossman, & Kopacz, 1999), police officers (e. g. Fretz, 1975), students (e. g. Donnelly 
et al., 1997; Matchinsky & Iverson, 1996; ProuIx, 1997; Schellenberg, Hirt, & Sears, 
1999), and resident assistants (D'Augelli, 1989). On the whole, these studies havc 
tended to find that homophobic individuals are less likely to have had personal contact 
with lesbians and/or gay men (Hansen, 1982[a]; Millham et al., 1976), are more likely 
to be older and less well educated (Nyberg & Alston, 1976; Snyder & Spreizer, 1976), 
to be more authoritarian (MacDonald & Games, 1974; Smith, 197 1 ), and to be less 
pen-nissive or positive about sexuality (MacDonald & Games, 1974; Nyberg & Alston. 
1976). (See Herek, 1984 for further examples of correlates of homophobia. ) In addition. 
more recent work has tended to find that males are more homophobic than females (e. (-'. 
scc D'Augelli, 1989; Donnelly et al., 1997; Klamen et al., 1999; Schellenben, et al., 
1999), and that those with religious affiliations are more homophobic than those who 
have no religious affiliation (e. g. see Berkman & ZinberL,,, 1997, Seltzer, 1992: see a],, () 
Eliason, 1995; Herek, 1994). 
In response to the study of homophobia, a large bodv of psycliotherapeutic 
literature emerged in the early 1980s, giving rise to the notion that lesbians and gay inen 
could internalise negative societal attitudes (Sophie, 1987). and therefore experience 
negative perceptions of themselves as lesbian or gay. This phenomenon. known to 
psychologists and therapists as 'internalised homophobia' (or lately as intemalised 
oppression/heterosexism) continues to dominate the psychotherapeutic literature on 
lesbian and gay issues (e. g. see Brown, 1986; Mayer & Dean, 1998: Malyon, 1981182- 
Shidlo, 1994; Sophie, 1987). Internalised homophobia has been viewed by 
psychologists as manifesting itself in one of two ways: (1) by the lesbian or (Jay rnale 
individual consciously accusing her/himself of being evil, second-class, or interior, 
resulting in the acting out of self-destructive or abusive behaviours, or (2) by her/his 
tolerating discriminatory or abusive treatment from others. ) on the grounds that bi(, lotry 
will prevent her/him succeeding (see Gonsiorek, 1988; 1993). Lesbians and gay men 
were therefore seen as in need of therapeutic assistance to adapt to society (c. o. see de 
Monteflores, 1986, cited in Davies, 1996; Gartrell, 1984; Sophie, 1987). 
Whilst on the one hand, studies of homophobia have been useful in contributing 
to the de-pathologisation of lesbians and gay men within psychology, they produced 
two main barriers to the advancement of lesbian and gay rights. First, the focus on 
homophobia necessarily internalised and individualised what was essentially societal 
oppression of lesbians and gay men (cf Kitzinger, 1994; 1996). That is, because ot'its 
association with a fear or (as the term 'homophobia' suggests) a phobia, it assumes a 
psychosocial pathology in certain individuals who may be identified and then treated 
through psychotherapy (Kitzinger, 1996a; Rothblum & Bond, 1996). Second, as a result 
of this individual isation, the concept of 'internalised homophobia' was promoted within 
psychology, resulting in a shift away from the oppressor as the source of the problem, 
and back onto lesbians and gay men as victims (Kitzinger, 1996a). Together these two 
things produced a depoliticised account of lesbian and gay oppression. relegating it to 
the individual sphere (cf, Kitzinger, 1996a), and leading away from a rights-based 
analysis of (and solutions to) the problem. 
From Homophobia to Heterosexism 
As a direct result of the critiques of the concept of homophobia, it was reincarnated, (in 
some quarters at least) as 'heterosexism'. which espoused a different theoretical focus 
from its predecessor. Like racism. sexism, and classism, heterosexism (or heteros-exual 
bias) was viewed as the product of prejudice and power (Neisen, 1990). therefore 
recognising the systematic oppression of lesbians and gay men on a societal levcl, 
rather than on a purely individual level, and shifting the focus from victim to sur\, ilvor 
(Neisen, 1990). Although the construct had featured in earlier literature (e., (. ý. Morin, 
1977; Garfinkle & Morin, 1978) , it was not until the late 1980s that the term came into 
favour. Gregory Herek (1990), who contributed significantly to the populansation of 
the term, defined heterosexism as "an ideological system that denies, denigrates, and 
stigmatises any non-heterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or 
community" (p. 316; see also Neisen, 1990, p. 25). 
Herek suggested that heterosexism manifests itself in two main ways, which he 
labels 'cultural heterosexism' and 'psychological heterosexism', respectively. Cultural 
heterosexism (or institutionalized homophobia) referred to heterosexual bias in societal 
customs and institutions (e. g. religion, education, and the legal system), resulting in the 
erasure and denial of lesbian and gay male existence, customs, and history, and by 
implication, the privileging of heterosexual experiences, customs, and history (for a 
detailed illustration, see Herek, 1990; Kitzinger 1996b). Psychological heterosexism, on 
the other hand, refers to anti -I esbi an/anti -gay attitudes and behaviour towards lesbian 
and gay issues and people (Herek, 1990; 1996). It is predominantly the latter type of 
heterosexism and its aftermath with which lesbian and gay psychology of this past 
decade has concerned itself 
The theoretical shift from measuring homophobia to thinking about lesbian and 
gay oppression as 'heterosexism', changed the focus of lesbian and gay psychology 
from one of mental illness (of either homosexuals, homophobes, or both), to one of 
societal prejudice or oppression (Garnets & D'Augelli. 1994). One of the main 
(political) advantages of this is that it more clearly recognised the element of power 
which perpetuates and sanctions prejudices against lesbians and gay men (\cisen, 
1990). However. despite viewing lesbian and gay oppression as societal, it falk short of 
a human rights approach, in that it conceptualises oppression as perpetrated by one .1 
group (heterosexuals) against another (lesbians and gay men). failing to recoi-, nisc the 
interconnectedness of all types of oppression (cf. Bunch, 1995,1996). 
Hate Crimes and Discrimination 
Since the late 1980s, a small but growing body of psychological literature has been 
devoted to documenting and reporting the incidence of violence against and 
victimisation of lesbians and gay men. However, this area of research is not well- 
established (Berk, 1990). These phenomena of violence and victimisation have 
commonly been referred to in the psychological literature as hate-motivated crimes, or 
hate-crimes for short. 
Hate crimes, or anti -I esbi an/anti -gay violence, are an extreme extension of the 
heterosexism pervading western society (Herek, 1990; 1994). As such, hate crimes 
represent attacks not just of individuals and property, but also on an individual's 
identity, and (in the case of homosexuality) the lesbian and gay community as a whole 
(Herek, 1994). 
A number of studies have been undertaken to investigate the incidence of hate 
crimes against lesbians and gay men. For the most part, these studies have investigated 
a similar range of anti -1 esbi an/anti -gay behaviours, from verbal abuse, threats of 
violence, property damage, to being chased or followed. Studies of lesbians and gay 
inen undertaken in the United States consistently show that between 80% and 90% ha\'c 
been the victims of verbal abuse in relation to their sexual orientation (see summary 
tables in Berrill, 1990; 1992), and around 35-50% of lesbian and gay respondents report 
having experienced at least one anti -I esbi an/anti-gay crime or attempted crime, or 
having suffered violence because of their sexual orientation (Herek et al., 1997: Hetrick 
& Martin, 1987; Hunter, 1992, von Schulthess, 1992). 
Across the studies, between 6% (D'Augelli, 1992) and 27% (vonSchulthess. 
1992) of respondents reported having had objects thrown at them. between 2% 
"') had been punched. hit, or beaten, (D'Augelli, 1992) and 120'o (von Schulthess, 19K 1 
and 171.0-3 "')', "o reported having been chased or followed. Around 881 o-951 o of those 
who had expci-Icnced victirnisation did not report the incident(s), predominantl,,, - 
through fear of further harassment, fear of being 'outed' by authontles. or because they 
believed that they would not be taken seriously (D'Augelli, 1989b. 1992: Herek, 199-')-. 
Norris, 1991). The majority of perpetrators of anti-lesbianýanti-gay violence and 
victimisation are consistently reported to be white, young adult. males (Berrill, 1990: 
1992; Comstock, 199 1; Herek et al., 1997). 
Few studies have investigated domestic violence against lesbians and g , a-, men 
(as lesbians and gay men), however, in studies of young lesbians and gay men (e. g. 
Hetrick & Martin, 1987; Hunter, 1992), 49%-61% of reported gay-related violence had 
occurred within the family. Similarly, earlier reports from US-based community 
organisations state that around 30% of sexual orientation violence reported to those 
organisations had been committed by family members (see Comstock, 199 1). 
Psychological research also suggests that lesbians and gay men are often 
discnminated against in the workplace. For example, in one study (Levine & Leonard, 
1984), 24% of respondents reported actual incidences of job-discrimi nation, 75% of 
those in the forrn of verbal harassment, just over a third non-verbal harassment (e. g. 
ostracism. ) vandalism, etc), and around 10% actual physical violence. Furthennore, 
lesbians and gay men have often reported experiencing the denial of employment, 
promotion, or being pressured to leave their jobs, because their sexual orientation had 
become known to employers (see Bell & Weinberg, 1978; Saghir & Robins, 1973; see 
also Kitzinger, 1991 for a full discussion of these issues). 
Although hate crimes are human rights issues (in that physical violence is a 
violation of the right to life, liberty, and security of person), psychologists have not 
adopted a human rights approach to the study of hate crimes. Instead they have tended 
to take a passive approach to human rights, merely documenting the incidence of hate 
crimes as discrete incidents directed at individuals, but designed to send a message to 
lesbians and gay men as a group. By taking this approach, the social context in which 
these incidents take place is largely ignored (Kitzinger, 1996a), harassment being seen 
as discrete incidents which are perpetrated by certain ('homophobic') individuals 
against a large number of individual lesbians and gay men. 
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Climate Studies 
Emerging out of the literature on hate crimes, 'climate studies' ha" c been undertaken to 
explore attitudes towards lesbian and gay issues and perceptions of the social 
environment for lesbians and gay men. Usually these studies have been undertaken NvIth 
a view to creating some change in policy and/or practice to improve the social climate 
for lesbians and gay men in a given setting, and as such have implicitly been concerned 
with the rights of lesbians and gay men. 
Studies undertaken on university campuses (e. g. D'Augelli, 1989b; 199-2, 
Herek, 1993; Norris, 1991) report much lower incidences of direct verbal abuse (around 
16-27%) and threatened violence than for studies of the general population. However, 
on average, campus climate surveys report around 60% of respondents having often 
overheard anti -lesbi an/anti -gay remarks by students or staff on campus (see D'Augell], 
1989a; 1992; Eliason, 1996; Herek, 1993; Malaney et al., 1997, Norris, 199 1), and in 
Eliason's (1996) study of university staff, 30% reported having observed negative 
treatment of a lesbian, gay male, or bisexual person by other staff members. 
Some recent studies have concluded that attitudes towards lesbians and gay men 
are predominantly positive (e. g. see Berkman & Zinberg, 1997; Norris, 199 1). 
However, in one study (Eliason, 1996), around 20% of respondents said that they felt 
uncomfortable around lesbians and gay men, and a similar percentage said they would 
find it unacceptable if someone known to them personally was lesbian or gay. In this 
same study, a huge mismatch was reported between heterosexual respondents' (28%) 
and lesbian, gay, and bisexual respondents' (74%) perceptions of the prevalence of anti- 
lesbian/anti-gay attitudes on campus. Furthennore, in another study around 30% of 
students said they would "do nothing" if they witnessed the verbal harassment of 
lesbian or gay students (Malaney et al., 1997). 
Similarly, respondents have typically shown strong support for the rights of 
lesbians and gay men. For example, the majonty of students surveyed agreed that 
lesbians and gay men should be allowed to teach in schools, marry, and have their 
relationships legally condoned (Malaney et al., 1997). However, there was much less 
support for lesbians and gay men to serve in the military, or to adopt children, and in 
another study (Eliason. 1996) up to 26% of staff surveyed did not support the right of 
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lesbians and gay men to teach children. Furthen-nore, less than 50% of unIvers1tv staff 
surveyed in Ellason's (1996) study said they would feel comfortable workino xvith an I oý 
openly lesbian or gay person, and around 3%-5% would avoid working \vith and/or 
oppose the hiring of a lesbian or gay man. 
On a basis of these findings, studies have generally concluded that a "chilly" 
climate exists for lesbians and gay men, on campus, in the workplace. and in societ". 
generally. What these studies have tended to suggest, is that although the incidence of 
overt violence appears to be reasonably low on campus (and is certainly much lower 
than in the general population), the anti-I esbi an/anti -gay attitudes and beha\-iours 
prevalent among the general population, and the broader institutional i sati on of 
heterosexism ensure that a climate of terror (or fear) is maintained. pressurino lesbians 
and gay men to conceal their sexual identity (Gamets et al., 1993; Hetrick & Martin, 
1987). As Kitzinger (I 996a) states - 
In an oppressive society, it is not necessary, most of the time, to beat us up or to murder or 
torture us to ensure our silence and invisibility. This is because a climate of terror has been 
created instead in which most gay people voluntai-i4i- and of our own free will choosc to 
stay silent and invisible (Kitzinger, 1996a, p. 11, her emphasis). 
This notion of a climate of terror is clearly illustrated by psychological research on the 
extent to which lesbians and gay men are 'out' 3 on campus, in the workplace, with their 
families, and in society generally. 
For example, studies of campus climate consistently show that around 50% of 
lesbian and gay male students were not comfortable disclosing their sexual orientation 
to others (e. g. see D'Augelli, 1989b; Herek, 1993), and up to 90% deliberately hid their 
sexual identity from other students (see D'Augelli, 1989b; Herek, 1993 -, Norris, 199 1). 
Furthen-nore, 55%-65% said that they were afraid, or feared for their safety on campus 
because of their sexual orientation, and 40%-60% students or staff had deliberately 
made changes to their behaviour and/or appearance to avoid discrimination or 
harassment (see D'Augelli, 1989b; 1992; Herek, 1993-, Norris, 1991; see also Berrill. 
3 The term 'out' refers to being openly py. A lesbian or gay man who is 'out' is one who has made her, his 
tuatioiis. but not in others. 'Outing' referý, to the identity known to others. She, he may be 'out' in some ,IIII 
disclosure of sorneone's lesbian, -av by others. 
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1990). Or in other words, because of discrimination and harassment, lesbians and gyaý- 
men take precautions to avoid being violated or discriminated against (KItzInger. 1994). 
resulting in a restriction of lesbians' and gay men's rights to freedom from fear. 
Similarly, early studies of lesbians in the workplace (e. (,. Bell & Weinbero ltý -- 
1978; Saghir & Robins, 1973) have shown that lesbians anticipate significant 
employment discrimination. Although little recent psychological research has been 
undertaken on discrimination in the workplace, psychologists writing and researching 
the subject have consistently reported that around 75% of lesbians and gay men wlio are 
out' enough to participate in studies report being out' to fe"'N' , if any, of their co- 
workers, many making deliberate attempts to conceal their identity at ýN'ork (Lex, iiie & 
Leonard, 1984; see Kitzinger 1991 for further references). 
Most lesbians and gay men who are not 'out' at work, including psychologists, 
anticipate being discriminated against if their sexual orientation is discovered. In 
particular, respondents reported that they feared both the possibility of verbal and 
physical abuse from co-workers (Levine & Leonard, 1984; Griffin & Zukas, 1993), and 
problems with supervisors or employers (Levine & Leonard, 1984), including the 
possibility of being fired (Levine & Leonard, 1984; Griffin & Zukas, 1993), particularly 
those who worked with children. Even in the relatively liberal and privileged world of 
academia, many lesbians and gay men choose not to be 'out' through fear of reprisals 
(Kitzinger, 1990; see also Mintz & Rothblum, 1997). 
Consequently, many lesbians and gay men choose to 'pass' 4 as heterosexual 
(Garnets & D'Augelli, 1994), creating a situation whereby they are exposed to other 
potential forms of harassment, such as the threat of disclosure, or in the case of lesbians. 
being seen as 'fair game' by heterosexual men (Kitzinger, 1994). Choosing to stay 
closeted also has drawbacks for the personal well-being of lesbians and gay men. in that 
by not being 'out' not only makes lesbians and gay men invisible to society. but to each 
other, resulting in the fragmentation of the lesbian and gay community (Gamets & 
D'Augelli, 1994), and ultimately their inability to find affirmation and support when 
they need it, and a sense of community and culture. 
4 To 'pass' as heterosexual refers to the actively disguising one's lesbian or gay identity. For example, a 
lesbian may refer to her (female) partner as 'he' in a conversation. so the person she is talking to does not 
recognise her as a lesbian. Similarly, a lesbian or gay man may dress and act in a stercot\-pically heterosexual 
ways 'passing' as heterosexual. 
Like the studies of hate crimes. climate studies have also been concemed with 
rights issues, but have not taken a rights-based approach. Climate studies also 
individualise lesbian and gay oppression, by focusing on the psychosocIal ývcllbelng of 
the lesbian or gay individual (Kitzinger, 1996a) in a social context made up of 
prejudiced individuals. However, they are less individualistic than 'homophobia, 
scores, in that they locate the problem in the social 'climate' rather than in the 
prejudiced individual. Fundamentally, this approach focuses on documentin(,, the 
normalcy of oppression, in order to seek expostfacto remedies, rather than focusing on 
the prevention of oppression. 
Additionally, although some climate sur-veys have included questionnaire items 
asking about lesbian and gay human rights issues - for example, "Gay men should be 
allowed to adopt" (Maney & Cain, 1997); "a woman's homosexuality should not be a 
cause for job discrimination in any situation" (Herek, 1984) - this has been largely 
incidentall rather than deliberately invoked. 
Psychosocial Consequences of Heterosexism and Homophobia 
The counterpart to studies of homophobia, heterosexism, hate crimes, and social 
climate, has been the assessment and documentation of the psychosocial consequences 
of lesbian and gay oppression. As with any fon-n of violence or abuse, victims of 
heterosexism and homophobia (usually, but not always, lesbians and gay men) are at 
increased risk of psychological distress as a consequence of victimisation, or 
discrimination (Gamets et al., 1993; Herek, 1994; Herek et al., 1997; Neisen, 1993). 
VvThilst much psychological research has focused on the psychosocial effects of abuses 
such as rape and sexual abuse (e. g. Ajdukovic & Ajdukovic, 1993; Arellano, Kuhn, & 
Chavez, 1997; Polusny & Follette, 1995; Rogers, 1997), few studies within mainstream 
psychology have specifically addressed the mental health and developmental 
consequences of abuses against lesbians and gay men. 
In the psychological literature on adolescence, in particular, there is a plethora 
of research specifically focusing on social and mental health issues (e. o. suicide, 
homelessness, substance abuse, truancy, depression and self-worth, and school 
perfon-nance). However, this vast body of psychological research has mided to focus on 
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the generic adolescent, with some reference to cultural issues, but has failed to dkcuslý 
these issues in relation to sexual orientation, ignoring lesbians and gay men as a high 
risk group (Nelson, 1994). Furthen-nore, In establishing 'risk factors' for these social 
and psychological problems, issues specifically relating to lesbian and gay adolescents 
are omitted. 
However, studies of lesbian and gay men have suggested that young lesbians 
and gay men, are "at risk" of suicide, substance abuse, stress-related disorders, etc. as a 
consequence of stressors associated with being lesbian or gay (Hetrick & Martin, 1987: 
Travers & Schneider, 1996). Studies on suicide and attempted suicide (parasuicide) 
undertaken in the past decade, consistently show that between 20% and 41 0,, o of lesbian 
and gay male respondents had attempted suicide at least once, a considerably higher 
figure than for the general adolescent population (e. g. see Diekstra et al., 1995: Tccnaoe 
suicide in the United States, 1991/92; Vannatta, 1996). Furthen-nore, in some studies 
(e. g. Hershberger et al., 1997; Remafedi, et al., 1993) more than half of the respondents 
reported having made multiple attempts, incidences of attempted suicide being reported 
as highest among lesbians and gay men who are homeless or seeking assistance from 
social services (e. g. see Kruks, 1991), cultural and ethnic minorities (e. g. see Bradford 
et al., 1994), adolescents (e. g. see Rothblum, 1990), and those who have more recently 
identified themselves as non-hetero sexual (e. g. see Hershberger et al., 1997; Remafedi 
et al., 1993). 
Psychological research on the incidence of alcoholism among lesbians and/or 
gay men has tended to suggest that lesbians and gay men are more likely than their 
heterosexual counterparts to abuse alcohol (e. g. see Anderson & Henderson, 1985, Kus, 
1988; Lewis et al., 1982; Mosbacher, 1988; Rotheram-Borus et al., 1992, cited in 
Grossman, 1997; Saghir & Robins, 1973). The incidence of substance abuse too, is 
reported at 28% to 39%, (at least three times that of the general population) (e. g. see 
Cabaj, 1996; Rotheram-Borus et al., 1992, cited in Grossman, 1997). Gay men are also 
reported to be disproportionately represented among crack/cocaine users (e. g. scc Kang 
et al., 1994; McKirnan & Peterson, 1989a, cited in Anderson, 1996), and more than a 
third of lesbian and gay youth have been found to have a current usage of substances 
NN'hich NN, 'ould meet the psychiatric criteria for substance abuse (Remafedi. 1987, Rosario 
et al., 1997), increasing their risk of chemical dependency in adulthood (Shiffin & 
'ý, 
Solis, 1992). 
Gay and lesbian youth are also over-represented among the homeless. truant. 
and school drop-outs (Travers & Schneider, 1996. see Savin-Williams. 1994, for a full 
review). Studies on school perfon-nance have reported that between 410 o (Jordan et al., 
1988) and 80% (Remafedi, 1987) of lesbian and gay youth surveyed had expenencd a 
deterioration in their school performance as a consequence of anti-lesbian anti-_, ay 
bullying, anxiety, and fear. Furthermore, in Remafedi's (1987) study 40() o Were 
reported to truant regularly, and 30% had dropped out of school. Similarly, Rotheram- 
Borus et al. (1991) reported that 60% had failed a grade, and Jordan et al., (1988) that 
17.6% had dropped out of school. 
As a consequence of oppression, lesbians and gay men are often reported to 
experience social isolation and loneliness (see Hetrick & Martin, 1987). Psychological 
research has often reported lower self-esteem among lesbians and gay men, attributing 
this primarily to negative societal attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (c. g. see 
Dombrowski et al, 1996; Fontaine, 1998; Frable et al., 1998-, Lima et al., 1993; Walters 
& Simoni, 1993). Similarly, 19% of youth in the Hetrick & Martin (1987) study 
reported some type of emotional problem, usually involving depressive feelings and 
anxiety. However, studies of the incidence of depression and seeking professional help 
have almost exclusively focused on lesbian populations. 
Studies consistently suggest that between 70% and 80% of lesbians have sought 
counselling at some point in their lives (e. g. see Albro & Tully, 1979; Bradford et al., 
1994; Morgan & Eliason, 1992; see also Montsho, 1995). For example, Morgan & 
Eliason (1992) found that 77.5% of lesbians (compared with 28.9% of heterosexual 
women) had been in therapy. Moreover, Ryan and Bradford's national (USA) survey of 
lesbians (see Bradford et al., 1994) found that of the 50% of lesbians surveyed %vho had 
sought counselling, 59% had sought help for depression (see also Lehmann et al., 
1998), 31% because they were anxious or scared about their sexuality, and 210 o for 
feelings of loneliness and isolation. 
Once again, rather than taking a fights-based approach, psychologists havc taken 
a mental health approach to lesbian and gay oppression. By attempting to advance the 
rights of lesbians and gay men by documenting suicide rates. the incidence of alcohol 
and drui, abuse, and school dropout and truancy statistics, psycholo(, y has once a(, ain 
personalised and individualised the problem of lesbian and gay oppression. 
repositioning the lesbian or gay person as 'victim'. In so dOin&,. attention is diN erted 
away from a human nghts focus. 
Evaluation of 'lesbian and gay affirmative' psychology 
According to Kitzinger (1997), contemporary lesbian and gay psychology (post 1970s) Is 
"psychology which is explicit about its relevance to lesbians and/or gay men, does not 
assume homosexual pathology, and seeks to counter discrimination and prejudice agaillst 
lesbians and/or gay men" (Kitzinger, 1997, p. 203). Lesbian and gay psychology is 
therefore concerned with the rights of lesbians and gay men, although this is seldom madc 
explicit. 
As has just been illustrated, psychological theory and research on lesbian and gay 
oppression (i. e. homophobia, heterosexism, hate crimes, climate, and psychosocial 
consequences) has taken an individualised and depoliticised approach to the problem. Fol- 
example, by studying 'homophobia' or 'hate crimes', lesbian and gay oppression is 
individualised as something perpetrated by those who have poor attitudes towards lesbians 
and/or gay men (i. e. 'homophobes') or who behave badly towards lesbians and gay men 
(i. e. 'criminals'). Conversely, by focusing on 'internalised homophobia' or psychosocial 
effects of oppression, the focus is on (individual) lesbians and gay men as victims, suffering 
as a result of the poor attitudes and behaviours of other individuals. 
In attempting to advance the rights of lesbians and gay men, therefore, lesbian and 
gay psychology ('gay-affin-native' psychology), and the study of lesbians and gay men 
prior to the 1970s, has done so predominantly by using arguments that are not rights-based. 
So, instead of arguing that it is a human rights violation to beat lesbians and gay men up, 
harass them, or dismiss them from their jobs, psychology has argued that these occurrences 
cause lesbians and gay men mental health problems. In so doing, the contemporary 
psychological study of lesbian and gay issues has, for the most part, neutralised human 
rights, by individualising lesbian and gay oppression and \'Iewing human rights \-Iolations 
as mental health issues, rather than socially and legally condoned oppression. 
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Theoretical and Methodological Rationale for the Present Study 
Although a human rights framework is ýý'ell established \ý'Ithin law and politics. therc does 
not appear to be a coherent Psychology of human rights, but rather a disparate collection of 
theory and research with a peripheral interest in human rights. Whilst a small body of 
psychological theory and research has explicitly engaged with human rights, eitlicr in 
relation to research and clinical practice, or in the study of attitudes toNý'ards and 
understandings about human rights, psychology has largely engaged ýN'Ith human rights in 
an implicit and cursory way. The two main areas of psychology where a human rights 
framework has been employed are (1) the study of moral reasoning, and (2) the study of 
oppression. As we have seen, human rights occupy a central position in the theory of moral 
reasoning, but because studies of moral reasoning typically employ a developmental 
approach, human rights are subsumed as a more morally developed way of thinking. 
Likewise, because psychologists have predominantly taken an individuallsed approach to 
the study of oppression, employing a psychosocial framework, human rights havc been 
neutralised (decontextualised and depoliticised) into mental health issues. 
The failure of psychology to engage directly with a human rights framework is 
striking. Despite a plethora of evidence that the human rights of lesbians and gay men 
around the world are violated in a whole range of ways, psychology has omitted to mention 
human rights in relation to lesbian and gay issues. For example, psychologists have 
typically investigated hate crimes against lesbians and gay men as something perpetrated by 
some individuals against others, rather than as systematic human rights violations against 
lesbians and gay men internationally. Furthermore, although homophobia and climate 
studies have typically included a small range of human rights issues within their scales, 
they have omitted exploring people's views in relation to (human) rights issues such as the 
right to life, the right to asylum and the right to freedom of expression and access to 
infort-nation. It would appear then, that to date no study has comprehensi'vely adopted a 
human rights framework in relation to a broad range of lesbian and gay issues. MoreoN, er. 
psychology itself has been responsible both for promoting and for violating the human 
rights of lesbians and gay men 
As was highlighted in chapter one, lesbian and gay issues are increasingly being 
recognised as hurnan rights issues, and in the global struggle to achieve equality with 
heterosexuals, inequalities for lesbians and gay men (and other marg, nafised -I-oups) are 
frequently being challenged using human rights arguments. A human rights framework 
is advantageous for studying lesbian and gay issues because by locating sexual 
orientation within a human rights framework, lesbians and gay men (and their 
advocates) can link their struggle to a tradition which has transfon-ned the oppre-s-sion ot' 
other groups (e. g. women and blacks). Consequently. it is important to employ a human 
rights framework to the psychological study of lesbian and gay issues, because by 
applying a human rights approach to phenomena such as attitudes, behaviours, and 
reasoning, we may gain an insight into the processes which maintain the denial of 
human rights, and from there establish how we might best work towards positi\'e social 
change (Payaslyo6lu & Iýduygu, 1999). 
As highlighted at the beginning of this thesis, the purpose of the present reseai-ch 
was explicitly to employ a human nghts framework to the study of lesbian and gaý' 
issues. This study therefore aimed to explore the way in which people think, reason, 
talk, and argue about lesbian and gay issues, focusing explicitly and comprehensively 
on the extent to which people support lesbian and gay human rights, and employ rights- 
based reasoning in thinking, talking, and arguing about lesbian and gay human rights 
issues. 
Methodological approach 
For the present research, a multimethod approach was employed so as to enable the 
exploration of different aspects of support for and reasoning about lesbian and gay issues 
(attitudes, thinking, discussion) in different contexts (individual, social, formal). 
Traditionally, in the social sciences, quantitative and qualitative methods have been seen as 
opposing research paradigms (Brannen, 1992; Hammersley, 1996, - Lincoln & Guba. 1985). 
in that methods of data collection and analysis have typically been viewed as divergent. 
Despite the widely recognised epistemological differences between the two approaches 
(e. g. see Hami-nersley, 1996; Henwood, 1996; Smith, 1984), a number of researchers (e. &,. 
Bryrnan, 1992, Hai-ni-nersley, 1996), including feminist researchers (e. (.,. Jayaratne, 1993: 
Henwood, 1996). have argued for the combination of both quantitative and qualitatix e 
methods in psychological research. "I 
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The use of diverse methods or 'multiple research strategies' (Bur, -, es,,. 1982 in 
Brannen, 1992) in tackling a research problem, most commonly applics to combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods. in what is known as 'triangulation' (Brýýman. 199-1. 
Hammersley, 1996), whereby the findings of different measures are compared against one 
another. However,, the main reason for combining methods in the present research was to 
gain a more complete picture of people's support for and reasoning about lesbian and gaý' 
human rights issues, by using methods which complement each other (cf, Bryman, 1992, 
Harnmersley, 1996; Jayaratne, 1993; see for example, Waterton & Wynne, 1999). In this 
study, then, the quantitative methods (i. e. questionnaire comprising attitude scales and the 
moral dilemma task) and the qualitative methods (i. e. focus groups, and texts) were 
designed to explore different aspects of the research question. 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaires have been widely used in survey research, and are commonly ernploycd as a 
means of researching attitudes (Goddard & Villanova, 1996). Feminist research airns to be 
politically useful in creating social change (see Kitzinger, 1996; Wilkinson, 1996b), and 
therefore has been primarily concerned with finding out about the lives and experiences of 
those who are oppressed, particularly women (Kelly, Burton, and Regan, 1994; Stanley & 
Wise, 1993). To be politically active in counteracting the damaging claims about women 
made by androcentric research, feminist psychologists have often employed survcy 
methods (despite criticism ftom other feminists; cf. Jayaratne, 1993) to provide counter- 
evidence to research findings of the 'malestream', or as a means of raising consciousness 
among women and in society generally (e. g. see Koss, 1988; Hite, 1976). Similarly, lesbian 
and gay psychologists have also used questionnaires to counteract damaging claims of 
heterocentric and heterosexist research and practice. For example, as outlined previously in 
this chapter, early homophobia studies (e. g. Smith, 197 1, Lumby, 1976) were largely an 
attempt by lesbian and gay psychologists to challenge the prevailing dominance of 
psychological research claiming that lesbians and gay men were patholo gi call y ill 
(Kitzing , cr, 
1987). 
Although feminists have frequently been critical of survey research, in that it 
imposes a pre-defincd framcwork. with little opportunity for reflection and elaboration 
,ý 
(Shields & Crowley, 1996), or that it is buying into the patriarchal culture of 'scientific, 
method (see Reinharz & Davidman, 1992). questionnaires and surveys can be particularly 
useful for advancing political goals and influencing policy (Jayaratne. 1993). In particular. 
surveys and questionnaires produce large scale data, which can be statistically quantified. 
and readily co-opted by activists, MPs, and the press (Bryman, 1992: Javaratne. 1993). 
Consequently, questionnaires and surveys provide a useful vehicle for raising a%% areness 
among the general population about the extent of a particular issue or problern (Reinharz 
Davidman, 1992). 
We know little about how people think about, reason about, and talk about lesbian 
and gay human rights issues. We also do not know whether people think about lesbian and 
gay issues from a human rights standpoint. One of the key advantages of carrying out a 
questionnaire study, is that it provides a means by which we can establish (relatively 
quickly) the views of a large number of people, in a way which would not be possible using 
qualitative methods such as interviews or focus groups. A questionnaire approach was 
therefore adopted in the present study to give a global snapshot of attitudes towards and 
reasoning about lesbian and gay human rights issues. 
Focus Groups 
Focus groups are small groups (usually less than 12 people) gathered by a researcher to 
collectively discuss a topic, or to explore a set of issues (J. Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999, 
Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990; Wilkinson, 1999a; See also Greenbaum, 1993). Although it 
is only relatively recently that focus groups have been employed in psychological research, 
they have a long history in marketing, public policy, and communications research (Stewart 
& Shamdasani, 1990; Wilkinson, 1999a). Increasingly though, focus groups have been 
employed by feminists in the social sciences for research on topics from breast cancer (see 
Wilkinson, 1998) and AIDS (J. Kitzinger, 1994), to adolescent issues and experiences (e. o 
Frith., 1997, Granello, 1997, Lovering, 1995; Macpherson & Fine, 1995). 
One of the main reasons that focus groups have gained popularity among 
terninist researchers, is that they provide a context within which ideas can be 
tonnulated and inodified, thus closely approximating evcryday con\ ci-sation (J. 
Kitzinger, 1994b. J. Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999, Wilkinson, 1999a). Secondk% although 
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the researcher may guide the discussion, the focus group method is largely participant 
led, participants engaging with each other (rather than the researcher) and de\-elopinsz 
their own agendas and "pursuing their own priorities on their own terms" (J. Kitzinger 
& Barbour, 1999, p. 5; see also Steýxart & Shamdasani, 1990). Consequently. focus 
groups may provide an insight into the social processes by which beliefs are accepted. 
rejected, and modified in a group context (Green & Hart, 1999). This attribute makes 
focus groups ideal for exploring people's attitudes, and the way(s) in which people 
reason about issues in a group (or societal) context (Greenbaum, 1993: J. Kitzinger & 
Barbour, 1999; see also discussion in Waterton & Wynne, 1999). 
Conversely, the group context has been seen by some as a drawback of the method, 
in that it can serve to silence particular individuals or inhibit (some) participants from 
raising points which may deviate from the group norm (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990; scc 
for example Granello, 1997; Kitzinger, 1994b). However, in this study, the ways in w1lich 
inequality is maintained, and the processes by which certain people or views are countered 
or silenced was of analytical interest, and therefore a benefit of the method, rathcr than a 
drawback. 
Focus groups were employed in this study to explore how people talk about lesbian 
and gay issues in a social context as opposed to the individualistic approach employed in 
the questionnaire. The focus group schedule used in this study was, therefore, designed to 
closely relate to the issues covered in the questionnaire, so as to allow comparison betý'N'ccil 
general trends in questionnaire responses, and the way in which the issues are discussed in 
a social context, shedding light on potential reasons for patterns in questionnaire responscs 
(cf J. Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999). 
Texts 
In the Social Sciences, researchers (particularly those engaged in rhetoric. discourse, 
and communication research) have found the analysis of culturally available texts (e. g. 
news reports; talk shows, printed press) useful for identifying the ývay in w1lich pcople 
talk about issues or societal groups. Recent psychological research of this kind has 
explored how anti-gav (etc) arguments are constructed in political and inedia fora, for 
example, talk shows (e. g. see Clarke, 1999). Hansard reports (e. g. Epstein, Johnson, & 
91 
Steinberg, 2000), and the print media (e. g. Myrick, 1998: Williams. 1996-9-)- 
As lesbian and gay human rights issues have tended to be at the forefront ofinedia 
attention, and are typically fought In the public arena, a text-based anal""sis was cinplo. yed I 
in this study to complement the data collected in the focus groups, by specificallý' exploring 
the arguments used to counter human rights in a context where human rights are explicitly 
made relevant. For this study, a single topical issue was selected as a case studý' for 
exploring reasoning about lesbian and gay human rights in public discourse (in this case, 
parliamentary debates, newspaper reports, and letters to the Editor). At the time of 
undertaking the research for this thesis, the age of consent for sex between men was being 
debated in the British parliament, and therefore Hansard and newspaper reports of this 
debate were chosen as a convenience sample. 
This chapter has focused on the relationship between psychology, lesbian and gay issues, 
and human rights, and in exploring the interface between these, has provided a rationale for 
the present research. The next three chapters will report the findings from the studies using 
each of the three methods described above: Questionnaire (Chapter 3), focus groups 
(Chapter 4), and texts (Chapter 5). 
CHAPTER 3 
Thinking about Rights: A Large-Scale Questionnaire Study of Support 
for and Reasoning about Lesbian and Gay Issues 
As indicated in the literature review (Chapter 2). mainstream psychology has rarely 
used a human rights framework. Where it has, only very few rights have been 
considered, and seldom in relation to lesbians and gay men. To date no study has 
comprehensively explored support for human rights as they apply to lesbians and gay 
men. 
In order to address this gap in the literature, and to provide a context ýNithin 
which to explore the way people talk and argue about lesbian and gay human rights 
(Chapters 4 and 5), a large-scale questionnaire study of attitudes and reasoning was 
undertaken. The purpose of the questionnaire was to explore students' support for and 
reasoning about lesbian and gay human rights issues, with a view to establishing the 
extent to which (a) lesbian and gay human rights are supported, and (b) people prioritise 
human rights reasoning when thinking about lesbian and gay issues. 
We know little about how people think about, reason about, and talk about 
lesbian and gay human rights issues. We also do not know whether people think about 
lesbian and gay issues from a human rights standpoint. One of the key advantages of 
carrying out a questionnaire study, is that it provides a means by which we can establish 
(relatively quickly) the views of a large number of people, in a way which would not be 
possible using qualitative methods such as interviews or focus groups. A questionnaire 
approach was therefore adopted in the present study to give a global snapshot of 
attitudes towards and reasoning about lesbian and gay human rights issues. providing a 
base on which to contextualise the material in the subsequent qualitativc studies. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the extent to which respondents (1) agree 
or disagree that human rights issues should be extended to lesbians and gay men. (2) 
view themselves as responsible for helping to create positive social change for Icsbians 
and gay men, and (3) employ human rights reasoning when presented with moral 
dilemmas involving lesbian and gay issues. The findings of the present study will 
therefore be presented in three distinct sections: 
Part 1: Levels of endorsement of lesbian and gay human rights issues. 
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Part 2: Individuals' sense of personal responsibility for creating pos, 16% e social 
change for lesbians and gay men. 
Part 3: Reasoning about lesbian and gay human rights issues. 
First, the method used for this study (all three parts) will be outlined. 
Method 
Development of the instrument 
The questionnaire developed for this study comprised four sections. The first section 
(endorsement of lesbian and gay human rights) consisted of two attitude scales, one 
measuring homophobia, and the other, support for lesbian and gay human rights. The 
next section comprised two questions, both requiring an indicative and a written 
response, on self-perceived personal responsibility for creating positive social change 
for lesbians and gay men (position on lesbian and gay rights). The third section 
comprised a psychometric measure constituting two moral dilemmas involving lesbian 
and gay issues, and the final section of the questionnaire asked respondents to give 
demographic information about themselves. In outlining the development of the 
questionnaire as a whole, I will discuss the development of each section of the 
questionnaire in turn, ending with a brief explanation of the final structure of the 
questionnaire. 
Section A: Endorsement of lesbian and gqi- human rights 
Since., to date, no study appears to have explored attitudes towards human rights issues 
(in their entirety) as they apply to lesbians and gay men, it was necessary to develop a 
scale specifically for this study, to measure this aspect of support for lesbian and gay 
human rights. To construct this section of the questionnaire, an item pool (see 
Oppenheim, 1992) was compiled of statements pertaining, to specific lesbian and gay It 
human rights issues. Items addressing human rights issues from scales. tests, 
questionnaires, and intenic\v schedules were selected from the psychological literature 
on lesbian and (,, ay issues. and on hurnan ri(, Yhts. Some of these \% crc ah-c(Ady t'ramed as 
lesbian and gay issues (e. g. "Women's hornosexualitý- should not be a cause for Job 
discrimination" [Maney & Cain, 1997]), and therefore were included in their existing 
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fon-n. Others were framed in relation to human rights generally. or in relation to specific 
groups or contexts. For example "A person's race or sex should not block the person's 
access to basic rights and freedoms" (Diaz-Veizades et al., 1995): "Gays, lesbians. and 
bisexuals should not be allowed to teach in public elementary schools" (Malaney ct al.. 
1994); "Books written by members of this group should be removed from a public 
library" (Sotelo, 1997). 
Where possible, statements of this latter type were modified or adapted (cf. 
Bourque & Clark, 1994), so that they focused on lesbian and gay human rights. For 
example, "a person's race or sex should not block that person's access to basic rights 
and freedoms" (Diaz-Veizades et al., 1995) became "A person's sexual orientation 
should not block that person's access to basic rights and freedoms". In addition, a 
number of items were created from scratch to represent current human rights issues 
regarding lesbians and gay men worldwide, which had not been covered by previous 
studies (e. g. "There is no situation in which it is justified to kill someone simply for 
being lesbian or gay"). Next, items were systematically compared against the Universal 
Declaration of human rights, to ensure that all items which could conceivably apply to 
lesbians and gay men (qua lesbians and gay men) were represented. Items were then 
systematically compared against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to ensure 
that all articles of the declaration which could conceivably apply to lesbians and gay 
men (qua lesbians and gay men) were represented. 
When completed, the item pool comprised around 50 statements. It is usual in 
attitude research for the pool of items to be larger than what is optimal to include in a 
single scale or questionnaire (Oppenheim, 1992). Often psychologists use factor 
analysis to reduce the number of items to those which fonn a succinct and coherent 
scale (e. g. see Herek, 1984). However, because the purpose of this study was to explore 
attitudes across a range of human rights issues, rather than to develop a psychometric 
measure, items were systematically hand-chosen using the following procedure. 
First, items in the pool were sorted according to the article of the Universal 
Declaration to which each pertained., their wording modified, and duplicate items 
discarded. After this process had been completed, most articles of the declaration were 
represented by a single questionnaire item, however, for multifaceted articles, more than 
one statement was included. For example, the right to marry and found a family (Article 
16) was represented by two items - "Lesbian and gay male couples should be Icually 
permitted to marry, just as heterosexual couples are" (item 2 1) and "Lesbian and gay 
ý4 ;, 
couples should have all the same parenting rights as heterosexuals do" (item 34). Scale 
items were finalised by systematically doubl e- check, ng that each releý-ant article of the 
UDHR was represented (in full or in part) by an item on the scale, and that the wording 
of each item accurately reflected the essence of the article to . N-hich it pertained. 
Throughout the process of developing items. care was taken to ensure that staternents 
were clearly worded, were not ambiguous, and that double negati, ý'es, and double- 
barrelled items were avoided as much as possible (cf. Oppenheim. 1992-, Fife-Schaw, 
1995b). The final scale comprised a total of 25 items asking about lesbian and gay 
human rights issues, around a third of which were worded so that they could be reverse- 
scored. 
In order to make possible a consideration of the relationship between support for 
lesbian and gay human rights and attitudes towards lesbians and gay men, a short 
homophobia scale was incorporated. Whilst there are numerous homophobia scales 
freely available in the psychological literature (e. g. see Hudson & Ricketts, 1980; 
Lumby, 1976; see also Davis et al., 1998 for many more), many are lengthy, outdated, 
or are designed for targeting a specific group (e. g. heterosexuals; men; etc). For this 
study it was necessary to choose a measure which would fit suitably with the SLGHR, 
and which was brief, so as not to make the complete questionnaire too lengthy, and to 
ensure a consistent format. The short form of the Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gay 
Men Scale (ATLG-S; see Herek, 1984) was therefore selected because of (1) its brevity; 
(2) its structure and format was similar to that of the SLGHR; and (3) its validity and 
reliability are strong. Although some of the wording in this scale appeared at odds with 
our choice of wording in the SLGHR (e. g. the use of 'female homosexuality' rather than 
'lesbianism'), this was left unchanged so as to maintain the validity and reliability of the 
scale (cf. Fife-Schaw, 1995b). 
The 25 human rights items and the ten homophobia scale items were organised 
quasi-randomly to ensure that the items of the two scales were well mixed, that items 
addressing similar issues were separated, and that reverse-scored items were distributed 
throughout the questionnaire. Items were laid out with a five point likert type scale, 
con-imonly employed in attitude sun, eys (Fife-Schaw, 1995b, Goddard &Villanova, 
1996), attached to each item. For this section of the questionnaire, respondents were 
asked to assess the extent to which they a eed with each item by indicating on a scale . gr I 
from -strongly agree" to -strong]y disagree". An 'unsure'neutral' option was also 
provided (cf, Goddard & Villanova. 1996). With the exception of the 14 reN erse-scored 
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items, which were scored from 5 through to 1. each item attracted a score of I (strong]". 
agree) through to 5 (strongly disagree). In all cases a low score (I or 2) represented pro- 
lesbian and gay human rights and more positive attitudes to,. vards lesbians and gay men, 
and a high score (4 or 5) represented lack of endorsement for rights issues and negative 
attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. Item scores may be totalled to iyi%, c an overall 
score for each participant, potentially ranging from 25-125 for the SLGHR. Items on the 
ATLG-S may be similarly totalled to give an overall score ftom 10-50 for each 
participant. 
This section of the questionnaire was piloted on 19 students (I I males and 8 
females). Potential participants were approached individually in one of the bars on 
campus, on a single afternoon during term-time. Each person approached was briefed 
on the study, and were then asked if they would be willing to spend 5- 10 minutes 
filling out the questionnaire. No changes were made to this section of the 
questionnaire as a result of the piloting. 
Section B: Position on Lesbian and Gay Rights 
To complement the situation-specific statements included in the first section of the 
questionnaire to explore endorsement of lesbian and gay human rights issues, the 
second section of the questionnaire was also designed to explore support for lesbian and 
gay human rights, but through self-perceived responsibility for helping create positive 
social change for lesbians and gay men. Previous research suggests that people will 
often endorse a proactive viewpoint in the abstract, but when asked about their personal 
commitment actively creating positive change, or if their active involvement is 
monitored, their commitment ceases to be evident (e. g. see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
Ideally, it would have been desirable to investigate people's actual behaviour in relation 
to lesbian and gay rights (see Stevick & Addleman, 1995 and Yates & Youniss, 1998 
for examples of research on political action), however, this would have been too large a 
project to be incorporated as part of the present study. 
In a number of studies, notably campus climate studies (e. g. Malane,,., et al., I 
1994), questions such as "if you witnessed one or more students making derogatory 
remarks about. or otherwise verbally harassing a student because theý' assumed he or 
she was gay, lesbian, or bisexual, what would you do first"" (%-Ialaneý' et al., 1994) ha%ýc 
been included to give an indication of the level of commitment people might be willing 
to give to such an nssue. Two questions of this type were used. The first of these was 
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adapted from McClosky & Brill's (1983) questionnaire to read -If [lesbians and gay 
men] are treated unjustly in our society. do you feel it is your personal responsibillt",, to 
help create positive changes? " focused on the individual's personal ownership of 
responsibility for lesbian and gay rights issues. The second, "How willing would you be 
to join others in their efforts to ensure that lesbian and gay rights are rcspected? "' 
(adapted from Doise, c. 1994) focused on one's commitment to lesbian and gay rights in 
relation to collectively working towards social change. 
To facilitate data processing and analysis (Bourque & Clark, 1994). as ý, vith the 
previous section, both questions were paired with a five point likert type scale from 
"most definitely" to "definitely not", and "extremely willing" to "extremely unwilling" 
respectively, and scored from I through to 5. In addition, for each of these two 
questions, an open-ended response format was used to allow respondents to explain 
their responses. 
Section C: Measuring Moral Reasoning: 
The purposes of this part of the present study, was to get an indication of the type of 
arguments being prioritised when thinking about moral dilemmas involving lesbian and 
gay issues, rather than to place respondents into Kohlbergian stages of development. In 
particular, the aim was to explore the kinds of arguments that people prioritise when 
faced with lesbian and gay human rights issues in competition with other 
considerations, and the extent to which human rights arguments are favoured. 
Consequently, the focus was on the extent to which it was used, or if it was used at all 
(as opposed to where this type of reasoning was placed in a given model). 
In his theory of moral development, Lawrence Kohlberg (1976) places moral 
thinking based on universal principles of justice, or human rights, at stage 6; the highest 
stage of moral development, characteristic of what Kohlberg terms principled 
reasoning, the most desirable way of thinking about moral issues (see Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987 for details of stages). Thus, ftom a Kohlbergian moral de'ý-clopmental 
perspective, thinking about moral issues from a human rights perspectlý'e is indicatiN e 
of mature moral thought/development. 
As with support for human rights issues. lesbian and gay issues do not appear to 
havc been the subject of studies on moral reasoning, although moral dilemmas havc 
N, used in other areas (e. g. Kahn, 1997, Keller et al., 1998. Snell, 1996: 'hite been wide]. : 71 
S-, Manolis, 1997). Currently, there are three major instruments used in moral 
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developmental research: I/ Kohlberg's Moral Judgement lntenýiew (MJI, ColbN, & 
Kohlberg, 1987), 2/ Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, 1979). and _3 Lind's Moral 
Judgement Test (MJT; Lind et al.. 1981-82. Lind & Wakenhut, 1985). For all three 
measures, participants are asked to respond to a series of hypothetical stories involving, 
moral dilemmas. Kohlberg's MJI takes the form of an interview where participants are 
read a moral dilemma and then asked a series of probe questions designed to elicit 
infori-nation about why they think the key player(s) in the moral dilemma should should 
not have acted in the way they did. Rest's DIT and Lind's MJT, on the other hand, are 
quantitative measures based on Kohlberg's MJI. 
Since no dilemmas relating to lesbian and gay issues existed in any of these 
three measures (nor in any other study to date) the possible options were to either create 
new dilemmas, as others (e. g. Schwalbe & Staples, 1992) have done, or adapt some 
existing dilemmas. The latter approach was chosen, as this would ensure that the 
important components that form the dilemma would remain intact, and that the revised 
dilemmas could be utilised within an existing measure. 
Kohlberg's MR, is very labour-intensive and not well suited to being used with 
a large sample, so could not have been incorporated as part of a questionnaire. By 
contrast, Rest's DIT is relatively straight-forward, has high level of validity and 
reliability, and has been employed in a large number of studies (e. g. see Galotti, 
Kozberg, & Fanner, 1991; Santilli & Hudson, 1992; Stevick & Addleman, 1995), 
including cross-cultural studies (e. g. see Hau & Lew, 1989; Zeidner & Nevo, 1987), and 
therefore seemed an appropriate choice for my study. This was therefore used as a 
starting point. 
The DIT comprises six moral dilemmas, three of which are taken directly from 
Kohlberg's MJI. For each dilemma, respondents are asked to indicate how they think 
the key players in the dilemma should have acted. Next, participants are asked to 
respond to a series of statements corresponding to arguments at each of Kohlberg's 
stages (with some distracter items), indicating how important the participant believes 
each argument to be in making a decision about how the key players acted. Finally. 
participants are asked to identify the four most important arguments, and to rank these 
in order of importance. 
Of the six dilemmas in Rest's DIT. three were easily modified into moral 
dilemmas involving lesbian and gay issues: student take-over (a dilemma where 
students take over an administration building. because the university wouldn't 
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implement an army ROTC program), Webster (about racial discrimination by an 
employer), and newspaper (about a school principal who embargoes a student 
newspaper publishing anti-Vietnam war material). In order to ensure that the validity 
and reliability of the DIT remained intact as much as is possible, only minor and 
absolutely necessary changes were made to the dilemmas. So, for example, in the 
Webster dilemma, the focus on racial discrimination was changed to one of lesbian and 
gay discrimination. Thus, all mentions of "orientals" were replaced with the , ý'ord-s -&Yaý' 
men and lesbians", and the words "... but he was Chinese" were replaced with the words 
"... but he was gay". In addition, as this questionnaire was to be used in a British context, 
American-specific language was replaced with the nearest British equivalent ("petrol 
station" rather than "gas station"). In every other respect, the forinat was kept identical 
to that of Rest's DIT. 
In order to assess the potential viability of the adapted dilemmas, and of the 
format of the DIT itself (which seemed quite complex), the proposed dilemmas were 
used as a forum for discussion with a postgraduate/staff group as a means of pre- 
piloting. A number of issues were raised in this forum, including the overwhelming 
complexity of the measure, the time needed to complete the task, and the level of 
comprehension required to understand what was required. However, the forinat of 
Rest's Defining Issues Test seemed to be a cause for concern: if staff and postgraduate 
students found the task difficult to comprehend, then how much more so would this be 
for undergraduate students? Researchers in the United States also reported problems: 
For example, one had resorted to conducting the DIT on a one-to-one basis, 'walking' 
each respondent through the task (Nicholas Santilli, personal communication). 
However, despite my reservations, I decided to pilot my adapted version of the DIT, but 
to trial some alternative measures/methods as well. 
I turned to the less well-known, and less frequently cited MJT (Lind & 
Wakenhut, 1985) which is freely available on the internet (at http: //wýý'ýý,. uni- 
konstanz. de/ag-moral). The MJT comprises two moral dilemmas, which like the DIT 
first require participants to indicate whether they agree or disagree 'with the actions of 
the key players in the dilemma. Next, for each dilemma, participants are asked to 
respond (on a nine-point scale) to six potential arguments for, and six 1)otctitial 
arguments against. the actions of the players in the dilemma (see Appendix Bii). In each 
case, one statement from each of the six equates'ývith one of the six stages of 
Kohlberg's theory of moral development. 
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Overall, the format of the MJT appeared much clearer than the DIT. so an 
adapted version of this measure was created. Two of the dilemmas (Student take-over 
and Webster) which had already been adapted were imported into the NUT. making onl%- 
the minimum adjustments to the statements of the scale, so as to leaN e the measure as 
intact as possible. For example, in the case of the student take-over dilemma. the 
statement "that it is unwise to risk dismissal from university because of other people" 
replaced statement 9 ("that it is unwise to risk dismissal from the company because of 
other people") of the MJT. 
An open-ended responses format version of the moral dilemmas was also piloted 
in addition to the DIT- and MJT-based versions. For this version,, the student take-over 
and Webster dilemmas were presented, each followed by a question asking respondents 
to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the actions of the key players in the 
dilemmas. Respondents were then asked to explain their response. 
Scoring details for the DIT and MJT were determined from their respective 
manuals (Rest, 1986 and Lind, 1998 respectively). Although there are a number of ways 
of scoring the DIT, the p-score (the most widely used method) seemed the most 
appropriate for me to use, in that it indicates the extent to which principled reasoning 
(Kohlbergian stages 5& 6) is prioritised in coming to a decision about whether the 
actions of the key players in a dilemma acted rightly or wrongly (Rest, 1979). The 
advantage of this method of scoring, is that it offers a way of dividing participants into 
two groups: Those who are employing rights-based (principled) reasoning, and those 
who are not. The MJT, on the other hand, produces a c-score, which assesses both the 
consistency of judgement behaviour, as well as the direction and intensity of 
preferences for stage-typical concerns (Lind & Wakenbut, 1985; see also Rest, Thoma, 
& Edwards, 1997). For the open-ended responses, a Kohlbergian-type analysis was 
applied, responses coded according to the Kohlbergian stage each best represented. 
The three versions were then piloted. Potential participants were approached 
individually in the library common room and in one of the bars on campus, over a 
period of several days. The same procedure was applied to the piloting of this section of 
the questionnaire as had been employed for the piloting of Section A. 
For version I (based on Rest's DIT), a number of problems were encountered, 
including the length of time needed to complete the task. and the high le% cl of reading 
comprehension necessary to comprehend what is required (.,, cc Ka\-. 1982: SandcT-.,, et 
al., 1995). Most of the questionnaires in this format were returned incomplete, or 
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incorrectly completed. The second version (based on Llnd*s MJT), ho, %N, e\ er. appeared 
to be much more comprehensible. and easier to complete. and respondents reported little 
difficulty completing the task. The third version (open response) also appeared to 
present no problems for respondents. However, the quality of the responses was 
disappointing, and the majority of responses did not engage with the moral or rights 
element of the dilemmas (although this may have been due to unclear instructions). 
On reviewing the feedback from the piloting, version I was abandoned, as its 
unwieldy nature appeared to have deterred respondents from completing the 
questionnaire in its entirety. Although the qualitative potential of open-ended responses 
(version 3) was enticing, the quality of responses was disappointing, and analysis was 
unnecessarily complicated by the lack of confonnity of the data to a moral or rights 
framework. On a basis of the piloting then, version 2 was clearly the favoured option, 
and was therefore adopted for use in the questionnaire. 
Section D: Information about participants 
The final section of the questionnaire was designed to collect demographic information. 
As suggested by others (Fife-Schaw, 1995b; Miller, 199 1, cited in Goddard & 
Villanova, 1996), this was placed at the end of the questionnaire. 
This section of the questionnaire was based on the standard fon-n used by 
Loughborough University to collect demographic information. The standard form asks 
for information about sex, race, and disability, and in addition, a question on age was 
added. Age bands were employed rather than asking for specific ages, and because the 
vast majority of students are under 25 years of age, response categories were provided 
which distinguished age among young participants, but offered a single category for 
those over 25 years of age. 
Some further questions were added to this section, based on the demographic 
details requested in other studies of lesbian and gay issues (e. g. Malaney et al., 1994) 
and human rights (e. g. Doise, c. 1994). Respondents were asked for information about 
their sexuality. In addition to the usual categories (e. g. heterosexual, lesbian') gay male, 
bisexual, and transgendered). an "unsure" and an "other (please specif". )" option were 
also added. In previous studies (e. g. D'Augelli. 1989b) participants werc only offered, 
at best, the options just described leaving no option for those who did not wish to 
identify themselves in these ways, nor for any participants ýOio were still unsure about 
their sexuality: such studies record high rates of non-response to qucsti It ions on sexuality. 
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Participants were also asked about religious affiliations. and membership of 
groups which promote human rights, as these factors were expected to contribute to a 
pro- (in the case of membership of human rights organisations) or antl- (In the case of 
particular religious affiliations) lesbian and gay human rights stance. 
This section of the questionnaire was piloted simultaneously with section A. and 
as a result of the piloting, some questions in the demographic details section were 
slightly modified. First, lines were added for all categories labelled "other (please 
specify)" to make it clear that a response was required. Second, for question 6 (religious 
affiliation) the categories 'catholic' and 'protestant' were collapsed and replaced with 
the category 'Christian'. Third, when asked for "school of study" several respondents 
misinterpreted this to mean the institution of study, rather than the faculty, school in 
which they study (e. g. Social Sciences, Humanities, Engineering). Accordingly, the 
question was rephrased to ask, "What is the main subject you are studying for your 
degree/course? " Since the target sample had changed, this question (question 8) was 
later extended to ask for occupation, and then for students, specific characteristics about 
their student status (e. g. full-time or part-time, undergraduate or postgraduate, and year 
of study) in addition to the main subject studied. 
For a self-administered questionnaire, it is usual to provide a statement at the beginning 
of the questionnaire, briefly explaining the nature of the study, assuring respondents of 
anonymity, and stating who the questionnaires are for (Fife-Schaw, 1995b; Goddard & 
Villanova, 1996). A statement of this nature was therefore included at the top of the 
questionnaire. However, because the moral dilemma task (section Q was less self- 
explanatory than sections A and B, instructions for completing the task were included at 
the beginning of that section. The final forinat of the questionnaire (see appendix A) 
was therefore 
Section A: Endorsement of lesbian and gay human rights (SLGHR & ATLG-S). 
Section B: Position on lesbian and gay rights (open-ended responses) 
Section C: Moral Reasoning (Moral dilemma task) 
Section D: Demographic Information. 
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Procedure 
Sampling 
The purpose of the questionnaire was exploratory. therefore in this study non- 
probability sampling (see McCready, 1996) was employed: in this case a con% enience 
sample. A convenience sample (sometimes called a 'judgement sample' - McCready. 
1996; Oppenheim, 1992) is typically employed where the size and demographic 
characteristics of the population are largely unknown, and from which it is therefore 
difficult to 'draw' a sample (Oppenheim, 1992). Although it would theoretically be 
possible to establish the number of students enrolled at a given university, and the 
ethnic and gender breakdown of each, this information is usually 'classified', making 
it difficult to employ a random and/or stratified sample. Furthen-nore, contact details 
for students would be virtually impossible to obtain, as these are typically confidential. 
Not withstanding this, even if it was possible to ascertain this information, for a large 
scale questionnaire study such as this, it would be an arduous task to obtain and 
monitor representation of all groups. For these reasons, a convenience sample was 
employed in the present study. 
For an exploratory study such as this one, sample size is not as important as it 
would be in studies where the results are to be generalised to the population as a whole 
(McCready, 1996), but should be large enough to allow a (relatively) accurate 
estimation of attitudes beyond the sample surveyed (Oppenheim, 1992; McCready, 
1996). McCready (1996) suggests that as a rule of thumb, the target sample size should 
be comparable to that reported in similar studies. With the exception of large cross- 
national studies (e. g. Doise et al., 1999) studies of attitudes towards lesbians and gay 
men and studies of human rights attitudes have typically employed between around 100 
to 900 participants. For this study therefore, it was planned to distribute around 1000 
questionnaires, and because of the distribution technique adopted, over half were 
expected to be returned. 
Although response rates to questionnaires may be as high as 80% or more, for 
long questionnaires (as this one was) and/or those ýN'hich deal with (relati" ely) scnsitiN C 
topics, return rates tend to be much loxN'er, averaging around 400 0 or less (Fi fe-Schaw, 
1995a). Response rates also tend to be higher NNýhen postage-paid and addressed 
en-N-clopes are provided, and NN-hen respondents or distributors are sent reminder 
letters/cards (Bums, 1990, Oppenheim, 19922, Vaux, 1996). 
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Distribution 
In order to reach students across the country. the help of lecturers wa. ,; enli. -ted to 
distribute questionnaires to classes of students on my behalf. It Is common in large scýllc 
research for questionnaires to be administered by others (e. g. a research team) oil the 
behalf of a researcher (e. g. see Malaney, 1994, Payaslyo6lu & lqduygu, 1999, Payne, 
2000). 
The questionnaire was first completed by a large class of students in the 
Department of Social Sciences at Loughborough University. Four colleagues at other 
universities were then approached in person, and asked if they could help b" 
distributing the questionnaire: all accepted. Subsequently, a personally addressed letter 
was sent to 25 established academic staff known to have related research and/or 
teaching interests, requesting assistance: this resulted in II offers of help (plus one 
additional one via word of mouth). An unsuccessful recruitment attempt was made ,,, ia 
the BPS Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section Newsletter. 
In addition to Loughborough University, the questionnaire was copied and 
distributed in bulk to the 16 members of academic staff at 14 universities across the 
United Kingdom, who had agreed to distribute questionnaires to students. Distribution 
to students was managed in one of two ways: (1) handed out to and completed by 
students during class time or (2) handed out to classes of students to take away and 
complete, and return at their next class, via a central postal facility, or to return to me 
directly. After 6 weeks, a reminder message was e-mailed to distributors from whom 
questionnaires were outstanding, again two weeks later, and for the last batches, a final 
deadline was imposed. 
In total, 1275 questionnaires were distributed and of these 627 completed 
questionnaires were returned, a return rate of 49.2%, the final sample comprising 
students from 13 UK universities (see Appendix B)1. The return rate for this study was 
therefore good. However, it is likely that the 'true' response rate is actually higher, 
given that many questionnaires may not have actually been handed to students and thcIr 
non-return therefore not the result of non-response. 
Anali, sis 
On their return, questionnaires were numbered, and a log book kept recording which 
institution each had been retumed from (cf. Fife-Schaw, 1995b). Each form was then 
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I Io r coded by hand (including reverse-scoring) and the data entered into an SPSS f 
windows (SPSSwin) data file. Statistical analyses (frequencies: correlations; t-tests: 
and scoring of SLGHR, ATLG-S, and moral reasoning task) were carried out Lisiniz 
SPSSwin. 
Qualitative responses were typed up into a table in Microsoft NVord, and 
analysed using thematic analysis (e. g. Boyatzis, 1998). The thematic analysis 
employed here was largely theory-led (see Hayes, 1997), in that I was looking for 
whether students did or did not view social change for lesbians and gay men as their 
personal responsibility, and the types of reasons they used to substantiate their 
position. To do this, I first read through the responses categonsing them into those 
who did view it as their personal responsibility, and those who did not. Next, I re-read 
the lists of responses looking for recurring reasons used by participants to substantiate 
their position. Responses were indexed (Frankland & Bloor, 1999) by marking similar 
responses in the same colour. Finally, theme headings were assigned to each type of 
response. 
As with the ATLG-S and SLGHR, the moral dilemma task (which was pre- 
coded) was entered into a data file and analysed using SPSSwin. Since the task used in 
this study mimicked the forinat and structure of Lind's MJT, the tasks were analysed 
using the scoring method devised by Lind (see Appendix A for a summary of this 
forinat; or Lind, 1998, for a detailed outline). 
. 
Ethical Considerations 
In accordance with the British Psychological Society (BPS) Code of Ethics (BPS. 
1990), confidentiality and anonymity were considered throughout the process of 
developing, administering, and analysing the questionnaire. In questionnaire studies, 
especially where distributed in bulk, anonymity is generally well preserved by the large 
number of participants taking part, and by the limited contact which participants ha% c 
with the researcher, especially where completed questionnaires are mailed back to the 
researcher (Goddard & Villanova, 1996). 
In designing the questionnaire, a staternent was included at the top of the first 
page clearly indicating that the questionnaire would be aiiotiyrnous, and briefly 
outlining its purpose. There was no requirement for participants to give their names on 
I No questionnaires were returned from two uni II 
distributors concerned, failed. 
iversities. and repeated attempts to contact the two 
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the questionnaire, however, on the first 250 questionnaires a space was provided at the 
end of the questionnaire for respondents to (voluntanly) give their name and contact 
details if they wished to participate in a focus group. Hoýý-ever, few respondents 
completed this section, so it was dropped from subsequent copies. My supervisor, a 
BPS Chartered Psychologist, (on behalf of the University Research Ethics Committee) 
gave ethical clearance before the questionnaire was distributed to students. 
Since the distribution of questionnaires was largely outside of my control. it is 
not possible for me to determine the extent to which anonymity between students and 
their lecturers was afforded to respondents during the distribution and collection 
process. However, questionnaire forms were not pre-numbered, so individual forms 
could not be connected with particular individuals. As questionnaires were distributed 
and returned without me being present, the vast majority of my respondents xvei-c 
unknown to me. Although a record was kept of the institutions from which each bulk set 
of forms was returned (stored separately from the questionnaires), this was purely for 
administrative purposes, and not so that inferences could be drawn from or comparisons 
made between one institution and another. Confidentiality was also maintained by 
aggregating the data for the complete set, so as to ensure individual or institutional 
responses were not identifiable (cf, Goddard & Villanova, 1996). 
Questionnaires were completed on a voluntary basis. Despite many of the 
questionnaires being distributed and completed during class time, there was no 
requirement that students complete them, and in only one case was a full complement of 
completed questionnaires returned. In addition, miscellaneous blank questionnaires 
were frequently returned amongst the completed ones for most subsamples. 
Validity and reliabilit 
In quantitative research employing scales and/or psychometric tests, reliability and 
validity are of considerable importance to the researcher (see Foster & Parker, 1995: 
Hammond, 1995; Ponterotto, 1996). In establishing the reliability of a test or scale, we 
are investigating its credibility as a measure (Hammond. 1995: Walsh & Betz. 1990). 
Validity, on the other hand, refers to the extent to which a scale or test mcýlsurcs what it 
purports to measure. (For detailed discussions of reliability and validity see Hainmond, 
1995, Ponterotto, 1996). 
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Reliability and validity of the homophobia scale (A TLG-S) 
For a scale to have good internal reliability. it should produce an alpha level of at Icast 
0.70, but preferably 0.80 or higher (Ponterotto, 1996). The full verslion of the ATLG Is 
reported to have a high level of internal reliability (a = 0.92). and good construct 
validity in that it was significantly correlated (p < 0.05) with both the construct validity 
measures and the parallel versions employed in the validation sample (see Herek. 1994). 
The internal reliability of the ATLG-S for Herek's original study is reported to be loýý-cr 
than for the full version, with an alpha value of 0.80. The ATLG-S was used unchanged 
in the present study, and reliability and validity were therefore expected to remain 
intact. 
Whenever a research instrument is used with a new sample, a new assessment of 
its reliability should be calculated (Ponterotto, 1996). For the present sample, a 
Cronbach analysis revealed a high level of internal reliabilitýT (a = 0.93), comparable to 
that reported in other recent studies (e. g. Campbell, Schellenberg, and Senn, 1997). 
Reliability and validity of attitudes towards Lesbian and Gay Human Rights (SLGHR) 
As the SLGHR was designed specifically for this study, established levels of reliability 
and validity are not available, and on a single sample, it is not possible to establish test- 
retest and inter-rater reliabilities. However, for the present sample, a Cronbach 
reliability analysis revealed a high level of internal reliability for the SLGHR (a = 0.94). 
In tenns of validity, the scale appears to have good (concurrent) criterion 
validity. It would be expected that responses on the SLGHR would show a strong 
positive correlation with responses on the ATLG-S (i. e. the more positive a participant's 
attitude toward lesbians and gay men, the more likely he/she would be to indicate 
support for lesbian and gay human rights), in that they both measure similar things, and 
that the former was developed from the latter. In the present study, this was upheld, in 
that a highly statistically significant relationship was found between attitudes toward 
lesbians and gay men and support for lesbian and gay human rights (r = 0.86, N= 585, p 
< 0.001). 
The SLGHR also showed good construct validity. Although it, ývas expected 
scale measuring support for lesbian and that the items would forni a unidi II 
gav human rights, this was onlV partially substantiated for the present sample. A factor 
I- greater than on th m0 ity of' analysis produced three factors with an eigenvalue i C. c aj n 
items convcroin-(,, on onc of two main factors. the first cxplainin(-, 24.501o of the 
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variance, and the second. 21.3% of the variance. Ten items loaded highly on the first 
factor, and eight on the second factor, with five further items loading reLi"Onabl", 
highly on both factors (see Appendix C). Thus, the SLGHR does not appear to be 
unidimensional, but neither does it have clearly defined subscales. 
Reliability and validity of the Moral Dilemmas 
The current versions of the MJT (Lind & Wakenhut. 1985) have established levels of 
reliability and validity (see Lind, 1998). However, when adapting a psychometric 
measure, such as the MJT, the reliability and validity of an instrument must be re- 
evaluated, as this may have been substantially altered by the adaptation process 
(Bourque & Clark, 1994; Fife-Schaw, 1995b). As this was the first time these moral 
dilemmas were used to explore reasoning about lesbian and gay issues, the reliability 
and validity of the moral dilemmas task has not yet been established. Since the intent of 
this task was to identify the types of arguments being prioritised, rather than to assess 
individuals' moral judgement competence, no attempt was made to determine the 
validity or reliability for this sample. 
Part 1: Levels of Endorsement of Lesbian and Gay Human Rights Issues 
One way of exploring support for lesbian and gay human rights is to investigate 
attitudes towards different human rights issues. In this section, attitudes are explored 
through levels of endorsement of lesbian and gay human rights issues. 
Sample 
The analysis presented in this section comprised a convenience sample of 627 students 
from 14 universities across the United Kingdom. As would be expected for a sample of 
predominantly psychology and social science students, the majority of participants wei-c 
young, wi-ifte, heterosexual, female undergraduate students. (see table 3, -I 
for a detailed 
breakdown of the sample). 
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Table 3.1: Composition of Questionnaire Sample. 
Sex Male 14.8% 
Female 83.1% 
Not Specified 2.1% 
Sexuality Heterosexual 89.8% 
Lesbian, gay or bisexual 5.9% 
Unsure 1.1% 
Not Specified 3.2% 
Ethnicity White 86.8% 
Black (for example, Black Caribbean; Black African) 3.2% 
Asian (for example, Chinese; Pakistani; Indian) 4.6% 
Other (for example, Eastern European; Mixed race, Maori) 2.6% 
Not specified 2.8% 
Age Under 18 0.3% 
18-25 77.7% 
25 and over 20.1% 
not specified 1.9% 
Degree Major Psychology (incl. Conjoint degrees) 69.0% 
Other Social Science (for example, Sociology; Human Geography) 15.6% 
Arts or Humanities (for example, Art and Design; English Literature) 3.8% 
Education 2.2% 
Maths/Science/Computer Science 1.4% 
Business/Law 1.2% 
Not specified 6.8% 
Student Status Undergraduate First year 10.7% 
Second year 60.9% 
Third year 19.3% 
Other 1.0% 
Not specified 4.8% 
Postgraduate 3.3% 
Religious Christian 49.3% 
Affiliation Other (for example, Muslim; Hindu; Jewish) 6.9% 
No religious affiliation 40.7% 
Not specified 3.1% 
Organisational Member of a human rights organisation 6.1% 
Membership Not a member of a human rights organisation 90.3% 
No response 3.6% 
Results 
Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men and Support for Lesbian and Gay Human 
Rights 
A highly statistically significant relationship was found between attitudes toward 
lesbians and gay men as measured on the ATLG-S and support for lesbian and gay 
human rights as measured on the SLGHR (r = 0.86, N= 585, p<0.001). Tbus, the more 
negative a participant's attitude toward lesbians and gay men, the less likely he/she was 
to indicate support for lesbian and gay human rights. 
iI 
Endorsement of Lesbian and Gay Human Rights Issues 
A descriptive analysis of responses showed that whilst 971 o of respondents were willing, 
to endorse the statement "a person's sexual orientation should not block that person's 
access to basic rights and freedoms" (item 18: see table 3.2), support Nvas considerably 
lower for many of the individual human rights issues. 
Table 3.2: Responses to a questionnaire item on access to basic rights and freedoms 
(expressed as percentages of the total sample). 
Agree/Strongly Unsure/ Disagree/ 
agree neutral Strongly disagree 
18. A person's sexual orientation should not block that 96.6 1.8 1.6 
person's access to basic rights and freedoms. 
Basic Personal Freedoms. - 
Fundamental to the construct of human rights are basic personal freedoms, such as 
rights to life, privacy and freedom from fear. According to the UDHR (United Nations, 
1948), (. 4everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" (Article three)-, "no 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile" (Article nine); and "no one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his [sic] privacy" (Article 12). In the 
SLGHR, article three was represented by item 12, article nine by item ten and article 12 
by item four (consenting sexual acts in private) and item 25 (privacy of identity). 
Endorsement of items in this category (with the exception of item 25) were extremely 
high, with more than 89% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with each item 
(see table 3.3). 
Political Rights: 
Human rights documents also afford all human beings certain political rights. For 
cxample, the UDHR (United Nations, 1948) states that "all are equal before the law and 
are entitled ... to equal protection of the 
law" (Article seven) and that -cvcryone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing ... of any criminal charge against 
him [sic]" (Article 
ten). On the SLGHR, Article seven was represented by items 22 22 and -3 30 (protection in 
policy) and item 14, and Article ten bv item 27. Similarl-v, the UDHR states that 
"cvci-yone has the ri,,, Iit to leave any country, including [his] own and to return to his 
[sic] country- (Article 1 -3) and "the 
fight to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
Table 3.3: Responses to questionnaire items on support for basic personal freedoms 
(expressed as percentages of the total sample). 
Agree/Strongly Unsure/ Disagree/ 
agree neutral Strongly disa2Lee 
4. Lesbians and gay men should not be fined or 89.4 4.8 5.8 
arrested for engaging in consenting sexual acts of 
whatever nature (for example, anal intercourse or 
sadomasochism) in the privacy of their own homes. 
10. No one, in any country of the world should be 94.4 3.0 2.6 
arrested, detained, or exiled simply for being lesbian 
or gay. 
12. A country should have the right to impose the 4.8 5.4 89.8 
death penalty on lesbians and gay men if that is 
consistent with that culture's values and beliefs. 
25. It is okay for a newspaper or organisation to 10.5 18.1 71.4 
publicise that a person is lesbian or gay without that 
person's permission. 
Table 3A Responses to questionnaire items on support for political rights (expressed 
as percentages of the total sample). 
Agree/Strongly Unsure/ Disagree/ 
agree neutral Strongly disagree 
14. The age at which male homosexual sex is 66.3 17.0 16.7 
considered legal should be the same as that for 
heterosexual sex. 
17. The partner of a lesbian or gay man should be 78.0 15.7 6.3 
entitled to the same immigration rights (for example, 
permanent resident status or citizenship) as is a 
partner of a heterosexual man or woman. 
22. For the most part, policies which guarantee equal 7.3 9.8 82.9 
rights to lesbians and gay men in such matters as jobs 
and housing damage society's moral standards. 
27. A man's homosexuality or a woman's lesbianism 90.1 7.7 2.2 
should not be raised as an issue in a court of law, 
unless the case under consideration directly relates to 
homosexual acts. 
30. Lesbianism and male homosexuality should be 84.2 10.4 5.4 
listed in policies, legislation and treaties as protected 
from discrimination, in the same way that race, class, 
sex, and religion are. 
31. Just like people persecuted for their religious and 57.4 30.1 12.5 
political beliefs, lesbians and gay men should be 
granted asylum in another country when 
homosexuality is persecuted in their own. 
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from persecution" (Article 14). These two articles were represented on the SLGHR bY 
items 17 (immigration) and 31 (asylum) respectively. Levels of endorsement for 
political rights were inconsistent. (see table 3.4) Levels of support ranged from around 
90 % agreeing or strongly agreeing that "a man's homosexuality or a woman IS 
lesbianism should not be raised as an issue in a court of law, unless the case under 
consideration directly relates to homosexual acts", whilst fewer than two thirds agreed 
or strongly agreed that "lesbians and gay men should be granted asylum in another 
country when homosexuality is persecuted in their own". 
Employment rights: 
With respect to employment, the UDHR (United Nations, 1948) unequivocally states 
that "everyone has the right to work, to ftee choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment" (Article 23). In 
order to cover the multiple aspects of this article, five items were included in the 
SLGHR: items one, seven, 15,20 and 33. Item 23 (service in the armed forces) also 
related to Article 22(2) of the UDHR ("Everyone has the right to equal access to public 
service in his [sic] country"). 
On the whole, the employment rights of lesbians and gay men were well 
supported. However, support for lesbians' and gay men's right to serve their country 
was somewhat lower than for other items, with 78% of respondents disagreeing that "it 
is not appropriate for lesbians and gay men to serve in the anned forces". (see table 3.5) 
Social rights: 
Social rights include rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association, access to 
education and information and the right to marry and found a family. The UDHR states 
that "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom 
... to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media" 
(Article 19) and that "education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms" (Article 26). Freedom of expression was represented on the SLGHR by three 
items: item three (marches and demonstrations), item eight (expression of \-lews) and 
item 24 (expression of affection in public). 
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Table 3.5: Responses to questionnaire items on support for employment rights 
(expressed as percentages of the total sample). 
Agree/Strongly Unsure/ Disagree/ 
agree neutral Strongly disagree 
1. There is never a situation in which someone's 82.6 8.0 9.4 
homosexuality should be a cause for job 
discrimination. 
7. The partner of a lesbian or gay male employee 71.5 19.3 9.2 
should be entitled to the same spousal benefits (for 
example, parental leave, insurance cover, travel 
benefits, pension rights, etc) as a married or defacto 
partner of a heterosexual employee. 
15. All employers should strive to develop just and 82.9 10.9 6.2 
favourable conditions in the workplace for lesbians 
and gay men. 
20. If it is discovered that a primary school teacher is 
lesbian or gay, she/he should not be allowed to 4.2 5.9 89.9 
continue teaching. 
33. It is not appropriate for lesbians and gay men to 8.8 13.2 78.0 
serve in the armed forces. 
Support for these items was moderately high, with around 74% to 79% of 
respondents endorsing them (see table 3.6.1). However, in relation to freedom of 
expression and access to information within education settings, support was surprisingly 
much more variable. 83% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that "children 
should be taught respect for the rights of lesbians and gay men", yet fewer than 55% of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that "books promoting lesbianism and gay male 
homosexuality as a positive lifestyle should be freely available in school libranes", that 
-university modules ... should explicitly 
include lesbian and gay male perspectives" 
and disagreed or strongly disagreed that "society has a right to prevent lesbians and gay 
men who want to speak in schools from actively promoting homosexuality as equivalent 
to heterosexuality" (see table 3.6.2). 
Even more surpnsing were levels of support for the nght to marry and found a family. 
Fewer than half of all respondents a eed or strongly agreed that "lesbian and gay gr I 
couples should have all the same parenting rights as heterosexuals" and fewer than two 
thirds that "lesbian and gaý, couples should be legally permitted to marry" (see table 
3.6.33) - 
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Table 3.6.1: Responses to questionnaire items on social rights - freedom of expression 
(expressed as percentages of the total sample). 
Agree/Strongly Unsure/ Disagree/ 
agree neutral Strongly disagree 
3. Lesbians and gay men should not have the right to 7.8 17.1 75.1 
flaunt their sexuality in public at marches and 
demonstrations. 
8. Lesbians and gay men should only be allowed to 14.4 11.2 74.4 
express their views as long as they don't offend or 
upset the majority. 
24. It should be acceptable for lesbian and gay male 79.1 12.3 8.6 
couples openly to express their affection for their 
partners in public without fear of harassment or 
violence. 
Table 3.6.2: Responses to questionnaire items on social rights - education and access to 
information (expressed as percentages of the total sample). 
Agree/Strongly Unsure/ Disagree/ 
agree neutral Strongly disagree 
5. Children should be taught respect for the rights of 83.1 11.4 5.5 
lesbians and gay men. 
13. Books promoting lesbianism and gay male 55.5 27.0 17.5 
homosexuality as a positive lifestyle should be freely 
available in school libraries. 
26. All university modules in fields such as social 48.8 36.2 15.0 
psychology, education, history, English literature, and 
health studies should explicitly include lesbian and 
gay male perspectives. 
28. Society has a right to prevent lesbians and gay 24.0 27.4 48.6 
men who want to speak in schools from actively 
promoting homosexuality as equivalent to 
heterosexuality. 
Table 3.6.3: Responses to questionnaire items on social rights - right to marry and found 
a family (expressed as percentages of the total sample). 
Agree/Strongly 
agree 
Unsure/ 
neutral 
Disagree/ 
Stronqly disagree 
21. Lesbian and gay male couples should be legally 63.4 22.2 14.4 
permitted to marry, just as heterosexual couples are. 
34. Lesbian and gay couples should have all the same 47.6 29.9 22.5 
parenting rights as heterosexuals do (for example, 
adoption, fostedng, and access to fertility services). 
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Discussion 
The results of this study indicate that not all rights are supported to the same degree. 
Although most lesbian and gay human rights issues received majority support, levels of 
support for basic rights and freedoms were considerably higher than for social and 
(some) political rights. Whilst others (e. g. Sotelo, 2000a; 2000b) have also found that 
specific human rights issues are not equally supported, the issues least supported here 
differ from those least supported in other studies. For example, Sotelo (2000a, 2000b) 
found that respondents were willing to extend social rights to a number of specific 
socio-political groups (e. g. feminists, homosexuals, immigrants) more readily than 
political rights; and were particularly unwilling to extend rights pertaining to 
homosexual public activities (e. g. demonstrations) to lesbians and gay men. Conversely, 
in the present study it was social rights, especially the rights of lesbians and gay men to 
parent children, and the inclusion of lesbian and gay perspectives in education, which 
were least supported. 
However, the findings presented in this section were comparable to those of 
other studies in some respects. For example, questions relating to parenting issues and 
marriage yielded similar levels of endorsement to some studies (e. g. Malaney et al., 
1997), but received lower levels of endorsement than in other studies (e. g. Annesley and 
Coyle, 1995). Like many other studies (e. g. Annesley & Coyle, 1995; Klamen et al., 
1999; Maney & Cain, 1997), fewer than 10% of respondents agreed that being lesbian 
or gay was grounds for job discrimination and fewer than 6% agreed that homosexuals 
should not be allowed to teach in schools (e. g. see Annesley & Coyle, 1995; D'Augelli, 
1989; Klamen et al., 1999; Malaney et al., 1997; Maney & Cain, 1997). However, the 
present respondents showed greater support than in other studies with regard to issues 
such as the extension of spousal benefits to lesbian and gay couples (e. g. see Eliason, 
1996) and in allowing lesbians and gay men to serve in the military (e. g. see Malaney et 
al., 1997-, Strand, 1998). 
However, the most surprising finding was that although most items on the 
SLGHR received majority endorsement, a comparison of individual human rights issues 
showed a lack of consistency in levels of support, even for items pertaining to the same 
or similar hurnan rights. Whilst basic personal freedoms and employment rights 
received high percentages of endorsement, support for social and (certain) political 
116 
rights was somewhat lower. For example. despite almost unanimous agreementwith the 
statement 'a person's sexual orientation should not block that person's access to basic 
rights and freedoms', fewer than two thirds of respondents %ý'ere willing to endorse 
lesbians' and gay men's rights to asylum, marriage and the provision of books which 
positively portray lesbians and gay men in school libraries; and f6N-er than half of 
respondents were willing to have lesbian and gay perspectives represented in school 
classrooms and university courses, and to extend full parenting rights to lesbians and 
gay men. 
This finding would seem to indicate that whilst respondents were willing to 
endorse basic liberal principles of non-discrimination they were somewhat less willing 
to endorse specific lesbian and gay human rights issues. The pattern of responses may 
suggest that respondents did not necessarily conceptualise lesbian and gay human rights 
as a universal and indivisible package, appears to run counter to that of previous studies 
on human rights issues (e. g. Clemence et al., 1995-, Doise et al., 1994; Doise et al., 
1999) which suggest that individuals adhere to an institutional definition of human 
rights. 
It is also noteworthy that issues not receiving a high level of endorsement were 
not so much opposed but rather respondents were unwilling to indicate a committed 
response one way or the other, evident in the inflated endorsement of 'unsure/neutral' 
responses. Theory around racism (for example, see McConahay et al., 198 1; Schuman 
et al., 1985) and sexism (for example, see Campbell et al., 1997; Masser and Abrams, 
1999) suggests that the current cultural climate makes it unlikely that respondents 
(especially university educated individuals) will openly espouse prejudicial attitudes. 
The present findings support this theory, in that very few respondents indicated clear 
opposition to any issue: This will be explored further in Chapter 4. 
Part 2: Perceived Responsibility for Lesbian and Gay Human Rights 
In part 1, attitudes towards lesbian and gay human rights issues were explored through 
levels of endorsement. Another approach to exploring support for lesbian and (-Yay 
human rights issues is to investigate the extent to which respondents view themseIN-cs as 
responsible for ensuring that lesbian and gay human rights are respected. This approach 
IF 
was adopted in Section B of the questionnaire, the findings of which are reported in this 
section. 
Sampl 
The findings presented in this section were derived from the same sample as that of part 
I of this chapter. However, since not all respondents completed the qualitative 
component of the questionnaire, the analysis of the qualitative material comprised 
responses from 52 1, rather than all 627, participants. 
Results 
Responses to the question '. 'If lesbians and gay men are treated unjustly in our society, 
do vou feel it is vour mrsonal resDonsibilitv to heln create positive chanmes? " 
Overwhelmingly, the majority of students surveyed did not view themselves as 
responsible for helping to create positive social change for lesbians and gay men. Whi 
59% of respondents saw themselves as in some way responsible for helping to create 
positive social change, only 19% said that it was "most definitely" their responsibility. 
Conversely, around a quarter (26%) did not view it as their responsibility (see figure 
3.1). 
Figure 1: Students' perceptions of their responsibility for helping to create 
positive social change for lesbians and gay men. 
clefiritely not m)st deFirttdy 
SD/ 
not usually 0 19yo 
150/0 possihly 
409/6 
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Responses to the question "How willing would you be to join others in their efforts to 
ensure that lesbian and 2ay rights are respected? " 
Similarly, on the whole, students showed a lack of willingness to join others in their 
efforts to ensure that lesbian and gay rights are respected. Fewer than half of 
respondents indicated a willingness to become involved (46%), and only 10% stated 
that they were "extremely willing" to join others to ensure that lesbian and gay rights 
are respected (see figure 3.2). More than a third of respondents were unsure about their 
willingness to be actively involved. 
Figure 2: Students' willingness to be actively involved in ensuring that 
lesbian and gay rights are respected? 
extremely 
unwilling unwilling extremely willing 
15% 3% 10% 
willing 
36% 
unsure/neutral 
36% 
Qualitative Responses to both Questions 
The qualitative responses for both questions (analysed together) indicated a 
predominant lack of (active) support for lesbian and gay human rights. Findings for this 
material will be presented in two sections: (1) those claiming that creating positive 
social change is not their personal responsibility and (2) those claiming that it is their 
personal responsibility. 
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It is not my personal responsibiliti, 
Of the 521 written responses to the question "If lesbians and gay men are unjustlY 
treated in our society, do you feel it is your personal responsibility to help create 
positive changes? " 43% (N = 223) indicated that lesbian and gay issues were not their 
personal responsibility. This response was accounted for in three main ways: (1) 
disinterest; (2) pessimism; and (3) moral prohibition. 
Disinterest: 
Disinterested responses comprised the majority of responses (63%; N= 139) from those 
who perceived positive social change as not their responsibility. Typically, respondents 
justified their position with statements like "It does not concern me" (R 6): "I'm not 
directly involved" (R 38); "it does not affect me" (R 48); "It is not my problem" (R 65), 
"It's not really my business" (R 126); "1 see the lesbian and gay issue as irrelevant to 
my life" (R 182); "Don"t want the hassle" (R 266); "1 don't feel strongly about this 
issue"; "I don't care" (R 330). This theme was also mirrored in responses suggesting 
that responsibility belonged with lesbians and gay men themselves - for example, "they 
should take responsibility themselves" (R 6); "it is their place to fight for it" (R 5 1), - 
"It's their responsibility, not mine" (R 201); "1 feel it is up to the gay community to 
create positive changes" (R 217). 
Pessimism: 
Pessimism about social change also emerged as strong within this category (I M, N 
25). This included responses such as I don't think I have the ideas or will to actively 
promote homosexuality" (R 2 1); "1 do not think I would be able to do anything" (R 
132); 1 do not have the power to make a change" (R 229); 1 don't think my personal 
view would have a huge effect" (R 374); 1 would not know how to create useful 
positive changes" (R 454). 
Moral Prohibition: 
Moral prohibition also characterised many responses of this type (I I%, - N= 25). 
Responses belonging to this theme focused on notions of lesbianism and gay male 
homosexuality as perverse, sinful, unnatural and a matter of choice. For example. "I w 
don't think homosexuality is right. as I see it as a choice" (R 114): "1 can't condone 
homosexuality- (R 131), "'it is a sin - it is not natural" (R. 28 1); "1 think such sexual 
1,10 
behaviour is a perversion and should not be encouraged" (R 481). and "homosexual Itv 
of any kind is a serious wrong deviation from what should be" (R 1-3 )-')). 
Fifteen percent of responses (N = 34) in this category did not fit any of the above sub- 
categories, and comprised largely idiosyncratic responses, such as I have not got the 
time to be involved" (R 163) or I am not creating any of the negative changes" (R 
535), or responses where reasons were not given (e. g. "depending on the situation" [R 
174]; "1 think you tend to ignore the situation unless it is happening to someone you 
know" [R 502]). 
It is my personal responsibilhý, 
Responses from 53% (N = 276) of respondents indicated some sense of personal 
responsibility for helping to create positive social change for lesbians and gay men. 
Responses here comprised (1) those who viewed their personal responsibility as being 
individual and (2) those who saw it as being political. 
Individual Responsibility: 
The largest group of responses (43%; N= 119) were justified in terms of an Individual, 
personal responsibility, but typically offered little more than a tokenistic endorsement of 
liberal notions of equality. At one end of the spectrum were respondents who saw their 
sense of personal responsibility as not extending beyond them personally, charactenised 
by passive responses such as "I try not to discriminate myself' (R 202); "by not 
condemning them myself or isolating them" (R 99); "by not personally saying anything 
harinful" (R 106); and by taking "a positive attitude towards them in social 
circumstances"(R 416). Others justified their sense of responsibility in terins of liberal 
acceptance or tolerance of lesbians and gay men. For example, "it is the responsibility 
of everyone to accept gays and lesbians for who they are and what they are" (R 238): "It 
is a "live and let live" opinion that other people would benefit in sharing" (R 29 1)-, "The 
sexuality of people should just be accepted. It should not need promoting" (R 359). 
Conversely, some Niewed their personal responsibility as comprising the education of 
others, especially children - for example, "It's my personal responsibility to ensure that 
my children have a positive attitude" (R 472). "1 feel it is my personal responsibility to 
pass my x, iews on to my children" (R 274): and "educating people in their perception of 
others" sexual orientation" (R 206). 
1-11 
Where respondents did indicate some sense of responsibility in term, --, of their 
beliefs or actions, this was usually offered conditionally. For example, "If I heard 
people talking negatively about lesbians or gay men I would speak out, but I would not 
go around preaching lesbian and gay fights" (R 33, my emphasis), "I believe that been 
[sic] lesbian or gay is a human right and as long as they do not influence with their 
behaviour" (R 188, my emphasis); I would "advocate that people have a right to choose 
their sexual orientations as long as they don't force others to convert" (R 385. rny 
emphasis). Similarly, respondents suggesting that they would actively challenge 
prejudice typically confined their responsibility to challenging only blatant 
discrimination - for example, I feel you must say something to someone in a situation 
where they are openI discriminating against lesbian/gay people in an offensive way 
(R 444, my emphasis); "I have a duty as a fellow human to defend [sic] outrigh 
discrimination" (R 538, my emphasis). 
Political (or collective) Responsibility: 
Comparatively, few respondents (19%; N= 52) saw their personal responsibility as 
political. However, respondents taking a political approach framed their responsibility 
for lesbian and gay rights in terms of a social (or collective) responsibility for social 
change. For example, "I think homophobia is equally as unacceptable as racism or any 
other form of prejudice. It is everyone's responsibility to promote human rights in all 
circumstances" (R 23 1); "In our society we value equality and freedom from 
discrimination so it is everyone's responsibility to help create positive changes" (R 
572); and "I believe it is the responsibility of all of us ... to make a united effort to 
abolish unfair and unjust treatment within our societies" (R 378). 
A few respondents gave responses that indicated an interconnectedness of 
lesbian and gay human rights with the rights of all of us as humans. For example "Since 
I'm not gay, it doesn't affect me personally, but giving all people equal rights benefits 
society, it benefits everyone indirectly" (R 588); "If gays and lesbians are disadvantaged 
and treated unfairly it ultimately effects [sic] society as a whole" (R 144), "any 
restrictions on the freedom of lesbians and gay men is a restriction of the life-style 
choice of all" (R 91); or, in the words of one respondent 
As a member of an ethnic minority I understand that it can be disempowering to have 
someone else fighting your battles. nonetheless under certain circumstances it would be 
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damaging to my own sense of sense [sic] if I ,ý ere to witnes,, discrinunation etc and not 
act. (R 38 1) 
In summary, although just over half of respondents viewed themselves as 
personally responsible for creating positive social change for lesbians and gay men. few 
gave responses which indicated a commitment to activelv, supporting lesbian and oav 
rights. As with the previous section, responses in this section indicated widespread 
endorsement of broad, liberal notions of equality for all, with little evidence of active 
commitment to creating positive social change. Furthermore, where respondents 
indicated some fonn of action aimed at creating social change, almost without exception 
these comprised retro-active (as opposed to pro-active) approaches. Responsibility for 
social change was also viewed predominantly as personal (individual) rather than 
political (collective). 
The remaining 38% (N = 105) of respondents claiming some responsibility, gave 
responses which could not be categorised as they did not give a clear reason for their 
answer. 
Discussion 
As in part I of this chapter, findings in this section indicated limited support for and 
commitment to lesbian and gay human rights. Whilst just under two thirds of 
respondents viewed themselves as in some way responsible for helping to create 
positive social change, fewer than half indicated a willingness to be actively involved in 
helping to create that change, suggesting a lack of overall support for lesbian and gay 
human rights. Similarly, although the qualitative responses indicated about a 50: 50 split 
between those who viewed positive social change as their responsibility and those who 
did not, a detailed analysis of responses suggested that the degree to which respondents 
viewed themselves as responsible for ensuring that the rights of lesbians and gay i-ncn 
are respected varied somewhat. 
As with endorsement of lesbian and gay human rights, responses were 
characterised by a willingness to endorse broad liberal principles of equal'tN-. but seldom 
the willingness to extend these principles to pro-actively initiating or politicallv 
oriý),, anising around positivc social change. This finding seems to concur with that of 
I -ý-, 
others (e. g. Diaz-Veizades et al., 1995: Doise et al.. 1994: Macek et al.. 1997). who-se 
respondents were also reluctant to view human rights as their responsibility. secing it I 
instead as a governmental or institutional concern. 
Part 3: Moral Reasoning and Lesbian and Gay Human Rights Issues 
In the first two sections of this chapter, support for lesbian and gay human rights was 
explored through endorsement of lesbian and gay human rights issues, and through 
perceived responsibility for creating positive social change for lesbians and gay men. 
Diverging from this focus, in the third section of the questionnaire, people's reasoning 
about lesbian and gay human rights issues was explored using a 'traditional' moral 
developmental approach. 
In essence, a human rights approach is a moral framework (cf. Bouandel, 1997, 
p. 20), and therefore human rights issues are moral issues. By implication, then, if we 
are thinking about lesbian and gay issues from a human rights perspective, we are 
thinking about them as moral issues to be reasoned about from a human rights 
standpoint. 
As noted in Chapter 2, traditionally within mainstream psychology, reasoning 
about moral issues has been explored from within a moral developmental framework. 
The present study, however, explores the types of arguments which people favour when 
thinking about lesbian and gay rights issues (rather than categorising individuals into 
developmental stages). For this particular study, a Kohlbergian approach was chosen to 
explore moral reasoning, (1) because this is a well-established approach, allowing 
comparison with other studies, and (2) it employs rhetoric reflective of the range of 
arguments widely available in social discourse (cf. Schwalbe & Staples, 1992). 
Although the moral issues represented within this fTamework are not the only moral 
viewpoints available in contemporary society, they fit within the liberal-humanist ethos 
of the current socio-political climate. 
As described in Chapter 2, human rights reasoning features at stage six of 
Kohlberg's model. Although rights-based reasoning is characteristic of both stages fi,, e 
and six, reasoning at stage 6 is distinct from stage 5 reasoning (see figure 2.1). 
Fundamental Iv. reasoning at stage 5 is based on maintaining a sense of communitv 
through previously agreed rules (social contract) and is oriented towards "N"hat is in the 
best interests of the majority - there is. therefore no basis for universal ag)-wement. .1- 
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Conversely, stage six reasoning is founded on unv, ersal pr-inciples of justice. equalit%'-ý 
and respect for the individual/person, which are applied to all situations. even when 
laws might suggest otherwise (see Kohlberg, 198 1; Colby & Kohlberg, 198 7). The 
principles characteristic of stage six can be applied universally to all people in all 
situations, therefore mapping directly onto a human rights framework. 
Although stage six reasoning has seldom appeared in empirical work (see 
Kohlberg et al., 1983; Kohlberg, 1984), this type of reasoning can be recognised in the 
following: 
I believe that one has at least a prima facie duty to save a life ... and in this case the 
legal duty not to steal is clearly outweighed by the moral duty to save a life" (quoted 
in Kohlberg, 198 1, p. 162). 
"Heinz ... just 
by virtue of being a member of the human race, has an obligation, a duty to 
protect other people.... I think Heinz should steal the drug ... out of a sense of 
responsibility to preserve life" (quoted in Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, pp. 33-34) 
Thus, stage six reasoning is characterised by human rights language, in particular the 
prioritisation of universal principles of justice, equality, and respect for the person over 
and above all other considerations. Since stage six reasoning is founded on universal 
principles, rights and obligations/duties are completely correlative, distinguishing it 
from stage five reasoning where rights and obligations are subject to social agreement, 
and therefore majority values (Kohlberg, 198 1). 
Although moral developmental theory does not appear to have been previously 
used to explore reasoning about lesbian and gay issues, like reasoning about AIDS 
issues (e. g. see Schwalbe & Staples, 1992), people presumably draw on some moral 
principles to guide their thinking about these issues. Knowing what these principles are 
is important for deciding on the best course of affirmative action. The purpose of this 
section of the questionnaire was to explore consistency in reasoning, and preferences for 
different types of moral arguments, used by respondents when thinking about moral 
dilemmas involving lesbian and gay issues. In particular, the aim was to explore the 
extent to which Stage 6 (or human rights) reasoning is employed when thinking about 
moral dileminas involving lesbian and gay issues. 
Based on the premise that people have a limited ability to articulate the 
underlying principles of their judgements, but can recognise preformulated arguments 
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congruent and incongruent with their own views (cf Schwalbe & Staples. 1992). a 
structured measure of cognitive moral reasoning was employed in this study. This 
measure will first be outlined before discussing the findings for the task. 
Method 
Measure 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, a plethora of studies have been published using a 
Kohlbergian framework, and employing Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interview (MJI) 
(see Colby and Kohlberg, 1987). The ME comprises a series of moral dilemmas to 
which respondents are asked to explain whether they think the action taken in each of 
the dilemmas was right, and to explain their responses. Responses given by participants 
are then categorised according to the modes of reasoning in Kohlberg's theory. Since 
this procedure is very labour intensive, in the 1970s James Rest and Georg Lind each 
devised a psychometric measure for operational i sing Kohlberg's theory. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, these two measures, the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1979) and the 
Moral Judgement Test (MJT) (Lind & Wakenhut, 1985), particularly the fori-ner, have 
been widely used for assessing moral reasoning, especially in correlational studies. 
In contrast, moral dilemmas involving lesbian and gay issues were employed in 
the present study to elicit preferences for different types of moral arguments. In this 
particular study two dilemmas from the DIT were adapted, and inserted into the 
framework of the MJT, to form a measure of moral reasoning in relation to lesbian and 
gay human rights issues. The type of information which this procedure yields, is an 
indication of the kinds of arguments people find compelling in evaluating the action 
taken in hypothetical moral dilemmas around lesbian and gay issues (cf. Schwalbe & 
Staples, 1992; see also Lind & Wakenhut, 1985 for a theoretical dicussion around the 
benefits of this method). 
Following the work of others (e. g. Lind & Wakenhut, 1985-, Schwalbe & 
Staples, 1992), the moral dilemmas employed in this study took the forrn of vigiiettcs, 
the first concerning student protest around the failure of a uni". 'ersity to institute a 
lesbian and gay issues awareness programme, and the second. employment 
discrimination against a gay man. These two dilemmas were chosen because. of the 
cxisting dilemmas that form the %loi-al Judgement Interview (MR), DIT, and MJT. these 
two, vignettes still made conceptual sense when adapted into moral dilemmas around 
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lesbian and gay issues, they were comprehensible to the population beine sampled. and 
perhaps most importantly, encapsulated specIfic human rights issues. 
The first vignette read as follwws: 
At Anytown University a group of students. called the Students for Lesbian and Ga% RIghts 
(SLGR), believe that the university should have a lesbian and gay issues awareness 
programme. SLGR students are against harassment and discrimination against lesbians and 
gay men, and want a programme to be created to educate staff and students about lesbian 
and gay issues. The SLGR students demanded that Anytown University should institute this 
programme as an official university course. This would mean that Anytown students could 
take lesbian and gay issues awareness training as part of their regular course work, and get 
credit for it towards their degrees. 
Agreeing with the SLGR students. the lecturers at Anytown agreed to implement 
the programme as a university course. But the Vice Chancellor of the university stated that 
he didn't want the programme on campus as a course. The SLGR students felt that the Vice 
Chancellor was not going to pay attention to the faculty vote or to their demands. 
So, one day last April, two hundred SLGR students walked into the university's 
administration building, and told everyone else to get out. They said they were doing this to 
force Anytown University to institute the lesbian and gay issues awareness programme as a 
course. 
This vignette, called Student Take-over, entails the dilemma of a conflict between 
obedience to a legitimate authority, and the right to freedom of expression of lesbians 
and gay men and their advocates (and their rights of access to inforination and 
education). 
After reading the vignette, respondents were first asked to indicate (on a5 point 
likert-type scale) the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the actions of the 
students. Respondents were then presented with six arguments in favour of the students' 
actions, and asked to indicate how acceptable they found these arguments. The 
arguments presented were 
because they weren't breaking any rules by doing it. 
because the Vice-Chancellor had committed an injustice 
first, the students were justified in acting the way they did. 
because most students would approve of their action and 
many of them would be happy about it. 
because they were restoring the equal opportunities policy 
which had been agreed to by the university. 
because the students saw no legal means of revealing 
the Vice-Chancellor's misuse of authority. 
Stage 1: punishment-obedience 
Stage 2: Instrumental hedonism and 
concrete reciprocity 
Stage 3: Interpersonal relations of 
mutuality 
Stage 4: Maintenance of social order, 
respect for law and authority 
Stage 5: Social contract 
because equality for all counts more than any other Stage 6: Universal ethical principles 
consideration. (human rights) 
The arguments were scrambled in the same order as for the MJT- [N. B. Stage labels 
have been included here for the reader's benefit, but were not included in the 
questionnaire itself ] 
After indicating how acceptable they found each of these arguments, 
respondents then rated the acceptability of six similar arguments against the students' 
actions: 
because they could get themselves into a lot of trouble, 
maybe even expelled from university. 
because it is unwise to risk being expelled from university 
because of other people. 
" because one does not take over a building if one wants to 
be considered a decent and honest person. 
" because law and order in society would be endangered if 
everyone acted as the students did. 
" because the students didn't exhaust the legal channels at 
their disposal and in their haste committed a sedous 
violation of the law. 
because when no universally valid principles justify doing 
so, it is wrong to violate such a basic right as the right of 
property ownership and to take the law into their own 
hands. 
Stage 1: punishment-obedience 
Stage 2: Instrumental hedonism and 
concrete reciprocity 
Stage 3: Interpersonal relations of 
mutuality 
Stage 4: Maintenance of social order, 
respect for law and authority 
Stage 5: Social contract 
Stage 6: Universal ethical principles 
(human rights) 
Employing this procedure for rating arguments in relation to moral dilemmas) enables 
us to establish how much weight (or rhetorical force) is given to a particular form of 
moral argument, regardless of whether the appeal supports or contradicts the 
respondent's own position (Schwalbe & Staples, 1992). (see Lind & Wakenhut, 1985 
for a detailed theoretical discussion of this procedure). 
In the second vignette, called Webster, the central dilemma encapsulated a conflict 
between a gay worker's employment rights (non-discrimination), and a manager's 
business rights. The vignette read as follows: 
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a petrol station. He wanted to hire another 
mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The only person he found 
who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Smith, but he was 'out' as gay. IXhile %Ir. 
Webstcr himself didn't have anything against lesbians and gay men, he Nvas afraid to hire 
Mr. Smith because many of his customers didn't like lesbians and ga" men. His customer., -, 
might take their business elsewhere if \Ir. Smith was working at the petrol -station. 
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When Mr. Smith asked %Ir. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said 
that he had already hired somebody eke. But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybociv. 
because he could not find anybodywho was a good mechanic besides Mr. Smith. 
As with the first vignette, after reading this -ý,, ignette, respondents ý, N-cre first 
asked to indicate (on a5 point likert-type scale) the extent to which they agreed with the 
manager's (Mr Webster's) actions, then to indicate how acceptable they found six stage- 
specific arguments in favour of the manager's actions: 
" because Mr Webster would open himself to the possibility 
of damage to his property from anti-gay behaviour. 
" because he must do what is in the best interests of his 
business by paying attention to his customers' wishes. 
" because he means nothing personal in refusing Mr Smith 
the job. 
40 because the law does not state explicitly that employers 
should not discriminate on a basis of sexual orientation. 
because a majority of people in Mr Webster's society feel 
the same way as his customers. 
because Mr Webster had to act according to his 
conscience. 
Stage 1: punishment-obedience 
Stage 2: Instrumental hedonism and 
concrete reciprocity 
Stage 3: Interpersonal relations of 
mutuality 
Stage 4: Maintenance of social order, 
respect for law and authority 
Stage 5: Social contract 
Stage 6: Universal ethical principles 
(human rights) 
Respondents then indicated how acceptable they found six stage-specific arguments 
against the manager's actions: 
because Mr Webster might expose himself to retribution 
from the gay community. 
because hiring a good mechanic is in the best interests of 
his business. 
because he should show compassion for Mr Smith, 
knoWng how badly he needs the job. 
because the law is meant to protect people from 
discrimination in employment. 
because most people would agree that it is wrong to act 
out of prejudice. 
because upholding an individual's equal right to 
employment is more important than any legal or business 
considerations. 
Participants 
Stage 1: punishment-obedience 
Stage 2: Instrumental hedonism and 
concrete reciprocity 
Stage 3: Interpersonal relations of 
mutuality 
Stage 4: Maintenance of social order, 
respect for law and authority 
Stage 5: Social contract 
Stage 6: Universal ethical principles 
(human dghts) 
Of the 627 questionnaires returned, 82 participants either didn't attempt the moral 
dilei-ni-na task. or failed to complete it in its entirety, and so were excluded from the 
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analysis presented in this section. The sample for the present analysis. therefore. 
comprised 545 participants. 
Results 
Unlike traditional Kohlbergian studies of moral development, the approach to analysis 
employed in studies which use the MJT (e. g. see Lind et al., 1981-82) of aggregating 
the data, rather than assessing participants individually on their moral reasoning ýý'as 
adopted here. In presenting my analysis, I will first explore consistency in moral 
reasoning, and then preference for stage-specific arguments. 
Cognitive-moral consistency 
Cognitive-moral consistency refers to the extent to which participants are consistent in 
the type of arguments they favour in reasoning about moral issues. In the present task, 
as with the MJT, cognitive-moral consistency refers to the extent to which respondents 
favour the same type of arguments across the two dilemmas, and across the pro and 
contra position for each dilemma. 
For the present sample, the mean agree/disagree score, on a 9-point scale from - 
4 through to +4, for the first dilemma (Student Take-over) was - 2.7 1, and for the 
second dilemma (Webster) -1.53. Respondents therefore tended to disagree with the 
actions of the students in the first dilemma (i. e. opposing a pro-rights stance), and to 
also disagree with the actions of Mr Webster in the second dilemma (favouring a pro- 
rights stance), indicating inconsistency in support for lesbian and gay rights. However, 
consistency in reasoning can be assessed in more detail by exploring cognitive-moral 
consistency across both dilemmas for both pro and contra arguments. 
Possible cognitive-moral consistency scores (c-scores) on the MJT (from which 
the present test was devised) may range from 0 to 100, although it is unusual for c- 
scores above 50 to be produced (Lind, 1998). In the present study, c-scores ranged from 
0 through to 56.77., but were highly positively skewed causing a floor effect [skewness 
= 1.004, S. E. skew = 0.105]. The distribution of c-scores for this sample is shown in 
figure 3. According to Lind (1998). c-scores have often been grouped into low (0-9), 
niedium (10-29). high (30-49), and very high (50+) consistency scores on the basis of 
power analysis (see Cohen, 1988). In the present sample, howe\, er, only one rcspondent 
produced a c-score higher than 50, so for the following analysis. the 'high' and , -ver\- I 
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high' categories were collapsed into a single category, referred to as 'high'. Unlike the 
DIT, to get a high score, a respondent need not favour principled reasoning, but must 
consistently judge same level arguments similarly across the pro and con stances for 
both dilemmas (Lind, 1998). 
Figure 3: Distribution of c-scores (N = 545) 
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Of the 545 participants, 41 % responded to the task with a low level, 51% with a 
medium level, and only 8% with a high level of cognitive-moral consistency. Therefore, 
participants in the present study did not reason consistently with regard to either 
dilemma, nor in relation to the arguments within each dilemma. 
Stage-specific Preferences 
As has been done in other studies (e. g. Lind, Sandberger, & Bargel, 1981-82; Lind & 
Wakenhut, 1985), for the present sample, the acceptability of (or preference for) each of 
the six types of moral argument by students with different degrees (i. e. low, medium, 
high) of coýmitive-moral consistency was explored. 
The findings of this analysis (presented in figure 4) suggest that respondents at 
all levels of moral consistency found stage two (Individualism, instrumental purpose, 
and exchange), stage four (maintenance of social order, and respect for authority) and 
stage five (social contract) reasoning the most acceptable, when faced with moral 
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dilemmas involving lesbian and gay issues, fax., ouring these arguments over ethical 
principles and human rights reasoning characteristic of stage six. For those -, N'ith high 
cognitive-moral consistency, this pattern of response ký-as even more marked. 
Additionally, respondents with higher moral consistency scores were much less likely to 
favour stage one and three reasoning, than those with lower moral consistenc\' scores. A 
similar pattern was evident for low and medium cognitive-moral consistency, but was 
more accentuated for those reasoning with a high level of consistency. But how does 
this compare with stage-specific reasoning within the dilemmas? 
Figure 4: Acceptability of the six stages of moral judgement by students with different 
degrees of cognitive-moral consistency (N = 545). 
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Based on Kohlbergian theory, if participants (collectively) favour human rights 
type arguments when faced with moral dilemmas involving lesbian and gay issues, we 
would expect the mean score for 'acceptability of argument' to be consistently higher 
for stage six arguments. The mean scores for each of the six stage-specific arguments 
(pro and contra) for both dilemmas are presented in table 3.7. 
Two things can be deduced from these data. First, stage six arguments are not 
I tavoured in either the pro or the contra position for either of the two dilemmas, as the 
mean scores for stage six arguments are not highest in any of the four conditions. 
Second, arguments for all stages are not favoured consistently across the pro and contra 
positions, or across the two dilernmas. The latter can be seen moi-e clearly in figure 5. 
L2 
Table 3.7: Mean Scores for Acceptability of Arguments by Stage for each Dilemma (N 
545) 
Stage represented by 
argument 
Dilemma 1: 
Student Take-over 
Dilemma 2: Webster 
Pro Contra Pro Contra 
1 
. 14 . 15 -. 
34 -. 37 
2 -. 12 -. 30 . 42 
2.38 
3 
. 27 . 14 -1.30 . 
44 
4 1.28 . 46 -1.61 
2.14 
5 
. 53 1.00 -1.06 
1.84 
6 1.03 . 23 -. 
94 1.18 
Figure 5: Mean Scores for Acceptability of Arguments by Stage for each Dilemma (N = 
545) 
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For the 'Student Take-over' dilemma (dilemma 1) participants as a whole used 
similar reasoning in both the pro (the students' actions were justified) and contra (the 
students' actions were not justified) positions, with the exception of the stage which was 
most favoured. For the pro position, the stage four argument ("they were restoring the 
equal opportunities policy which had been agreed to by the university") was clearly 
favoured, whilst in the contra position the stage 5 argument ("the students didn't 
exhaust the legal channels at their disposal") was favoured. For this dilernma, stage 4 
and 6 arguments were rated significantly more favourably in the pro condition (stage 4 
[t = 6.09, df = 606, p< 0.00 1] Stage 6 [t = 6.00, df = 602, p< 0.00 1 ]). whilst stagyc 5 
argurnents were rated siýmificantly more favourably in the contra condition (t = 3.47. df 
= 605.1)-- 0.00 1) (see figure 3.12). 
emma 1- oontra 
[Dilemma 2 -contra 
Ci lemma 1 -pro 
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For the 'Webster' dilemma, on the other hand. reasoning was clearly diveruent, 
in that with the exception of stage one arguments. respondents consistently rated 
arguments in the con position (that Mr Webster's actions were not justified) more 
highly than the arguments in the pro position (that Mr Webster's actions lvel-ejustified). 
Consequently, significant differences were not found between the pro and contra 
positions for stage one arguments. However, significant differences -were found for 
stage two through stage six arguments, arguments in the contra position being rated 
significantly higher than those in the pro position were (see table 3.8). This finding 
suggests that for this dilemma, responses evidenced a bias towards seeing opinion- 
compatible arguments as more legitimate. In the pro position, respondents favoured the 
stage two argument ("because he must do what's in the best interests of his business") 
over all other arguments. In the contra position, both the stage two ("hiring a good 
mechanic is in the best interests of his business") and the stage four ("the law is meant 
to protect people from discrimination in employment") arguments were more favoured. 
Table 3.8: T-test of statistical significance of differences in acceptability ratings for the 
pro and contra positions of each dilemma. 
Stage represented by 
argument 
Dilemma 1: 
Student Take-over 
Dilemma 2: Webster 
t df Sign. t df Sign. 
1 -0-08 600 ns -0.36 583 ns 
2 1.48 602 ns 16.6 589 P<0.001 
3 -0.89 603 ns -14.18 588 P<0.001 
4 6.09 606 P<0.001 29.36 590 P<0.001 
5 3.47 605 P<0.001 -22.89 582 P<0.001 
6 6.00 602 P<0.001 -15.91 580 P<0.001 
These findings would therefore seem to suggest that, respondents did not typically 
reason about lesbian and gay issues from a human rights standpoint. 
Discussion 
The findings presented here indicate, first. that respondents do not apply moral 
reasoning consistently, and second, do not (clearly) favour human rights arguments 
xN,, hen thinking about lesbian and gay human rights issues. 
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The analysis presented in Part I of this chapter suggested that respondents 
indicated inconsistent levels of support for different human rights issues. fax'Ouring 
basic rights and freedoms, and employment rights over social and (some) political 
rights. Likewise, in the present analysis respondents appeared to apply different types of 
reasoning to the first dilemma, which pertained to social rights, than to the second 
dilemma, pertaining to employment rights. However, when the responses are aggregated 
across the dilemmas and the pro and contra positions (via the calculation of c-scores) 
stage two, four, and five arguments (i. e. instrumental hedonism and concrete 
reciprocity; maintenance of social order, respect for law and authority; and social 
contract, respectively) appear to be favoured by respondents for justifying actions when 
faced with moral dilemmas involving lesbian and gay issues. 
On the other hand, when the dilemmas and pro and contra positions are assessed 
separately, a slightly different pattern emerges. For 'student take-over' (dilemma 1) the 
stage four argument ("because they were restoring the equal opportunities policy which 
had been agreed to by the university") is favoured in the pro position, yet the stage five 
argument ("because the students didn't exhaust the legal channels at their disposal and 
in their haste committed a serious violation of the law") is favoured in the contra 
position. However, for 'Webster' (dilemma 2) the stage two argument ("because he 
must do what is in the best interests of his business by paying attention to his 
customers' wishes") is favoured in the pro position and the stage two ("because hiring a 
good mechanic is in the best interests of his business") and stage four ("because the law 
is meant to protect people from discrimination in employment") arguments in the contra 
position. For neither dilemma nor pro/con position were stage six (human rights) 
arguments favoured. 
These findings concur with those reported in Schwalbe and Staples' (1992) 
study of reasoning about AIDS related dilemmas, where stage two, four, and five 
arguments were also favoured. The predominance of a relativi st-indi vi dual i st reasoning 
(inherent to the arguments of each of these stages) is hardly surprising given the current 
political ethos that promotes individualism and encourages a complacent (or apolitical) 
'live and let live' approach to thinking about social issues. However, the findings in 
Schwalbe and Staples' and the present analysis appear to run contrary to those of 
(traditional) moral reasoning studies using the MJT where a near-linear relationship has 
typically been found between stage of arguments and acceptability of arguments. with 
stage -six (hurnan rights) arizurnents consistently being favoured most highly (e. g. , cc 
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Lind et al., 1981-82; Lind, 1985). The incongruence In findings may be partly 
explainable in terms of the different types of dilemmas used in the MJT as opposed to 
those used in this study and that of Schwalbe and Staples: that is, the MJT includes a 
'life and death' dilemma, whereas this study and Schwalbe and Staples' study do not. 
Whilst this difference may suggest that people apply different types of reasoning to 
different moral issues, including lesbian and gay issues, some caution should be 
exercised in drawing this conclusion, as there are other factors which may hax-'e 
contributed to this difference. For instance, the socio-cultural context in which each of 
the studies was undertaken, varies: The Lind studies were undertaken in Gen-nany 
(although replicated in several other European countries), whilst Schwalbe & Staples 
undertook theirs in the US, and I in the UK. 
It is however, potentially valuable to know what kinds of arguments are 
favoured when thinking about particular issues, in order to determine what type of 
arguments are likely to be politically persuasive when attempting to work for positive 
social change. Knowing how people are thinking about lesbian and gay human rights 
issues is essential for designing effective education programmes for changing attitudes 
and (mis-)understandings about human rights for lesbians and gay men. Like Schwalbe 
and Staples' study, the findings presented here suggest that it cannot be assumed that 
the same principles or concerns that are salient for one issue will be so in regard to 
another issue. However, the preponderance of arguments based on values of 
individualism (stage 2), fulfilling social duties and obeying the law (stage 4) and social 
and cultural relativity (stage 5) suggest the need for both education in human rights, and 
development of effective counter-discourses to the liberal-humanist framework 
underlying these principles, if we are to seek positive social change for lesbians and gay 
men. 
What we can deduce from these findings, then, are that the types of argument 
people find most compelling when faced with moral dilemmas involving lesbian and 
gay issues are heavily dependent on the issue they are faced with, and whether they are 
arguing for or against a particular course of action (i. e. moral reasoning is highlý' 
context-dependent). So, as highlighted by Schwalbe and Staples (1992), although 
people may favour a stage four argument when arguing for a particular course of action, 
they may prefer a stage five argument when arguing agains the same action (as was the 
case for dilemina I in the present study). 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, support for lesbian and gay human rights has been explored through 
both endorsement of lesbian and gay human rights issues (Part 1) and sense of personal 
responsibility for ensuring positive social change for lesbians and gay men (Part 2). 
Overall, the findings presented in parts I and 2 of this chapter indicated a lack of 
support for lesbian and gay human rights. In Part 3, reasoning about lesbian and gay 
human rights issues was explored through the use of moral dilemmas to determine the 
types of reasoning prioritised by respondents when thinking about these issues. 
Whilst a cursory reading of the data in parts one and two of the chapter seemed 
to indicate limited but majority support for (most) lesbian and gay human rights issues., 
a detailed analysis gave a more nuanced picture of this support. Typically, respondents 
were willing to endorse broad liberal notions of extending human rights to lesbians and 
gay men, but when asked about specific human rights issues (e. g. same-sex marriage; 
parenting; books in school libraries) especially social and (some) political fights they 
were much less willing to extend human rights to lesbians and gay men. Furthermore, 
when asked about their sense of personal responsibility for ensuring lesbian and gay 
human rights, respondents indicated only limited support for lesbian and gay human 
rights in terrns of helping to create positive social change, lending credence to work 
suggesting a weak link between attitudes and actions (e. g. see Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1980). Results from the moral reasoning task suggest that respondents did not priontise 
human rights arguments when thinking/reasoning about lesbian and gay issues within 
the context of moral dilemmas. 
In conclusion, the findings presented in this chapter suggest that support for 
lesbian and gay issues as human rights issues is limited and that other types of reasoning 
(i. e. individualism, legal duty, and relativism) tend to be prioritised over rights-based 
reasoning when thinking about lesbian and gay human rights issues. Although these 
data indicate, to some extent, the level of support for specific lesbian and gay human 
rights issues, this grily tells us about the attitudes people hold in relation to these issues 
and the types of arguments prioritised when thinking about lesbian and gay issues. and 
not ALhy students do or do not support these issues. Thus we do not know what types Of 
arguments led to the judgements which respondents made in deciding on the extent to 
which they supported each of these issues. Leading from the findings of this study then, 
the next two chapters \N-111 explore the context of moral reasoning, that is, the \ý-ays in 
I ', 
which people talk about, and counter lesbian and gay human rights. The focus group 
study presented in the next chapter (Chapter 4) looks at reasoning about lesbian and gav 
rights in an interactive social context, whilst the case study in Chapter 5 looks at 
reasoning in the formal context of parliamentary debates. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Discussing Rights: A Small-Scale Qualitative Study of Talk and 
Reasoning about Lesbian and Gay Issues 
As we have seen (in Chapter 2), the majority of psychological researches on attitude', 
and reasoning have been based on attitude surveys, and/or psychometric tests. 
Consequently, these studies have employed a pre-established framework withiii which 
to explore people's attitudes and reasoning. Indeed, this is the framework used in 
Chapter 3, where the results of a large-scale questionnaire study, predominantly 
comprising attitude scales and a psychometric test of moral reasoning, were presented. 
However, in order qualitatively to explore the way(s) in which people reason about 
lesbian and gay issues, and the range and diversity of arguments they use, it is necessary 
to employ a more discursive approach. In this case, a focus group approach was 
employed. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the way(s) in which students talk about 
lesbian and gay issues in a social context. Building on the previous chapter then, this 
chapter aims to explore if and how human rights reasoning is employed to talk about 
lesbian and gay issues in a social context, and to identify potential reasons why lesbian 
and gay human rights may or may not be supported. 
Focus group discussions complement scales and tests, in that they provide a 
useful means for developing and extending the inforination acquired from these more 
structured approaches. Whereas previous studies have focused solely on quantifying 
levels of support, this study aimed to qualitatively explore the reasoning behind those 
quantified attitudes: that is, ýKha people do or do not support lesbian and gay human 
rights issues. In relation to investigating support and reasoning, then, focus groups 
provide a means to obtain data which qualifies the responses of an attitude scale. 
However, focus groups also provide information about the processes used to reason 
about issues, and therefore provide a more in-depth means of exploring reasonin(y than a 
hughly structured psychoi-netric test (such as that employed in the previous chapter). 
Thus, focus group discussions enable an analysis of Nva-ys in which people reason about 
-icws gx , 
ix, en issues, as well as about why they hold particular N s. In addition, focus oups 
contextualisc people's reasoning. allowing an analysis of how people talk about issues 
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in a social context, rather than in a vacuum (as is the case with traditional, 
individualistic approaches to moral reasoning). 
This chapter is based on an analysis of data from six one-off focus (group 
discussions on lesbian and gay issues. After an outline of the methodologý- used for the 
study, results will be presented in four main sections (1) Human rights in focus group 
talk - an analysis of incidences of human rights talk occurring in the discussions (2) 
Support for lesbian and gay human rights; (3) Reservations about extending specific 
human rights to lesbians and gay men; and (4) Barriers to support for lesbian and gaý' 
human rights - an analysis of potential reasons why support for lesbian and ga", human 
rights is limited. 
Method 
Development of the focus group schedule 
In preparation for running the focus groups, a focus group schedule (see Greenbaum, 
1993) was created based on key items from the questionnaire used in Chapter 3, 
especially those pertaining to recent public debates in the UK. Included in the schedule 
were questions on same-sex marriage, lesbian and gay parenting, teaching lesbian and 
gay issues in schools (viz. Section 28), lesbians and gays in the military, partner 
benefits, and the age of consent for sex between men. These issues were chosen for 
discussion, as their high public profile and media coverage were likely to mean that 
participants were more likely to have thought about them. 
Items from the questionnaire pertaining to these issues were selected, simplified, 
and reworded into question format. For example, "Lesbian and gay male couples should 
be legally permitted to marry, just as heterosexual couples are" became "what do you 
think about same-sex marriage? " Questions were then organised into probe questions, 
and follow up questions, and questions on similar topics grouped together following a 
probe question. So, for example, the issue of lesbians and gay men in the militarv was 
used as a key question for the section on employment, and was followed up by probe 
questions on employment and partner benefits, the issue of immigration was 
incorporated into the section on same-sex marriage, and so forth. In wording the probe 
and follow-Lip questions, care was taken to ensure that the words 'n(ghts, and 'human 
tights' were not used, to allow the discussion of hurnan rights to occur spontaneously. 
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Stewart and Shanidasani (1990) suggest that focus group items should be 
II I\e ordered from the more general to the more specific. and according to their relati 
Importance to the research agenda, and that the schedule should begin with an item 
which does not require too much thinking. The schedule was therefore organised to 
begin with the issue of lesbians and gay men displa ing affection in public, followed by Yi I 
a series of social issues from same-sex marriage through parenting. through inclusion of 
lesbian and gay issues in the school curriculum. These were then followed by questions 
on employment issues (lesbians and gay men in the military, employment 
discrimination; partner benefits), and lastly questions on political issues (age of consent, 
asylum). The progression of items moved from the most contentious through to the least 
contentious, as identified by preliminary findings from the questionnaire (see Chapter 
4). The schedule then ended with a section directly asking respondents whether they 
thought that the issues we had been discussing could/should be considered human rights 
issues (see appendix D for a copy of the focus group schedule). 
The focus group schedule was then piloted with a group of three male 
postgraduate students. No changes were made to the focus group schedule as a result of 
piloting, so these data were incorporated into the main study. 
Ethical Considerations 
As with the questionnaire, the focus groups were carried out in accordance with the 
British Psychological Society Code of Ethics (BPS, 1990). However, because focus 
groups involve face-to-face contact with participants, and involve participants 
disclosing information to each other as well as to the researcher, the ethical 
considerations are somewhat different than for questionnaires. 
First, it is necessary when interviewing people individually or as a group to gain 
their infon-ned consent to participate in the research (especially when the interview is 
being recorded). In this study, participation in focus groups was on a purely -ý"oluntar"" 
basis, and consent to participate was initially gained when participants volunteered for 
the study. Inforined consent was formally gained (in writing) at the focus group itself 
after the nature of the research had been outlined, and participants had been infonned of 
their right to withdraw from the study. Participants were also assured of anonymity and 
confidential itN' - 
Anonymit\,,, xvýis maintained throughout the process of running the focus groups. 
Names of participants were only recorded on the consent forrns (which were securelv 
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stored separately ftom cassette tapes and transcripts). and whilst transcribing the tapes. 
pseudonyms were inserted into the transcripts. Pseudonyms were double-checked to 
ensure that none of them corresponded with the actual name of any person who had 
participated in the focus groups (nor a derivative of anyone's name). and that the 
pseudonym assigned to any given participant did not begin ý, N-Ith the same letter as the 
person's real name. 
Respondents were assured that information shared within the context of the 
focus group would not be disclosed by me (as researcher) to others outside the group, 
except for the express purposes of the research, and only then in an anonymous fashion. 
Similarly, all focus group participants were asked to respect the confidentiality of others 
in the group by not repeating (specific) information shared during the focus group with 
people outside of the group. In the case of participants from within the department, 
information about who may listen to recordings (i. e. my supervisor; research group), 
under what conditions this would happen, and the identity of my supervisor was made 
explicit - no participants declined participation as a result. Additionally, in the case of 
one group comprising students from the practical class for which I was a demonstrator 
at the time, I was careful to explain that I had no responsibility for assessing their work, 
and that their participation would therefore not have a bearing on their course grades 
(had there have been any doubt about this, I would not have recruited these students). 
PrwMiire 
Recruitment 
Participants were recruited from among the student population, attempting to ensure 
that my sample encompassed the range of students in my questionnaire sample (i. e. 
male and female; white and non-white-, Christian and non-religious; heterosexual and 
lesbian/gay). Participants were recruited through several different methods. My first 
focus group included a casual acquaintance (introduced by a colleague) who invited two 
of his colleagues to join him in a focus group. Three further groups, were recruited from 
undergraduate students within the department. Another group was organised on my 
behalf by a casual acquaintance, who recruited participants by e-mailing, all her social 
contacts. Finally, I specifically wanted to include an cxclusk-ely lesbian and vay grroup, 
, so I 'solicited potential participants at a meeting of the 
Loughborough Lesbian, Gay and 
Bisexual Association (LLGBA). of \\-hich I had fort-ricrly been a member. 
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All focus groups were conducted during the daytime (early evening. in one case) 
and took place in a tutorial room within the department. Participants were requested to 
meet at my office. 
Running the groups 
Prior to commencing the formal proceedings of the focus groups, sandwiches. biscuits. 
and drinks were provided for participants (cf. Greenbaum, 1993-, Stewart & 
Shamdasani, 1990), while the tape recorder and microphone were being set up. 
Participants were unpaid volunteers, and were not offered any other incentives (see 
Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990) to participate. 
Before formally beginning the focus group, I introduced myself and my 
research, briefed participants on ethical considerations, and outlined the procedure that 
would be adopted for the discussion (see focus group schedule, appendix D). Following 
this introduction, participants were given the opportunity to ask questions, and their 
written consent to participate was gained at this point (for a copy of the consent fonn, 
see appendix E). After completing the consent form, participants were asked to 
complete a short questionnaire of demographic details (e. g. sex, age, sexuality, etc), and 
once these were collected the tape-recorder was switched on. 
For each focus group, the discussion followed more-or-less the focus group 
schedule. Once the discussion was completed, participants were thanked for their 
participation, and reminded to respect the confidentiality of others in the group. In each 
case, the tape-recording of the discussion was transcribed verbatim (Krueger, 1998). 
Anaýjýsis 
Focus group data may be analysed in a variety of ways, the method chosen often 
deten-nined by the design of the study. For example, analyses may make comparisons of 
data ivithin groups or they may explore similarities and differences across groups (cf. 
Krueger, 1998). 
Since the purpose of this part of the present study was to explore reasoning, the 
analysis was concerned with how students argue for and against lesbian and gay nghts. 
For this reason, I chose to employ a data-driven (or bottom-up) qualitative thematic 
analysis (cf. Boyatzis, 1998. Hayes, 1997). rather than the more quantitatively onented 
approach of content analysis (Stewart & Sharridasam. 1990), to analysc most of the 
fOCLIS group data. However, when cxplonng the týpes of arguments raised as potential 
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reservations a out extending specific rights to lesbians and gay men, a combined 
content and thematic analysis was used. Thus. for each argument raised. the number of 
occurrences of the argument was also recorded in order to not misrepresent the data. 
since many arguments were raised by few respondents (yet were arguments commonly 
used in lay and public discourse) whilst other arguments were raised by participants 
across several different groups. The method used to do this, was simple counting (cf. 
Morgan, 1996). 
Like much qualitative analysis in the social sciences (discourse analysis and 
thematic analysis alike), analyses of focus group data have typically involved the 
drawing together of similar themes or discourses (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999). 
However, because focus groups comprise a social/group context, commentators have 
suggested that analyses should also pay attention to the group dynamics or interaction 
(Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999). Consequently, drawing on the methods of analysis 
employed in discursive studies (e. g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987), the analysis presented 
here explored both the content and processes employed in focus groups to talk about 
lesbian and gay rights issues. 
A systematic approach similar to that used in other qualitative studies (e. g. see 
Frankland & Bloor, 1999; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Sherrard, 1997) was adopted in 
this study. Analysis began with the reading through of each of the transcripts for 
systematic patterns in the data, in particular, recurring features across the transcripts. 
These features were then coded (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) or indexed (Frankland & 
Bloor, 1999), by marking each place where a particular feature occurred. The transcripts 
were then re-read, and further incidences of the features initially identified, also marked. 
This process was repeated several times, after which conclusions were drawn based on 
the analysis. 
In order to identify the extent to which rights-based reasoning was employed in 
the focus group talk, it was necessary to derive a working definition of what rights- 
based talk would look like. As described in Chapter 2, and highlighted in the analysis 
presented in Part 3 of Chapter 33. human rights reasoning features at Stage 6 (the highest 
stage) of moral reasoning, according to Kohlberg's moral -developmental theory. 
Howcver. despite giving numerous examples of reasoning at staocs one through five. I tN . 17 
the manual for Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interview (Colb & Kohlber(, 9 7) does 
not givc any working examples of stage six (human rights) reasoning. Althougyh 
Kohlberty quotes some philosophical accounts of stage six reasonino (sc P. It, c 
Chapter 3 
144 
125-126), these pertain to the right to life, and therefore do not ON ea clear indication of 
what stage 6 reasoning might look like in relation to other issues. The stage six 
examples incorporated into the Defining Issues Test (DIT) and Moral Judggernent Test 
(MJT) were of little help also, as they were too succinct to adequately encompass what 
human rights actually comprise. A new operational definition was therefore created for 
this study as a guide to analysis. 
This definition was based on material from Chapter 1, where following Cranston 
(1962), human rights were defined as "the rights of all people at all times, and in all 
situations" (cited in Bouandel, 1997, p. 20). Consistent with human rights theory, 
human rights were further defined as universal and egalitarian (i. e. they apply to all 
people equally), indivisible (they cannot be separated from one another) and inalienable 
(they cannot be taken away or foregone) (for example, see Donnelly, 1993; Jones, 
1994). In relation to lesbian and gay issues then, it was expected that if respondents 
were using human rights reasoning, they would be employing the language of human 
rights, as just described, or drawing on human rights principles (e. g. the right to life is 
paramount over cultural considerations; everyone has the right to live without fear). 
Therefore, in analysing the focus group data, passages were selected where participants 
explicitly mentioned human rights (i. e. "lesbians and gay men should be allowed to 
parent children, because it is a basic human right to parent children"), or when this was 
implied by the use of human rights language, such as universality and egalitarianism 
(i. e. "lesbians and gay men should be afforded partner rights as a matter of equality"). 
However, lay conceptions of concepts seldom comprise fon-nal definitions or 
highly structured 'official' language. Consequently, a statement which drew on human 
rights concepts was, in the present study, deemed to be considered human rights talk. 
So, for example, where a participants referred to "equality for all people, regardless of 
sexual identity", or that "all people should have the right to marry", this was deemed to 
be human rights talk, in that the statement "all people" implies universality. Likewise, 
where a participant said, for example, "lesbians and gay men should have the same 
rights as heterosexuals", or that "denying lesbians and gay men to serve in the rnilitary 
is the sarne as not allowing blacks to serve in the military". this too was deemed to be 
hurnan rights talk, in that it implicitly refers to equality. Therefore, talk which drew on 
human rights concepts, but did not necessanIv state them explicitly was considered 
rig, lits-based talk for the purpose of the present analysis. 
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The analysis for the latter part of the chapter explored potential reasons wh', 
support for lesbian and gay human rights may be limited. Four dominant themes were 
identified in the data: (1) ignorance about lesbian and gay issues; (2) incomplete 
knowledge of human rights; (3) social change being ý'Iewed as occurring wIthout an 
agent; and (4) the view that lesbians and gay men are basically the same as 
heterosexuals. The analysis of the data was built around these themes, using the method 
described earlier in this section. 
Participants 
Eighteen students from Loughborough University each participated in one of six focus 
groups. Of the six groups, five groups of predominantly heterosexual students were 
interviewed, and the sixth group comprised participants recruited primarily because they 
self-identified as lesbian or gay. The breakdown of the groups by sex, age, ethnicity, 
sexuality, student status, and majoring subject can be found in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Breakdown of focus group sample 
Pseudonym Sex Age' Ethnicity Sexuality Student Subject Major 
Stat USb 
Group 1: Adam M 2 white Heterosexual PG Sports Science 
Bryan M 2 white Heterosexual PG Sports Science 
Chris M 2 white Heterosexual RA Sports Science 
Group 2: Diana F 1 white Heterosexual UG Psychology 
Emma F 1 white Heterosexual UG Psychology 
Fiona F 1 white Heterosexual UG Psychology 
Group 3: Imogen F 1 white Heterosexual UG Psychology 
Jessica F 1 white Heterosexual UG Psychology 
Heather F 2 white Heterosexual UG Psychology 
Group 4: Gavin M 1 white Heterosexual UG Electronics 
Melissa F 1 white Heterosexual UG Physics 
Katherine F 2 white Bisexual PG/UG Art/Design 
Leanne F 1 white Lesbian UG Ergonomics 
Group 5: Pam F 2 white Heterosexual UG Social Policy 
Rita F 1 white Heterosexual UG Social Policy 
Group 6: Wendy F 2 white Lesbian UG Psychology 
Robert M 1 white Gay LIG Art/Design 
Tim M 1 white Gay UG Physics + Maths 
b: UG = undergraduate; PG = postgraduate, RA = research assistant 18-2 11 2ý 25+ 
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Results 
The analyses of the focus group data ", III be presented in four sections. First, the extent 
to which human rights talk (language and concepts) was used in focus group discussions 
will be explored. This will then be followed by a section exploring support for les-bian 
and gay human rights. Third, potential arguments against lesbian and gay human rights 
will be outlined, followed by an analysis of potential limitations to support for and 
reasoning about lesbian and gay human rights issues. 
Human rights in focus group talk 
An analysis of the transcripts from all six focus groups showed that to some degree 
focus group participants did use the language of human rights when discussing lesbian 
and gay issues, although the phrase 'human rights' itself was used infrequently. 
Whilst the discussion of most issues invoked brief reference to human rights, a 
human rights perspective was most prominent in relation to the statement "In some 
countries lesbians and gay men are imprisoned, tortured, or killed, simply for being 
lesbian or gay", a human rights framework being employed by most participants to 
suggest that these actions should not occur. For example, "I don't think they have the 
right as humans to kill other humans" (Katherine, FG 4); "it's human rights at the end of 
the day" (Rita, FG 5); "we go into places like Kosovo and stuff like that for basic 
human rights ... why can't we 
do that for gay people? " (Wendy, FG 6); and it's "human 
rights basically" (Tim, FG 6). 
Similarly, when the concept of human rights was explicitly introduced in 
relation to lesbian and gay issues, several participants explicitly discussed the interface 
between lesbian and gay issues and human rights. For example, the following excerpt 
shows Rita (FG 5) employing a human rights framework to indicate support for lesbian 
and gay issues as human rights issues: 
Soil . a: Do vou think that the concept of human rights might be relevant to thinki j Zý i ing 
about lesbian and gay issues" If so. ho-%N-. if not, why not'? 
Parn: If persecution in other countries because of their sexuality. yeah, it's a 
human right issue. 
Rita: And in this country I think it is as Nvell. You know in any culture -I mean, 
it's not equal now, for gav and lesbians compared to heterosexual,,. and I 
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think that is a human right really. that they should have the right of anybody 
else walking on this earth, they should ha,. e just as much right. So. yeah, I 
think it is a human rights issue. 
In this excerpt, I introduce the notion of human rights in relation to lesbian and gay 
issues, to which Pam responds that she thinks persecution In other countries on grounds 
of sexuality is a human rights issue. Rita then adds "in this country... as well" and "in 
any culture" (human rights are universal), pointing out that lesbians and gay men do not 
have equality with heterosexuals (human rights are egalitarian), and that lesbians and 
gay men should have the same rights as "anybody else walking on this earth" (human 
rights apply to all people everywhere). 
Likewise , in response to the same question, Bryan indicated support 
for the 
notion of lesbian and gay issues as human rights issues, as illustrated in the following 
excerpt: 
Bryan: Right. But whether you know issues surrounding sexuality have been 
elevated to that of human rights, and they haven't - they certainly haven't 
it's usually based on religious or um ethnic persecution, human rights. 
Son . a: Do you think they should be elevated to that? j 
Bryan: Absolutely, absolutely. I mean it's like Adam said, you're talking about 
issues that are related fundamentally to you know, people have the right to 
be free of fear of discrimination, persecution, and for what - and for the 
issues that that encompasses, I mean that should be taken very seriously. 
(6.0) 
Here, Bryan first points out that lesbian and gay issues have not typically been 
considered human rights issues. However, when asked whether he thinks they should 
be, he gives his unequivocal support ("absolutely"), going on to use the central tenet of 
human rights - albeit his own version - to Justify his stance ("[all] people have the right 
to be free of fear of discrimination"). 
Fiona (FG 2) also employs a human rights perspective, but in this case "xhen 
discussing lesbian and gay marches. She says 
Homophobic people are, I think, worsened by that kind of behaviour, not because I think 
they shouldn't ha-, e freedom of speech. because I think everybody should, but just because 
I am not entirelv sure that it's not saying "look. Here Nve are. and we're difterent, and vou 
have to acccpt us*'. 
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Fiona introduces a human rights principle ("freedom of speech") attending to 
egalitarianism ("I think everybody should"). Although in this excerpt Fiona 
actually disagreeing with the right of lesbians and gay men to freedom of 
expression, later in the focus group she revisits this issue during a discussion of 
Section 28, and retracts her previous stance in light of her newly found awareness 
of "these ridiculous rules that still exist". 
Congruent with this, the notion of equal rights, or equality for all, was frequently 
invoked. For example, in connection with same-sex marriage, Fiona ( FG 2) clan-ned 
(. 4it')s just another question of equal rights", Katherine (FG 4) that "it's a difference [sic] 
of equal rights", and Tim (FG 6) that "the same rules should be applied to both". 
Likewise , in relation to the age of consent, Diana (FG 2) stated "if you're making 
everything else equal, I can't see any argument why the age of consent shouldn't be 
equal as well", whilst Robert (FG 6) asserted "it should be equal, whatever age it is". 
The concept of equality was also alluded to where some participants claimed 
that a lack of equality suggests that lesbians and gay men are somehow 'less worthy' of 
equal rights than heterosexual persons. For example, when discussing partner benefits, 
Diana (FG 2) claimed that the existing inequalities "suggests that lesbian and gay 
couples aren't on the same level as heterosexuals, that they're not worthy enough". 
Similarly, when discussing the age of consent for sex between men, Pam (FG 5) states 
"if it's a different age, it's just saying that ... it's [being 
lesbian or gay is] not as good as 
heterosexuals [sic]". 
Another way in which the concept of human rights was raised, was through the 
notion of universality, or that the issues (or rights) in question should apply to all 
people, equally. For example, when discussing same-sex marriage, Adam (FG 1) stated 
"I think one of the problems is that it's got to be all or none. I don't know whether or 
not there's any kind of justification for half measures" and that "It's got to be either 
they're equivalent, or no law". Similarly, when discussing employment rights. 
Katherine (FG 4) suggests that rather than having universal laws, that lesbian and gay 
discrimination is "a case of multiple laýN,, s" or "separate laws for different groups". and 
likened it to "the Jews being sent off into little ghettos" during the holocaust. 
In discussing employment issues. the concept of human rights as uni\ ersLil and 
coalitarian was invoked by participants often through the drawing of parallels betx% cell 
discrimination against lesbians and gaý, men, and race discrimination. For example, 
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when discussing the ban on lesbians and gay men in the armed forces. Imogen (FG 3) 
stated "you can't take away somebody's right to employment like that, because of their 
sexuality", going on to add that "it used to be that black people weren't accepted in the 
an-ny", and that "you can't take away somebody's right to employment ... 
because 
they're blacks". Likewise, when as moderator I introduced the idea of lesbians and gay 
men being fired for being lesbian or gay, Rita (FG5) stated "It's wrong" because "'It's 
just like being sacked because of your race". Similarly, Tim (FG 6) stated that firing 
someone on grounds of their sexual orientation is "just blatant discrimination" and that 
"it's like firing someone for race, you just don't do it"). 
In discussing other issues, some participants also employed human rights talk by 
invoking the notion of non-discrimination on grounds of characteristics such as 
ethnicity and religion. For example, when discussing parenting rights, Imogen (FG3) 
makes a strong rights-based claim for lesbian and gay parenting: 
I think that anyone should - not have the right to have a child, because it isn't a right, but should 
have a chance to have their own children. And just because you happen to have a certain kind of 
sexuality, doesn't take away that you should have that chance, so anyone should be able to have a 
chance to have their own child, whatever colour, sexuality, whatever, they should be able to, and 
you shouldn't be lumped with somebody else's child, but you shouldn't have to adopt to have a 
child in your family. 
Here, Imogen draws on the language of human rights by suggesting that the 'chance' to 
have a child should be afforded all people, irrespective of colour or sexuality. Similarly, 
Adam (FG 1) suggests that the right to asylum should be extended to lesbians and gay 
men in the same way as is afforded on the basis of religion, creed or ethnicity, stating 
"if you're having a policy of offering asylum to people who are being discriminated on 
the basis of religion, ethnic what's it, creed, sexuality, I mean -I am sure it has to fit in 
under those - under the scope of those concepts". 
Finally, when discussing same-sex marriage, some participants employed nghts- 
based reasoning, referring to the benefits accrued by marriage and not available to 
unmarried partners. For example, Tim (FG 6) stated "some married couples get benefits 
on tax relief' and that "It would be nice to see gay couples recognised by the 
o, overnment", NN-hilst Katherine (FG 4) said "I'm not as worried about the ten-ninology. I 
think the legal rights are more important". Similarly, the following interchange between 
Katherine and Leanne (FG 4) occurred when Leanne (a self-identified lesbian) puts 
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forward the idea of the (gay) 'commitment ceremony . as equivalent to (heterosexual) 
marriage: 
Leanne: In this country you can - you can do a commitment ceremony, which is - 
isn't a marriage but it's the same level of commitment, it's performed by a 
priest and it can be - it can be a Christian ceremony, yeah, so it isn't - it isn't 
called a marriage, because you can't legally get married, but it is - it is a 
ceremony of commitment which says that "I am committed to you, and I 
want to be with you for the rest of my life" and it is - it is a very , similar 
statement, so it - it isn't a marriage because that's not legal, but it is a \-el-. - 
similar ceremony saying very similar things, so 
Katherine: It does the emotional 
Leanne: It does have the same effect. 
Katherine: It doesn't cover the - It doesn't cover if one of the couple falls ill then their 
family gets the rights of choosing medical 
Leanne: I'm not sure how it works, but there is -I don't think it's covered by the 
same rules, because it's not a marriage. It's a very grey area, but it's a 
Gavin: sort of like a() 
Leanne: yeah, and it's things like - if, if you're working for a company which has 
health insurance, when it says it covers a spouse, a gay partner is not 
covered because they're not a spouse unless you're married, and things like 
that. So, it's very difficult. 
In response to Leanne's suggestion that the commitment ceremony is "similar" to 
marriage, Katherine introduces a rights-based approach by pointing out that although a 
commitment ceremony does the same job in terms of the "emotional" aspect of 
marriage, it does not extend the rights afforded by a legal marriage. Leanne then 
backtracks on her claiml first claiming ignorance ("I'm not sure how it works") going 
on to adopt a rights-based approach herself, highlighting that partner benefits in the 
workplace are only extended to a (legally defined) "spouse" and therefore are not 
extended to lesbian and gay couples. 
Although there were many instances of human rights reasoning bein. (. i ernploycd 
in the focus group discussions, the discussions were typically characterised bý' initial 
support for the issues, followed by the discussion and evaluation of potential 
reservations or considerations about individual issues. However, across all six goups. 
there was little evidence of resistance to any issue. These findings seem to su (Y (Yest that zrýt 
to soine extent, people employ human riohts (stage six) reasoning when discussing 
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lesbian and gay issues in a social context. Howe% er. they tend to employ this type of 
reasoning before going on to describe possible concerns and problems with 
implementing them, thus drawing on non-rights-based reasoning. 
Suivort for lesbian and gay human rights 
For the most part, the focus group discussions were characterised by participants 
initially expressing support for each issue, followed by a discussion of the potential 
considerations around or limitations to that support. Support was evident by 
unequivocal and immediate agreement with each issue, and appeared across all issues, 
and across all focus groups. 
Issues around basic personal freedoms (i. e. the right to life, liberty, and security of 
person'') were strongly supported across all groups. When I as moderator introduced the 
notion that in some places around the world, lesbians and gay men are imprisoned, 
tortured, or killed for being lesbian or gay, respondents showed strong opposition to 
these actions, and (almost) all supported asylum on grounds of sexual orientation. For 
example, "there really isn't even a spin-off issue there. There isn't even a we should 
consider this, or we should consider that, it's just disgraceful" (Emma, FG 2), 1 think 
any torture is not on, is it? " (Pam, FG 5), "Disgusting. Breaks my heart" (Wendy, FG 
6), "it's human rights at the end of the day" (Rita, FG 5) and "then they [lesbians and 
gay men] should have the same rights to asylum as everybody else" (Heather, FG 3). 
Employment rights were also well supported. When I introduced the UK 
govenunent's proposal to lift the ban on gays in the military, Rita (FG 5) immediately 
responded "I think it's a good idea in principle to lift the ban". Similarly, Melissa (FG 
4) stated "I think they [lesbians and gay men] should be allowed to be [in the military], 
just like everybody else", whilst others said "about time! " (Heather, FG 3), "at some 
point it's got to change" (Imogen, FG 3), and "I don't see a problem with it" (Jessica, 
FG 3). Similarly, when I introduced the notion that lesbians and gay men were being 
fired for being lesbian or gay, respondents stated "it's just not right is it! ... it's 
outrageous" (Pam, FG 5), "it's just discrimination" (Jessica, FG 3). "that's just blatant 
discrimination" (Tirn, FG 6), and "it's discrimination" (Adam, FG 1). These responses 
also suggest support for equalivy, for lesbians and gay men in employment. 
In contrast to the questionnaire study. the extension of social rights to lesbians and 
gay men was well supported in the focus group discussions. The followino exchanue ,IU- 
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occurred up when the topic of lesbian and gay Issues in schools was in one gro I 
introduced: 
Sonja: What do you think about lesbian and gay ,, sues being d1scussed In schools'? 
Jessica: Should be. 
Heather: They should be 
Jessica: Yeah, definitely. 
Imogen: Without a doubt. 
Heather: And at an early age. Primary school. 
In this excerpt, the topic - whether lesbian and gay issues should be discussed in 
schools - was introduced by me as moderator, endorsed by Jessica ("should be"), 
reinforced by Heather ("they should be"), then Jessica indicates her agreement with 
Heather ("yeah, definitely"), which is then also endorsed by Imogen ("without a 
doubt"). After initially indicating their agreement, participants then moved on to discuss 
potential limitations to lesbian and gay perspectives being discussed in schools (e. g. 
insensitive children; ill-infon-ned and prejudiced teachers; lack of time). Similarly, in 
other groups, the inclusion of lesbian and gay perspectives in schools was also 
supported. For example, when I asked "what do you think about lesbian and gay issues 
being discussed in schools? ", participants responded "they definitely should" (Emma, 
FG 2); "1 think they should be discussed more" (Rita, FG 5); "1 think it's fine" (Tim, FG 
6). The right of lesbians and gay men to show affection in public (freedom of 
expression) was also well supported, with most participants claiming "I've got nothing 
against it" (Emma, FG 2), "I've got no problem myself'(Rita, FG 5), "1 wouldn't think 
anything" (Jessica, FG 3) and "I've got no problem with it" (Pam, FG 5). 
Similarly, respondents indicated considerable support for same-sex marriage. 
When I introduced the topic, saying "what do you think about the idea of same-sex 
marriages"" participants' responses included "I think if people want to get married, 
whatever they are, as long as they're consenting adults, then there should be no 
boundaries laid down, due to anything" (Imogen, FG 3), "there's no logical explanation 
to stop it" (Heather, FG 3), "if people Nvant to get married, then they should be able to" 
(Jessica, FG 3), ", they should be able to get married" (Emma, FG 2), and ftom 
lesbianIgray respondents, "'good idea" (Wendy, FG 6); "1 think it'd be cool". 
Furthen-nore, the folloNving interchange occurred in focus group 1: 
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Sonja: Okay, what do you think about the idea of same sex marriage? 
Chri s'. Ahl. That's nice. Yeah. [laughter] Couples get married? 
Sonja: Yeah. Should gay couples 
Adam: Absolutely. 
Chris: Yeah, of course. It's ridiculous not to. 
Bryan: Yeah. 
Like the excerpt in the previous paragraph, I (as moderator) first introduce the topic - 
same-sex marriage, and after I begin to clarify the question for Chris, Adam agrees that 
same-sex couples should be able to get married ("absolutely"), Chris agrees ("Yes, of 
course. It's ridiculous not to"), and Bryan consolidates the agreement, responding 
"yeah". 
The focus group discussions also evidenced a certain level of initial support for 
lesbian and gay parenting generally, although support was typically conditional. For 
example, when asked "what do you think about lesbian and gay couples parenting 
children? ", participants responded I agree with it. Why shouldn't they? " (Wendy, FG 
6), "Yeah. I think that responsible parenting is not based on sexuality" (Bryan, FG 1), 
-as long as the couple is loving and remain together then it shouldn't be a problem" 
(Leanne, FG 4), "1 wouldn't have a problem with two men bringing up a child" (Fiona, 
FG 2), "as long as they're capable parents" (Rita, FG 5). Support for lesbian and gay 
parenting was perhaps, then, not as strongly supported as other social issues. 
Similarly, only some respondents supported an equal age of consent for sex 
between men. The following excerpt from focus group 3 showed strong support for an 
equal age of consent, with all respondents agreeing with the government's proposal: 
Sonja: Okay. You may have heard that the British government currently 
attempting to reduce the age of consent for sex between men from 18 to 16. 
What do you think about this" 
Jessica: I think -I don't understand why it should be different. 
Imogen: It should be the same [cough] 
Jessica: Yeah. 
Heather: Absolutek. 
Whilst some participants in other groups agreed with this position - e. g. "'it should be 
equal, whatevei- age it is" (Robert, FG 6), "Yep, lower it" (Bryan. FG 1), "it should be 
the saine" (Wendy, FG 6) - others were less certain claiming, I guess it's 18 because 
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they think it's such a- it's a big decision to make" (Diana. FG 2). "1 think it should all 
be raised to 18" (Katherine, FG 4). and "I think it should be stayed at 18" (Tim. FG 6). 
It would seem then, that unlike other issues, support for an equal age of consent was 
mixed. 
Another way in which participants backslid on their initial support for lesbian and 
gay human rights was to put a proviso on that support: That is, the use of the word 'but' 
to indicate some qualification to their support. For example, when discussing lesbian 
and gay parenting, Fiona (FG 2) states 
it's not that I think that homosexual couples should be deprived the joy of parenthood... 
but I just think it's very difficult. I wouldn't perhaps be extremely chuffed to be the first 
child anyone knew in my social circle, or the first one at my school who had... 
homosexual parents (my emphasis). 
Similarly, when discussing lesbians and gay men in the military, Rita (FG 5) 
agrees - "I think it's a good idea in principle to lift the ban" but then immediately 
after, states "but I don't think it will change the issues with the military" (my 
emphasis). 
Respondents also tended to backslide by first suggesting they agreed with 
an issue, but then stating that they could see or understand why others did not. For 
example, when discussing lesbians and gay men in the military, Emma (FG 2) 
claims "I'm totally for [it] being alright, but I can see the issue there" (my 
emphasis). However, she immediately follows this with an illustration of an 
incident at a children's camp where several "lesbians" were thrown off the staff 
because "they were found in their room together at night". She then completely 
backslides on her initial position by concluding that "if lesbians are together on 
that camp", then that "provides a situation where they can be in contact with one 
another in a sexual way, which is exactly the same as in the army". 
In a similar way, when discussing whether books presenting lesbian and gay 
issues positively should be available in school libraries, Katherine (FG 4) claims 
I don't believe any books should be banned" but then states "but, I think... if 
they're put it into a comer with bright labelling or something it could be a bit too 
much" (rny emphasis). On the one hand. Katherine agrees in principle that books 
should be available, but then partially retracts this claim by putting a proviso on it, 
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implying that it's okay for lesbians and gay men to have their rights 
acknowledged, as long as they are not too visible about it. 
In relation to some issues respondents typically professed to not have a 
problem with the issue, but then backslid by admitting that in some way thev 
actually did. For example, when discussing lesbians and gay men showing 
affection in public, Emma (FG 2) states "I've got nothing against it [lesbians and 
gay men showing affection in public], but I would look twice if I saw a girl and a 
girl snogging", and in the same group, Fiona states "not that I'm prejudiced 
against homosexuals, but just if I saw it, it would be more remarkable" (my 
emphasis). 
In the focus group discussions, therefore, respondents tended to agree in 
principle that certain rights should be afforded lesbians and gay men, but then 
placed limitations or qualifications on their agreement. This finding concurs with 
the pattern of responses in the questionnaire study, in that questionnaire 
respondents indicated high levels of support for the principle of extending human 
rights to lesbians and gay men, but specific individual issues (particularly social 
issues) were much less well supported. This data may suggest that differences in 
support for certain issues in the questionnaire study (Chapter 3, Part 1), and the 
large number of 'unsure/neutral' responses, might be due to potential reservations 
about extending all human rights to lesbians and gay men. 
Expanding on these findings, the next section will explore the reasons 
respondents suggested might (potentially) be used to deny the extension of 
specific human rights to lesbians and gay men. It should be noted, however, that 
these were not necessarily participants' own reservations. Although participants 
sometimes did express their own concerns about extending certain nghts to 
lesbians and gay men, on the whole they were not using these reasons to advocate 
the denial of nghts to lesbians and gay men, but rather to point out that they could 
be used (by others) in this way. 
Resen-ations about extending specific human rights to lesbians and g gay men 
As highlighted in the pivvious section, although the discussions were typically iý .1 
characteriscd by initial support for the issues. a discussion and evaluation of potential 
reservations or limitations about individual issues tended to follow. This section will 
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outline for each issue, using illustrative examples, the types of reasons participants 
suggested might be considerations for not extending specific rights to lesbians and gay 
men. [In presenting the arguments raised, the frequency each argument occurred is, 
presented in brackets. ] 
Affection in public: 
In connection with lesbians and gay men showing affection in public, four (relativch") 
idiosyncratic considerations were raised as to why people might object to lesbians and 
gay men showing affection in public: 
0 It's not the norm (1). 
It may be seen as offensive (1). 
It might turn children into lesbians/gay men (1). 
Children might ask embarrassing questions (1). 
For example, one participant suggested that "some people find it more offensive" 
(Emma, FG 2), whilst another said that I suppose it's just prejudice" (Rita, FG 5). The 
other two incidences pertained to lesbians and gay men showing affection in the 
presence of children, in that it can be "embarrassing even to a non-nal [sic] heterosexual 
couple" if a small child notices and then asks their parents awkward questions (Melissa, 
FG 4), whereas another suggested that parents might be concerned that " 'it's going to 
turn my daughter into a lesbian'" (Adam, FG 1). 
Same-sex Marriage: 
Discussions around same-sex marriage evoked the following six reasons why lesbians 
and gay men (potentially) should not be afforded the right to marry: 
Heterosexual marriages are failing (21). 
Lesbians and gay men can't reproduce (I). 
Homosexuals are too promiscuous 
There are lots of legal issues (1). 
They would be under pressure with media interest (1). 
Homosexuality is not condoned by religious groups (1). 
I r, - 
Twice, the alleged failure of heterosexual marriages was used to Justify discrill-iination 
against lesbians and gay men in relation to mamage. For example. Tim (FG 6) stated 
44 seeing as marriages are failing anyway... I think it's not too great a deal" whilst 
Melissa (FG 3) claimed "the divorce rate's something like one in three, the allowed 
heterosexual marriages and it's probably rising". Other reasons included "half the 
arguments against gay couples seem to be 'oh, well, they'll run off and have something 
with somebody else... (Katherine, FG 4), that "it [homosexuality] goes against religious 
canon" (Adam, FG 1), and "other than by adoption a gay or lesbian couple - you know 
- they can't be biologically father and mother to a child" (Melissa, FG 4). implying 
perceived deficiencies in lesbian and gay relationships, and societal prejudices. should 
be grounds for discrimination. 
Parenting issues: 
In contrast to same-sex marriages, the issue of lesbians and gay men as parents, 
generally, was dominated by considerations concerning the well-being of the children of 
lesbian and gay parents, whilst only donor insemination raised some additional issues. 
Participants put forward the following considerations: 
" Children need both a father and mother figure (2). 
" The child will be bullied at school (10). 
" The parents might be vegan (1). 
" Homosexuals do not stick together long enough to provide stability for the 
children (1). 
0 The children will turn out to be homosexual (1). 
Donor insemination: 
0 It will cause the child psychological damage when they find out that their 
father was a spenn donor (2). 
It's not normal (1). 
0 Using frozen sperm is a risky practice (1). 
Although two participants claimed that "children need a father and mother figure- 
(Bryan. FG 1, also Chris, FG 1), the most frequentl, v raised concern was that the 
children would be bullied or ostracised in school'. For example. Tim (FG 6) stated "my 
1 Issues around children needing both a mother and a father. and bullving in school were also pre-% alent in 
talk show and focus group data in Victoria Clarke's current work on lesbian parenting, (e. g. Clarke. in 
pro, gress. Ckuke, Kitzin, -, ct-. & Potter. 
in preparation). 
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concern would go out for the kids who I was looking after... about him in school, how 
kids of his age would react", adding "at the end of the day. I think it's just what kind of 
flack the kids will get", whilst Diana also suggested that "kids get so much stick just 
having two parents of the same sex". Similarly, Jessica (FG 3) claimed "I think that 
child ... will have problems at school, undoubtedly, because [ofl the other childreii who 
aren't educated" (Jessica, FG 3); and Adam (FG 1) said that he would be concerned 
about "how the kid is going to develop with peers at school, with others knowing hc's 
got two daddies". 
Other considerations in relation to lesbian and gay parenting generally. although 
only mentioned by one participant (in each case) drew on popular stereotypes about 
lesbian and gay parenting. For example, these included that relationships between gay 
men "just don't last" (Tim, FG 6), and therefore can't provide the stability children 
need; and employing an illustrative example of a lesbian couple I can see serious issues 
by the fact that these two women are both vegan" (Gavin, FG 4); and that f. people say 
the boy or girl will turn out homosexual because they've been brought up by 
homosexuals" (Tim, FG 6). 
Whether or not lesbians and gay men should have access to assisted 
reproductive services also raised issues concerning the welfare of the children. For 
example, whilst Pam (FG 5) queried the effect on the child of knowing "that their father 
had just wanked in a tube for a tenner", Tim (FG 6) claimed "the child will grow up and 
say 'who's my father? ' 'Oh, number 59 at the sperm bank"' adding I think I would go 
off the rails if I found out I was from a spen-n bank". Tim also showed his opposition to 
donor insemination, claiming that "going to a sperm bank isn't exactly non-nal". Pam, 
on the other hand, raised concerns about health risks, saying "they did this research now 
that says they've [recipients of assisted reproduction] got a higher chance of getting 
cancer and things like that", and that medical intervention in reproduction is "quite a 
dodgy area" "when you've got frozen eggs, and frozen sperm". 
Lesbian and gay perspectives in schools: 
the discussion around teaching lesbian and gay issues in schools evoked five 
considerations: 
0 Teachers are poorly informed, lack training. and can be prejudiced (8) 
Pragmatics - IC., difficult to kno,, %- where in the curriculum It should be 
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taught, and to find the time to teach it (5). 
" Parents will be worried that their children ýý ill be converted to 
homosexuality, will withdraw their children from classes. or cause an 
uproar (5). 
" Children and adolescents are not mature enough to deal with the issues (4). 
" Students are not interested (I ). 
" It should only be included if it's relevant (1). 
Concerns about teachers being poorly informed, lacking training in lesbian and gay 
issues, or being insensitive and/or prejudiced were commonly raised as considerations 
for preventing the inclusion of lesbian and gay perspectives in schools. For example, 
Fiona (FG 2) said I don't necessarily feel that teachers are the best qualified people in 
some cases to talk about sensitive issues", whilst Rita (FG 5) suggested that including 
lesbian and gay perspectives could be a problem "if you get ... a teacher [who] doesn't 
have any idea of gay and lesbian issues". Others suggested that the homophobia or 
prejudice of teachers was an issue - e. g. "teachers are as prejudiced as the next person" 
(Heather, FG 3); "teachers can be so prejudiced" (Jessica, FG 3); and "you hear about 
some lecturers being very - like marking certain people's papers down, because they 
know they're gay" (Tim, FG 6). 
Concerns about parental prejudice were also raised several times. Katherine (FG 
4) suggested that "deliberately installing lesbian and gay issues would just cause a lot of 
fuss and nonsense" from parents, whilst others highlighted that some parents "believe 
that children can be made to be lesbian or gay" (Imogen, FG 3), and say " 'no, we don't 
want our children experimenting with [learning about? ] homosexuality... (Adam, FG 1). 
Concerns about including lesbian and gay perspectives in schools were also 
expressed in connection with the overall maturity of children and adolescents. For 
example, Heather (FG 3) suggested that "it's what kids can take on board, or understand 
... I think it would 
be wrong to start education, and [for children] not to click on, 
because you could give them a lot of misconceptions". Others, appeared to have 
reservations about including lesbian and gay perspectives because "the maturity of 
children up to 15 is too low" and "they're not mature enough to discuss it - rationally- 
(Gavin. FG 4), and that iN, hilst "it's [homosexuality's] an issue for 14,15,16 ycar olds". 
it's not until - 17,18 flicy're usually mature enough... to talk about it" (Leanne. FG 4). 
In addition, several participants raised reservations with respect to pragmatic 
issues. For cxample. on seN-eral occasions Parn (FG 5) su(,,, (, ested that -It's quite um hard I -tý 
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to find times to talk about other issues such as disability. or racism. or Whatever- and 
that "it's quite hard to fit everything in anyway". Similarly. Heather (FG 'ý') stated "I 
don't know how you would fit it in", to which Imogen added "and what would you doT' 
In addition, one participant implied that it would be a waste of time, claiming "It's a 
non-issue... people are I suppose too busy dyeing their hair in bnght colours frankly to 
be concerned about sexuality" (Katherine, FG 4) 
Employment issues: 
In terins of both lesbians and gay men in the military, and employment issues more 
generally, a range of considerations were posed to (potentially) justify discrimination 
against lesbians and gay men: 
Lesbians & gays in the militaty. - 
0 It's a security risk (2). 
Gays are preoccupied with sex, and will be too busy eyeing up the other 
men 
9 Others will be prejudiced against them (5). 
0 They might go out with someone above their rank, and get special 
treatment (1). 
0 They will be sharing dormitories with others of the same sex (3). 
0 Having gays and lesbians around will affect the morale of others (2). 
EmploYinent general4v. - 
" Being lesbian or gay affects how you interact with others (1) 
" Some employers are prejudiced (1). 
" Things are the way that they are, and lesbians and gays just have to live 
with the status quo (4). 
0 Homosexuality is not condoned by religious groups (1). 
With specific reference to the military, participants raised considerations about lesbians 
and gay men being a potential security risk (e. g. "they reckon they're more likely to 
give secrets away" - Wendy, FG 6; "there is the old quagmire of being in jobs where 
there's high security involved" - Adam, FG 1). Concerns were also raised about lesbians 
and (., ay men sharino dormitories and bathrooms Nvith persons of the same sex, in that 
"they're more likely to look at the boys in the showers" (Tim, FG 6). and would be 
morc likely to caLISC "debauchery going on between people of the same [sex]" (Bryan, 
FG 1). The same sorts of reasons Nvere also used to su (Yest that lesbians and (-, a,, - men 917 
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would be too distracted by their sexual urges to focus on the job. as the following, 
excerpt highlights: 
if you're too busy eyeing up someone else in that situation, you're not L oing to be 
concentrating on what you're doing. It's more important to see the bigger picture. and 
while there's nothing wrong with being homosexual, or being gay, when you're paid to 
protect not just your life, but everyone else's it's more important to stay focused. 
(Gavin, FG 4). 
When discussing employment more generally, this same participant claimed that "it 
[being lesbian or gay] affects how you interact with other people" and therefore "in Jobs 
where you do have to interact with people it can be a problem" 
In relation to both the military, and employment more generally, the prejudiced 
(i. e. homophobic) attitudes of others were considered a barrier to the realisation of 
lesbian and gay human rights. For example, when discussing the lifting of the ban on 
gays in the military, Rita (FG 5) stated I think it's a good idea to lift the ban. Gay 
rights. But I don't think it will change the attitudes in the military", whilst Leanne (FG 
4) claimed that "the problem comes when ... you get chucked out purely because the 
commanding officer or whatever is biased against lesbians or gays" (Leanne, FG 4). 
Congruent with this, some suggested that concerns around having lesbians and gay men 
in the military were often based around "heterosexual men not feeling comfortable" 
(Imogen, FG 3), or that "It's going to affect morale it's going to affect our 
communication" (Adam, FG 1). 
Another barrier to change was the perception that lesbians and gay men should 
just accept the status quo, and avoid making choices which involve putting them in that 
situation. For example, Gavin (FG 4) suggested that "basically priests choose to be 
there" and like "if you're a professional footballer or something you'-ý,, e got to play by 
the rules". Or, as Bryan suggested, if a lesbian or gay man chooses to enter the 
priesthood "you have to resolve those sorts of issues in your own mind", implying that 
employment discrimination in some occupations is something for lesbians and gay men 
to either livc with or choose another occupation. 
Age of Consent: 
In relation to the age of consent for sex betwecii men, three (potential) considerations 
against an equal age of consent vvere raised in the focus group discussions: 
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0 Adolescents of 16 are not mature enough (7). 
0 Girls mature faster than boys (1). 
0 Older men may exploit younger men (1). 
Whilst one respondent claimed that lowering the age of consent for sex between men to 
16, making it equal to the age of consent for heterosexual sex, may mean that "older 
men might just exploit younger 16 year olds" (Tim, FG 6), the other eight incidences all 
pertained to issues of maturity. As one participant highlighted, "there was a big, thing 
that men mature a lot later than women do" (Heather, FG 3), whilst others claimed that 
"they're [ 16 year olds are] not actually ready to sleep with someone" (Melissa, FG 4), 
and that "most 16 year olds are not physically ready for sex" (Gavin, FG 4). In some 
cases, personal anecdotes (from both heterosexuals and non-hetero sexual s) were used to 
argue for continued discrimination against lesbians and gay men. For example, Tim (a 
gay man; FG 6) suggested that the age of consent should remain at 18 "because my 
teenage years probably was like -I was swinging all over the place, and when - by the 
time I was 18,1 pretty knew what I wanted". 
Asylum Rights: 
On the whole, lesbians' and gay men's right to asylum evoked little suggestion of 
exceptions or competing considerations. When participants were introduced to the 
concept of asylum and told that in certain countries lesbians and gay men are tortured or 
killed, simply for being lesbian or gay, few participants could come up with any 
potential reasons to justify these actions. For example, Emma (FG 2) responded "there 
isn't even a spin-off issue there. There isn't even a 'we should consider this, or we 
should consider that"'. However, the following two considerations were raised: 
0 It clashes with cultural rights (2). 
0 You don't get asylum for being heterosexual (1). 
A potential conflict between cultural rights and human rights was raised in connection 
with this issue. For example, Chris (FG 1) claimed that "certain countries do not join 
this asylurn thing" ... "because of their religion", whilst Katherine pointed out that It's 
not Kiir, but it is also frequently the government standing by the local culture and 
religion" and that "you're condemning an entire religion for their belicfs too" 
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(Katherine, FG 4). Another respondent claimed that lesbians and gay men "shouldn*t be 
granted" asylum, because "you don't get asylum on grounds of being heterosexual" 
(Gavin, FG 4). 
Overall, there appear to be four key concerns (potentially) limiting support for 
lesbian and gay human rights: (1) Issues concerning the care and 'protection' of 
children take precedence over lesbian and gay human rights. (2) people's Inadequacies 
and prejudices take precedence over lesbian and gay human rights; (3) the perception of 
lesbians and gay men as deficient or deviant warrants the denial of human rights. and 
(4) pragmatic issues stand in the way of changing current policy and practice. (see table 
4.2 for a summary). 
Barriers to Support for Lesbian and Gay Human Rights 
An analysis of the focus group transcripts suggested four potential reasons why lesbian 
and gay human rights are not well supported, and why students may not be actively 
involved in creating positive social change for lesbians and gay men. The focus groups 
with students indicated that (1) people are not particularly well informed about lesbian 
and gay issues; (2) they lack a comprehensive understanding of human rights; (3) they 
view social change as something which just happens, and doesn't require action; and (4) 
they view lesbians and gay men as basically the same as heterosexuals. Each of these 
potential barriers to support for lesbian and gay human rights will be explored in turn, in 
this section. 
Ignorance about lesbian and gay issues 
One potential barrier to support for lesbian and gay human rights is that people may 
have insufficient knowledge about the socio-political climate faced by lesbian and gay 
men. Indeed, across the focus groups, participants' talk indicated a certain degree of 
unawareness or ignorance about lesbian and gay issues. Participants (including lesbian 
and gay participants) seemed to be either not aware of specific lesbian and gay issues or 
problems or else they appeared to have only a vague conception of them. 
For example, despite recent publicity around the proposed repeal of Section 28 
of the Local Government Act 1988, few participants had heard of this law. and those 
who claimed they had, made patchy attempts to explain what it was about. This was 
even true of students in the lesbian and gay group. For example, Imogen (FG ") stated 
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Table 4.2: Summary of reservations and concerns about extending specific human rights 
to lesbians and gay men. 
_Overriding concern 
Examples Issues under which raised 
Issues concerning 0 Children might be converted to homosexuality affection in public; parent-ing: the care and lesbian and gay perspectives in I protecton' of schools 
children take 
precedence over 0 Children might ask awkward questions affection in public lesbian and gay 
human rights. 0 The children of lesbian/gay parents may be parenting 
bullied in school 
0 Children need both a father and a mother figure parenting 
0 Finding out that one's father is a sperm donor 
could be psychologically damaging to a child parenting 
Children and adolescents are not mature enough 
to discuss homosexuality, let alone engage in lesbian and gay perspectives in 
homosexual sex schools, age of consent 
" Older men may exploit teenage boys 
age of consent 
" Girls mature faster than boys age of consent 
Majority prejudice or Some people find lesbian/gay behaviour offensive affection in public 
other people's 
inadequacies take 0 Teachers are poorly informed and lack training in lesbian and gay perspectives in 
precedence over lesbian and gay issues schools 
lesbian and gay 
human rights. a Parents/teachers/employers/comrades are lesbian and gay perspectives in 
homophobic schools; employment issues; 
serving in the armed force 
0 Heterosexual men will feel threatened, and it will serving in the armed forces 
affect morale 
0 Cultural rights are more important asylum 
a Prejudice is a fact of life, and lesbians and gays employment issues 
just have to live with the status quo 
0 Homosexuality is not condoned in religion affection 
in public; same-sex 
marriage; parenting issues 
Lesbians and gay Homosexuality is not the norm, and is not affection in public; same-sex 
men are inadequate condoned in religion marriage; parenting issues 
or deviant. 
Homosexuals are promiscuous, preoccupied with same-sex marriage; serving in 
sex, and too busy eyeing up others the armed forces; employment 
issues 
Lesbians and gay men can't reproduce same-sex marriage 
Homosexuals are a security risk serving in the armed forces 
being lesbian/gay affects how you interact with employment issues 
others 
Pragmatic difficulties 0 not enough time, difficult to find space, too many same-sex marriage; lesbian and 
take precedence legal complications gay perspectives in schools 
over lesbian and gay 
human rights. 0 Assisted reproduction carries health risks parenting 
a Shared dormitories serving in the armed forces 
Other issues 0 Heterosexual marriages are failing same-sex marriage 
0 They would be under pressure from media same-sex marriage 
invasion 
0 You don't get asylum for being heterosexual asylum 
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"that's when they um, they wanted to introduce it. isn't it? And they took all the books 
out. Is that the one? " The following interchange between a lesbian and a gav man, Tim 
and Wendy (FG 6), also shows a student struggling to articulate the essence of Section 
28: 
Sonja: Have you heard of Section 28 
Tim: That's um to do with 
Wendy: The legal age of consent isn't it? 
Tim: No, it's 
Wendy: No? I'm not sure then. 
Tim: It's a by-law passed years ago - well, not too long ago, about A shit, I can't 
remember. 
When I attempted to outline Section 28 to participants, I received responses that 
suggested ignorance - for example, "How old is the legislation? " (Fiona, FG 2), and 
when I told her, "really? " Similarly, when I asked about the provision of books in 
school libraries (alluding to Section 28) one of these participants responded "I think 
they are, are they not? " (Fiona, FG 2). In only two instances was Section 28 raised 
spontaneously in a focus group, and in neither case was the participant able to clearly 
articulate what it was about. For example, Pam questions "Isn't there that Clause 28? 
and it um started banning things like that? ", and in another group a lesbian participant 
who, in relation to teaching lesbian and gay issues in schools, merely said "there's all 
this great big block about teachers or whoever promoting gay and lesbian issues". 
Questions about workplace discrimination yielded similar types of responses. In 
one case, when I asked "what do you think of people losing their jobs or being fired for 
being lesbian or gay? " Pam (FG 5) responded "and that happens does it? " Furthermore, 
despite considerable publicity around the South West Trains case, one respondent 
(Katherine, FG 4) incorrectly explained the case as being about a gay male employee 
rather than a lesbian employee, and another respondent (Pam, FG 5) told the story as 
being about a tube worker, and claimed that the case had been won in the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
Likewise, some participants seemed unclear about the legal status of lesbians 
and gay men in relation to marriage. For example, Leanne (a self-identified lesbian: FG 
4) mentions (at length) the commitment ceremony which some lesbian and gay couples 
liave, claiming "it is a very similar statement" to marriage. When Katherine (bisexual) 
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challenges her saying "it doesn't cover [certain legal] rights-. she then states -Tm not 
sure how it works", but then goes on to clearly explain how lesbian and gay coupleý are s 
discriminated against in terms of partner benefits. Heterosexual participants were also 
unclear about this, for example, Rita (FG 5) asked "are they [lesbians and gay men] 
actually allowed to get married? ", to which Pam clarified "not in England. No. no, 
they've got no legal right". 
Other issues produced responses that appeared equally uninformed. For 
example, questions about various issues yielded responses such as "is it [the age of 
consent] the same - is it 16 for women ... or 16 for heterosexual sex? " (Adam, FG I). "is 
it [lesbians using reproductive services] illegal? " (Cluis, FG 1), "It's not illegal in the 
States to be gay though, is it? " (Wendy, FG 6); and in relation to my question about 
teaching lesbian and gay issues in schools, "don't they? " (Chris, FG 1), all assuming 
less discrimination than is actually the case. 
Participants were especially ill infon-ned when it came to issues of human rights 
violations in other countries. For example, in response to questions about lesbians and 
gay men being imprisoned, tortured, or killed because of their sexual orientation, 
participants responded with an overwhelming shock or disbelief not evidenced when 
asked about other lesbian and gay issues. For example, "which countries? " (Chris, FG 
1); "1 don't know where these countries are, but... " (Wendy, FG 6); "It is terrible ... you 
really don't... " (Diana, FG 2); "it's almost unbelievable actually" (Fiona, FG 2). 
In one group, participants seemed particularly aware of their lack of knowledge, 
actively reflecting on their self-confessed ignorance. For example, when discussing 
lesbians and gays in the military, one respondent said 
But we should know that as a point really that . ve're missing, we should know it's a huge 
great big world like risking debate whether or not gays should be allowed in the militarv, 
and we don't know enough about it to make a decision for ourseIN es. and I think that's 
where we're going wrong. I think we should know. (Emma, FG 2). 
Likewise, when discussing Section 28, Fiona revisits the issue of marches and 
demonstrations stating "they do achieve awareness, and there's none of us kncý\ about 
that Section 28". Later, when discussing the torture and killing of lesbians and uaý Y men. 
Fiona acknowledges her lack of avN-areness about the socio-political situation for 
lesbians and gay men intcrnationally. saying "that makes me realise is that I livc a N-cry 
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sheltered existence where it doesn't even occur to me that people are persecuted 
because of their sexuality like that. to that extent". 
On the other hand. although participants appeared to have limited knoxvledge 
about lesbian and gay issues, many of them raised specific lesbian and gay issues 
spontaneously, showing that they were aware of their existence, even if they were 
unclear (or misinformed) of their details. For example, the recent case of the gav couple 
from Essex who had given birth to twins through a surrogate mother in the US, and wilo 
had both been named as parents on the twins' birth certificates, was raised and 
discussed in four of the six focus groups. Likewise, in relation to partner benefits, the 
Lisa Grant v South West Trains case was raised by two participants (Katherine, FG 4, 
Pam, FG 5) (even though they got some of the details incorrect), one of whom 
(Katherine) was also able to name three major companies (Disney, United Airlines, and 
Netscape Corporation) who offer partner benefits to lesbian and gay couples. Moreover, 
the age of consent was raised spontaneously in one group (Melissa, FG 4), the Matthew 
Sheppard case raised in another (Tim, FG 6), and in a third group two respondents 
(Adam & Chris, FG 1) appeared to know about registered partnerships in Sweden and 
the Netherlands, respectively. 
These findings would seem to suggest that participants were not entirely 
ignorant of lesbian and gay issues, but rather that their knowledge of the socio-political 
situation for lesbians and gay men, nationally and internationally, is patchy. Thus, it is 
possible that a failure to support lesbian and gay liberation is due, at least in part, to not 
knowing how and to what extent lesbians and gay men are discriminated against. 
However, it is not necessarily a case of people not wanting to know about lesbian and 
gay issues. As one respondent highlighted 
But we should know that as a point really that we're missing, we should know it's a huge 
great big world like risking debate whether or not gays should be allowed in the militarv. 
and we don't know enough about it to make a decision for ourselves. and I think that's 
where we're going wrong. .1 
think we should know. (Emma, FG I my emphasis) 
This would seem to suggest that at least some participants were aware that they werc 
not well infon-ned on the issues, but wanted to know more. 
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ii) Incomplete knowledge of*human rights 
Another potential barrier to support for lesbian and gay human rights issues, may be a 
lack of understanding of human rights and what they entail. On a basis of the focus 
group discussi ons, participants seemed to have a limited kno"I edge about hum an I n- 
especially their breadth and scope. For example, when asked "have you heard of the 
phrase human rights? " most participants said yes, with only one participant (Chris) 
claiming to have not heard of them. However. when asked to explain what human rights 
are, many participants responded in ways which suggested an uncertainty about content. 
For example, Heather (FG 3) stated "everyone has got certain rights - Freedom of 
speech -I don't know what they all are" and Rita (FG 5) "1 don't know about 
education. I don't know if that's a human right". Others, gave partial and halting 
explanations: "a general kind of acceptance of diversity", "people's right to be who they 
want to be", "live free from persecution" (Adam, FG 1); "people have a basic right to 
live. To live freely" (Pam, FG 5); and "persecution. Any prejudice" (Rita, FG 5). 
The discussions also suggested that people do not generally think of human 
rights as the more mundane issues, such as non-discrimination in employment, or the 
right to marry and found a family. For example, when towards the end of the focus 
group discussions I introduced the notion of whether the issues we had been discussing 
(e. g. same-sex marriage; lesbian and gay parenting; and lesbian and gay rights to 
employment) might be considered human rights issues, Diana said, "human rights to me 
suggests something a little more deeper like being killed and being abused or 
something". Likewise, Fiona suggested that "human rights would just be rights like to 
not be persecuted and tortured and all that sort of thing"; and Pam "I've never thought 
of um lesbian and gay issues as a human rights thing". It would seem then that 
participants were not aware of the range of issues encompassed by human rights, and 
often could not see that lesbian and gay issues might be conceptualised as human rights 
issues. 
These responses, although not conclusive, seem to suggest that participants may 
have an incomplete knowledge of human rights, limiting their ability to think about .1 
lesbian and gay issues as human rights issues. Never-the-less, they were able to (and 
did) invoke rights-based talk when discussing lesbian and gay issues. So, like the way in 
onorant of many lesb*an and gay but spontaneously which they appeared to be il I 
raised others, they seemed to have a partial Icnowledge of human rights, yet sometimes 
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employed the language of human rights or drew on rights-based concepts in their 
discussions. Thus, a lack of knowledge about human rights may also be a potential 
barrier to support for lesbian and gay human rights. 
iii) Social change in search of an agent 
A third feature of the focus group discussions was the notion of social change just 
occurring without any need for action. For example, when discussing partner benefits 
for same sex couples, Gavin (FG 4) said that ""its [the existing discrimination is] just a 
prejudice that will change in time", claiming that, in the past, de facto heterosexual 
couples were not recognised and now they are, so "it's like a natural progression" that 
lesbian and gay couples should be recognised. 
Congruent with this, was the perception that positive change would naturally 
occur with the passing of time. For example, in the following excerpt, Bryan highlights 
that increasingly, lesbian and gay couples are adopting children. Adam adds that "it'll 
become more acceptable", to which Bryan responds by agreeing ("right"), claiming that 
it probably won't be an issue in the future ("it may be a moot point in twenty years' 
time): 
Bryan: I think we're at that time where it's becoming - well, we're just starting to 
deal with the fact that its - that, that now couples - gay couples are adopting 
children, or want to adopt children. 
Adam: It'll become more acceptable 
Bryan: Right, and so it may not be - it may be a moot point in twenty years time 
Similarly, when discussing same-sex marriages, Tim (FG 6) stated that 46(sixty years ago, 
a single parent family... would be a totally different situation to a single parent family 
nowadays 11) going on to say "it might be the same for gay couples" "sixty years down 
the road". Likewise, others suggested that positive social change was Just a matter of 
time'. For example, Jessica (FG 3) claimed that "it just takes time. It's like the issue of 
women. You know, women weren't wearing trousers that long ago, it takes time to 
come through". and Tim (FG 6) stated "societv takes a NN, hile to change. and it won't 
happen overnight", whilst li-nogen (FG 3) asserted that "at some point in time it has got 
to change". So. wlulst participants highlighted the need for change. for the most part, 
they did not indicate that tlicy saw either themseIN es or specific others as hax., in ,a role 
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to play in creating that change. Furthermore. in none of these cases wa., ", reference made 
to how the change would come about. 
On the other hand, in some places participants did make reference to social 
change, claiming that "it's beginning to happen" (Katherine & Leanne, FG 4) and 
referring to it being surreptitiously introduced into society in ways which escape the 
notice of those who would normally be prejudiced. For example, Emma (FG 3) 
suggested that the presence of lesbian and gay persons in television soaps 
was a good way of creating positive change because even people who if they -saw two 
girls snogging outside would be terribly shocked and offended" would "accept it, kind 
of in a porous way". Likewise, Melissa (FG 4) claimed that being lesbian or gay is now 
more accepted, claiming "with it being on television, everyone's sort of beginning to 
relax a little more about it, and not get so up tight". 
On the other hand, across the discussions, there were three incidences in which 
participants did indicate some sense of agency, or active commitment to creating 
positive social change for lesbians and gay men. In the following excerpt, Adam 
recounts an incident at a football club, where players were being overtly homophobic, 
and he recognised the need to challenge their homophobic behaviour: 
I had an interesting situation at Leicester, Leicester city, and it was when Robbie Fowler 
and Graham (? ) - do you know those two players? Basically when they were playing 
football Robbie Fowler pretended to take down his shorts and bent over towards this other 
footballer, and Robbie Fowler proceeded to be fined a lot of money () in the football club, 
you know, all the old lads - "Oh, f- don't want fags in the football club". In that situation, 
I certainly didn't mention -I didn't say "oh, no that's" - you know, "that's a nasty thing 
to say" whatever, I 'passed' if you like as a homophobe, because it was going to be critical 
to my job prospects. (Adam, FG 1). 
Although Adam, in fact, did not challenge their behaviour (because it might affect his 
job prospects), his retelling of the incident indicates a recognition of the need for action 
in order to initiate social change, in that he was both able to recognise the need to 
challenge the behaviour of others, and to acknowledge that he had "passed... as a 
homophobe" in having not done so. 
Heather (FG 3). on the other hand, shows an acti\, e commitment to positi\ e 
social change. through the education of her son. Recounting a discussion with her 
father, she clairns "I'm different to my dad", going on to add "my son will be different 
again, that's just normal for him. That's ho%N- I'm educating him". Likewise. when Tim 
(FG 6) says that he (as a gay man) couldn't bring, up children because of society's 
preju ices against lesbians and gay men, Wendy challenges him. claiming ""but we 
should be able to change society. We should be able to change their way of looking" 
Like the questionnaire findings presented in part 2 of Chapter -3. then, the 
focus 
group discussions provided little evidence that participants saw themselves as 
responsible for helping to create positive social change. Thus. the perception that 
positive social change does not require doing anything active may also be a contributing 
factor to people not supporting lesbian and gay human rights, and in particular. not 
being actively involved in fighting for positive social change. 
iv) Asserting 'no difference' between lesbiansIgaY men and heterosexuals 
A final feature of the focus group discussions which might potentially be a barrier to 
support for lesbian and gay human rights was the tendency of participants to assert that 
in their view there was (basically) no difference between lesbians or gay men and 
heterosexuals. This type of response was characterised by phrases such as "no 
difference", "just like" or "just the same as". 
This phenomenon was particularly evident in discussion around lesbians and gay 
men showing affection in public. For example, Emma (FG 2) states "if a heterosexual 
couple are really snogging, then that really annoys me". She then goes on to say - it'd 
be the same if it was two blokes, or two girls". Likewise, Rita (FG 5) asserts that 
lesbians and gay men showing affection in public is "just the same as if you're a 
heterosexual couple". She then qualifies this by saying that if it was at a swimming 
baths and there were children around, that she "wouldn't like to see a heterosexual 
couple do that [show affection in public] either". Also, Heather (FG 3) states I would 
no more appreciate it if it was a lesbian or gay couple than I would if it was a 
heterosexual couple". Whilst this type of response appears relatively liberal, it falls to 
acknowledge the socially condoned differences between what is considered acceptable 
in public for a heterosexual couple, compared with what is deemed acceptable for a 
sal-ne-sex couple. 
Discussions around employment discrimination also evoked claims of little or 
no difference betwcen lesbians or gay men and heterosexuals. For instance, when 
discussing whether lesbians and gay men should be prevented from working in specific 
occupations. Leanne (FG 4) claims "being gay or lesbian doesn't affect the *ob you do. 
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it merely affects who you go to bed with". Rita (FG 5) makes a similar claim - -lesbian 
and gay men aren't really that different to us, they just... fancy the same sex rather than 
another sex"; as does Melissa (FG 4) - "it [being lesbian or gay] just basically affects 
who they sleep with". In all three cases, the socio-political differences between 
lesbians/gay men and heterosexuals are reduced to an issue of sex of one's partner, 
ignoring the manifold ways in which lesbians and gay men are discriminated against or 
oppressed. 
In focus group five, "just like" claims were common across the whole range of 
issues. For example, when discussing the age of consent for sex between men Rita 
claimed "they [homosexuals] are the same as us [heterosexuals]" and in relation to 
same-sex couples showing affection in public "it's just the same as being heterosexual 
really". Likewise, in relation to same-sex marriage, Pam claimed "I think it's quite a 
hard thing to do anyway, whether you're heterosexual, or gay", in relation to 
immigration "if it's a legal minefield for heterosexuality it's the same as homosexuality. 
It's just the same. "; and with respect to lesbian and gay parenting "It's just like with us 
[i. e. heterosexuals parenting]". 
Although claims of no difference between lesbians/gay men and heterosexuals 
appear to be supportive of lesbian and gay rights as claims of equality, and participants 
may well have intended them this way, in practice they work against the achievement of 
equal rights. In particular, although they imply equality, sameness arguments fail to 
recognise the actual socio-political differences between what is automatically extended 
to heterosexuals, and denied to lesbians and gay men. So, for example, although it 
might be 'difficult' for unmarried heterosexual couples to attain immigration status, or 
to be recognised as partners for the purposes of partner benefits, participants tended to 
ignore the relative difficulties faced by lesbian and gay couples (i. e. lesbian and gay 
couples can't overcome those difficulties by getting married, whereas heterosexuals 
can). Sameness arguments, therefore, have the effect of neutralising lesbian and gay 
rights. Thus, highlighting sameness, rather than difference, acts as a potential barrier to 
the achievement of human rights for lesbians and gay men, in that they mask structural 
differences, which in turn suggest the need for different treatment. On the other hand, 
46sameness') arguments are a good thing insofar as they show an orientation to rights- 
based thinking (i. e. suggest equality, or at least the need for empathy). 
Discussion 
Since many of the participants in this self-selected, non-random sample knew lesbian', 
and gay men, and others were lesbian or gay themselves, it was expected that support 
for lesbian and gay human rights in the focus group discussions would be greater than 
for the questionnaire sample. This was to some degree substantiated by the focus Oroup 
data, in that the focus group discussions comprised a fair amount of talk using human 
rights language, or drawing on human rights concepts. 
The findings of this study also suggested that, up to a point, participants 
supported lesbian and gay human rights. This was evident, in that there was clear initial 
support for issues, little evidence of opposition to any issue raised, and in many places, 
human rights language and concepts were employed to argue for positive social change. 
However, the use of the human rights language and concepts was intermittent, and some 
issues were more supported than others. Typically, participants offered initial support, 
progressing to a discussion and evaluation of potential reservations and considerations 
about extending specific rights to lesbians and gay men. 
These findings would appear to be consistent with the response pattem in the 
questionnaire, in that respondents agreed in principle that human rights should be 
extended to lesbians and gay men, but when asked about specific human rights issues, 
support was limited. However, the focus group data extended on the questionnaire data, 
in that it provided qualitative data about the types of reasons lesbian and gay human 
rights are not necessarily supported. Although not necessarily presenting their own 
views or beliefs, participants raised a number of reservations or considerations which 
they potentially saw as preventing the extension of specific rights to lesbians and gay 
men. Some of the main arguments levered against the extension of rights to lesbians and 
gay men included (for example) that the children of lesbian or gay parents might be 
bullied or psychologically damaged; that teachers and employers are prejudiced and 
poorly informed about lesbian and gay issues, and that homosexuality is not natural. 
The reservations mentioned by participants vaned from issue to issue, but 
ovci-all, three key issues xN, ci-c identified as taking precedence over lesbian and gay 
human rights: (1) Issues concerning the care and 'protection' of children: (2) other 
people's inadequacies and prejudices-, (3) Moral issues or principles of right and wrong. 
These too concur with the questionnaire findings, in that these arguments are con-sistent 
with stage five (social contract) reasoning. Stage fivc reasoning is predicated on 
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majoritarian interests (i. e. the greatest good for the greatest number) - manifested in the 
focus group discussions as arguments around other people's inadequacies and 
prejudices - and a concern for the welfare of others - manifested as issues concerning 
the care and protection of children. As stage five reasoning featured as one type of 
reasoning prioritised over human rights reasoning in the moral dilemma task of the 
questionnaire study, it is not too surprising that the types of reasons put forward as 
potential limitations to the extension of human rights to lesbians and gay men in the 
focus group discussions were consistent with stage five reasoning. 
Despite support for lesbian and gay human rights being limited due to a range of 
non-rights-based reasons and practical concerns, participants did sometimes discuss 
lesbian and gay issues using human rights language, or drawing on human rights 
concepts. However, in the same way that basic personal freedoms were strongly 
supported as human rights in the questionnaire study whilst social and (some) political 
rights were not, human rights reasoning was most frequently invoked in discussions 
around issues pertaining to the right to life, and the right to asylum, whereas rights- 
based reasoning occurred only intermittently in discussions around other issues. This 
too is consistent with stage five reasoning, in that from a social contract (stage five) 
perspective, human rights is viewed as encapsulating the right to life - which is 
considered absolute - whilst other issues are open for negotiation and subject to 
majoritarian values. This (somewhat narrow) conceptual i sati on of human rights was 
evident, in that focus group participants appeared to have a limited perception of the 
range of issues encompassed by human rights. 
However, it is not entirely surprising that participants' knowledge of human 
rights centred around the right to life at the expense of other issues. The 'commonsense' 
notion of human rights is that which is promoted in the media and by activist groups -- 
the scenes of genocide and torture which are portrayed daily on our television screens, 
spread across the pages of the daily newspaper, and freely accessible on the internet. 
Human rights violations are therefore commonly perceived as only the extreme fonns of 
violation, and something which happens in non-western countries or in Russia or 
Bosnia, rather than equally prevalent in western societies (cf. Moghaddam & 
Vuksanovic, 1990). Therefore, it is only to be expected that the participants in this study 
would view lesbian and gay human rights primarily as the right to life, and freedom 
from torture, rather than other issues (e. g. lesbian and gay parenting. same-sex 
marriage) even though they did employ human rights language to discuss other issues 
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(in the same way that they spontaneously mentioned some lesbian and gav issues-. and 
omitted to mention others). Thus, a lack of knowledge about human right,, may also be a 
potential barrier to support for lesbian and gay human fights: Again. if you do not 
understand what human rights are, how can you argue for them? 
Likewise, whilst the findings of the present study suggest that participants were 
not entirely ignorant of lesbian and gay issues, their knowledge of human rights 
violations and discrimination against lesbians and gay men appeared patchy. For the 
most part, participants underestimated the extent of discrimination against lesbians and 
gay men, and few appeared to have any idea about the ways in which lesbians and ga"' 
men are, or have been, socio -politically discriminated against, even in their own cultural 
context. Furthermore, many participants appeared unaware that lesbian and gay issues 
might be seen as human rights. Consequently, the lack of global support for lesbian and 
gay human rights, may (at least in part) be due to people not knowing that lesbians and 
gay men are discriminated against and oppressed, and to what extent: It is difficult 
unequivocally to support something you know little about. 
However, it is also not surprising that participants appeared to have a patchy 
knowledge about lesbian and gay rights issues, nor is it surprising that few connect 
lesbian and gay issues with human rights. Despite increasing lesbian and gay visibility 
in the media, lesbian and gay lifestyles remain relatively invisible (cf, Griffin & Zukas, 
1993; Kitzinger, 1996a), discrimination against lesbians and gay men is perhaps not as 
well publicised as other types of discrimination, and lesbian and gay issues are 
infrequently promoted as human rights issues, except in select arenas, such as 
parliamentary debates (see next chapter). Consequently, people acquire an incomplete 
picture of the socio-political situation for lesbians and gay men. Moreover, the absence 
of lesbian and gay perspectives in education helps to perpetuate this ignorance, in turn 
maintaining, rather than challenging discrimination against lesbians and gay men. 
The focus group discussions also gave little evidence that participants vicwed 
themselves as agents of social change for lesbians and gay men. Instead, participants 
discussed social change as if it occurred without any agency or political action. This is 
consistent with the findings reported in Chapter 3, where around half of respondents 
viewed themselves as not responsible for creating positive social chan(., Ye for lesbians 
and gay men, and with other studies (e. g. Diaz-lv,, 'eizades et al., 1995, Dolse et al., 1994, 
Macek et al., 1997) which suggest that people seldom view themselves as responsible 
fo ing that hurnan rights are respected. r ensun 
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Finally, the tendency for participants to view lesbians and gay men as basically 
the same as heterosexuals was also problematic for both support for lesbian and gay 
human rights, and for creating social change. Whilst discourses of 'sarneness I appear 
relatively liberal, and orient towards a rights perspective (i. e. implyIng equality). they 
are not expedient in creating positive social change, in that they are devold of analyses 
of power (Fine & Addelston, 1996) and therefore fail to recognise the differences in the 
socio-political realities of lesbians/gay men as opposed to heterosexuals, due to tile 
prioritisation of heterosexual values and lifestyles in society. For example, whilst 
unmarried heterosexual couples can attain rights sometimes denied them (e. g. partner 
benefits 
, immigration status, rights to adoption, etc) lesbian and gay couples are 
prevented from attaining these rights, because the law actively prevents them from 
marrying. Furthen-nore, because heterosexual unions are automatically recognised, 
rights are often automatically extended to unmarried heterosexual couples, when lesbian 
and gay couples are not afforded them (even when they can provide evidence of being 
in a long-term partnership). 
This chapter has explored how human rights reasoning is employed to talk about lesbian 
and gay issues, and has identified some potential reasons why lesbian and gay human 
rights may not be supported. Following on from this chapter, the next chapter (Chapter 
5) continues to explore barriers to lesbian and gay human rights by examining the types 
of arguments used explicitly to counter lesbian and gay human rights. In contrast with 
the focus group context employed in this study, Chapter 5 entails a textual analysis, set 
in the forinal context of a parliamentary debate, and where lesbian and gay human rights 
are made explicit. Therefore, this chapter and the next explore reasoning about lesbian 
and gay human rights issues in two very different types of social context. 
CHAPTER 5 
Arguments against Rights: A Case Study of 
the UK 'Age of Consent' Debates. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter (Chapter 4), when discussing lesbian and gay 
human rights issues in a social context, people (in this case, students) sometimes engage 
in rights-based talk, typically drawing on human rights arguments intennittently. 
However, as highlighted in Chapter 1, when social change for lesbians and gay men is 
promoted in a socio-political context, human rights arguments are often employed to 
mobilise change. Building on the previous chapter, this chapter explores within a 
political and societal context (parliamentary and public debate) how issues gxplicitly 
promoted as lesbian and gay human rights are then countered. Since an analysis of the 
whole range of lesbian and gay human rights issues currently and recently under debate 
is a rather large undertaking, this chapter will be based on a case study of a single issuel 
the age of consent for sex between men. Specific reference, however, will be made to 
other campaigns for lesbian and gay rights. 
The UK Age of Consent Debates in Context 
The age of consent for sex between men has recently been at the forefront of political 
debate and media coverage around lesbian and gay rights in the UK. Essentially a 
human rights issue, the debate is about non-discrimination (or equality) - in particular, 
about the rights of all men (gay, straight, bisexual, and unlabelled) to be afforded equal 
status. 
The age of consent was first created in 1885, out of a concern over prostitution 
among young girls, and prohibited sexual intercourse with women under the age of 16 
(Waites, 1998). This same act made (male) homosexuality illegal for the first time in 
Britain, by stipulating that 'gross indecency' between males (in both private and public) 
be considered a criminal offence, punishable by two years imprisonment (Hyde, 1970: 
Mason & Palmer, 1998). This act, known as the'Labouchere amendment* (Stonewall. 
c. 1994), set the tone for what became the 1956 Sexual Offences Act. Although the term 
-gross indccency" has never been defined in statute, in practice the common law 
prohibition of 'buggery' or 'sodomy' has commonly been applied to all homosexual 
acts between males (Stonewall, c. 1994). 
In 1957, the Wolfenden Committee (a Home Office inquiry into the legislation 
on homosexuality and prostitution) recommended the decriminalisation of male 
homosexual practices (DCHOP, 1957). The 1967 Sexual Offences Act (England and 
Wales)', which finally put the Wolfenden recommendations into la'x. decriminalised 
consensual sexual practices in private places between adult males, ,, N, Ith the exception of 
anal intercourse (which remained illegal for both heterosexuals and homosexuals). 
Although the 1967 Sexual Offences Act (partially) decriminalised homosexuality. it 
simultaneously discriminated against (male) homosexuals by setting the age of consent 
at 16 for heterosexual sex and 21 for (male) homosexual sex, therefore constructing an 
age of consent distinction (Smith, 1994; Stonewall, c. 1994; Waites, 1998). 
In the early 1990s, a series of campaigns, led predominantly by Stonewall, were 
mounted to challenge the discriminatory age of consent (Smith, 1995, Waites, 1998), 
and as a result, the question of the unequal age of consent was revisited in 1994. After 
considerable debate in the House of Commons (Hansard, 1994), the age of consent for 
male homosexual sex was reduced from 21 to 18. ) and anal intercourse was 
decriminalised for consenting adults over the age of 18. However, an age distinction 
remained in place, and attempts to achieve an equal age of consent with heterosexuals 
(of 16) failed. 
Subsequently, a case was brought before the European Court in respect of the 
unequal age of consent (Euan Sutherland v. UK). The Sutherland case was heard in the 
European Court, and on I July 1997, the European Human Rights Commission ruled 
that there was no reasonable justification for the maintenance of the age of consent 
distinction (ILGA, quoted in Krickler, 1998b - see Chapter 1). The Sutherland case, 
coupled with the recommendations of the Roth Report, a landmark report on equality 
issues for lesbians and gay men (see Sanders et al., 1997; Wilets, 1994), required the 
UK to bring its age of consent laws in to line with its obligations under the European 
Convention (McKelvey, 1998). Consequently, the issue was once again rexisited in the 
British parliament. 
In June 1998 in the House of Commons, Labour backbencher Ann Keen tabled 
an amendment (new clause 1) to the Crime and Disorder Bill which advocated the 
reduction of the age of consent for gay men from 18 to 16 - the same as their 
heterosexual counterparts. In the House of Commons the clause was ovcrwhelmingly 
1ý I'he law remained unchanged in Scotland until 1981 and in Northern Ireland until 1982, when the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom that the law in Northern Ireland 
violated the right to respect for private life (Sanders, Krickler. & Croome. 1997; Wintemute. 1997). 
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supported (336 to 129). A month later in the House of Lords. "vehement opposition to 
the reform" (Ward, 1998) led by Baroness Young reversed the Commons' decision - 
again by an overwhelming majority (290 to 122). In 1999, a re\ýised version of the 
amendment , in the 
form of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill, was tabled and 
supported in the House of Commons (313 to 130) but opposed in the House of Lords 
(222 to 146). However, the age of consent was finally equalised in a rare im-ocation of 
the parliament act (AIUK, 2000). Consequently, until November 2000, the British laý, ý, 
maintained a different age of consent for sex between males compared with that for 
heterosexual sex. 
As with other attempts to secure civil and human rights (e. g. for women and for 
racial and ethnic minorities. For example see Tomagevski, 1998) lesbian and gay rights 
activists campaigning for lesbian and gay rights to marriage (e. g. see Zicklin, 1998), or 
domestic partner benefits (e. g. see Spielman & Winfeld, 1996), and for the right to 
serve in the military (e. g. see Wyman & Snyder, 1997) have frequently based their 
campaigns on the issue of equality, or equal human rights for all. Similarly, in the UK 
age of consent debate, the key principle advanced by those in favour of lowering the age 
of consent (1994,1998, and 1999 debates) was a human rights argument based on 
equality. Throughout the campaign in the UK, gay and lesbian lobbying groups such as 
Stonewall and Outrage!, and civil and human rights organisations, such as Liberty (The 
National Council for Civil Liberties) prioritised the principle of equal rights and the 
removal of discrimination. In particular, their focus was on arguing for an equal age of 
consent, rather than on the lowering of the age of consent, the latter of which seemed to 
be paramount to the campaigns of the opposition. Consequently, the public campaign of 
these groups was mobilised on arguments of equality - "The case for equality" 
(Stonewall, 1998), "Write for the right to equality" (Stonewall, 1999b), "Outrage! 
Backs equality at 16" (Outrage!, 1999), "Liberty welcomes equalisation of the age of 
consent" (Liberty, 1999) and the most recent campaign was supported by a public 
opinion survey (NOP Research Group, 1999) and full-page advertisement titled "Age of 
consent for young gay men: whose side are you on? " (The Times, April 13 1999. p. 14). 
requesting that the public indicate their support by endorsing the statement "I'm on the 
side of equality". 
The equality argument xvas also echoed in the houses of parliament by 
proponents of change. For example, speaking in the House of Commons, members 
stated - "it [the age of consent issue] is not an issue for gay men alone ... 
but one of 
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human rights, which touches us all ... ... Equality is the only worthwhile and 
sustainable position" (Edwina Currie); I belie%-e in the fundamental principle that we 
are all equal before the law" (Chris Smith) (See Hansard. 1994. cols. 75.8 1,111). 
Again, in the 1998 Commons' debate, Am Keen claimed that "This debate is about 
equality", and others supported this argument by suggesting that "it is an issue of 
equality" (Stephen Twigg), and that "the basic starting point in addressing the issue is 
that there should be equality in law" (Evan Harris) (Hansard, 1998a, cols. 756,778, 
796). Similarly in the House of Lords - "the moral imperative is equality before the 
law" (Lord Williams of Mostyn; Hansard, 1998b, col. 968), and in the words of Lord 
Alli - 
Equality before the law is a high and exacting standard. It means that we have to support 
things that we do not personally believe in: it means that we have to let people do things 
that we would not do ourselves; and it means that we have to allow people to say things that 
we personally do not agree with. (Hansard, 1999b, col. 737). 
The argument of equality in law is based on a human rights perspective 
(Donnelley, 1993; Jones, 1994), a central tenet of which is that of non-discrimination 
(see Chapter 1). Not surprisingly, then, a human rights approach (centred around the 
notion of equality) has been seen as a powerful political tool in fighting for social 
change. Nonetheless, in relation to the age of consent, many MPs, Lords, Journalists, 
and letter-writers opposed it. 
Method 
As lesbian and gay human rights issues have tended to be at the forefront of media 
attention, and are typically fought in the public arena, a text-based analysis was 
employed in this study to complement the data collected in the focus groups, by 
specifically exploring the arguments used to counter human rights. So for this study, a 
single issue was selected as a case study for exploring reasoning about lesbian and gav 
human rights in public discourse (in this case, parliamentary debates, newspaper 
reports, and letters to the Editor). At the time of undertaking the research for this thesis. 
the age of consent for sex between men'ýN'as being debated in the British parliament, 
providing a case study of 'convenience'. Since then. other lesbian and gay issues (e. g. 
lesbians and gay men in the military; the proposed repeal of Section 28) have been 
debated in parliament, and could equally have been used for a similar analysis. 
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Procedure 
Data collection 
A complete set of published Hansard reports (from both the House of Lords and House 
of Commons) (Hansard, 1994; 1998a; 1998b; 1999a; 1999b), and newspaper articlcs 
and letters to the Editor from the ma or British daily broadsheet 2 newspapers (The Dailý- 
Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, and The Times), pertaining to the 1994. 
1998, and 1999 parliamentary debates on the homosexual age of consent were collected. 
In addition, articles and letters to the editor were collected from the tabloid newspapers 
(e. g. The Daily Mirror; The Sun) and gay press (e. g. Pink Paper; Axiom News), 
covering the periods of the 1998 and 1999 debates (16 April 1998 through 31 July 1998, 
24 - 28 January 1999, and 10 - 14 April 1999 inclusive). 
Since the purpose of this study was to identify the range of arguments used for 
and against the lowering of the age of consent, only direct statements were included in 
the analysis. Consequently, newspaper articles secondarily reporting what had been said 
in parliament or elsewhere were excluded from the analysis. The criterion for inclusion, 
therefore, constituted an individual putting forward an argument for or against lowering 
the age of consent, either as part of a parliamentary speech, or as a viewpoint in an 
article or letter to the Editor. The final sample for analysis comprised five Hansard 
reports, 41 newspaper articles, and 71 letters to the Editor. 
Ana4i, sis 
As with the focus groups, a data-driven (or bottom-up) analysis was conducted on the 
texts. In this case, content and thematic analyses (cf. Krippendorf, 1980 for content 
analysis, and Boyatzis, 1998; Hayes, 1997 for thematic analysis) were employed to 
identify key arguments used to promote and oppose the lowering of the age of consent. 
The newspaper coverage and Hansard reports were read, and each incidence of an 
argument for or against the lowering of the age of consent was marked. The marked 
data was then re-read to identify key themes recurring within the data. This process 
followed a similar form as that employed for the analysis of the focus group data, and 
' In the UK. broadsheets and tabloids are different in size (tabloids are smaller and cheaper), image and 
character. The tabloids, or 'popular' press have a large circulation, and their presentation and format are 
Nisual. In contrast. the broadsheets, or 'quality' press. tend to be more elaborate and in- short and high],, 
depth. (Fenton, Bryman. & Deacon. 1998. Fenton & Finlay. under review). 
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similar to that commonly employed in qualitative studies (e. (Y. see Frankland & Bloor, 
1999; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Sherrard, 1997). 
Although the sources of data employed in this method differ substantially in 
purpose, style, and audience, the aim of this study was to identify the range of 
arguments employed. Others (e. g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987) ha\-e suggested that the 
arguments people use in any given social situation constitute culturally and socially 
available discourses (interpretive repertoires). So, although people may employ 
different arguments depending on the social context they find themselves in, they still 
form some of the discourses available to argue for or against specific rights, thus the 
context within which the arguments were made was largely ignored. 
An analysis of the data showed that opponents of the amendment countered with 
three key arguments which laid claim to ethical principles overriding human rights: 
1. Principles of right and wrong take precedence over human rights. 
2. Principles of democracy take precedence over human rights. 
3. Principles of care and protection take precedence over human rights. 
Two further arguments were also widely used: One relying on 'facts' about health risks, 
and the other, demands for more rights (wedges and slippery slopes). These five 
arguments comprised two types of rhetoric: moral arguments and 'fact' based 
arguments (or 'truth' claims). The fon-ner draw on rhetoric around what is 'right', 
f natural', or 'sinful' based on what is viewed by proponents as 'non-nal' or 4 acceptable'. 
The latter employ the selective use of statistical 'evidence' (i. e. opinion poll results, 
medical and psychological research) or statements from authority figures (i. e. medical 
practitioners, major organisations, and former parliamentarians). 
Results 
In this section, the employment of each of these five arguments in relation to the age of 
consent debate will be illustrated, and discussed in relation to how these arguments map 
onto the arguments employed in other debates on lesbian and gay issues. Although each 
of these fivc categories has been treated as discrete, they are to a large extent 
intertwined. and many contributors to the debate used more than one argument. 
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(i) Principles of right and wrong take precedence o-,. -er human rights; There can be no 
&equality' between nonnality and abnormality. moral probity and sin. 
In the UK age of consent debates, those opposing a human rights position frequently 
drew on arguments of homosexuality as 'unnatural'. 'sinful'. 'abnormal'. or as a 
violation of the [acceptable] moral code. In response to the moral argument based on 
human rights, alternative moral frameworks, primarily Judeo-Christian morality. are 
used to advance ethical objections to the proposal for an equal age of consent. 
Typically, two moral arguments were employed as attempts to discredit the argument of 
equality. 
First, those opposed to the lowering of the age of consent argue that "there is no 
equality between homosexual and heterosexual intercourse" (Andrew Robathan, 
Hansard, 1999a, col. 79), and therefore "there is no requirement on any government to 
give equal treatment to normal and abnon-nal behaviour" (J. Hereford, letter to the 
Editor, Daily Mail, 27/7/98, p. 44). Similarly, Earl Ferrers suggests that "men and 
women are made differently ... 
fundamentally, for the procreation and continuation of 
the species. Heterosexuality must therefore be the norm. Homosexuality... an aberration 
from the norm" (Earl Ferrers, Hansard, 1999b, col. 67 1 ). In addition to arguing that 
homosexuality is not the norm, others argue that "there is no equality between 
heterosexual and homosexual behaviour. One is the natural order of things; the other is 
not" (Lord Stoddart of Swindon, Hansard, 1998b, col. 965). Still others claim that 
"[heterosexuality] is the path to the creation of families [and] ... to suggest that it is 
equivalent to the homosexual act is wrong". ("Men and boys", article, The Daily 
Telegraph, 19/6/98, p. 25), and therefore a "violation of the moral code which ... 
has 
distinguished civilised life for millennia" (Lord Jacobovits, Hansard 1998b, col. 949). 
Second, the argument that God denounces homosexuality is invoked to argue 
against equalising the age of consent. For example, the Lord Bishop of Winchester 
stated that "some forrns of sexual fulfilment are intrinsically better and more in accord 
with God's will" (Hansard, 1999b, col. 715) and therefore it does not folloýv that all 
forms of sexuality should be granted equal status. Similarly, others claim that 
homosexuality is "unnatural: it is a pen, ersion, and it is repeatedly and firmly 
condemned in holy scripture" (Lord Ashbourne, Hansard, 1999b, col. 727), and that 
"the NcNv Testament ... 
is equally strong in its denunciation of ývhat the Bible -states is ... 
abnon-nal practice and perversion" (Rev Ian Paisley. Hansard, 1999a, col. 62). 
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This rhetoric is familiar from other contexts in which lesbian and gav nghts hax c 
been opposed, and was evident in both the questionnaire and focus group data (Chapters 
3& 4). It is commonly argued that the protection of gays and lesbians undermiiies 
morality (Samar, 1994), and rhetoric around homosexuality as 'sinful', 'morall, \ 
wrong', 'sick', 'unnatural' or 'deviantý is well established in both psychological and 
public discourse (see Chapter 2). Despite this view no longer being espoused in 
psychology, these discourses continue to be adopted when opposing lesbian and gay 
rights issues in political debates and public discourse, and any effort to put 
homosexuality on an equal plane with heterosexuality is typically seen as subversivc 
(Smith, 1994). 
Those who use this argument commonly employ what Jacobs (1993) calls the 
"scourge rhetoric", conveying disapprobation for homosexuality, and drawing on moral 
(often biblical) discourses to assert the intrinsic evil of lesbians and gays. For example, 
the 1970s USA anti-gay crusader Anita Bryant claimed that "God has ordained sexual 
identities innate in male and female: so homosexuality is a twisting of divine order" 
(Anita Bryant, quoted in MacKinnon, 1992, p. 85). Similarly, US organisations of the 
4new religious right' claim that "Homosexual activity is not a civil right, it is a lethal 
and immoral behavior" (FRC, 1999), and that "The homosexual movement ... 
has 
initiated a quiet, deadly war on America and everything this nation once stood for" 
(Ovadal, 1995). 
When biblical justifications are more difficult to find, or when the appeal to 
biblical images is less likely to be effective, those opposed to equality typically draw on 
arguments around what is 'natural' or 'normal' (MacKinnon, 1992- see also Tiefer, 
1997). Consequently, in post-Christian Europe, much of the opposition to lesbian and 
gay rights has centred around claims that the legitimisation of homosexuality through 
the granting of ('special') rights, will result in the demise of the (heterosexual, two- 
parent, nuclear) family, seen as the foundation of morality and society as we know it 
(e. g. see MacKinnon, 1992). Consequently, in the UK, the campaigns of Mary 
Whitehouse and the Thatcher government, which led to the institution of Section 28 of 
the Local Goverriment Act, were designed to address the alleged "declining morals" of 
British society (Adam, 1995). Similarly, in the recent French campaign to achieN-e legal 
recognition for gay couples, opponents of change denounced the move as "the death of 
the family" and "licensed debauchery" (Bremner, 1999). and in the 1986 local election 
in the Borough of Haringey (London). Peter Murphy (Consen-ati% e Chain-nan for 
18-71 
Tottenham) claimed that "the council's pro-lesbian and (jay rights policy was -part of a 
Marxist plot to destabilise society as we know it"' (Smith, 1994, p. 187). 
In summary, arguments around normality and abnormality. moral probity. and 
sin are commonly employed in political and public discourse as a means to denv 
lesbians and gay men equality. These claims serve as 'rational i sati ons' for maintaining tl 
inequality (see Tiefer, 1997), and because they are emotive are difficult to counter with 
substantial evidence. 
(ii) Principles of democracy take preccdence over human rights; the majority of the 
population opposes any lowering of the age of consent. 
The second key argument put forward by opponents of change, was that the majority of 
the British population was opposed to the lowering of an equal age of consent. 
Consequently, results of opinion polls allegedly supporting these claims frequently 
appeared in the Hansard reports and press coverage of the UK age of consent debate, 
even though other opinion polls (e. g. NOP Research Group, 1999) suggested otherwise. 
For example, although the NOP poll (NOP Research Group, 1999), widely publicised 
by Stonewall, found that 66% of respondents thought that the age of consent in Britain 
should be equal for everyone, members of the public argued against equality claiming 
that "at least 80 per cent of the population is against legalising gay sex for 16 year-olds, 
yet our MPs have not asked our opinion" (T. Domeng, letter to the Editor, The Express, 
25/7/98), or that "70 per cent of the public oppose the measure, what democratic right 
have our MPs to ignore public opinion and try to force this measure through? " (P. 
Smith, letter to the Editor, The Daily Telegraph, 25/7/98, p. 19). Similarly, MPs stated 
that "opinion polls suggest that between three fifths and three quarters of people in this 
country do not want the age of consent to be reduced" (Andrew Robathan, Hansard, 
1999a, col. 79), and that "it is opposed by 70 per cent of the population, so the House 
will be out of kilter with the public" (Gerald Howarth, Hansard, 1999a, col. 29). 
Others, however, resorted to broad sweeping statements about majoriov, 
opposition, claiming that "people do not want it, parents do not want it" (Earl Ferrers, 
Hansard 1999b, col. 672), "the public at larae do not want the age of consent lowered to 
16"' (Baroness Youn(g. Hansard, 1998b). and "there is no doubt that the British people 
oppose the IoNvenng of the age of consent" (H. Thomson. letter to the Editor. The 
Independent, 24,7,98, p. 2. i-eview section). It Nvas also argued that "the public have it 
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right: no matter how much people may wish to tolerate homosexuality and accord 
equality to it, a large element of public opinion is uneas), about the step we are 
considering" (James Clappison, Hansard, 1999a, col. 106). and that "we should listen to 
the public and not move to reduce further the age of consent" (SITNon-nan Fowler. 
Hansard, 1999a, col. 35). 
Further credibility was gathered for this argument by conflating it with issues of 
care and protection, invoking public concern around exposing young boys to 
homosexuality. For example, "most British people do not think it is self-eý'ident that 
boys should be allowed to sleep with one another when they are 16". ("The people's 
peers", article, The Daily Telegraph, 24/7/98, p. 27), or as suggested by Lord 
Ashbourne: "Opinion polls always show support for vague concepts of equality, but 
when it is spelt out that this means giving homosexual men legal access to schoolboys, 
opinion is solidly against" (Hansard, 1999a, col. 726). Finally, others claimed that "[A] 
tiny dissident minority [i. e. homosexuals] ... cannot demand that the other 95 per cent 
or 99 per cent must accept and treat as equal" (Lord Jakobovits, Hansard, 1998b, col. 
949), and that the government "tends to be persuaded by pressure groups who, although 
representing only a very small minority, make their voice heard" (D &J Godfrey, letter 
to the Editor, The Daily Telegraph, 24/6/98, p. 25). 
Proponents of this position draw on majoritarian arguments to claim that what 
the majority wants is what is in the best interests of society as a whole. Like this debate., 
the US Supreme Court's sole expressed reason in Bowers v Hardwick for upholding 
Georgia's sodomy statute from Equal Protection Challenge was that the law expressed a 
legitimate state purpose in that it promoted 'morality'. The court made it clear that what 
it meant by 'morality' was simply "the majority sentiments about ... morality" (Mohr, 
1988, p. 205). Similarly, other debates over lesbian and gay rights in the UK have also 
employed majoritarian arguments. For example, in arguing for the institution of Section 
28, the Conservative party offered opinion polls as 'conclusive' evidence for the 
necessity of the section and to argue that the public supported the need for legislation 
(Smith, 1994). 
This line of reasoning relies on the argument that what the (real or perceived) 
majority wants, is in the best interests of society as a whole. However, few political 
measures aimed at instituting hurnan rights for any minority group has received 
majority endorsement, or even been popular. 
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(iii) Princinles of care and protection take precedence over human rights: Young men 
are immature and vulnerable and need the protection of the criminal law. 
In the age of consent debates, employment of rhetoric around young (adolescent) men 
as vulnerable and in need of being protected by society were also frequently employed 
to deny human rights to gay men. Typically, two discourses were employed here, I/ the 
'fragile youth' discourse concerning predatory older (homosexual) men, and 2/ teenage 
boys as immature and unsure of themselves. Consequently, the debates centred around a 
proliferation of arguments about the need to protect young people (e. g. "My 
overwhelming concern. ... 
is the protection of young people", Baroness Young, Hansard. 
1999b, col. 652; "Our priority is to protect the vulnerable and to reinforce the duty of 
professional care", Alun Michael, Hansard, 1998a, col. 787; "the consideration of 
protecting vulnerable individuals remains valid", Crispin Blunt, Hansard, 1998a, col. 
792). 
Throughout Hansard and in the newspaper reports, there were numerous 
protestations that equalising the age of consent would open the floodgates for teenage 
boys to be seduced or coerced into homosexuality by older (homosexual) men. For 
example, among claims that "the Home Secretary is bulldozing through a paedophiles' 
charter" (Editorial Comment, Daily Telegraph, 26/1/99, p. 2 1), or "... granting a 
charter for unnatural sexual practices with young boys" (H. Thomson, letter to the 
Editor, The Independent, 24/7/98), suggestions were made that lowering the age of 
consent would necessarily result in young boys "being led or forced into doing 
something they do not want to do" (L. Stafford, letter to the Editor, The Express, 
26/7/98, p. 10); 44of being befriended and abused by older, homosexual men" (Lord 
Annaly, Hansard, 1999b, col. 729)-, and that "older homosexuals do prey on teenagers, 
and will be even more blatant about it if the age of consent is lowered to 16" (J. Worker. 
letter to the editor, The Telegraph, 25/7/98). This rhetoric was also accompanied in the 
press, notably the Daily Telegraph, by text invoking the stereotype of homosexuality as 
predatory, and gay men as child abusers: The la", was described as "a licence for the 
exploitation of children" and support for changes as "a vote for child abuse" ("a vote 
for child abuse", article, Daily Telegraph 24! 6/98, p. 25). 
Secondly, claims were made that young boys "are often less mature than girls at 
16, and not infrequently ambivalent about their sexuality" (Baroness Young. Hansard, 
1999b, col. 0-52), and therefore in need of protection until they are 'mature' enough to 
1 8, 'ý 
decide their sexuality (or rather. discouraged from taking up a homosexual lifestyle). 
For example, Lord Annaly claimed that "young men mature physically and emotionall% W- 
rather later than girls.... by keeping the homosexual age of consent at 18. time is 
allowed for adolescent boys to mature and be in a better position to decide their 
sexuality" (Hansard, 1999b, col. 729). Others claimed that "sixteen is an extremelv 
fon, native age.... at 16, young people ... are unsure about them selves. . .. They are unsure 
about life and their relationships" (Earl Ferrers, Hansard, 1999b, col. 672), and that the 
"difference between 16 and 18 is but two years.... those extra two years may ý, vell save 
[a boy] from becoming involved in a homosexual relationship which he might bitterly 
regret later in life" (Lord Gray of Contin, Hansard, 1999b, col. 72 1). Similarly, Lord 
Harmsworth argued that "once that crucial experience has been had ... the chances of 
parental help in accelerating a likely swing later the other way may be lost forever" 
(Hansard, 1999b, col. 716). 
Principles of care and protection also featured prominently in the focus group 
data, especially with regard to lesbian and gay parenting, and the inclusion of lesbian 
and gay perspectives in schools, in addition to the age of consent. Rhetoric around the 
need to protect young men (in this case, those aged 16-18 years) relies on the 
mobilisation of the image of homosexuality as essentially predatory, and the 
construction of young men as helpless and vulnerable children, the majority of whom 
are open to corruption (Smith, 1994). In debates around lesbian and gay rights, anti- 
discrimination laws have typically been equated with 'child molesting' and 'gay 
recruiting' (Button, Rienzo, & Wald, 1997), hence the non-nalisation of the image of the 
vulnerable young man who is threatened with perversion by the older male homosexual 
seducer (Smith, 1994). For example, the Anita Bryant campaign to "protect Amenica's 
children" was known as the "Save our Children" campaign and was aimed at protecting 
children from 'exposure' to homosexuality (Button et al., 1997; MacKinnon, 1992). It 
was this campaign which was responsible for the ban on open homosexuals teaching in 
public schools in some states (Diamond, 1995). Bryant claimed that "the recruitment of 
our children is absolutely necessary for the survival and growth of homosexuality - for 
homosexuals cannot reproduce, they must recruit. must refreshen their ranks" 
(MacKinnon, 1992, p. 123; her emphasis). 
Furthermore, Bryant's campaign evoked sentiments that proposed anti- 
discriiniination laws wei-c equated with 'child-molesting', 4boy prostitution', and (,, -ay 
recruiting', resulting in the proposed anti-discrimination rneasures being overturned in 
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several states, including Minnesota, Kansas. and Oregon (Adam. 1995). Similarly, the 
myth of homosexual recruitment of youths, was also inNroked in 1991, bN, Rev. Louis 
Sheldon, head of the Coalition for Traditional Values, when arguing against Assembly 
Bill 10 1, a measure designed to protect lesbians and gay men from housing and 
employment discrimination in Califomia (Jacobs, 1993). 
Concerns around the need to 'protect' children, ha,., e also centred around the 
idea that legitimising homosexual behaviour encourages role models harmful to 
children, who are necessarily seen as impressionable (Samar, 1994). In particular, 
arguments about education and the distribution of information about lesbianism and gay 
male homosexuality corrupting children and young people are widely employed in 
contemporary debates around lesbian and gay rights issues. For example, the Right 
wing US organisation Concerned Women for America (CWA) have stated that 
None of our tax dollars must go to support "sensitivity training" programs designed to promote the 
homosexual lifestyle among our children. And none of our tax dollars must go to "celebrate" 
Lesbian and Gay History Months in our public schools. ... 
CWA is going to stand our ground and 
continue giving parents the information they need to protect their children. .. 
What we are 
standing against is the blatant implementation of a radical political agenda that millions of parents 
believe is harmful and destructive for children. (LaHaye, 1995). 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, Section 28 of the Local Government Act, 
serves to ensure that children are not exposed to material presenting homosexuality in a 
favourable light until 'true' sexuality has been carefully nurtured (Smith, 1994). 
Consequently, in the recent bid to repeal Section 28, the campaign of the 'keep the 
clause campaigners' has adopted this theme - e. g. "Kids face gay lessons: protect young 
children from these trendies" (article, The Sun, ? "/1/00); "Law must be preserved to 
protect schoolchildren" (article, Daily Telegraph, 8/2/00); and "there must be 'adequate 
safeguards' to protect children" (The Archbishop of Canterbury, paraphrased in Jones, 
Daily Tclegraph, 25/l/00). 
In summary, principles of care and protection have frequently been prionitised in 
issues concerning equality for lesbians and gay men, including the al,,, c of consent for 
sex between males. Like arguments around moral probity, these are rhetorically 
pei-SLUISIVC, in that they eN-oke societal moral panic (see Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994) by 
employing unsubstantiated claims that (all) children are in 'real' danger of being 
corrupted. 
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Liv) Health Risks 
The alleged health risks of a homosexual lifestyle, in particular, medical rhetoric around 
AIDS/HIV, were also employed by those opposing an equal age of consent. Members of 
the public claimed that "the new bill is unlikely to promote sexual health. Homosexual 
HIV infections rose by II per cent from 1995 to 1996 after the age of consent was 
lowered to 18 in 1994" (D. Holloway, letter to the Editor, The Times, 10/4, /99, p. 2 1), 
that "the medical consequences of a homosexual lifestyle are truly shocking" (H. 
Thomson, letter to the Editor, The Daily Telegraph, 27/1/99), and that "homosexual 
practices carry great health risks to young people" (Baroness Young, Hansard, 1998b, 
col. 940). 
Typically, homosexuality was constructed primarily (or even solely) as 
comprising anal intercourse, and consequently, rhetoric around health risks relied on 
truth claims about medical risks surrounding this practice. For example, claims were 
made that "anal intercourse is deemed to be very dangerous from the medical 
viewpoint"(Lord Annaly, Hansard, 1999b, col. 729), and about the "ample medical 
evidence of the increased risks attached to anal intercourse" (Lord Stallard, Hansard, 
1999b, col. 747); and claims were also made that "homosexuality is largely associated 
with the dangerous practice of anal intercourse, frequent changes of partner and the 
spread of HIV, hepatitis B and gonorrhoea" (A. Rogers, letter to the Editor, The Daily 
Telegraph, 24/6/98, p. 25); with "... sarcomas, lower bowel damage and AIDS" (P. 
Watson, letter to the Editor, The Daily Telegraph, 20/6/98, p. 25); and with " ... HIV 
infection and other sexually transmitted diseases" ("Men and boys", article, The Daily 
Telegraph, 19/6/98, p. 25). 
Furthermore, concerns about health risks were sometimes conflated with other 
issues, some suggesting that "the Bill legitimises a dangerous physical activity that will 
increase radically the prospects of children -- boys and girls of 16 and 17 -- contracting 
fatal diseases" (Dr Julian Lewis, Hansard, 1999a, col. 90), and others that "anal sex is a 
fundamentally dangerous activity because the Almighty did not design that part of the 
anatomy for that purpose" (Edward Leigh, Hansard, 1999a, col. 70). Concerns were also 
raised about "the effects of the gay subculture, the level of promiscuity among 
homosexuals and the high proportion of homosexual men who are reported as having 
been raped or coerced into sexual activity" (Baroness Blatch, Hansard. 1999b. col. 735). 
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Rhetoric around homosexuals as promiscuous. and homosexuality as being 
unhealthy' and responsible for the spread of diseases such as hepatitis B, HIV and 
AIDS has been widely employed by those wishing to exclude lesbians and gav men I 
from human rights. For example, Dr. Paul Cameron's (Family Research Institute, 
Colorado) pamphlet on Same Sex Marriage reads as follows: 
Why is homosexual mamage a health hazard? ... They 
[homosexuals] see shared biological 
intimacy and sexual risk-taking as the hallmark of trust and commitment. Being exposed in this 
way to the bodily discharges of their partner increases the nsk of disease .... 
The evidence is also 
strong that gays disproportionately contract more disease, especially AIDS and the vanous forms 
of hepatitis... (Cameron, 1997). 
Disease rhetoric is strategically employed so that homosexuality is represented as a 
threat to society as a whole, not just homosexuals (Smith, 1994). Thus homosexuality 
becomes constructed as not only morally contagious, but also physically contagious 
(MacKinnon, 1992), in the same way that around the turn of the century, Jews were 
widely regarded as tuberculosis carriers (Smith, 1994). 
(y) Wedges and Slippery Slopes 
Finally, the cliches of "the thin end of the wedge" and the "slippery slope" were also 
employed, but to a much lesser extent. Excerpts of this type centred around the idea that 
if the age of consent was reduced, then this would initiate requests for further changes. 
For example, in the words of Lord Stallard 
this Bill is the beginning of a long agenda of demands. We have heard that there are to be 
demands for the lowering of consent to 14. for the right to homosexual marriage, for the 
right to adopt and foster children, for the repeal of Section 28 of the Local Govenu-nent Act 
and for an end to the storage of police information and data on paedophiles. (Hansard, 
1999b, col. 747). 
Similarly, others stated that this is "the thin end of the wedge" (Gerald Howarth; 
Baroness Young), as "soi-ne people want to reduce the age further, from 16 to 14" 
(Gerald Howarth, Hansard, 1999a, col. 69), -lowering the age of consent to 14 ... a 
demand for gav and lesbian marriages and for the right for such couples to adopt 
children" (Baroness Young. Hansard, 1998b, col. 939); and "the pressure will then shift 
to a campaign to allow homosexuals to adopt children. for clause 28 to be repealed. and 
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for legal marriage between homosexuals" (Edward Leigh, Hansard. 1999a, col. 69). Or 
in the words of Lord Habgood - "We may accept that we lower the age of consent to 16 
now, but in practice it gives the green light to 14 year-olds, and we are going down a 
slippery slope" (Hansard, 1998b, col. 955) 
These arguments have also been widely adopted in debates around lesbian and 
gay rights issues. Founded on the premise that granting such rights opens the floodgates 
to affirmative action programmes (Samar, 1994), and like the issue of care and 
protection, evoke a sense of moral panic (see Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). Underlying 
this line of argument is the construction of lesbian and gay rights as "special rights" (as 
opposed to human rights), or rights which are 'earned' by those who 'deserve' them 
(Button et al., 1997). For example, in the ballot for anti-discrimination laws in Oregon 
(1988), those opposed to the proposed laws attempted to convince voters that gays and 
lesbians were "demanding something beyond basic legal protections enjoyed by other 
groups of citizens" (human rights) and "demanding special excessive privileges" 
(Diamond, 1995, p. 253). 
This line of reasoning is typically founded on beliefs that lesbians and gay men 
do not deserve 'additional' rights, either because the proponents of this position do not 
perceive lesbians and gay men as having suffered discrimination, or because 
discrimination is viewed as justified, in that homosexuality is an objectionable 'chosen 
behaviour' (Button et al., 1997; Schacter, 1994). In effect they are diversionary 
arguments, shifting the focus away from human rights, to that of special rights. 
Discussion and Conclusion: Arguing Back 
The findings of this case study show that in the UK age of consent debates (and also in 
other debates on lesbian and gay human rights issues), the arguments used to oppose 
human rights, are not, for the most part, rights-based. When human rights arguments 
were made explicit in relation to the age of consent debate, they were countered ývith 
arguments about the principles of right and wrong (i. e. the morality of homosexual it v), 
principles of democracy, principles of care and protection; arguments about health risks. 
and arguments about the permitting of one right allowing demands for other rights. 
Some of these arguments (i. e. principles of right and wrong, principles of care and 
protection) Nvere raised in the focus group discussions as potential considerations 
against cxtending specitic hurnan rights to lesbians and gay men. 
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As we have seen, the arguments used to oppose the lowenng of the age of 
consent for sex between men are familiar arguments, x, ý'hich also have been employed in 
other contexts to oppose lesbian and gay rights. In arguing against human ritylits and 
equality, those opposed to change employed two types of arguments: moral arguments 
(i. e. there can be no 'equality" between normality and abnormality, moral probity and 
sin) and 'fact' based arguments (or 'truth' claims). On a basis of these, those opposed to 
the lowering of the age of consent have developed a coherent and effective strategy for 
opposing equality (Samar, 1994; Smith, 1994). 
Although proponents of change initially argued for the lowering of the age of 
consent on grounds of human rights and equality, in arguing back against the opposition 
they resorted to providing counter-evidence to the opposition's claims (e. g. see Smith, 
1994) (perhaps because these are easy to argue against in that they can easily be refuted 
by available evidence [Samar, 1994]). For example, in responding to claims that 
homosexuality is amoral, sinful, and unnatural, proponents of change argued that people 
"are entitled to campaign for those opinions ... [but] not entitled to insist that their 
prejudices be written into British law" (Edwina Currie, Hansard, 1994, col. 76), and that 
"in the past, the same thing has been said about practices such as divorce and 
contraception, and we do not now make laws banning them" (Edwina Currie, Hansard, 
1994, col. 79). 
With regard to majoritarian arguments, proponents of change employed parallel 
examples, to argue that "basic rights and freedoms should [not] be decided on the basis 
of majoritarianism or the outcome of opinion polls" (Lord Lester of Herne Hill, 
Hansard, 1998b, col. 950). For example, Edwina Currie argued that "83% of the public 
stated that they were in favour of capital punishment [but] that did not stop a huge 
majority of hon. Members voting the other way" (Hansard, 1994, col. 76). Lord 
Dholakia asked 
Who in 1965 - 35 years ago - would have eNýer believed that this country would ha\, e three 
separate pieces of race relations legislation if one had simplý- decided to act on public 
opinion? In the past four decades who would have believed that we would have legislation 
about gender equality. the termination of pregnancy ... Is it that we 
follow public opinion 
or do we lead it'! (Hansard, 1998b, col. 945). 
Neil Kinnock similarly argued that "if in 1967, our predecessors in the House had 
waited for a consensus of public opinion ... we would still 
have total cnminalisation of 
homosexual bchaviour. (Hansard, 1994, col. 85). 
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In opposition to the claim that the age of consent discrimination ýý as necessary 
to protect young men, it was argued that the law did not protect young men, but rather. 
inhibited them from seeking a&ice and support from individuals and on-yanisations 
(Ann Keen, Edwina Currie, Mr Watson, and others; Hansard. 1994, see also Stonewall. 
1998). For example, Baroness Mallalieu states that "on occasions when sexual 
attentions are or have become unwelcome, to cut them [young gay men] off from the 
protection of the police and the authorities ... 
far from protecting them, it denies them the 
protection the rest of us enjoy" (Hansard, 1998b, col. 940). Similarly, E&Nina Currie 
argued that "a law that keeps people silent and means that they are unable to lodge a 
complaint is not a protective shield.... It is a gag, and it is likely to leave them much 
more open to abuse, pressure, harassment, blackmail, and extortion" (Hansard 1994. 
col. 77). 
Where arguments were made about exposing young boys to abuse by predatory 
older men, proponents of change offered counter-arguments suggesting that 
"overwhelmingly the problem of abuse is the problem of abuse by older men of younger 
women" (Chris Smith, 1994, col. 112); that "no one seems equally bothered about 
rapacious, middle-aged heterosexuals chasing young girls" (Mrs Currie, Hansard 1994, 
col. 80); and that sexual abuse "happens ... with young girls, yet no one would advance 
that as a reason for raising the age of consent" (Tony Blair, Hansard, 1994, col. 99). To 
those who argued that young men were not mature enough to make decisions about 
their own sexuality, proponents of change argued back that "the vast bulk of evidence 
suggests that, at 16, boys and girls ... are aware of their sexuality" (Tony Blair, 
Hansard, 1994, col. 99); that "of course, young people are immature, but that it is not an 
argument for making them criminals" (Edwina Currie, Hansard 1994, col. 80). and 
quoting the Royal College of Psychiatrists that "there is no developmental reason to 
treat young men and young women differently" (Neil Kinnock, Hansard, 1994, col. 82) 
Similarly, counterclaims put forward in response to the opposition's arguments 
about medical risk, included that "criminalisation of homosexual activio, ' may inhibit 
health education and healthcare" (BMA - Edwina Currie, Hansard 1994, col. 78). "the 
present criminality of homosexual relationships can limit health promotion acti, ý Itles" 
(Neil Kinnock, Hansard, 1994, col. 78); and that "all sexual activities carry some 
medical risks" (Earl Russell, Hansard, 1998b, col. 963, also Lord Annan, Hansard, 
1999b, col. 667). Others provided parallels with heterosexual it \Y, for example. "when NN C 
, see a heterosexual couple, %ve do not instantly think of gonorrhea. xvc see people ti ry i n, g 
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to form a long-term relationship, caring about each other and falling in 10ý c- (Edwina 
Currie, Hansard 1994, col. 78), and that -to drive them to secrecy within the 
homosexual community [is] to isolate them; to cut them off from seeking advice, 
guidance and help from family and ffiends, from doctors... " (Baroness Mallalieu, 
Hansard, 1998b, col. 940). 
However, in attempting to initiate social change, providing 'positive images' as 
counter-discourses to prejudice is not a particularly successftil strategy, in that it 
reinforces the opposition's arguments (Smith, 1994). By enga ing with the opposition's 91 -- I 
arguments, we end up involved in lengthy and diversionary debates about whether 
sexuality really is fixed by the age of 16, or whether homosexuals really are more prolic 
to contracting AIDS or hepatitis (cf. Ellis, 1999). In so doing, heteronormativity 
remains unchallenged, compounding the very problem we seek to overcome (Rahman, 
1998). 
Human rights discourse, on the other hand, occupies a privileged moral position 
in democratic states so should be rhetorically powerful. However, the human rights 
arguments employed in the age of consent debate failed to be heard. By engaging in a 
counter- arguments approach, the human rights argument becomes buried among the 
plethora of other arguments and counter-arguments. For example, although proponents 
of change first argued from a position of human rights and equality for all, when faced 
with arguments against equality, they provided counter-arguments to the claims of their 
opposition, instead of consolidating the human rights argument. 
Secondly, in presenting their human rights argument, proponents of change 
placed undue emphasis on the notion of 'equality', which resulted in the conflation of 
the concepts of 'equity' and 'civil rights' (also associated with equality) with that of 
hinnan rights. In prioritising the notion of 'equality', rather than 'human rights', the 
distinction between human rights and other types of equality became lost. Since 
discourses around 'equity' and 'civil rights', entail different assumptions about what 
constitutes equality, co-opting the term equality proved disadvantagcous for a&ancing 
a pro-lesbian and gay human rights position. In so doing. those opposed to equality 
were able to hijack the debates with arguments around morality, democracy. care and 
protection, and health. and to by-pass the real issue, xN, hich is one of justice (or hurnan 
rights) versus oppression (Dean. 1994). 
, ýk human rights perspective 
has been seen as very important in pursuing justice 
for lesbians and gay men (Kaplan, 1997). and indeed it has been central to the 1=1 
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achievement of equal (human) rights for lesbians and gay men internationally. in the 
political and legal arenas. The purpose of a human rights approach is to oblige 
governments to change the structures that perpetuate the denial of equal rights (cf. 
Tomagevski, 1998). It is therefore important that we develop effective strate(, Yies to 
argue for lesbian and gay rights, by prioritising the notion of human rights-, highlighting 
that human rights are universal, inalienable, and indivisible: and clearly illustrating hoNN. 
issues such as the age of consent are human rights issues. 
As has been illustrated in this chapter, the comparisons of the arguments raised 
in relation to the age of consent debate, are familiar arguments. as they have also been 
frequently employed in other debates on lesbian and gay issues. This supports the 
general findings of all the research contained in this thesis, that lesbian and gay human 
rights are not seen as human rights, and as this chapter suggests, their legitimacy as 
human rights countered using claims which are not rights-based. It would seem then, 
that in order to facilitate positive social change for lesbians and gay men, we need to 
consider how best to convince others that lesbian and gay issues are human rights 
issues. 
The next, and final, chapter of this thesis will review the findings from this 
chapter, and those of Chapters 3 and 4, considering how best we might go about 
facilitating positive social change in relation to lesbian and gay human rights. 
1 ý4- 
CHAPTER 6 
Lesbian and Gay Human Rights - Where to from Here? 
In recent years, issues of discrimination against lesbians and gay men haý, -e been at the 
forefront of international political debate (at least in the western world). In conjunction 
with this, there has been an increasing recognition of lesbian and gay issues as hui-nan 
rights. For example, advocates of positive social change for lesbians and gay men ha-ý-e 
called for the recognition of lesbian and gay (equality) issues as human rights issues, 
arguing that "love is a basic human right" (AIUK Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and 
Transgender Network), "lesbian rights are human rights" (ILIS), and quoting the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "all human beings are born equal in dignity 
and rights" (Stonewall). However, despite this increasing recognition of lesbian and gay 
issues as human rights issues in the political arena, internationally, the record of human 
rights violations against lesbians and gay men is both astonishing and appalling, as we 
have seen in Chapter 1. This record would seem to suggest a lack of support for lesbian 
and gay human rights internationally, and the paucity of political action for positive 
social change, would seem to suggest that the lack of support for lesbian and gay human 
rights at the macro-level is underpinned (at least to some extent) by a lack of support at 
the micro (or individual) level. Therefore, there is an urgent need for positive social 
change, and for research aimed at understanding resistance to change, particularly in 
relation to lesbian and gay rights issues. This is the key contribution of this thesis. 
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to draw together the findings across 
the three studies in this thesis and explore the implications of these findings for creating 
positive social change. I will first summarise the key findings of my research and then 
outline some of its implications, following this with a critical evaluation of the theory 
and method employed in this thesis. 
Summary of Thesis 
In Chapter 1, a human rights perspecti-ve was introduced. Human rights were dcfined as 
"the rights of all people at all times and in all situations" (Cranston, 1962. quoted in 
Bouandel. 1997. p. 20), and therefore inclusive of lesbians and gal,, r men. The 
application of a hurnan rights perspective to lesbian and gay issues in practice was then 
explored and some limitations of this approach discussed and countered. Then in 
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Chapter 2, the relationship between psychology and human rights was explored. 
showing that psychology has seldom engaged explicitly with human ri, -). ht.,,, - issues. much 
less specifically in relation to lesbian and gay rights. Chapter 2 also highlighted the way 
in which from a moral -developmental framework, human rights had been subsumed as a 
more morally developed way of thinking. Conversely, whilst the contemporary 
psychological study of lesbian and gay issues had often been directly concerned with 
advancing the rights of lesbians and gay men (Kitzinger, 1997). it had only implicitly 
engaged with human rights, focusing instead on mental health. 
A multimethod approach was employed to enable the exploration of different 
aspects of support for and reasoning about lesbian and gay issues (attitudes, thinking, 
discussion) in different contexts (individual, social, formal). In Chapter 3, a large-scale 
questionnaire study was undertaken, followed in Chapter 4 by a small-scale focus group 
study. Finally, Chapter 5 comprised a single-issue case study of Hansard and newspaper 
articles on the age of consent debate, exploring the types of arguments used to counter 
human rights. Chapter 3 took an individualistic approach to support and reasoning, 
whilst chapters 4 and 5 explored support and reasoning in two distinct social contexts: 
(relatively informal) focus group discussions, and (formal) parliamentary debates, 
respectively. 
Support for and Reasoning about Lesbian and Gay Human Rights: 
A Summary of Key Findings 
In this section, the key findings of this series of studies will be summarised and 
compared, first looking at support for lesbian and gay human rights, and then reasoning 
about lesbian and gay issues. 
Support for Lesbian and Gay Human Rights 
'Support' was investigated in two main ways: (1) levels of endorsement of lesbian and 
gay human rights issues, and (2) perceived responsibility for creating, positive social 
change for lesbians and gay men. These will be discussed in turn. 
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Endorsement of lesbian and gay human rights 
Overall, the findings of this series of studies suggest moderate - although not uniform - 
support for lesbian and gay human rights. This was surprising because a number of 
researchers (e. g. see Kitzinger, 1987; Payaslyo6lu & Iýduygu, 1999, Sotelo, 2000a) 
have suggested that support for human rights is typically greater, and attitudes more 
'liberal', among university educated individuals. It was therefore expected that because 
a student sample was employed, the questionnaire responses and focus group 
discussions would evidence strong support for lesbian and gay issues. 
An initial reading of the data seemed to indicate strong majority support for 
most lesbian and gay human rights issues, however, a more detailed picture emerged 
from a more detailed analysis. Rather, the findings of this study showed that 
respondents did not extend all human rights to lesbians and gay men to the same degree. 
Whilst almost all respondents (97%) were willing to endorse liberal notions of equality 
for all (e. g. 'a person's sexual orientation should not block that person's access to basic 
rights and freedoms' [item 18]) and most indicated high levels of support for basic 
rights issues (e. g. the right to life; arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile; the right to 
privacy), they were much less willing to extend social rights (e. g. the presentation of 
lesbian and gay perspectives in schools; the provision of books positively portraying 
lesbian and gay lifestyles; the fight to marry; the right to parent children) and some 
political rights (e. g. asylum; an equal age of consent) to lesbians and gay men. Although 
Sotelo (2000a, 2000b) also found that respondents indicated different levels of support 
for different issues, in contrast to the present findings, Sotelo found that respondents 
were more willing to extend social rights to a number of socio-political groups (e. g. 
feminists, homosexuals, immigrants) than they were to extend political rights to those 
groups. 
In the focus groups, support for lesbian and gay human rights also appeared 
strong, in that participants initially agreed with specific issues, and frequently invoked 
human rights concepts, such as equality etc. This is not completely surprising. in that 
the 'contact hypothesis' (Herek & Capitano, 1996) suggests that attitudes are much 
more positive among those who have some contact with lesbians and gav men (e. g. see 
Hansen, 1982a; Millharn et al., 1976). However. there was evidence in the focus groups 
that participants did not wholly support lesbian and gay human rights. For example. 
despite initial agreement xvith the issues, participants engaged in lengthy discussions 
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about limitations to support for particular lesbian and gay human n ghts, in many cases 
backsliding on their initial support. 
The analysis of the focus group discussions also shed some light on potential 
reasons for the modest levels of support for lesbian and gay human rights in the 
questionnaire study. in general, whilst Initially indicating support for each of the ISSUe, 
presented for discussion, focus group participants progressed to a discussion and 
evaluation of potential reservations and considerations about extending specific rights to 
lesbians and gay men. So, although participants initially supported the issues, and 
sometimes employed human rights language and concepts to argue a pro-rights position. 
they also offered substantive reasons as to why particular human rights should not be 
extended to lesbians and gay men. 
Basic Personal Freedoms and Political Rights 
In relation to basic personal freedoms and political rights, the questionnaire responses 
showed extremely high levels of support. For example, around 97% of respondents 
agreed that "a person's sexual orientation should not block that person's access to basic 
rights and freedoms"; whilst just over 94% of respondents agreed that no one should be 
-arrested, detained, or exiled simply for being lesbian or gay, 90% that "a country 
should not have the right to impose the death penalty on lesbians and gay men", and 
89% that "lesbians and gay men should not be fined or arrested for engaging in 
consenting sexual acts... in the privacy of their own homes". In the focus group 
discussions, these issues evoked little or no discussion of competing concerns or other 
considerations: only two respondents suggested a need to weigh up cultural rights 
against lesbian and gay rights. 
In the light of this, it was surprising that asylum rights for lesbians and gay men 
were not nearly as well supported. Despite strong support for asylum in the focus group 
discussions, only 57% of questionnaire respondents agreed that "just like people 
persecuted for their religious and political beliefs, lesbians and gay men should be 
granted asylum in another country when homosexuality is persecuted in their own". One 
potential reason for this considerably lower level of support may. however, either be an 
indication that (a) respondents did not understand what is meant by asylum, or (b) they 
\verc not aware of the extent to which lesbians and gay men are the victims of human 
rights violation and discrimination. The focus group discussions provided limited 
support for this theory, in that asylum was explained to focus group particil)ants before 
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the statement "in some countries, lesbians and gay men are imprisoned. tortured. or 
even killed simply for being lesbian or gay" was introduced for discussion: the issue of 
asylum was therefore contextualised in the focus groups, where it was not in the 
questionnaire. An analysis of the focus group data also suggested a certain extent of 
ignorance about the level of discrimination against lesbians and gay men. For example, 
when discussing asylum rights, Fiona stated 
The only thing there that makes me realise is that I live a very sheltered existence 
where it doesn't even occur to me that people are persecuted because of their sexuality 
like that, to that extent. 
Many other responses in the focus groups also indicated surprise or disbelief about the 
fact that in some countries lesbians and gay men are tortured, imprisoned or killed 
simply for being lesbian or gay. (See analysis in Chapter 4). 
Employment Rights 
Employment rights, on the other hand yielded reasonably high levels of support in the 
questionnaire study, although they were not quite as well supported as basic personal 
freedoms and political rights. For example, around 83% of respondents agreed that 
"there is never a situation in which someone's homosexuality should be a cause for job 
discrimination"; nearly 72% that "the partner of a lesbian or gay male employee should 
be entitled to the same spousal benefits as a married or defacto partner of a heterosexual 
employee"; and 78% agreeing that it is "appropriate for lesbians and gay men to serve 
in the an-ned forces". Whilst levels of support for these issues are still reasonably high. 
they indicate that a sizeable proportion (between 17% and 28%) of respondents did not 
agree with the extension of employment rights, including the right to serve in the an-ned 
forces, to lesbians and gay men. 
Likewise, in the focus groups, employment rights were also reasonablý, well 
supported. However, in contrast with basic rights and freedoms and political rights, 
these issues yielded an array of considerations as to why employment rights may not be 
extended to lesbians and gay men. The types of considerations raised here broadly fall 
into three main categories: first. other people's prejudices take precedence oý-er lesbian 
and gay hurnan rights (e. g. employers andlor colleagues are homophobic; 
homosexuality is not condoned in relig . on. the presence of homosexuals will affect the ZP I 
morale of heterosexual employees. and prejudice is a fact of life): second, lesbians and 
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gay men as inadequate or deviant (e. g. lesbians/gav men are a secuntv risk-: being 
homosexual affects how you interact with others; lesbjans'gay men are preoccupied 
with sex); third, pragmatic issues (e. g. lesbians gay men would be sharing don-nitories 
with people of the same sex, whereas heterosexuals are prevented from sharing with 
people of the opposite sex). Although these views were (on the whole) not presented as 
the personal views of focus group participants, they draw on culturally available 
arguments based on common stereotypes about lesbians and gay men. 
Levels of support for employment rights for lesbians and gay men appear to be 
slightly lower than in other comparable studies. For example, recent studies have 
reported 93% (Annesley & Coyle, 1995), 88% (Maney & Cain, 1997), and 75'o 
(D'Augelli, 1989a) of respondents agreeing that "there is never a situation in which 
someone's homosexuality should be a cause for job discrimination", and 96% (Klamen 
et al., 1999) agreeing that "homosexuals should have equal opportunity employment". 
However, these differences may (at least in part) be due to sampling differences 
between studies. With the exception of DAugelli's (I 989a) study, the results of which 
more closely resemble those in the present study, these studies have been undertaken on 
highly educated professionals, such as clinical psychologists (e. g. Annesley & Coyle, 
1995), preservice teachers (e. g. Maney & Cain, 1997); and medical students (e. g. 
Klamen et al., 1999). It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that the views of these 
individuals are more supportive of employment rights for lesbians and gay men than a 
convenience sample of mainstream psychology undergraduates, in that they are more 
likely to have encountered lesbian and gay issues in a professional context, especially in 
relation to equal opportunities policy and ethics of practice. 
On the other hand, many of the students who participated in the present research 
were recruited from courses on "human sexuality" or "gender and sexuality" and had, 
therefore, been exposed to lesbian and gay issues. Whilst it would be expected that as a 
consequence of their increased knowledge of lesbian and gay issues, they might hax. -C 
more positive views, this appears not to be the case. One possible reason that support 
for employment issues was not as strong as for basic personal freedoms, may be that 
respondents were not axvare of the extent to which employment discrimination against 
lesbians and gay men exists. This was evident in some of the focus group data. For 
example, Pam's response "and that happens does it? " when I asked "what do you think 
of people losing their jobs or being fired for being lesbian or gay'. ). 1 suggests that Pam 
was una,,, %-are that scxual orientation discrimination in the workplace is as prevalent as is 
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documented in Chapter 1. Ignorance in relation to employment discrimination. thou(yh. 
is perhaps not entirely surprising in that it is commonly assumed that because equal 
opportunities policies exist in most workplaces. discrimination does not occur. It is also 
commonly assumed that equal opportunities policies 'protect' lesbians and gay men 
from discrimination, whereas this is not necessarily the case: like human n(, Yhts 
declarations and treaties, equal opportunities policies do not necessarily explicitly 
include lesbians and gay men, leaving policy open to abuse. 
Social Rights 
Social rights, on the other hand, evoked the lowest levels of support of all the issues 
covered in the questionnaire and discussed in the focus groups. Whilst 79% of 
questionnaire respondents agreed that "it should be acceptable for lesbian and gay 
couples openly to express their affection for their partners in public without fear of 
harassment or violence" (a freedom of expression issue), support for other social rights 
issues was considerably less. For example, just over 55% of respondents agreed that 
"books promoting lesbianism and gay male homosexuality as a positive lifestyle should 
be freely available in school libraries"; only 49% that "university modules... should 
explicitly include lesbian and gay male perspectives"; and only 48% disagreed that 
"'society has a right to prevent lesbians and gay men who want to speak in schools from 
actively promoting homosexuality as equivalent to heterosexuality" (education and 
access to information issues). Likewise, whilst just over 63% of respondents agreed that 
"lesbian and gay couples should be legally pennitted to marry", only around 47% of 
respondents agreed that "lesbian and gay couples should have all the same parenting 
rights as heterosexuals". 
On the whole, the relatively low levels of support for social rights in the present 
research is surprising, given levels of support in previous studies. Support for same-sex 
marriage, and for the inclusion of lesbian and gay perspectives in schools was 
considerably higher in Malaney et al's (1997) research than in this study, with 83% 
agreeing that "junior high sex education classes should include information about being 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual", and 89% agreeing that "gays. lesbians, and bisexuals should 
haw the legal right to get married. Howcver, in another study (Maney & Cain, 1997). 
only -52% of pre-ser\-ice teacher trainees 
indicated that they felt "comfortable" teaching 
about gay and lesbian family units. Similarly, a relatively recent public survey in the US 
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(Elam, Rose, & Gallup, 1996) found that only 34% of respondents supported the 
teaching of homosexuality as an acceptable alternativc lifestyle. 
On the other hand, the level of support for lesbian and gay parenting has vanc(I 
considerably from one study to another. Whilst only around 470 o of respondents in the 
present study agreed that lesbians and gay men should have all the same parenting 
rights as heterosexuals, in other studies between 25% (Maney & Cain, 1997) and 781"o 
(Malaney et al., 1997) of respondents agreed with the idea of lesbians and gay men 
adopting children. Therefore, levels of support for lesbian and gay parenting in the 
present research were within the range of previous studies, although a little lower than 
for Annesley and Coyle's (1995) UK study, where 64% of respondents agreed that 
"lesbians should be allowed to adopt children", and 63% that "lesbians should have the 
same access to artificial insemination [sic] as heterosexuals". 
In the focus groups, social rights were generally supported, but these issues 
evoked a wide array of potential considerations against the extension of human rights to 
lesbians and gay men. Discussions around social rights were dominated by concerns 
around the care and protection of children, and were raised in connection with 
lesbians/gay men showing affection in public (e. g. children asking embarrassing 
questions; children being converted into homosexuals), the inclusion of lesbian and gay 
perspectives in schools (e. g. children are not mature enough to discuss the issues; 
children being converted to homosexuality), and lesbian and gay parenting (e. g. children 
needing a mother and father figure; children being bullied; the children of lesbian/gay 
parents being recruited to homosexuality, psychological damage to children who are the 
off-spring of anonymous sperm donors). As highlighted in Chapter 5, 'care and 
protection' arguments have commonly been invoked in debates around lesbian and gay 
rights issues (see also Clarke, 2000, in preparation; Clarke, Kitzinger, & Potter, 2000 in 
preparation). 
Like employment rights though, arguments around lesbians and gay men as 
inadequate or deviant (e. g. homosexuality as not normal, lesbians/gay men cannot 
reproduce as a couple; lesbians/gay men as promiscuous and unable to maintain Ion(-F- 
terrn relationships), other people's homophobic prejudices (e. g. poorly informed and 
hornophobic teachers; lesbian'gay affection in public as offensivc to some members of 
the public); and pragmatic issues (e. g. how and where to fit lesbian and gay ssues in an 
already packed curriculum) wcre also raised as potential reasons for not extending 
social rights to lesbians and gay men. 
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E, - Lquality and the Age of Consent 
As indicated in Chapter 5. arguments against equalising the age of consent for sex 
between men to the same as that for heterosexuals, invoked arguments commonly 
employed to argue against lesbian and gay human rights for a whole range of issues. 
Whilst just over 66% of questionnaire respondents (in Chapter 3) agreed that "the Li oe at 
which male homosexual sex is considered legal should be the same as that for 
heterosexual sex", in the focus group discussions, arguments about the care and 
protection of children (e. g. girls mature faster than boys; 16 year olds are not mature 
enough to have sex; older men will sexually exploit young boys) ýN'ere raised as 
potential considerations for not lowering the age of consent from 18 to 16. In the case 
study of Hansard reports from the age of consent debate (Chapter 5), care and protection 
arguments were one of three dominant arguments invoked against positive change, the 
others being principles of democracy (i. e. the majority don't want the change) and 
principles of right and wrong (i. e. homosexuality is morally wrong/sinful/unnatural). In 
addition, arguments about health issues (e. g. AIDS; physical danger of anal intercourse) 
and demands for further rights (e. g. marriage; parenting rights) for lesbians and gay men 
if the age of consent was reduced, were also invoked. 
Summary ofResponse Patterns 
The findings of this study showed that support for lesbian and gay human rights was not 
uniform. Support for basic human rights ranged from 89% to 97%, support for 
employment rights from 72% to 90%, and for social rights from 47% to 63%. 
With the exception of social rights, most other issues were opposed by less than 
10% of respondents. Likewise, when asked about sense of personal responsibility for 
creating positive social change, only around 6% of respondents gave responses which 
suggested that they opposed lesbian and gay human rights. Whilst in the questionnaire 
study, levels of support were substantially stronger for some issues than for others, 
levels of opposition were not nearly as diverse. A closer investigation of response 
patterns indicated that for many issues, especially for social issues, a large proportion of 
respondents (up to 360 0) gave 'unsure' or 'neutral' responses. For example, 3()Oo of 
respondents were unsure/neutral as to whether lesbians and gay men should be granted 
asylum rights, 27% as to whether books positively portraying lesbian and glay lifestyles 
should freely be available in school libraries, and 30% xN, hether lesbian and gay couples 
should have all the same parenting rights as heterosexuals. 
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These findings appear to suggest that whilst lesbian and gay human rights were 
not uniformly supported to the same degree, they were not overxvhelminglý- opposed 
either. The sizeable proportion of unsure/neutral responses seems to indicate some 
degree of support, but with reservations: many of these reservations ", vere explicated in 
the focus group discussions. This base of support is encouraging. as it is indicative that 
there is sufficient support around which to mobilise a political strategy for positiVe 
social change. 
Responsibility for creating positive social chang 
The findings associated with students' self-perceived responsibility for creating positive 
social change for lesbians and gay men (based on Section B of the questionnaire) also 
suggested a lack of support for lesbian and gay human rights. Whilst just under two 
thirds of respondents viewed themselves as in some way responsible for helping to 
create positive social change, fewer than half indicated a willingness to be actively 
involved in helping to create that change. Although the qualitative responses indicated 
roughly a 50: 50 split between those who viewed themselves as in some way responsible 
for helping to create positive social change, and those who did not, a detailed analysis of 
the responses suggested that predominantly, respondents did not view themselves as 
responsible for creating positive social change. The 50% of respondents who did view 
themselves as responsible for creating positive social change, perceived their role as 
comprising small individual actions (i. e. holding positive personal views; encouraging 
positive views in their children), rather than large-scale, collective political action (e. g. 
actively challenging homophobic remarks; attending gay marches). Overtly non- 
supportive responses, on the other hand, were characterised by a disinterest in, 
pessimism about, or moral prohibition of lesbian and gay human rights. 
Likewise, in the focus group discussions, there were only three incidences of 
respondents recognising the need to take some action in order to contribute to social 
change. Typically, the focus group discussions were characterised by the assumption 
that social change is something which 'just happens' vvith the passing of time, thus 
respondents appeared to construe social change as having no need of an agent. Limited 
support for lesbian and gay human rights through political action was therefore evident 
in the questionnaire responses, and reinforced to some extent in the focus group 
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discussions: as one respondent stated "it's not a case of not wanting to change the 
attitudes but not wanting to be the one who had to do it" (Fiona, FG 2). 
These findings are consistent with those of other studies which suggest a lack of II- 
self-perceived responsibility for ensuring human rights. For example, as highlighted in 
Chapter 2, studies on attitudes towards human rights (e. g. Diaz-Veizades et al., 1995. 
Doise et al., 1994; Macek et al., 1997) have concluded that most respondents view the 
enforcement of individual human rights as the responsibility of governmental 
institutions, rather than themselves. In Macek et al. 's (1997) study, the majority of 
respondents did not believe that they could contribute to the implementation of an,,,, of 
the articles of the UDHR, whilst of Doise et al. 's (1994) respondents, almost two thirds 
considered that none of the human rights issues concerned them personally. 
Similarly, studies of political action have suggested (to some degree) a lack of 
responsibility for helping create positive social change. For example, in Malaney et al's 
( 1997) study, respondents were asked 
if you witnessed one or more students making derogatory remarks about or otherwise 
verbally harassing a student because they assumed he or she was gay, lesbian or 
bisexual, what would you do first'? 
Although many respondents did indicate that they would take some action (e. g. report it; 
intervene directly), 31% said they would do "nothing". 
Overall , it would appear that in the present thesis, participants in both the 
questionnaire and focus groups did not view themselves as agents of positive social 
change (at least not in relation to lesbian and gay issues). Although the findings do not 
suggest overwhelming apathy for creating positive social change, and indeed at least 
half the questionnaire respondents saw themselves as responsible for creating positive 
change (albeit often in very small ways), the findings showed that respondents did not. 
in general, see themselves as active agents of positive social change. 
Reasoning about Lesbian and Gay Human Rights 
'Reasoning' (the way people think, talk. and argue) about lesbian and gay issues was 
explored in the moral development task, the focus group discussions, and the a(-, e of 
consent data. This section xvill summarise the findings of these studies in relation to (1) 
-)0, ý 
human rights reasoning in thinking and talking about lesbian and gay issues. and (2) 
arguments against lesbian and gay human rights. 
Human rights reasoning in thinking, and talking about lesbian and gay issues 
The findings of the moral reasoning study showed that when presented with lesbian and 
gay human rights issues, people find liberal arguments about individual rights. relatl\'e 
values, and the maintenance of the current social structure, more persuasive comincingy 
than human rights arguments. Human rights (stage six) arguments were generally less 
favoured than other types of arguments. However, human rights arguments were 
favoured more than stage I (avoidance of punishment) and stage 3 (interpersonal 
conformity; 'being good') arguments. Although respondents tended to be inconsistclit in 
their reasoning across dilemmas, and across the pro and con position for each dilemma, 
stage two (individualism, instrumental purpose and exchange), four (maintenance of 
social order, respect for authority), and five (social contract) arguments were 
consistently selected as the most acceptable arguments for thinking about lesbian and 
gay issues. 
An analysis of the focus group transcripts suggested that to some degree, 
participants used the language of human rights or drew on human rights concepts when 
discussing lesbian and gay issues, although they seldom used the phrase 'human rights' 
itself. Participants used human rights principles, such as 'equality for all', 'freedom of 
expression', and referred to parity between lesbian and gay issues and race issues. 
However, despite being able to employ human rights concepts and/or language when 
talking about lesbian and gay issues, they did not consistently use a human rights 
framework in their talk. Typically, rights-based arguments were interspersed between 
talk drawing on other frameworks (e. g. personal preference; current social frameworks), 
and arguments against human rights predominantly characterised by non-nghts-based 
reasoning. 
The analysis of Hansard and newspaper reports showed that opponents of 
change argued against human rights, by invoking principles of right and wrom-, (e. g. 
homosexualitv is sinful /unnatural arnoral), principles of democracy (e. g. the majontv 
are not in favour of change), principles of care and protection (e-_g- young men are not 
mature enough to engage in homosexual behaviour. predatory older men), health risks 
AIDS; anal intercourse as dangerous) and arguments around allowing one change 
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would lead to demands for further rights (,, vedges and slippery slopes). Simllarly. 
arguments around care and protection, and principles of right and wrong NA-ere 
highlighted by focus group participants as potential considerations against the extension 
of human rights to lesbians and gay men. In arguing against lesbian and gay human 
rights, then, people appear to employ arguments derived from non-rights-based 
frameworks, rather than arguing directly with a human rights perspective. 
In summary, it would appear that in reasoning (thinking, talking, and arguing) 
011-. about lesbian and gay human rights issues, people sometimes employ human rights 
reasoning, but predominantly draw on frameworks which are not rights-based. In 
particular, as highlighted by the results of the moral dilemma task, and supported by the 
focus group and age of consent data, people predominantly draw on arguments 
consistent with relativism and social contract (stage five) based reasoning, such as 
majority viewpoints, principles of right and wrong, care and protection, and health 
issues. 
The fact that participants in the present research tended only to use human rights 
reasoning intermittently is not entirely surprising, in that a human rights perspective is 
not the dominant framework used in public and psychological discourse for talking 
about lesbian and gay issues. Until relatively recently, lesbian and gay issues were not 
promoted as human rights issues in political and public debate. Even though recent 
political debates in the UK around lesbian and gay rights issues (e. g. the Age of 
Consent; Section 28; gays in the military) have been promoted as human rights issues, 
media coverage has overwhelmingly focused on opposition to positive social change, 
which (as illustrated by the analysis of the Age of Consent data in Chapter 5) has almost 
exclusively comprised non-rights-based reasoning. Likewise, as explicated in Chapter 2, 
lesbian and gay 'affirmative' psychology has relied on arguments which are not rights- 
based (especially mental health issues) to argue for positive social change, 
individualising (rather than politicising) lesbian and gay oppression. Therefore, the 
findings of this study suggest a strong similarity between lay and psychological theory 
about lesbian and gay issues, psychological theory therefore having an important 
influence on lay attitudes and reasoning (this is explored further in the next section). 
I 
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Arguments against Lesbian and Gay Human Rights 
There are striking similarities in the arguments used against lesbian and gay human 
rights in all three studies. The analysis of the moral dilemma task presented in Chapter _I 
suggested that stage five (social contract) arguments were one type of reasoning 
prioritised over human rights (stage six) arguments when thinking about lesbian and gaý 
issues. Stage five arguments are characterised by a relativist perspective in ýN'hich the 
right to life is not negotiable, but all other rights are subject to negotiation, and agreed 
upon in terms of what is in the interests of the majority ("the greatest good for the 
greatest number") as part of a social contract. Therefore, from a stage five perspective, 
fteedoms may be limited by a given society when they are incompatible with the 
interests/beliefs of others (Kohlberg, 1981,1984; Langford, 1995). Consistent with this, 
the focus group discussions and the age of consent debates produced two key arguments 
consistent with this framework: first, arguments about democracy and majority 
prejudice (e. g. the majority of the population are opposed to the proposed changes) and 
second moral prohibitions, or principles of right and wrong (e. g. homosexuality is a sin; 
assisted reproduction services are not natural). 
The flip-side to rights, is obligations. According to Kohlberg (198 1) from a 
stage five (social contract) perspective, obligations are defined in terms of a "rational 
concern for the welfare of others" (p. 216). Arguments consistent with this notion were 
prevalent in the focus group discussions and Age of Consent debates. For example, in 
talking about lesbian and gay parenting, focus group participants raised many concerns 
pertaining to the welfare of the children (e. g. children need both a mother and a father 
figure; a child may be psychologically damaged if he/she finds out their father was a 
sperm donor) as potential reasons why lesbians and gay men should not be afforded the 
right to parent children. Likewise, in the Age of Consent debates, arguments around 
care and protection (e. g. older men preying on young boys; teenage boys are not mature 
enough to make their own decisions) and health issues (e. g. young men will be at 
greater risk of contracting diseases; anal intercourse is a risky sexual practice) took 
precedence over human rights arguments. Therefore, arguments about the alleged 
welfare needs/interests of others are priontised oý-er those of lesbians, and gaý- men, 
when considering lesbian and gay human rights issues. 
In addition, stage five reasoning was also evident in the data pertaining to 
support for lesbian and gay human rights. The key trend observed in this data was that 
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basic rights issues (e. g. the right to life, liberty, and security of person) were much more 
strongly supported in the questionnaire responses (Chapter 3). and more frequentlY 
talked about (unproblematically) as human rights issues in the focus group discussion', 
(Chapter 4), whereas other issues, especially social issues, were much less well 
supported, and infrequently referred to as human rights issues. This too is consistent 
with a stage five perspective, in that according to Kohlberg's theory. issues concerning 
life and liberty are considered non relative, and therefore to be "upheld in any society 
and regardless of majority opinion" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 175; see Figure I Chapter 21), 
whilst other rights issues are open to negotiation. 
Although reasoning about lesbian and gay human rights issues in the present 
research was dominated by arguments from a liberal -rel ativi st framework characteristic 
of stage five of the Kohlbergian model, there were also examples of stage two 
(individualism, instrumental purpose, and exchange) reasoning in the qualitative 
responses from the questionnaire study and stage four (maintenance of social order) 
reasoning in the Age of Consent debates. Stage two reasoning entails acting to meet 
one's own interests, and only acting in the interests of others if there is some personal 
gain from doing so (see Kohlberg, 198 1). This type of reasoning was most evident in 
the questionnaire responses, where a large proportion of respondents claimed no 
responsibility for creating positive social change for lesbians and gay men because "it 
does not concern me" (R 6); "It is not my problem" (R 65); "1 see the lesbian and gay 
issue as irrelevant to my life" (R 182). These type of responses typify stage two 
reasoning, in that they suggest that action should only be taken if the issues are in some 
way relevant to oneself. 
On the other hand, in the age of consent debates, some opponents of change 
argued that lowering the age of consent would result in demands by lesbians and gay 
men that they be afforded other rights. These 'wedges and slippery slopes' arguments 
characterise stage four reasoning, in that they orient towards maintainiiig the existing 
social order by not affording further rights to lesbians and gay men. 
With respect to arguments against lesbian and gay human rights. the findings of 
the present research appear to concur with the writing of at least some others (e. (,,. 
MacKinnon, 1992; Samar, 1994). The majority of work exploring opposition to lesbian 
and gav rights havc focused predominantly on religious perspectives. and argurnents 
around what is 'natural', 'non-nal', or 'sinful' (e. g. Halstead & Lewicka, 1998; Pronk, 
I "). Although the findings reported in this thesis showed principles of right and 99-1 
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wrong (e. g. arguments that homosexuality is unnatural, not non-nal, and is sinful) Nvei-c 
one type of argument used to oppose lesbian and gay human rights, a range of other 
arguments were also used, with principles of care and protection being a dominant 
theme, especially in relation to social rights. 
Congruent with the findings of the present study, Samar ( 1994) suggests a 
number of typical arguments proffered in favour of discrimination against lesbians and 
gay men, including the need to exclude those groups that the majority deems 'deviant' 
in order to maintain social stability and do what's best for the overall good of society 
(as defined by dominant values), to avoid undermining morality, and to protect children 
from 'harmful' role models. These principles define a social contract perspective, and 
closely relate to the arguments about (majority) principles of right and wrong, and 
principles of care and protection, which both emerged as strong themes in the focus 
group and age of consent data. Samar (1994) also suggests that lesbian and gay rights 
issues are often opposed because they open the door to affinnative action programs, 
which closely relates to the 'wedges and slippery slopes' arguments raised in the age of 
consent debates, and characteristic of the stage two reasoning favoured in the moral 
dilemma task. 
Overall, the findings of this series of studies suggest that human rights (stage 
six) reasoning is not the dominant discourse used for arguing for lesbian and gay human 
rights, and rights-based arguments are seldom employed to argue against lesbian and 
gay human rights. Instead, people predominantly draw on arguments around existing 
social structures, including concern for the welfare of others, following majority 
interests (stage five), and obeying existing laws (stage four), and doing what's in one's 
own personal interests (stage two) when thinking about social change. Following on 
from these findings, the next section will highlight the implications of these findings, 
particularly in the arenas of education and structural change. 
Implications of the Present Research - Where to from Here? 
Essentially the findings presented in this thesis suggest that people do not uniformly 
support lesbian and gay rights as human rights. However, the majority of students in the 
present research seem to support lesbian and gay human nghts, at least to some degree. 
In the qLicstionnaire, some n(-Ihts were almost unanimously supported. whilst others 
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received lower levels of support. Likewise. in the focus group discussions. participants 
did employ nghts-based arguments in favour of lesbian and gay human rights. but also 
explored the practical limitations of them. In this section, some of the implicatioils of 
these findings will be discussed, particularly in relation to structural change and human 
rights education, with a view to facilitating positive social change for lesbians and gay 
men. Structural change will first be considered, followed by human rights education. 
Increasing Support and Changing Attitudes Through Structural Change 
A major contribution of the present research is that it highlights the dominance of 
existing social structures as a key basis upon which people make decisions about 
support for specific lesbian and gay human rights issues. The analysis of the moral 
dilemma task showed that social contract (stage five) reasoning and an adherence to 
existing laws and agreed duties (stage four reasoning), as underpinning support for 
lesbian and gay human rights, especially social issues. In particular, when assessing the 
moral dilemmas (Chapter 3), people favoured arguments about equality, but in relation 
to "restoring equal opportunity policy", effecting change by going through the "legal 
channels available", and "the law" protecting people fTom discrimination. Similarly, in 
the age of consent debates, arguments around democracy (i. e. majority opposition), and 
maintaining the existing social structure ("wedges and slippery slopes"), as well as 
arguments consistent with this framework (e. g. the duty of care and protection of 
children; health issues) were central to decisions about lesbian and gay human rights 
issues. Since people appear to draw strongly on existing structural frameworks when 
reasoning about lesbian and gay issues, it would seem that structural change (socio-legal 
changes) is of urgent concern, in that changes in attitudes are more likely to follow 
structural change, rather than precede it. 
As highlighted by those arguing for the equalisation of the age of consent, it has 
often been necessary for legislative change to lead public opinion. For example, if 
majority opinion had been followed in relation to issues such as the legalisation of 
abortion and contraception, or implementing racial or gender equality laws, these issues 
too would most likely be subject to the same difficulties faced by those fighting for 
equality for lesbians and gay men now. In the current research, issues backed (at least to 
, some extent) 
by legislation or policy were well supported, whilst rights opposed b,, 
leolslation were much less Nvell supported. For example, although lesbians and gay men ýt' - 
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are not explicitly protected from discrimination in UK employment legislation. an 
increasing number of businesses and organisations are including sexual orientation in 
their non-discrimination policies, and a few (e. g. British Ainý-ays. Microsoft 
Corporation, Disney) have begun to recognise lesbian and gay couples for partner 
benefits. Consistent with this, equal employment rights issues were reasonably Nvell 
supported exceeding 80%, whilst support for partner benefits Ný-as a little IoNN'er at 
around 71%. On the other hand, issues where legislation and policy actively 
discriminate against lesbians and gay men - e. g. the age of consent, lesbian and gay 
perspectives in schools, parenting rights, marriage - were less well-supported: 66% (age 
of consent), 49%-55% (lesbian and gay perspectives in schools), 48% (parenting rights), 
and 63% (marriage). 
In the light of this, it would seem that there is a pressing need for the social 
rights of lesbians and gay men to be explicitly recognised in legislation, and the removal 
of existing discriminative legislation. Key structural change in the UK might well 
include the following: 
The Repeal of Section 28 in England, Wales and Northern Ireland; and 
the mandatory inclusion of lesbian and gay perspectives in Education. 
" The extension of marriage to same sex couples, with all the legal rights 
currently afforded married heterosexual couples (e. g. partner benefits in 
employment; recognition of partnerships for the purposes of 
immigration; accession rights; and parenting rights). (cf. "Dutch Senate 
approves Lesbian and Gay Marriage", 2001) 
" The introduction of specific legislation affording lesbian and gay couples 
the same parenting rights as heterosexual couples (including access to 
Assisted Reproductive Services). 
" Legal protection from employment discrimination for lesbians and gay 
men. 
The introduction of sexual orientation/preference as a social category 
recognised for asylum. 
The legal protection of lesbians' and gay men's rights to freedom of 
expression, and access to information (e. g. making books and resources 
positivcly portraying lesbian and gay lifestyles freely available in 
-) I Z, 
libraries; allowing lesbian and gay persons and their advocates to speak 
openly about lesbian and gay issues in schools and publicl ý-- funded fora). 
In terms of enhancing positive attitudes towards the social rights of lesbians and gay 
men, these would appear to be key issues for structural change. 
Whilst it is important to ensure that all specific human rights are respected, the 
two issues which might be considered priorities for facilitating widespread social 
change are education and marriage. First, marriage is important because marriage (as it 
is currently constituted in most societies) automatically affords a couple a whole range 
of other rights: partner benefits, international recognition for the purposes of 
immigration, property rights following the death of one's partner, and parenting rights. 
Therefore, legally permitting same-sex couples to marry would address a number of 
other rights issues currently denied same-sex couples. Second, education is important 
because the existence of Section 28 means that current provision of lesbian and gay 
perspectives, in schools particularly, denies lesbian and gay young people their right to 
freedom of expression and access to infori-nation through the erasure and denial of 
lesbian and gay culture and existence. To be truly democratic education needs to 
acknowledge the worth of all 'cultures' or 'worldviews', including those of lesbians and 
gay men, but in order to do so, potential legal restraints (e. g. Section 28) need first to be 
removed. In addition, education is a vehicle by which positive social change can occur 
(This issue is followed up in detail in the next section of this chapter). 
In order to ensure that lesbians and gay men are afforded all their human rights, 
however, it would be desirable for structural change to be initiated through the 
institution of an umbrella type of legislation, rather than the more piecemeal approach 
currently favoured. For example, a recent article ("a cruel prejudice", 2000) suggests 
that the UK government should approach discrimination against lesbians and gay men 
as a single head-on battle by drafting and proposing a "Homosexual Equality Bill", 
based on the "Sex Discrimination Act". However, the institution of the (now legal) 
Human Rights Act would appear to be a much better approach. in that an umbrella law 
based on 'human rights', rather than 'sexual orientation', avoids having to engage 
(directly) with the types of arguments presented in this researcli when lesbian and gay 
issues are raised (e. g. whether same-sex relationships are natural; whether or not the 
majority of people approve of lesbian and gay relationships). at the same time providing 
the legislative backing to effect social change in relation to individual discni-ninator\, 
: io 
laws. Additionally, a human rights approach takes the focus away for lesbians and gay 
men, focusing instead on human beings, linking the fight for lesbian and gay human 
rights to the struggle of other marginalised groups, and legislation can be designed iii 
parallel to sex/race/disability discrimination. It therefore provides a better strategy for 
effecting positive social change across the racial, gender, and sexuality divide. 
Increasing Support and Changing Attitudes through Education 
As suggested by the focus group findings, one of the main barriers to positive social 
change is the prejudice of others towards lesbians and gay men (e. g. homophobic and 
poorly informed teachers; prejudiced employers or employees, religious and cultural 
opposition to homosexuality). Many of the practical limitations to lesbian and gay 
human rights discussed by focus group participants rely on heterocentr1c bias (e. g. the 
argument that homosexuality is not natural/non-nal) or ill-infon-ned stereotypes (e. g. 
homosexuals as child molesters and spreaders of disease; homosexuals as promiscuous, 
homosexuals as a security risk). These arguments, together with the patchy knowledge 
about human rights issues evident in the focus group discussions, would seem to 
suggest that education is an important means by which to raise awareness, increase 
support, and encourage political action for creating positive social change for lesbians 
and gay men. This section will discuss the implications of this thesis for first, human 
rights education, and second, lesbian and gay affirmative education. 
Human Rights Education 
Participants' apparent limited knowledge of the range and scope of issues encompassed 
by 'human rights' would appear to be an important consideration for education. 
Although the findings presented in this thesis suggest limited support for particular 
lesbian and gay human rights. what we cannot tell from these data is wIlcther this is 
specific to lesbian and gay human rights or whether it applies to human rights issues 
more generally (i. e. do people support social rights in general less than they support 
other rights, irrespective of individual differences such as sexual preference, race, or 
scx? ). Attitudes towards and reasoning about human rights in and of themsel\-es, and in 
relation to specific minority groups I ID minorities) (e. (T. ethnic, gender. sexual and religious 
haN e been undcr-rescarched. Nevertheless, what the findings of this series of studies do 
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suggest, is that even among highly-educated populations, whilst people are able to (and 
intermittently do) employ human rights reasoning, they do not apply it consistently 
across issues, nor do they perceive all human rights issues as such. Therefore, it would 
seem that some type of human rights education might be an appropnate prerequisite for 
positive social change. 
Although human rights education has infrequently featured on the education 
agenda, in 1978, following the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration. UNESCO 
highlighted "the need for teaching about human rights at all levels of education, 
including out-of-school settings" (UNESCO, 1978, p. 13). However, it would seem that 
since the 1970s, human rights education has largely been subsumed under the broader 
heading of 'moral education' and thus lost among other moral frameworks. Therefore, 
efforts to educate people about human rights need to explicitly focus on human n olits, 
and to promote specific issues of discrimination as human rights issues. So, for 
example, discrimination against lesbians and gay men needs to be publicly presented as 
a human rights issue, as some recent campaigns (e. g. Stonewall's "Equality 2000" 
Campaign - see http: //www. stonewall. org. uk/) have attempted to do. The high levels of 
support for basic personal freedoms in the present research suggest that social (e. g. 
lesbian and gay parenting; Section 28) and political issues (e. g. asylum) especially need 
to be publicised and promoted as human rights issues. 
However, to present issues of discrimination as human rights violations is not 
enough in and of itself, especially if people do not understand what human rights are. 
Therefore, it would be advantageous if the school curriculum included learning about 
what human rights are, and what they mean, not so much as in being able to repeat the 
Universal Declaration word for word, but to gain an understanding of why it was 
constructed, and what it contains. To do so, would both enhance people's understanding 
of the nature and scope of human rights, as much as to raise people's awareness about 
what constitutes human rights violation. People are much more likely to use rights- 
based talk if they understand the history and language of, and the concepts behind 
human rights (Alderson, 1999). 
An on-line library of resources and syllabi (e. g. United Nations, 1999; Amnesty 
International - International Secretariat, 1997) for Human Rights Education along the 
lines just outlined are freely available on the internet at the Human Rights Education 
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Associates (HREA)l webs1te (http:,,, výNw. hrea. org)- Similarly. many unlvers, tles and 
colleges offer modules/courses on "The History of Human Rights" (University of 
Montana), "The Concepts of Human Rights and its Definitions" (AI-Quds Open 
University, Jordan), and "Human Rights and Ethnic Minorities" (Utrecht Uni" er"it"', 
The Netherlands) (see the Human Rights Internet website: http: //wxN-xN,. Iiri. ca). In order 
to be able to promote lesbian and gay issues as human rights issues, we need to ensure 
that people understand and accept lesbian and gay issues as human rights issues. These 
type of Human Rights curricula could, therefore, not just educate people about human 
rights, but also explicitly include lesbian and gay perspectives alongside cultural and 
gender perspectives on human rights. 
In addition, future psychological research could usefully expand on the present 
research by exploring barriers to political action, both in relation to lesbian and gay 
human rights, as well as human rights more generally. However, the more immediate 
need is for education in human rights which facilitates political action. As a starting 
point, we need to aim for increasing people's level of support for lesbian and gay 
human rights to one which evokes outrage, rather than just disgust, apathy, or 
acceptance of discrimination against lesbians and gay men (and other minority groups). 
One of the difficulties, though, is how do we then promote political action" The results 
of the present series of studies is testimony that positive attitudes alone are not enough 
to effect political action, supporting the notion of a weak link between attitudes and 
action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). 
On a basis of the questionnaire responses on self-perceived responsibility of 
helping create positive social change, it would seem that there are two key principles 
around which to focus human rights education aimed at encouraging people to become 
agents of positive social change: 
1. Human rights violations against any group affect the human rights of all. 
2. Social change requires action. 
First, as the questionnaire responses indicated, the majority of those who sa,,, N- I 
themselves as not in any way responsible for creating positive social change. belle\ cd 
that lesbian and gay human rights --did not concern" or "were not relevant" to them. 
HRLA is an a-political [sic], non-profit organisation based in Anisterdarn and Cambridge. 
Massachussets. whose main aim is to support efforts aimed at introducing human nghts concepts and 
values into educational curricula and teaching practices. 
-119 
However, as highlighted in Chapter 1. human rights theory suggests that "if the human 
rights of any group are left behind. the human rights of all are incomplete" (Bunch. 
1996, p. viii). People are more likely to have a vested interest in actively working for 
positive social change if they can see some societal or global gain from doing so. 
Second, the perception of social change as something which 'just happens' (as 
suggested in the focus group discussions) or can be effected by merely holding posit1VC 
personal attitudes and never challenging prejudice (as suggested by many questionnaire 
respondents) also needs to be countered: People will not actively engage in creating 
positive social change if they believe it will happen without them doing anything. It is 
therefore important that educative strategies for facilitating positive social change 
include highlighting and reinforcing the way(s) in which historically social change has 
resulted from actions. In relation to lesbian and gay human rights, this could include 
making explicit the 'behind-the- scenes' work undertaken by campaigners such as 
Stonewall and Outrage! which resulted in the lowering of the age of consent, or the 
lifting of the ban on lesbians and gay men in the military. Often, the publicisation of 
major structural changes reinforces the idea that social change evolves (i. e. 
spontaneously occurs over time), by opaquely presenting the process of change, rather 
than explicitly highlighting the progression of events which led to change. 
In relation to the previous point, a number of questionnaire respondents did not 
see themselves as responsible for creating positive social change because they would 
have such a small effect, that their actions would be futile. Human rights education 
should therefore highlight the way in which it is often small actions which (collectively) 
result in positive change. That is, small localised action, repeated in many places can 
effect change on a much larger scale. However, in developing programmes aimed at 
encouraging people to become active agents of social change, the notion of action (i. e. 
public acts) needs to be made prominent: Having a positive personal attitude but never 
publicl challenging discrimination is insufficient to initiate the process of change. 
Recent approaches to moral education have suggested that political action may 
be initiated through a collective (Lind & Althof 1992) and contextualised (Alderson. 
1999, Rabow, Stein, & Conley, 1999) approach. Therefore, education for action might 
include a specific focus on creating positive social change for lesbians and gay men, and 
on encouraging collectiN, e strategies for localised action (e. &Y. Rabow. Stein, & Conley. 1 
1999). Guides to activism, such aslfakinu theMountain Move (Long. 2001) and Ple 
Loudet- we will Sing (AIUK. 1999) are a good place from wNch to begin human rights 
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education focused on action, the latter with specific reference to lesbian and gay human 
rights. 
Lesbian and Gay Affirmative Education 
In the psychological literature, lesbian and gay affin-native education has predominantly 
focused on changing attitudes through increasing contact with lesbians and oa-. " men 
(e. g. see Grack & Richman, 1996; Pratarelli & Donaldson, 1997), including lesbian and 
gay perspectives in sexuality education and professional training courses (Buhrke, 1989; 
Serdahely & Ziemba, 1984), inviting guest speakers (e. g. Geasler et al., 1995) and 
providing in-service training courses on lesbian and gay issues for teachers, counsellors, 
and social workers (e. g. Friend, 1993; Schreier, 1995). In light of the present findings, it 
would seem that in-service courses might be useful as a means of educating teachers, 
employers, and employees in lesbian and gay awareness: at least as a starting point. 
Whilst these approaches are an important means for raising awareness about 
lesbian and gay issues, they are merely a band-aid solution to the greater problem of 
societal prejudice. At best, they may change the attitudes of a small number of already 
receptive individuals, whilst those who are opposed continue to resist these efforts. It is 
not unheard of for people to withdraw their children from sessions in school when 
lesbian and gay issues are to be discussed, and in the workplace, to excuse themselves 
from lesbian and gay awareness training courses (e. g. see Peel, 2001). For those who do 
attend, and take on board the issues raised, conscientisation seldom exceeds a liberal 
'tolerance' or 'acceptance" of lesbians and gay men. However, this is a significant step 
on the ladder towards positive social change, even if the realisation of lesbian and gay 
human rights requires much more than this. 
On the whole, participants in the present research were not opposed to lesbian 
and gay human rights, but rather supported them up to a certain extent. Only around 61 o 
of questionnaire respondents expressed religious or cultural aversion to homosexuality 
when asked whether they saw themselves as responsible for helping to create positi%'e 
social change, and opposition to most questionnaire items was small (typically less than 
15010). The prognosis for lesbian and gay human rights is therefore reasonably 
optimistic. in that there would appear to be a sufficient base of support upon, -N, hich to 
build efforts to help create positive social change for lesbians and gay mcn. 
Regardless of the extent to which any individual participant supported lesbian 
and gay human rights, the focus group discussions suggested a number of practical 
limitations (e. g. issues of care and protection: principles of right and , Nýrong, prejudiced 
individuals) to the extension of human rights to lesbians and gay men, ýN-hich ýý-ere 
mirrored in the age of consent data as arguments against lesbian and gay human nights. 
In addition, there was some evidence in the focus group data to suggest that participants 
had a limited knowledge about discrimination against lesbians and gay men, and an 
incomplete perspective of the range of issues encompassed by human rights. If indeed 
people do have a limited knowledge of the extent to which the human rights of lesbians 
and gay men are violated, it would seem that what is needed is a wider awareness of 
lesbian and gay issues, problems, and rights in society generally. 
One of the problems, with existing educative measures is that they have tended 
to focus on attitudes towards lesbians and gay men, rather than on lesbian and gay 
issues themselves. For example, the climate based studies reviewed in Chapter 2 (e. g. 
D'Augelli, 1989a, 1989b, 1992; Eliason, 1996; Norris, 1991, and others) have tended to 
focus on both attitudes and actions towards lesbians and gay men, rather than taking a 
more holistic approach which incorporates attitudes towards and support for lesbian and 
gay issues more generally. Although the levels of support for lesbian and gay human 
rights (measured on the SLGHR) reported in this study ranged from moderate to very 
high, attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (measured on the ATLG-S) were 
overwhelmingly positive (in fact, there was a ceiling effect), suggesting that it may not 
be attitudes towards lesbians and gay men which are the main problem. The educational 
agenda might, therefore, more usefully focus on raising people's awareness of 
discrimination against lesbians and gay men, rather than promoting positive attitudes 
towards lesbians and gay men. The fact that the two were strongly correlated in this 
study might equally suggest that support for lesbian and gay human rights results in 
positive attitudes towards lesbians and gay men, as for positive attitudes towards 
lesbians and gay men resulting in increased support for lesbian and gay human nights. 
Results of the present study also seem to suggest that support is stronger for 
highly publicised human rights issues (e. g. basic personal freedoms) than for Xý, hat are 
considered 'lower level' rights (e. g. social rights). These findings therefore support the 
need for a broader education in both human rights and socio-political issues. around 
prejudice and discrimination, including the promotion of political discussion in the 
classroorn (Sotelo, 1997). This. together with an apparently limited knowledge of the 
III 
extent of discrimination against lesbians and gay men. would seem to suggest that in 
raising awareness about lesbian and gay human rights, there is a need for much more 
emphasis on highlighting the extent of discrimination against lesbians and men, 
especially in relation to the less 'visible', but more highly controversial. forms of 
discrimination (i. e. social rights). To do this, education practice might usefully include 
anecdotal material (such as that outlined in Chapter 1), statistics and ca-, se studies. to 
illustrate and highlight the extent of discrimination against lesbians and gay men. 
Perhaps more importantly, though, the differing levels of support for different 
human rights issues would appear to be a key issue for human rights education, and for 
research practice. Whilst the levels of support presented in this thesis are a major shift 
from the attitudes and values of previous generations, they are still a far cry from the 
'ideal' position where the human rights of lesbians and gay men around the world 
would be wholeheartedly respected and acknowledged. One of the key contributions 
which this research makes, is that it highlights the way in which certain issues are well 
supported, whilst others are not, and begins to identify some of the reasons for this. The 
relative lack of support for social issues, as opposed to basic personal freedoms and 
employment rights, suggests that the focus of efforts to promote lesbian and gay rights 
needs to be on increasing support for social rights to the level afforded basic rights and 
freedoms. 
One of the main problems, however, is the type of reasoning used to argue 
against the extension of specific social rights (e. g. marriage, parenting, and the inclusion 
of lesbian and gay perspectives in education) to lesbians and gay men. The dominance 
of concerns around the care and protection of children (based on the false assumption 
that lesbians and gay men are necessarily promiscuous or are child molesters) is 
especially problematic for creating positive social change, and therefore a key issue for 
education to address. 
Also problematic, is that the inclusion of lesbian and gay perspectives in the 
classroom has typically been seen as the inclusion of lesbian and gay issues in sex or 
sexuality education (in the school classroom), or lesbian and gay perspectives in niche 
modules, such as 'human sexuality' or 'gender studies' (in Higher and Further 
Education). As a result of this somewhat narrow conceptual 1 sation (evident in the focus 
group discussions), the inclusion of lesbian and gay perspectives in education has 
typically been equated xvith the discussion of sexual practices (as opposed to sexual 
identitv, culture. and history), resulting in diminished support for their inclusion. In the I 
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present research, only around 50% of respondents supported the inclusion of lesbian and 
gay perspectives in university courses, the provision of lesbian and gay literature in 
school libraries, and allowing lesbian and gay persons to speak openly about W 
homosexuality in schools. Furthermore, in the focus group discussions, when asked 
"what do you think about lesbian and gay issues being discussed in schools? " 
participants immediately equated this question with sex education, and when asked 
about inclusion in other subjects, few concrete suggestions were forthcoming,. 
In order to increase support for lesbian and gay human rights then, it is 
necessary for lesbian and gay lifestyles to be 'normalised' as part of the diversity which 
makes up society, and for the focus on sexual difference to be de-emphasised. Like the 
inclusion of racial and disability perspectives then, it is desirable that lesbian and gay 
perspectives are incorporated through an integrative, rather than segregated (or 
compartmental i sed) approach. So, in addition to inviting lesbian and gay speakers, or 
including a unit on lesbian and gay issues (approaches which may not only appear 
tokenistic, but which treat lesbians and gay men as a societal anomaly, thus reinforcing 
the notion of lesbians and gay men as deviant) - adding lesbians and gay men in - 
lesbian and gay perspectives need to permeate the whole curriculum in an age- 
appropriate manner (cf Petrovic, 1999). For example, in teaching about families, 
lesbian and gay families should be present alongside single-parent households, conjoint 
(or step-) families, extended families, and the nuclear family as equally valid 
organisations of family life. Similarly, (heterosexual) marriage need not be presented as 
the 'Ideal' arrangement around which family and social life is organised, but could be 
presented alongside households headed by one person (male or female) or two people 
(whether two women, two men, or a man and a woman). 
Furthermore, positive images of lesbian and gay people (including single people, 
couples, families, and other living arrangements) - that is, as well-adjusted people 
living 'non-nal' lives - need to be included in children's books and classroom resources 
alongside persons with disabilities and black persons. To do so would help to enhance 
support for lesbian and gay social rights, in that it would challenge prejudiced notions of 
lesbians and gay men as 'abnormal' or 'deviant', whilst at the same time addressing 
pragmatic concerns about lack of time and space in the curriculum: content is not being 
added, oN-cr and above the existing curriculum, but rather what is already there is being, 
enriched or cnhanced, in ways which respect the human rights of lesbians and gay men. 
Nevertheless. there is a danger that sucli an integrated (or normallsed) approach to 
lesbian and gay rights issues might result in lesbian and gay rights being subordinated 
or even overlooked, thus there is a need for lesbian and -, a%, issues to be explicitly raised 
within the context of existing curricula. 
In order to effect social change, however, 'education' also needs to extend 
beyond the formal setting of the classroom and into the wider world. Consequent] y. an 
integrative approach to increasing support for lesbian and gay human rights. also needs 
to be employed in society more generally: The popular media (teleNision, the internet, 
magazines, and the printed press) have a central role to play here. The media too need to 
focus on including more representative images of societal diversity, including realistic 
images of lesbians and gay men as well-adjusted, fully functioning human beings with 
regular, everyday lives. Until lesbians and gay men are depicted (positively) in the 
popular media as capable parents, competent workers, and happy well-adjusted 
individuals, support for lesbian and gay human rights (especially rights concerning the 
care and education of children) is unlikely to increase. The current lack of visibility 
perpetuates the myth that homosexuality is a private issue about sexual behaviour: It is 
therefore important that lesbian and gay identities and lifestyles are given positive 
public recogmition (Richardson, 2000; also cf, Perilla, 1999). 
Psychologists have also tended to marginalise lesbian and gay issues and 
perspectives (see Chapter 2). Since, the findings of this series of studies Indicated a 
strong relationship between lay attitudes and psychological theory, it would appear that 
a more well-rounded inclusion of lesbian and gay issues within psychology may be 
advantageous for improving attitudes. An agenda for the development of psychology to 
be more inclusive of lesbian and gay issues and perspectives might include positiVc 
representation of lesbian and gay perspectives in textbooks and in the classroom. and an 
official policy on the use of non-heterosexist language and practices (akin to that which 
governs the use of sexist language). These issues have been addressed to a much greater 
degree in the US, through the work of the APA and allied psychological bodies. The 
same needs now to happen in the UK (via the BPS) and elsewhere. 
As highlighted in this section, the inclusion of lesbian and gay perspectives in 
education (and in wider society) is essential for enhancing support for lesbi ian and -(, av 
hurnan rights. It is also crucial to the realisation of lesbian and gay human nAts. 
Writing of lesbian and gay perspectives in education from a human nghts perspective. 
Petrovic (1999) states 
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Not presenting any materials reflecting GLB is indefensible because this is not a rule or 
procedure that ensures recogrution, i. e. systematic exclusion is a betrayal of the principle of 
non-oppression. Presenting materials that portray homosexuality as a pathology. a 
perversion, an evil, or solely as a link to AIDS is similarly indefensible. Such inclusion 
promotes intolerance (attenuating any possible recognition) and is a form of cultural 
imperialism which restricts students' rational deliberation of competing ways of I Ire. the 
only defensible alternative here is positive systematic inclusion. (p. 205) 
Finally, therefore, the non-inclusion of lesbian and gay perspectives in education is not 
only a violation of lesbians' and gay men's rights to freedom of expression and access 
to infori-nation, but is a direct rejection of human rights by its systematic oppression of 
lesbians and gay men. 
Structural Change and Education: An Indivisible Partnership 
In summary, the findings of the set of studies presented in this thesis suggest the need 
for both structural change as well as human rights education as central to the 
advancement of lesbian and gay human rights. However, as highlighted in these two 
sections, positive social change requires a holistic approach, and therefore the two 
things go hand-in-hand. 
Likewise, in attempting to effect positive social change for lesbians and gay 
men, the findings of this thesis suggest that there is a need for human rights education in 
addition to lesbian and gay affirmative education. Consequently, lesbian and gay 
affirmative education should be considered an adjunct to human rights education, not a 
substitute for it; and might work most effectively if implemented in partnership with 
structural change both at a local and a global level. 
Reflecting Back: Towards an Evaluation of Theory and Method 
This section focuses on evaluating the theory and method used for the research. 
weighing up the benefits and pitfalls, and highlighting the limitations of the findnigs. 
This material will be presented in two sections, the first evaluating the theoretical 
frarnework of the research (i. e. a human rights approach), and the second evaluating its t4 
rnethodoloi, y- 
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Evaluating the Theory (i. e. a Human Rights Approach) 
As highlighted in Chapter 1, a human rights perspective has pro", -ed an important tool 
for achieving social justice for racial minorities and women, and has therefore been seen 
as very important in pursuing justice for lesbians and gay men (Helfer & Miller. 1996: 
Kaplan, 1997). Yet, as indicated in Chapter 2, psychologists have seldom employed a 
human rights perspective, much less in relation to lesbian and gay issues. Typically, 
within psychology, human rights have either been subsumed as a more morally 
developed way of thinking about moral issues (i. e. at stage 6 of a Kohlbergian model), 
or have been neutralised as mental health issues. This research, however, goes beyond 
these approaches, making human rights an explicit part of the investigation of attitudes 
and reasoning in relation to lesbian and gay issues. This section will evaluate a human 
rights approach, first by highlighting the advantages of a human rights approach, with 
specific reference to the present research, and then by looking at its limitations. 
Advantages of taking a human rights approach 
Rather than focusing on attitudes towards lesbians and gay men, as has been the case in 
homophobia studies (e. g. Douglas et al., 1985; Hudson & Ricketts, 1980; Schellenberg 
et al., 1999; Smith, 197 1), the present research focused on attitudes towards lesbian and 
gay issues - in this case human rights issues. Taking this approach enabled an 
examination of attitudes and reasoning (directly) in relation to existing social structures 
and potential social change. The findings of this series of studies showed a strong 
relationship between support for specific issues as human rights issues and existing 
legislation, with the most supported issues being backed by anti -di scri minati on 
legislation, and the least supported issues mapping onto existing discriminatory 
legislation. This research therefore took a dual approach to social change (i. e. focusilli, 
on individuals and society), as opposed to focusing solely on individual attitudes as the 
source of discrimination, and on changing attitudes at the individual level. Further, 
rather than simply documenting what attitudes people hold, the present research looked 
at why people held those views, how those N-ie,. N, s were manifested in a social context, 
and what type of arguments were used to promote or deny lesbian and gay human 
ngh ts. 
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By looking at arguments for and against lesbian and gay human rights. as well ýis 
levels of support, it was possible to identify strategies for effecting positiN e social 
change, with a view to preventing rather than 'curing' lesbian and gay oppression. For 
example, studies of hate crimes (e. g. Berrill, 1992: D'Augelli. 1992; Herek. 1990: 
Hetrick & Martin, 1987) and social climate (e. g. Eliason, 1996; Malanev et al.. 1997: 
Noms, 199 1), have tended to document incidences of homophobia, and explored the 
psycho-social consequences for lesbians and gay men, offering small-scale, postventiVe 
solutions to the problem of lesbian and gay oppression. In contrast, a human rights 
approach, such as that employed here, enables a focus on broader, societal (and global) 
structural changes together with educative measures aimed at the prevention of 
individual discrimination (rather than attempting to cure homophobia, or dealing with 
the psycho-social aftermath of oppression and discrimination). In this respect, a human 
rights approach is a direct path to social change. Whilst these other approaches can be, 
and sometimes have been, effective in advancing rights, they can be seen as 
diversionary, in the sense that they draw attention to non-rights based frameworks, 
which call into question the legitimacy of homosexuality (as non-nal, natural, moral, 
etc), rather than attending to rights afforded on a basis of being a human being (across a 
range of dimensions of oppression). 
Unlike other attitude studies (e. g. Herek, 1984; Maney & Cain, 1997) which 
have explored attitudes in relation to a limited range of lesbian and gay issues, this 
series of studies explored attitudes and reasoning in relation to the whole range of 
issues encompassed by human rights as constructed in human rights legislation. 
Taking a human rights approach meant working within a pre-existing structural 
framework (human rights), which is holistic in the sense that it explores attitudes 
and reasoning across the range of issues within that framework both individually, 
and as a whole, enabling links to be made between levels of support for (and types 
of reasoning about) specific issues, and existing social policy and social structure. 
Since the present research employed a human rights framework. human 
rights were made explicit. So, rather than ignoring stage 6 (human rights) reasoning. 
or at best de-emphasising it - the approach taken by the vast majont,, v of moral 
developmental researchers - this series of studies explicitly explored the extent to 
which (human) rIghts-based reasoning was employed when thinking and talking 
about lesbian and gay issues. In contrast Nvith traditional moral reasoning studies 
(e. g. Colby & Kohlberg. 1987. Lind & Wakenhut, 1985) then, this research enabled 
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an exploration of the complex way in which people reason about lesbian and (_'Lly 
human rights issues. Whereas the majority of work in the Kohlbergian and neo- 
Kohlbergian traditions has tended to explore (individually or collectively) moral 
development by allocating individuals to stages on a basis of their responses, the 
present research explored the types of reasoning used to think about and discuss 
lesbian and gay human rights issues, avoiding the more prescriptivc, fixed-stage 
approach which is typically used in research on moral reasoning (cf. Schwalbe & 
Staples, 1992). By combining the findings from the moral dilemma task and the 
focus group discussions, it was possible to explore the range of arguments used to 
think and talk about lesbian and gay human rights issues. In addition, the extent to 
which people changed, developed or modified the types of arguments they used 
within and across issues could also be explored. 
However, it is precisely the fact that human rights works within existing social 
frameworks which makes it potentially useful in working towards positive social 
change. In particular, one of the key strengths of a human rights perspective is that it is 
a universal framework, which can be applied to the study of prejudice and 
discrimination against any group/all groups, rather than compartmentali sing oppression 
into racism (oppression on the basis of race), sexism (oppression on the basis of sex), 
able-ism (oppression on the basis of dis/ability), and heterosexism (oppression on the 
basis of sexual orientation) etc. 
Limitations of a human rights approach 
Nonetheless, (and particularly as revealed in the focus group discussions), there are 
a number of limitations to a human rights framework. First, the findings of the focus 
group study suggest that many people do not understand a human fights approach. 
When asked to explain what is meant by human rights, they give halting 
explanations, suggesting an incomplete knowledge of human rights. In the focus 
group discussions., it was apparent that people were unaware of the range of issues 
encompassed by human rights, which is likely to contribute to the lack of support 
for sorne human rights issues, especially social rights. 
Furthermore, when lesbian and gay issues are explicitly presented as human 
ing arguments which are inconsistent with a rights. people argue against them us' I 
human fights framework. For example, the most direct argument against human 
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rights is to claim that lesbians and gay men are 'not human' (Richardson & Maý-. 
1999), an argument frequently used by opponents of positi%, e social change %\-hen 
human rights activists fight for lesbian and gay rights as human rights (e. L. Y. AIUK. 
1999). However, as we have seen in this series of studies, lay people and %. IPs (at 
least in the UK) argue against lesbian and gay human rights using a wide ranoc of 
arguments, including issues of care and protection, democracy (majonity rules), and 
existing prejudice to justify the denial of human rights to lesbians and gay men. It 
would seem then, that despite being a strong framework, a human rights approach is 
not as strongly supported or as widely used for thinking and reasoning about issues, 
as would be desirable to effect positive social change. 
Perhaps more importantly though, an individualised approach (such as a focus 
on homophobia, hate crimes, or climate) is a double-edged sword, in that it provides 
opponents of lesbian and gay rights with infort-nation which can be used against lesbians 
and gay men as 'evidence' of 'pathology' or 'deviance' (see Kitzinger, 1987 and Kitzinger 
& Perkins, 1993 for similar discussion). Whilst it is politically useful to document 
incidences of violence and discrimination, or psychosocial consequences, what is really 
needed is social change. It is not necessary to demonstrate that lesbians and gay men 
(and ethnic minorities, disabled people, etc) are disadvantaged or suffer mental health 
problems, in order for the rights of those people to be acknowledged. However, a 
human rights approach does not necessarily overcome this problem either. Whilst in 
theory it should be more expedient in creating positive social change, as we have seen, 
people do not consistently nor coherently argue lesbian and gay rights from a human 
rights standpoint, and when human rights arguments are explicitly presented in relation 
to lesbian and gay issues, people draw on a whole range of non-rights-based arguments 
to counter them. 
Another problem with a human rights framework, is that it is a liberal 
framework, and therefore is easily confounded with other liberal frameworks (including 
other rights-based frameworks). For example, as illustrated in Chapter 5. although 
proponents of change to the current age of consent promoted the issue from a human 
rights perspective, they tended to priontise the notion of 'equality' rather than other 
aspects of human rights. The problem with this, is that although a human rights 
approach to lesbian and gay issues does mean seeking equality for lesbians and gay men 
(but entails much more than this), equality is also inherent in other framcNvorks (c. g. 
civil rights). in which it has different implications for lesbian and gav human rights. For W 
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example, a civil rights framework is not al I -encompassing in the way that a human 
rights framework is, and civil rights are afforded on the basis of bein(i citizens (as ot 
opposed to human beings); legislation being the grounds on which rights are afforded 
individuals. Since so may laws discriminate against lesbians and gay men (either 
implicitly or explicitly), this is problematic for achieving positive social change. 
Similarly, as highlighted. in Chapter 5, in lay discourse 'equality' and 'equit. N" 
(or fairness) are used interchangeably. Consequently, injustices against lesbians and ga). 
men are approached from a perspective of 'sameness' (i. e. homosexuals are the same as 
heterosexuals), and therefore neutralised. Consequently, people's thinking about lesbian 
and gay issues comes from a standpoint of assuming a level playing field for 
lesbians/gay men compared with heterosexuals. Thus, the reliance of a human rights 
framework on the notion of equality is problematic, and is therefore disadvantageous for 
advancing lesbian and gay human rights, and promoting positive social change. On the 
other hand, as highlighted in Chapter 4, 'sameness' arguments are a good thing insofar 
as they show an orientation to rights-based thinking (i. e. suggest equality, or at least the 
need for empathy). 
Evaluating the Methodology 
This section explores some of the advantages and disadvantages of the methodologies 
employed in this thesis, in particular, highlighting the problems and difficulties 
encountered in carrying out each part of the research (and the extent to which these 
were successfully overcome). 
Questionnaire 
Attitude scales and psychometric tests have frequently been the objects of 
methodological criticism. However, in the present study, both the attitude scales 
(ATLG-S and SLGHR) and the psychometric test (moral dilemma task) - together as 
the substantive components of a large-scale questionnaire study - proved a useful 
foundation on which to ground the focus group and textual analyses. As the first larec- 
scale questionnaire studN, comprehensively investigating support for lesbian and gay 
human rights. and one of only a handful which have explored attitudes towards lesbian 
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and gay issues in a UK context, this study has made an important contribution to 
attitude research on lesbian and gay issues. 
In collecting a sample of student attitudes, the net was cast wide, resulting" in the 
return of bulk questionnaires from 14 universities as geographically dispersed as 
Northern Ireland and Scotland to the metropolitan centres of London and Bristol. 
However, despite the wide geographic distribution, and the inclusion of respondents 
from 14 different UK universities, return rates from these institutions varied from less 
than 10% through to 100%. In addition, although it was strongly recommended that 
distributors administer the questionnaires in class time, as indicated in Chapter 3, the 
actual distribution procedures varied from institution to institution. There would appear 
then potentially to be a considerable response bias, in that a majority of the 
questionnaires returned represent only those who were willing to engage with the 
material, and to take the time to complete the rather lengthy questionnaire. It is therefore 
likely that the sample obtained for this study is over-representative of those who 
perceive themselves to have reasonably liberal views, or those with strong views. 
The questionnaire sample was, however, ethnically diverse, including 
participants who self-identified as many categories of 'black' (i. e. Caribbean, Affican, 
British); a diverse range of Asian ethnicities (i. e. Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sni-Lankan, 
Mauritian, Anglo-Indian, Chinese, Iranian, and Japanese); and several 'other' ethnic 
groups, including Eurasian, Maori, and Slavonic. However, despite this diversity, only 
10% of the questionnaire sample comprised respondents identifying themselves as 
anything other than 'white'. Similarly, male respondents -a group typically reported to 
hold more negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (e. g. see D'Augelli, 1989: 
Donnelly et al., 1997; Klamen et al., 1999; Schellenberg et al., 1999) - were also 
underrepresented in the questionnaire sample. Consequently, the views presented in the 
questionnaire study (Chapter 3) may in fact be more positive than might otherwise ha,,., c 
been the case. 
Since distribution of questionnaires was predominantly undertaken by lecturers 
who had initially been approached because they either had teaching or research intel-csts 
in lesbian and gay psychology or allied areas (e. g. psychology of Nvomen: gender 
studies), or were members of the BPS Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section. 
questionnaires were mostly distributed to students in Psychology or Sociology courses. 
The gender and ethnic balance of the questionnaire sample therefore reasonably 
accuratel v reflects the gender and ethnic composition of these courses across UK 
2 3, -' 
universities, where males and non-ýhite students tend to be underrepresented: the 
questionnaire findings, therefore predominantly represent the -ý, 'iexvs of (young) NN-hite. 
female British students. 
In addition, as a student sample, the vieý, N's presented in the present thesis cannot 
necessarily be presumed to represent those of the wider population. Others (e. see 
Payaslyoolu & lgduygu, 1999; Sotelo, 2000a) have suggested that attitudes among 
university students tend to be more supportive than those usually found in the gencl-al 
population. However, the importance of exploring students' attitudes should not be 
underestimated, in that they represent the views of future generations. including 
professional psychologists, social workers, teachers, and employers. Overall, support 
for lesbian and gay human fights in the present sample was moderately high, although 
social fights issues were the least well supported, and whilst discussions about lesbian 
and gay issues tended to orient around non-rights-based arguments, human rights 
arguments were sometimes invoked. These findings therefore provide some positiVc 
indication for the future of lesbian and gay human rights, although there is still 
considerable scope for developing and promoting increased support for lesbian and gay 
issues as human rights issues. 
Careful consideration was given to the construction of the questionnaire, which 
for the present sample showed a high level of internal reliability ((x = 0.94) and good 
criterion validity, responses on the SLGHR being strongly correlated with those on the 
ATLG-S (r = 0.86, N=585, P<0.00 1 ). The questionnaire was therefore an effecti Ve 
measure for providing standardised responses about attitudes towards lesbians and gay 
men, and support for lesbian and gay human rights, and for allowing comparison with 
previous attitude studies. However, if the questionnaire were to be employed in future 
research, some minor adjustments would need to be considered. 
First, in Section B, the question "If lesbians and gay men are treated unjustly in 
our society, do you feel it is your personal responsibility to help create positiVc 
changes? " was accompanied by the quantitative response options 'most definitel)". 
'possibly', 'unsure/neutral', 'not usually', 'definitely not'. Although at the tirne of 
construction this scale appeared eveiily balanced around the 'unsure /neutral' midpoint, 
in many of the completed questionnaires, respondents selected the 'possibly' option, but 
i, ave qualitative responses which werc more cogent with other options. If this question 
was to be employed in future research of this tylic, consideration would need to bc 
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given to the labelling of scale points to ensure that the meanini-) of each option was 
clear, and the scale more evenly balanced. 
Second, during the analysis process it became evident that the collection of some 
other types of demographic details may also have been useful. For example. although 
respondents were asked for their religious affiliation, and whether they were members 
of any human rights organisations, they were not asked for their political affiliation: if 
indeed they had one, this may have had some bearing on responses to certain issues as 
studies have tended to show a strong relationship between political affiliation and 
attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (e. g. see Eliason, 1995). Likewise, many studies 
of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (e. g. Herek & Capitano, 1996; Klamen et al., 
1999; Millham. et al., 1976) have suggested that people who have lesbian or gay fiiends 
and/or family tend to have more positive attitudes than those who do not. The omission 
of a question asking whether respondents knew any lesbians and gay men is, therefore, 
an important oversight (particularly as focus group participants mentioned lesbian and 
gay acquaintances, suggesting that their relatively positive views resulted from 
increased contact with lesbians and gay men). 
The incorporation of a formally structured moral dilemma task into the 
questionnaire provided large-scale data concerning reasoning about lesbian and gay 
human rights, and acted as a preliminary investigation for contextualising the findings 
from the (comparatively smaller scale) focus group and textual studies. The inclusion of 
this measure was therefore beneficial, in that first, it allowed comparison between 
reasoning in this study with other studies of moral reasoning, and second, it enabled a 
large-scale investigation of the types of arguments prioritised when thinking about 
lesbian and gay issues. As an individualistic approach, then, the moral development task 
complemented the more contextualised approaches of focus groups and Hansard 
reports, which looked at the range of arguments used to reason about and argue against 
lesbian and gay human rights. Consequently, the outcome of the present series of 
studies point to the benefits of combining methodological approaches for exploring 
moral reasoning, in that an issue or problem may be explored from a range of different 
perspectives, in a more holistic investigation of reasoning in both isolated and social 
contexts. Whilst the study of moral issues/development using moral dilemillas might 
provide a baseline from NN-hich to explore attitudes, this approach falls to explore the 
ranoe of argurnents people use, shifts in the t,, pes of reasoning employed, and is devold 
of context (i. e. is highly structured and individualistic). Moral deN elopmental It, - 
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psychologists might therefore consider the benefits of using focus groups or culturally 
available texts either as an alternative to, or in conjunction with, traditional measures. 
when exploring moral issues and reasoning. 
By comparison with the attitude scales though, the moral dilemma task was 
fraught with problems. Despite having gone to considerable lengths to ensure the i-noral 
dilemma task was self-explanatory, comprehendable, and reasonably easy to complete 
(see Chapter 3), failure to complete the task, evidence of acquiescence (the tendency to 
select the mid-point for all or most items), and the time taken to complete this section of 
the questionnaire are worrying. This would seem to support the contentions of others 
(e. g. Kay, 1982; Sanders et al., 1995) that, despite being widely used, psychometric 
tests of moral reasoning are complex, and require considerable comprehension skills, 
calling into question their adequacy as a measure of moral development. Furthennore, 
of the 627 completed questionnaires returned, only 545 respondents had fully completed 
the moral dilemma task, resulting in a fairly high attrition rate (13%). Furthen-nore, of 
those who did not fully complete the task, some had not attempted it, whilst others had 
only partially completed the task, suggesting that respondents either had difficulty 
comprehending it, or had insufficient time to complete it. This may account for the 
responses to this task resulting in a floor effect for consistency in moral reasoning (see 
Chapter 3, Part 3), and consequently the lack of clearly distinguishable patterns in the 
arguments favoured by specific respondents. 
Focus Groups 
In contrast with the questionnaire, which was designed to collect large-scale quantitatl\'e 
data, the focus group discussions provided a forum for investigating, on a small-scale, 
the discussion of lesbian and gay issues in an interactive social context developing and 
extending findings of the more structured questionnaire study. On the whole, these 
provided a rich source of data about how people talk about lesbian and gay human 
rights issues, especially focusing on the extent to which participants employed human 
rights reasoning; the range of arguments used to oppose human nights: and the processes 
used to deN-elop reasoning about lesbian and gay issues. In this respect, the focus &Yroup 
study cornplemented and extended the questionnaire study. 
Although most of the groups were forthcoming with discussion. it was 11 
sometimes difficult to get participants talking directly about the issues under 
1 11 1; 
investigation, and the discussions were seldom centred on whether participants- agreed 
or disagreed with a given issue, and why/why not. Instead, participants drew on a wide 
variety of frameworks, often prioritising heterosexual agendas or perspectives (e. (-,. 
pregnancy and contraception; divorce rates). Nevertheless, the focus groups collectively 
produced about 10 hours of interactive discussion about lesbian and gay issues (185 
pages of transcript). In contrast with the questionnaire then, the focus groups provided 
dynamic data where reasoning about and arguments against lesbian and ga,,., hurnan 
rights were being created and recreated in a social context, drawing on culturally 
available repertoires (cf. Potter & Wetherell, 1987). These discussions provided 
information about the types of arguments and processes of reasoning, data not possible 
to collect using more structured, individualistic approaches such as moral dilemma 
tasks. 
The focus group discussions did, however, raise some issues which could be 
investigated more specifically in a follow-up study, or in other contexts and settings. 
For example, in the context of the present study, people's understandings of human 
fights was barely touched, yet this is a major issue for thinking about creating social 
change: if people do not understand human rights, it is difficult to expect them to 
support them, whether in relation to lesbian and gay issues or not. The applied literature 
could therefore explore strategies for motivating political action and enhancing support 
for human rights. The relationship between human fights and discrimination on a basis 
of sex, culture, or disability could also be explored. 
Like the questionnaire study, the recruitment of focus group participants failed 
to produce a sample of students from diverse social and ethnic backgrounds, and 
therefore the discussions did not produce the full diversity of perspectives and 
viewpoints (i. e. cross-cultural and religious perspectives; strongly anti-lesbian/gay 
views) that one would have hoped for. Largely, this is due to the composition of the 
student-intake of the Department of Social Sciences at Loughborough University 
(around which I focused my recruitment efforts), which almost exclusively comprises 
white, middle-class women. Since a self-selected, non-random sample, ýN, as employed 
for this study, the views presented were perhaps more pro-lesbian/gay rights than might 
be expected frorn a more representative sample. Nevertheless, the discussions did yield 
a range of issues and considerations used against lesbian and gay human rights. 
The 'problem' of undertaking research on lesbian and ga\, issues when N, ou are 
yourself lesbian or gay inay also have contributed to recruitment issues. Despite the 
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'liberal' ethos of a university context, the potential for hostilitý- and violence toXN ýIrds 
lesbians and gay men on campus caused me carefully to monitor my recruitment 
procedures, thus perhaps not accessing those students who might be more likely to 
oppose lesbian and gay human rights. For example, it is likely that I would have had a 
better chance of recruiting participants from the Christian Organisations on campus had 
I turned up to their meetings in person, rather than attempting to recruit by e-mail or 
letter. Likewise, I could have solicited students by negotiating (through the appropriate 
channels) access to students in Halls of Residence or social venues on campus. 
However, I was not willing to put myself in a position where (outside of the research 
context itself) I would be opening myself to the possibility of harassment or abuse on 
account of my research topic. Therefore, for my own personal safety I actively chose to 
access the wider student population through third parties and written communications, 
at the possible expense of recruiting a sample with more diverse views. 
Whilst the focus group sample may not (necessarily) be representative of the 
views of the student population as a whole, the research findings reported in this thesis 
are no less reflective of the views and perspectives which exist among students., and 
indeed in wider society. What they represent is a series of snapshots of the views 'out 
there', which are insightful for moving forward in thinking about and working towards 
positive social change. 
Textual Analysis 
In contrast with the focus group sample, the textual analysis involved an analysis of 
existing written transcripts of parliamentary debates and newspaper reports, rather than 
a self-selected sample. As pre-existing data, the reports were not produced for the 
present study, and therefore the 'participants' (MPs and members of the public) were 
producing reasoning about lesbian and gay issues (in this case the Age of Consent) in a 
real-life context (a parliamentary debate), rather than for the present project. As a result 
of these two features of the data, a 'real-life' presentation of arguments for and a(,, ainst 
lesbian and gay hurnan rights was given than was the case for the focus group data 
where there \N, as more of a temptation for participants to produce responses which 
conformed to an anti -di scrimination norm (Maison, 1995), or that con\*inced me (a. " 
moderator) that they \N-cre not prejudiced. The textual analysis therefore enabled a more 
detailcd analysis of arguments against lesbian and gay human rights than \N-as possible 
using the focus group data, and facilitated the exploration of some poss ble I ways of 
countering these arguments. 
On the other hand, there are some limitations to the textual data. First. as data 
produced in a formal context, for the most part, it was not interactiN'C data. So, although 
the data complemented that collected in the focus groups. it did not enable an analysis 
of people's own views and how these shift within that context. It could also be argued 
that this data is distorted, in the sense that it is structured in a 'debate' format, 
emphasising extreme viewpoints, and in the case of letters to newspaper editors. is 
necessarily going to be biased towards those with strongly negatiNýe views. Howevel-, 
whilst this is essentially true, it is this feature of the data which made it an ideal source 
within which to explore opposition to lesbian and gay human rights. In particular, 
because the argument for an equal Age of Consent for gay men has always been one of 
equality based on human rights, the debates were initiated from a human rights 
standpoint, and therefore were clearly structured in such a way as to see other 
arguments for and against human rights. 
With regard to the employment of a case study, one of the main limitations is 
that we don't know the extent to which the arguments used to oppose lesbian and gay 
human rights (in this case in relation to the age of consent) map onto the arguments 
used against other human rights issues, nor the extent to which these arguments are 
constant across time and context. For example, the questionnaire findings (Chapter 3) 
showed differing levels of support for different issues, and the focus group study 
(Chapter 4) showed that the types of arguments used to (potentially) limit the extension 
of specific rights to lesbians and gay men varied from issue to issue. Consequently, the 
extent to which the findings of the case study (Chapter 5) can be generalised to other 
lesbian and gay human rights issues is uncertain. Nevertheless, the textual analysis 
gives a starting point from which to begin thinking about how opposition to lesbian and 
gay human rights might be challenged. 
As highlighted in this section on methodology, each method employed in this thesis has 
its strengths and its weaknesses. However, the use of a multi-method approach for this 
thesis was effective in that each method contributed a different perspect1% C to the 
multifarious picture of attitudes towards and reasoning about lesbian and gay human 
rights issues. 
1) 1 2'8 
Epilogue 
Placing lesbian and gay issues within an international human rights framework. and 
exploring people's support and reasoning about these issues, draws attention to the 
extent of the problem of prejudice against lesbians and gay men. However, it also 
highlights the need for human rights legislation and societal structures which frame (and 
monitor) its implementation, to work more effectively on behalf of lesbians and gay 
men. 
During the period in which I have planned, researched, and written this thesis, 
lesbian and gay issues have received an unprecedented amount of attention and real 
social change in British (and international) politics. The success of some moves to 
achieve recognition of the rights of lesbians and gay men (e. g. the lifting of the ban on 
gays in the British military; the removal of Section 28 from Scottish law-, the 
equalisation of the age of consent), and the failure of others (e. g. the removal of Section 
28 in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland), suggests that research such as this - 
exploring support and reasoning, with a view to how we might best effect positive 
social change - is both timely and necessary for understanding the arguments and 
processes which promote and/or inhibit social change in relation to lesbian and gay 
human rights. 
The findings of this thesis suggest a dialogical relationship between structural 
and social change, highlighting the need for lesbians and gay men to be recognised (and 
explicitly included) in education and in human rights legislation as a catalyst for attitude 
change. On October 2,2000 - whilst I was writing up this thesis - The Human Rights 
Act (2000) came into effect in UK law; on November 30, the invocation of the 
Parliament Act finally saw the Age of Consent equalised (AIUK, 2000), - and in 
December The Netherlands became the first country to legalise same-sex marriage with 
the full rights of heterosexual marriage ("Dutch Senate... ", 2001). We are therefore 
4-4-poised on the edge of social change" (Mason, 1997, p. 5). The UK Human Right,,, -\Ct 
incorporates a set of rights which all citizens are entitled to (rights which closely mirror 
those rights in the Universal Declaration), and specifically rules out discrimination 
against individuals on grounds of sexual orientation (MacErlean. 2000). In the long 
tcrm, this lcoislation will make it possible for structural changes to be more easily 
implemented in that indkýidual rights issues are now encompassed by an over-arching 
piece of legislation. Consequently, i is now pos in ination auainst t* sible to fight disc ck 
lesbians and gay men as human rights violations. which was not possible to the same 
extent until now. Instead of having to take human rights violations to the European 
courts, cases of human rights violation against lesbians and gay men are nox, ý- legally 
protected in domestic law. 
However, the challenge for policy-makers will be to ensure that this legislation 
is implemented in such a way as to be inclusive of all people, including lesbians and gay 
men. The present thesis is important because it goes some way towards highlighting the 
key areas where there is still resistance to lesbian and gay human fights, and examining 
the basis for this resistance, and therefore goes a small way to understanding the process 
social change. Politicians and policy-makers will need to ensure that the more 
contentious issues (especially social issues) are given specific attention., to ensure that in 
practice the full range of human fights are afforded lesbians and gay men, and indeed all 
people in the future. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire & Scoring Keý 
Lesbian and Gay Rights Questionnaire 
I would be very grateful if you could spare the time to complete this anonymous questionnaire. 
The questionnaire has been designed to ask your views about issues relating to lesbian and 
gay rights, and is for a doctoral research thesis on lesbian and gay issues. There are four 
sections. Please complete all four. Thank you! - Sonja Ellis, Dept of Social Sciences, 
Loughborough University. 
Section A: Attitudes towards Lesbianism 
and Gay Male Homosexuality 
Below is a list of statements about lesbians and gay men. Please indicate the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with each of them by ticking the box which most closely represents 
your own personal view. (Be sure to tick one box only for each statement). 
1. There is never a situation in which 
someone's homosexuality should be a 
cause for job discrimination. 
2. Just as in other species, male 
homosexuality is a natural expression of 
sexuality in human men. 
3. Lesbians and gay men should not have 
the right to flaunt their sexuality in public 
at marches and demonstrations. 
4. Lesbians and gay men should not be 
fined or arrested for engaging in 
consenting sexual acts of whatever 
nature (e. g. anal intercourse or 
sadomasochism) in the privacy of their 
own homes. 
5. Children should be taught respect for 
the rights of lesbians and gay men. 
6. Lesbians just can't fit into our society. 
7. The partner of a lesbian or gay male 
employee should be entitled to the same 
spousal benefits (e. g. parental leave, 
insurance cover, travel benefits, pension 
rights, etc) as a married or defacto 
partner of a heterosexual employee. 
8. Lesbians and gay men should only be 
allowed to express their views as long as 
they don't offend or upset the majority. 
Strongly Agree Unsure Disagree Strongly 
agree neutral disagree 
Li L) LI LI 
u La iuj 
Li j LA LA LA 
ca Ll j li -i 
Ll Ll Li Li 
u Ll Ll 
j 
-j 
j 
-j 
J 
I 
Strongly Agree U ns ure Disagree Strongly 
agree neutral disagree 
9. Female homosexuality in itself is no -J -J -J 
problem, but what society makes of it can 
be a problem. 
10. No one, in any country of the world -J -J 
should be arrested, detained, or exiled 
simply for being lesbian or gay. 
11.1 think male homosexuals are Ll JU -J -J disgusting. 
12. A country should have the right to -J 
impose the death penalty on lesbians and 
gay men if that is consistent with that 
culture's values and beliefs. 
13. Books promoting lesbianism and gay L) LJ J -J 
male homosexuality as a positive lifestyle 
should be freely available in school 
libraries. 
14. The age at which male homosexual L) J 
sex is considered legal should be the 
same as that for heterosexual sex. 
15. All employers should strive to develop U L) JJJ 
just and favourable conditions in the 
workplace for lesbians and gay men. 
16. Lesbians are sick. JU L) -J 
17. The partner of a lesbian or gay man Ll J L) L) J 
should be entitled to the same 
immigration rights (e. g. permanent 
resident status or citizenship) as is a 
partner of a heterosexual man or woman. 
18. A person's sexual orientation should J L) 
not block that person's access to basic 
rights and freedoms. 
19. Male homosexuality is a perversion. J 
20. If it is discovered that a primary J L) -J 
school teacher is lesbian or gay, she/he 
should not be allowed to continue 
teaching. 
21. Lesbian and gay male couples should J -J 
be legally permitted to marry, just as 
heterosexual couples are. 
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22. For the most part, policies which 
guarantee equal rights to lesbians and 
gay men in such matters as jobs and 
housing damage society's moral 
standards. 
23. Male homosexuality is merely a 
different kind of lifestyle that should not 
be condemned. 
24. It should be acceptable for lesbian 
and gay male couples openly to express 
their affection for their partners in public 
without fear of harassment or violence. 
25. It is okay for a newspaper or 
organisation to publicise that a person is 
lesbian or gay without that person's 
permission. 
26. All university modules in fields such 
as social psychology, education, history, 
English literature, and health studies 
should explicitly include lesbian and gay 
male perspectives. 
27. A man's homosexuality or a woman's 
lesbianism should not be raised as an 
issue in a court of law, unless the case 
under consideration directly relates to 
homosexual acts. 
28. Society has a right to prevent lesbians 
and gay men who want to speak in 
schools from actively promoting 
homosexuality as equivalent to 
heterosexuality. 
29. Female homosexuality is a sin. 
30. Lesbianism and male homosexuality 
should be listed in policies, legislation and 
treaties as protected from discrimination, 
in the same way that race, class, sex, and 
religion are. 
31. Just like people persecuted for their 
religious and political beliefs, lesbians 
and gay men should be granted asylum in 
another country when homosexuality is 
persecuted in their own. 
Strongly A2ree Unsure Disagree Stronilv 
agree neutral disagree 
JJ -i -i -i 
j Ll Ll Li i 
u Li Li Ll j 
Li Li L) j -1 
Ll Ll Ll 
j L) j 
1: 1 ujJ ý-j 
-1 S) , 
32. State laws regulating private, 
consenting lesbian behaviour should be 
loosened. 
33. It is not appropriate for lesbians and 
gay men to serve in the armed forces. 
34. Lesbian and gay couples should have 
all the same parenting rights as 
heterosexuals do (e. g. adoption, 
fostering, and access to fertility services). 
35. Homosexual behaviour between two 
men is just plain wrong. 
Strongly Agree Unsure Disagree '-, tronfly 
agree neutral disagree 
-i j -i -i -j 
J J J 
J J J -J 
li jJ -i J 
Section B: Your Position on Lesbian and Gay Rights 
1. If lesbians or gay men are treated unjustly in our society, do you feel it is your personal 
responsibility to help create positive changes? 
Most Possibly Unsure/ Not Definitely 
definitely neutral usually not 
U J J U 
r-it:: dbt:, - tl)kpldlll yuul lubpullbtl Ilulu 
2. How willing would you be to join others in their efforts to ensure that lesbian and gay rights 
are respected? 
Extremely Willing Unsure/ Unwilling Extremely 
willing neutral unwilling 
L) jjjJ 
Please explain your response nere 
Section C: Moral Dilemmas 
In this section of the questionnaire you are asked to read two stories, and to decide in each 
case whether you tend to agree or disagree with the actions of the students (in the first story) 
and Mr. Webster (in the second story). You are then asked to indicate how acceptable or 
unacceptable you find each of the arguments for and against the actions of the students and 
Mr Webster, by ticking one of the boxes to the right of each statement. 
"84 
STORY 1: STUDENT TAKE-OVER 
At Anytown University a group of students, called the Students for Lesbian and Gay Rights 
(SLGR), believe that the university should have a lesbian and gay issues awareness 
programme. SLGR students are against harassment and discrimination against lesbians and 
gay men, and want a programme to be created to educate staff and students about lesbian and 
gay issues. The SLGR students demanded that Anytown University should institute this 
programme as an official university course. This would mean that Anytown students could take 
lesbian and gay issues awareness training as part of their regular course work, and get credit 
for it towards their degrees. 
Agreeing with the SLGR students, the lecturers at Anytown agreed to implement the 
programme as a university course. But the Vice Chancellor of the university stated that he didn't 
want the programme on campus as a course. The SLGR students felt that the Vice Chancellor 
was not going to pay attention to the faculty vote or to their demands. 
So, one day last April, two hundred SLGR students walked into the university's 
administration building, and told everyone else to get out. They said they were doing this to 
force Anytown University to institute the lesbian and gay issues awareness programme as a 
course. 
Do you tend to agree or disagree with the students' behaviour? disagree agree 
-3 -2 -1 0123 
How acceptable do you find the following arguments in favour of the students' behaviour? 
Suppose someone argued they were right ... I find the argument... 
completely completely 
unacceptable acceptable 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
1 because they weren't breaking any rules by doing it . ........... 2 because they were restoring the equal opportunities policy 
which had been agreed to by the university . ........................... 3 because most students would approve of their action and 
many of them would be happy about it . ................................... 4 because equality for all counts more than any other 
consideration. 
5 because the Vice-Chancellor had committed an injustice 
first, the students were justified in acting the way they did. 
6 because the students saw no legal means of revealing the 
Vice-Chancellor's misuse of authority . .................................... 
How acceptable do you find the following arguments agains the students' behaviour? Suppose 
someone argued they were wrong... 
I find the argument... 
completely completely 
unacceptable acceptable 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
7 because law and order in society would be endangered if 
everyone acted as the students did . ..................................... 
8 because when no universally valid principles justify doing 
so, it is wrong to violate such a basic right as the right of 
property ownership and to take the law into their own hands. 
9 because it is unwise to risk being expelled from university 
because of other people . .................................................... 
10 because the students didn't exhaust the legal channels at 
their disposal and in their haste committed a serious violation 
of the law. 
11 because one does not take over a building if one wants to 
be considered a decent and honest person . ........................... 
12 because they could get themselves into a lot of trouble, 
maybe even expelled from university . ..................................... 
STORY 2: WEBSTER 
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a petrol station. He wanted to hire another 
mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The only person he found who 
seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Smith, but he was 'out'as gay. While Mr. Webster 
himself didn't have anything against lesbians and gay men, he was afraid to hire Mr. Smith 
because many of his customers didn't like lesbians and gay men. His customers might take 
their business elsewhere if Mr. Smith was working at the petrol station. 
When Mr. Smith asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that he 
had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody, because he 
could not find anybody who was a good mechanic besides Mr. Smith. 
Do you tend to agree or disagree with Mr. Webster's behaviour? disagree agree 
-3 -2 -1 0123 
How acceptable do you find the following arguments in favour of Mr Webster's behaviour? 
Suppose someone argued he was right... 
1 because Mr Webster had to act according to his 
I find the argument... 
completely completely 
unacceptable acceptable 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
conscience. 
2 because a majority of people in Mr Webster's society feel 
the same way as his customers . ........................................ 3 because he must do what is in the best interests of his 
business by paying attention to his customers' wishes . ....... 4 because Mr Webster would open himself to the possibility 
of damage to his property from anti-gay behaviour . ........... 5 because the law does not state explicitly that employers 
should not discriminate on a basis of sexual orientation. 
6 because he means nothing personal in refusing Mr Smith 
the job . ................................................................................ 
How acceptable do you find the following arguments agains Mr Webster's behaviour? Suppose 
someone argued he was wrong... 
I find the argument... 
completely completely 
unacceptable acceptable 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
because he should show compassion for Mr Smith, 
knowing how badly he needs the job . ................................ 
8 because most people would agree that it is wrong to act 
out of prejudice . .................................................................. 
9 because upholding an individual's equal right to 
employment is more important than any legal or business 
considerations . ......... 
10 because Mr Webster might expose himself to retribution 
from the gay community . ................................... 
11 because hiring a good mechanic is in the best interests 
of his business . ..................................................................... 
12 because the law is meant to protect people from 
discrimination in employment . ............................................ 
-', 
S () 
Section D: Some Information About You 
It would be very helpful if you could provide me with the following information- 
1/ Sex 
r--ý Male 
2/ Age 
[--] under 18 
= Femaie 
= 18-21 
3/ Ethnic Origin (please tick one box) 
White 
Black-African 
Black - Caribbean 
Black other (please specify) 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Chinese 
Asian other (please specify) 
other (please specify) 
4/ Sexuality 
F7 22-25 = over 25 
Which of the following most closely describes you? 
Heterosexual 
Lesbian 
Gay male 
Bisexual (male or female) 
Transgendered 
Unsure 
Other (please specify) ................................................................. 
5/ Disability status 
Do you consider yourself to have a disability? 
F--1 Yes = No 
6/ Religious affiliation 
Christian 
Muslim 
Jewish 
Sikh 
Other religion (please specify) 
No religious faith or affiliation 
7/ Are you a member of a movement or organisation concerned with promoting human rights? 
2S7 
= Yes No 
If yes, which one? 
8/ What is your occupation? 
If you are a student, please complete the following: 
Are you Full-time Part-time 
Are you an Undergraduate Postgraduate 
If you are an undergraduat lease indicate your year of study: 
First Second Third Other 
What is the main subiect vou are studvina for vour deciree/course? 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
If you have any questions or would like to discuss this further please contact: 
Ms Sonja J. Ellis 
Dept of Social Sciences 
Loughborough University 
Loughborough 
Leics LE1 1 3TU. 
Phone: 01509 - 228871 
E-mail: S. J. Ellis@lboro. ac. uk 
or my supervisors Sue Wilkinson (S. Wilkinson@lboro. ac. uk) Phone: 01509 - 223364 
CelialKitzinger (C. C. Kitzinger@lboro. ac. uk) Phone: 01509-223678 
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Scoring Key for Questionnaire 
Section A: Views and Opinions on Lesbianism and Male Homosexuality 
Strongly Agree 1 
Agree 2 
Unsure/neutral 3 
Disagree 4 
Strongly Disagree 5 
Reversed scored items = 3,6,8,11,12,16,19,20,22,25,28,29,33,35. 
Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gay Men (ATLG; Herek, 1984) Scale Items = 2,6,9,11,16, 
19,23,29,32,35. 
To score for endorsement of lesbian and qay human riqhts: Add points for all items excluding 
those for the ATLG scale (listed above). Possible scores range from 25 to 125, low scores 
indicating greater support for lesbian and gay human rights, high scores indicating lack of 
support for lesbian and gay human rights. 
To score the ATLG scale (short form): Add points for the items of ATLG (listed above). Total 
scores range from 10 (extremely positive attitudes) to 50 (extremely negative attitudes) . 
See 
Herek (1994)1 for reliability and validity information. 
Section B: Position in Relation to Lesbian and Gay Rights 
Question 1 Question 2 Score 
Most definitely Extremely willing 1 
Possibly Willing 2 
Unsure/neutral Unsure/neutral 3 
Not usually Unwilling 4 
Definitely not Extremely unwilling 5 
Section C: Moral Reasoning 
As per numbers in questionnaire (4 through 4). 
Section D: Demographic Information 
Q1 Sex 1 male 
2 female 
Q2 Age 1 under 18 
2 18-21 
3 22-25 
4 over 25 
1 Herek, G. M. (1994). Assessing heterosexuals' attitudes towards lesbians and gay men: A 
review of empirical research with the ALTG scale. In B. Greene & G. M. Herek (Eds. ). 
Psychological perspectives on lesbian and gay issues, Vol. 1. Lesbian and gay psychology. 
Theory, research, and clinical applications (pp. 206-228). Thousand Oaks, CA- Sage. 
Q3 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
Q7 
Q8 
Ethnicity 1 white 
2 black (e. g. African; Caribbean; other) 
3 Asian (e. g. Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; Chinese) 
4 other 
Sexuality 1 heterosexual 
2 lesbian 
3 gay male 
4 bisexual 
5 transgendered 
6 unsure 
7 other 
Disability 1 yes 
2 no 
Religious 1 Christian 
affiliation 2 Muslim 
3 Jewish 
4 Sikh 
5 other 
6 no religious faith or affiliation 
Human Rights 1 yes 
member 2 no 
Occupation 1 Student (full-time) 
2 Teaching (e. g. lecturer; teacher; nurse) 
3 Caring professions 
4 Business/consultancy 
5 Admin/sales 
6 Service 
7 Homemaker/volunteer worker 
8 Other 
Student status 11 full-time 
2 part-time 
Student status 21 
2 
year of study 0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
main subject 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
99 
undergraduate 
postgraduate 
not applicable 
first 
second 
third 
other 
Psychology (incl. Neuroscience; Health Science) 
Social Sciences (e. g. Sociology; Media, Politics) 
Humanities (e. g. English Lit; European Studies) 
Business 
Math s/Scie nce/Co m puter Science 
Education* (incl. Conductive Ed) 
Art/Design/Drama 
Law* 
Geography 
PE/Sports Science 
Psychology + Criminology 
Psychology + Social Science 
Psychology + Humanities 
Psychology + HRM 
Missing 
* incl. conjoint Psychology and Social Science/ Hum anities 
-19() 
Scorina Lind's MJT 
pro con pro con Ix 
Stage 1 -1 -4 -2 -3 -10 100 Stage 2 -2 -4 -3 -4 -13 169 Stage 31 -4 1 -4 -6 36 
Stage 42 -2 0 -2 -2 4 
Stage 5423 -1 8 64 
Stage 6334 -1 9 81 
7 -9 3 -15 454 
SSmean = Add all item scores, square the sum, and divide by 24. 
SSdev Square each item score and add up. 
SStotal Subtract SSdev from SSmean. 
SSstage = Add the 4 item scores for each stage (Y-x), and square th ((,: X)2) e sum Add the six 
squared sums and divide the result by 4 (unadjusted stage sum of squares). Subtract SSmean from 
this figure to give the adjusted score. 
r2 (coefficient of determination) = SSstage/SStotal 
C=r2x 100 
For the above example - 
SSmean = 8.2 
SSdev 186 
SStotal 177.8 
SSstage = 105.3 (or 454/4 - 8.2) 
r2 =105.3/177.8 
C= (105.3/177.8) x 100 = 59.0 
-1 -4 -2 -3 
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Appendix B: Breakdown of Returned Questionnaires by Institution 
University Total completed 
questionnaires 
The University of Kent at Canterbury 30 
The University of East London 27 
South Bank University, London 17 
Birkbeck College, the University of London 32 
The University of the West of England 26 
The University of Luton 98 
Nene University College Northampton 53 
Loughborough University 134 
Nottingham Trent University 18 
The University of Staffordshire 37 
Keele University 78 
The University of Dundee 24 
The University of Ulster at Coleraine 51 
Unsure (returned individually, no postmark) 2 
Total 6 
29-, 
Appendix C: Factor Analysis (Rotated) for SLGHR 
Component 
23 
Q34 Parenting rights . 778 . 189 
6.268E-02 
Q13 Books in school libraries . 712 . 340 -2.576E-02 Q21 Same-sex marriage . 683 . 397 
2.648E-02 
Q14 Age of consent . 683 . 277 -3.051 
E-02 
Q26 Perspectives in university modules . 653 2.623E-03 . 
384 
Q28 Speaking in schools . 644 . 346 -5.068E-02 Q24 Affection in public . 641 . 530 -8.866E-02 Q7 Partner benefits 
. 598 . 403 . 
157 
Q17 Immigration 
. 598 . 435 
6.945E-02 
Q31 Asylum 
. 559 . 192 9.169E-02 Q15 Favourable conditions in workplace . 522 . 452 . 
219 
Q5 Teaching respect for rights . 498 . 
479 . 
238 
Q18 Basic rights and freedoms . 237 . 773 . 109 Q10 Arrest, detention, exile . 258 . 738 . 127 Q20 Lesbian/gay teachers in schools . 316 . 577 . 
245 
Q30 Protection in policy . 408 . 571 7.249E-02 Q12 Death penalty . 168 . 541 . 131 Q3 Public marches and demonstrations . 480 . 541 -. 
204 
Q4 Consenting acts in private . 206 . 535 . 178 Q8 Express views opposing the majority . 289 . 511 -. 
397 
Q22 Equal rights policies . 421 . 510 7.468E-02 Q33 Serving in the armed forces . 
430 
. 
457 . 210 Q1 Discrimination at work . 345 . 409 . 366 Q25 Publicising of identity against one's wishes -2.495E-02 . 116 . 662 Q27 Disclosing one's identity in a court of law . 170 . 382 . 500 
-)g-, 
Appendix D: Focus Group Schedule 
Focus Group Schedule: Lesbian and Gay Issues 
First of all, thank you very much for coming. I'm really pleased that you were willing to do 
this, and I hope you will get something out of it too. As you know, we have come together to 
discuss specific lesbian and gay issues. All of you will have different experiences of the 
issues we are going to discuss. Some of you may have had first hand experience of some of 
these through friends and family, others of you might never have thought about them before 
- That doesn't matter. Whatever your views about lesbian and gay issues, they are as 
important as those of anyone else in the group. 
First of all, I am a psychologist researching people's views on lesbian and gay issues - 
Things like same-sex marriages, lesbians and gay men in the military, and the teaching of 
lesbian and gay issues in schools. Some of these things have recently been in the news, but 
I am interested in your opinions on them. At this point, I would like to say that there are no 
right or wrong answers, and what I am particularly interested in is what you think about the 
issues, rather than whether you agree or disagree with them - 
Now I'll just run through today's procedure. What I'm going to do is to pose six or seven 
discussion questions and to ask you as a group to talk about the questions with each other. 
I'll take very little part in the discussion because it's your views that are central, but I might 
just interrupt to ask you to clarify something, or to talk a bit more about something, or if you 
are getting well off the topic to try and bring you back to the main point. The discussion 
should take us about an hour and a half, and we won't be taking a break, so if you want to 
help yourselves to a glass of water or coke, feel free to do that. If you need to go to the loo 
or to pop out for any other reason, please just slip out quietly and slip back in, you don't 
need to ask. 
As you can see from the microphone there, we're going to be tape-recording the discussion, 
because I'd never remember an hour and a half's discussion otherwise, but I want to assure 
you that the tapes are absolutely confidential. Your names are not on the tapes, they will 
only be heard by me and my immediate research team, and they will be destroyed at the end 
of the project. I also want to ask that you regard the discussion that takes place in this room 
as completely confidential. Whilst I hope that you will discuss with others the issues raised in 
this focus group, I ask that you respect the confidentiality of others in the group by not 
repeating in other places what has been shared in this group. 
Just a couple of practical things. In order to get a nice clear recording, it would be helpful if 
you could speak only one at a time. Often if people get going they sort of cut across each 
other but that doesn't record well. Also, the more clearly you speak the better. Second, just a 
reminder that there are no right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree with each 
other about some things, and that's okay - whatever your views are, I want to hear them, 
and please say what you think. However, I ask that you allow others in the group the space 
to speak, giving them the same level of respect that you would expect yourself. 
Before we start, I need you all to sign a consent form, to say that you agree to take part in 
this discussion. Please read it carefully and sign and date both halves of the form. If you 
have any questions, I am happy to answer those now. 
Are there any questions before we get started? 
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Many lesbian and gay couples are afraid of holding hands, hugging, or kissing in 
public, through fear of reprisal. What do you think about this? 
,- Are there any situations in which you think this is not okay? Which ones? 
Why/why not? 
Are there particular types of behaviours that you think are not okay? Which 
ones? Why/Why not? 
What about in front of children? Marches and demonstrations? 
2. What do you think about same-sex marriage? 
Do you think that lesbian and gay couples should be able to get married? 
Why/why not? 
What if they want to make a public affirmation of their love for religious or other 
reasons? 
What if a lesbian or gay man from Britain is in a committed relationship with a 
partner who is not British? 
3. What do you think about lesbian and gay couples parenting children? 
What about if they have children from a previous heterosexual relationship? 
ý- What if a lesbian couple neither of whom had ever had children wanted to have 
their own (biological) child? What if they wanted to use alternative insemination 
services at a medical clinic? 
ýo- What about adopting or fostering a child? Are there some situations when you 
would consider this okay? - What if, say, there was a child who nobody else 
wanted to adopt? 
4. What do you think about lesbian and gay issues being discussed in schools? 
ý- Are there any situations when you would consider that this is not okay? Which 
ones and why/why not? Sex(uality) education? What about in History, or Social 
Studies? In addressing issues of homophobic bullying in the class/school? 
ý. - Did anyone ever mention lesbian and gay issues when you were at school? 
When? In what context? 
What do you think about lesbian and gay guest speakers talking in schools 
about being lesbian or gay? 
What do you think about lesbian and gay perpectives being routinely included in 
the school curriculum? 
Do you think that books presenting lesbianism and male homosexuality as a 
positive lifestyle should be made available in school libraries? Why/why not? 
. P, What about public libraries? 
Has anyone heard of Section 28? Do you know what it is? What do you think its 
effect might be? 
5. It has sometimes been suggested that lesbian and gay perspectives should be 
routinely included in university courses. What do you think about this? 
ý- What about in subjects/modules which are likely to lead to careers as teachers, 
psychologists, counsellors, or social workers? 
6. You may or may not know that there is currently a ban in this country on lesbians 
and gay men serving in the armed forces. The papers say that the government is 
soon to lift this ban. What do you think about this? 
Do you think that there are any jobs which should not be open to lesbians and 
gay men? Teaching? Priesthood? 
What do you think about people losing their jobs, or being fired because they're 
lesbian or gay? 
Did you know that a lesbian or gay employee is not entitled to travel benefits for 
his/her partner, but heterosexual couples are. What do you think about this? Do 
you think that lesbian and gay couples should be entitled to the same benefits as 
heterosexual couples? Why/why not? 
What do you think about people telling jokes, taunting, ostracising, or 
blackmailing lesbians and gay men at work? Are there any situations where you 
think this is okay? Which ones? Why/why not? 
7. You may have heard that the British government is currently attempting to reduce 
the age of consent for sex between men from 18 to 16. What do you think about 
this? 
I 
,, Are there any circumstances under which you think the age of consent for homosexual 
consent should not be 16? 
I *, Do you think that the age of consent for homosexual sex should be the same as that for 
heterosexual sex? Why/why not? 
8. Do you know what asylum is? (if not, explain) In some countries, lesbians and gay 
men are imprisoned, tortured, or even killed simply for being lesbian or gay. What 
do you think about this? 
I- Are there any situations in which you think this is justified? If so, which ones/ If not, 
why not? 
#, What do you think about lesbians and gay men seeking asylum on grounds of their 
sexual orientation? 
9. Have you heard of the phrase'human rights'? Do you have any idea what it 
means? 
. 01 Do you think 
it might be relevant to thinking about lesbian and gay issues? if so, 
how? If not, why not? 
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Appendix E: Consent Form 
PARTICIPATION CONSENT FORM: 
Research Project: Lesbian and Gay Human Rights 
Researcher: Ms Sonja J. Ellis 
Researcher's copy 
The researcher has fully explained this study to me. I have had the opportunity to ask any 
questions and discuss my participation. Any questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
I agree to participate in this research project, and understand that I am free to refrain 
from answering any questions I do not wish to answer, or to withdraw from the study 
completely, up until a week from today. I have been assured that I will not be penalised in 
any way for withholding information or withdrawing from the study, and that nobody other 
than the researcher and her immediate research group will hear the tape. 
I give my permission for extracts from the things I say to be used in the final report and in 
subsequent publications and/or presentations of the results, providing my identity is kept 
confidential. 
Signature: 
Name: 
Date: 
N-1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PARTICIPATION CONSENT FORM: Participant's copy 
Research Project: Lesbian and Gay Human Rights 
Researcher: Ms Sonja J. Ellis 
The researcher has fully explained this study to me. I have had the opportunity to ask any 
questions and discuss my participation. Any questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
I agree to participate in this research project, and understand that I am free to refrain 
from answering any questions I do not wish to answer, or to withdraw from the study 
completely, up until a week from today. I have been assured that I will not be penallsed in 
any way for withholding information or withdrawing from the study, and that nobody other 
than the researcher and her immediate research group will hear the tape. 
I give my permission for extracts from the things I say to be used in the final report and in 
subsequent publications and/or presentations of the results, providing my identity is kept 
confidential. 
Signature: 
Name: 
Date: 
